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Abstract 
In the study of international relations, domestic variables have rather seldom been used to explain 
phenomena on the international level. In comparative politics and historical sociology, explaining 
domestic outcomes have been based upon reductionist concepts of the international system, if this 
level has been addressed at all. In the latter discipline, analysis is often truly sociological, while in 
the former, economic models of action and systems are predominant.  
In contrast, this thesis is a demonstration of the utility of comparing states by using explanatory 
variables from international relations, while at the same time presenting a sociological analysis of 
international institutions.The interplay between international and domestic politics is highlighted, as 
is the interplay between material and ideational incentives for action, since the state is embedded in 
a domestic as well as an international society. By combining the strategic and the habitual reservoir 
of action, interesting perspectives emerge through an empirical analysis of extraterritorial foreign 
policy. Extraterritorial foreign policy is maritime and naval state policies, and these policies were 
shaped by domestic and international factors, just as the policies in turn shaped international 
relations and institutions. It is argued here, that both the interplay between the domestic and 
international, and the combination of strategic and habitual state preferences can be studied by 
applying a typology of states based on ideological principles and degrees of overseas interests. 
From the second half of the 17th century, the international system showed a higher degree of 
hierarchical properties than what often portrayed in neorealism. Therefore, the moulding of 
international institutions was highly dependent upon both preferences and ideational motives on 
behalf of the strongest powers in the international system. For smaller states, the alternatives were 
bandwagoning or sovereignty-seeking behaviour. However, the nature and content of the 
international institutions created structures that could be utilised by all states in the international 
society. It is demonstrated here that the post-war era therefore led to a major upheaval in the 
history of the international system, since it represented more formal equality for all states in a 
system where power was unevenly distributed. In spite of globalization and large-power rivalry, the 
autonomy of smaller states increased: sovereignty was transformed, not eroded. State autonomy 
increased for the majority of states as liberalism increasingly was institutionalised on the 
international level. Nevertheless, the thesis demonstrates that historically, other organizations than 
states have also waged war and used political power at, and from, the sea.  
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1 Introduction-theme and theory 
“Ultimus limes cruce Christi signatus. Non licet ultra ire”. Translated into English, this should 
correspond to the phrase “The outer limit marked by Christ’s cross. Further journeys not allowed”.1 
This information is written on the territory portraying the northern fringe of Norway on an Italian 
map dated 1467. Borders, frontiers, cleavages and distinctions are essentials of politics and social 
life, including the community of social scientists. One can only hope to be forgiven for crossing the 
disciplinary borders of the ever more divided and specialised field labelled social science. And yet, 
crossing some bridges might also yield new and interesting perspectives to enduring themes in social 
science. I do so in the firm belief that the present analysis deals with a specific theme and with 
empirical data that have been neglected by political scientists and sociologists. The method and 
approach applied here makes the present thesis belong to the realm of comparative politics. While 
this field of study shares unclear boundaries with sociology, history and some approaches in 
international relations, comparative politics as conceived here lies in the borderline between history 
and sociology. It is a field literally defined by its method,2 but its true distinctiveness lies in the fact 
that it both tries to study societies and institutions as entities through an ideographic approach, and 
on the basis of this empirical analysis seeks to contribute to attempts of creating "nomothetic" social 
theory. In other words, the view here is that “nomothetic theory can only be constructed as a 
pyramid of ideal-types on the basis of locally valid ideographic statements”.3 This requires a close 
analysis of the stated covered here. The essence of the following challenge is to carve out such ideal 
types and interpret them in a meaningful way for one field of world politics. I intend to combine 
those ideal types in an analytical model where state preferences and principles are combined4, where 
the international system is seen as constituted by both ideas and material factors, and where the 
principles of the states that occupy the highest positions in the international hierarchy especially 
shape international relations, and thus the enabling and restricting structures that all states must take 
into account in foreign policy decision-making. The first - and mainly ideographic- purpose of this 
thesis is to analyse how a group of states have used their agents at sea to define, consolidate, 
                                                 
1 Ræstad, 1912: 152 
2 The case-oriented strategy, or the small-n approach, in comparative politics has sometimes been called The 
comparative method. See Smelser, 1973, Ragin, 1983, Skocpol, 1979. Such approaches seem to fall between two 
stools in some respect. On one side, historians and other specialists on one country or region (or city for that matter), 
often criticizes a study of more units as being too inaccurate. As Skocpol has argued, however, the demand that all 
sources in social science should be primary sources would render such comparative studies impossible. On the other 
hand, advocates of statistical analysis at times have argued that the potential for generalisations and contributiuon to 
nomothethic theory in small-n studies is too small. All in all, the continuum between detailed case studies and 
universalising social theory involves different conceptions of how social and human sciences can be carried out. We 
will repeatedly return to this later in chapter 1. See Gerring, 2004 for a useful overview. 
3 Bakka, 1998: 5.  
4 John M. Hobson has strongly argued in favour of such an approach (Hobson, 1997: chapter 1 and ibid: 221) 
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transcend and dispute borders and demarcations of areas beyond their territorial base or motherland, 
activities that have been produced from both ideational and material interests. Needless to say, this 
kind of activity raised both questions of international cooperation and conflict, as well as domestic 
debates on identity and interests.5 Thus, the ideographic part of the exercise is not so much aimed at 
describing the praxis of maritime policies, as it is to see this praxis as embedded in the habitus of 
foreign policy. In this way, the praxis of maritime politics is seen as a particular quality of foreign 
policy and an indicator of the level of institutionalization of world politics. This activity is here 
divided into two phenomena.  
Firstly, extraterritorial sovereignty6 is the claims to de jure state annexation or occupation of new 
territories and oceans, often at the expense of other units. This represents a political ambition, often 
inspired by ideological arguments. I will argue that no single source of social power was 
predominant a priori in time and space as a source of motivation for extraterritorial ambitions. Thus, 
mono-causal theories of imperialism will be disputed throughout the thesis, as will approaches in 
which single sources of social power are given primacy. 
Secondly, the actual exercise of extraterritorial sovereignty was carried out by various, but 
increasingly homogenous institutions. The state agent that I hold to be the chief instrument in this 
process is the navy. However, the dividing line between state agents and non-state actors has at 
times been blurred.7 I label all these types, governmental or not, of agents as means (or institutions) 
of extraterritorial violence.  The means and praxis8 of extraterritorial violence constitute the 
                                                 
5 Hobson, 1997 is one of the most promising recent attempts at combining historical sociology and IR in a way that 
offers new nomothetic findings for IR. 
6 For a discussion of concepts of the state in competition with ideologies of Empire, see Armitage, 2000, Skinner, 
1978, Tully, 1995. A principle reason why, with the exception of the dependencia-school and world-systems 
analysis, extraterritorial sovereignty has been less analysed, perhaps lies in the foundation of political thought itself. 
As Armitage (2000: 3-4), reminds us, political thought is ”…by definition the history of the polis, the self-contained, 
firmly bounded, sovereign and integrated community that preceded and sometimes shadowed the history of empire. 
For this reason, The British Empire has not been an actor in the history of political thought, any more than political 
thought has generally been hospitable to considering the ideologies of empire”. 
7 In this respect the ideographic analysis of extraterritorial violence is a particularly interesting contribution to a 
nomothetic theory of the modern state. I will argue that the institutionalisation of violence at sea to a high degree 
parallells the strengthening of state apparatuses. The clashes between states in the industrial age to a considerable 
degree were fought as naval arms races and battles that in turn increased the perceived need to create international 
instiutions that sought to regulate extraterritorial sovereignty.  
8 The central motivation behing applying a praxis approach here lies in my assumption that the empirical analysis is 
the most important task of social science in the sense that empirical work both evaluates existing theories as well as 
produces the raw material on which to revise, expand and replace existing theory. Theory and methodology are both 
a group of tools to enhance the empirical analysis, not the other way around. Moreover, I find the use of this type of 
analysis as particularly intriguing when applied to comparative politics and international relations-themes in the 
longue duree. Praxises of war and diplomacy appear throughout the last millennium, in changing forms, in different 
contexts, but always observeable. While some scholars probably will see praxis-analysis within social science as 
somewhat “radical” (mainly, one might suppose, because it is somewhat novel in CP and IR), I will argue to the 
contrary.My position here is one of rather extreme positivism. I see constructivism in CP and IR in much the same 
light; it is a positivist approach to empirical analysis that builds on scientific realism. In this view, a praxis or 
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secondary and institutional part of the ideographic analysis. Extraterritorial violence is the 
application of physical force at sea and in the littoral of overseas territories.9  
This phenomenon is seldom addressed in political science. As Robert Jervis once remarked, among 
social scientists, “it is a common-place that navies are even more hide-bound than most 
bureaucracies”.10  At the time of writing, new exotic naval concepts as that of sea basing (whereby a 
huge mobile, fleet is used as the base for military strikes and thus renders territorial bases obsolete) 
are being investigated. According to the US Navy, the concept of sea basing “revolutionizes the 
projection, protection and sustainment of sovereign war fighting capabilities around the world”11, 
presumably by using ships as the base for both sailors, aviation crews and ground forces.  
Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the states covered here all contained particular configurations 
of thought on how and why extraterritorial violence should be applied. This was their ideology of 
extraterritorial violence. Even among the major economies of the world, we have found eras where 
these states (The US 1866-1889) had restricted extraterritorial ambitions. In contrast, even 
continental states and relatively small island states at times sought to become world powers through 
building first-rank navies from scratch (Imperial Germany 1893-1914 illustrates the former, Imperial 
Japan 1880-1941 the latter). These empirical issues have important bearings on nomothetic macro 
theory in international relations and comparative politics alike. The empirical variation of this 
phenomenon cannot be explained by Marxist theories that treat states as part of superstructures, or 
by theories from international relations that treat states as synonymous to firms in a perfect market. 
Thus, a potential nomothetic contribution to IR from this thesis is  analysing the international system 
through the model of an international hierarchy, rather than anarchy, of states, and how this 
                                                                                                                                                             
constructivist approach is not radical in any sense of the word. In the words of John Searle (1995:228, italics added 
by me) :"From dollar bills to cathedrals, and from football games to nation-states, we are constantly encountering 
new social facts where the facts exceed the physical features of the underlying physical reality". Moreover, the 
notion of states as actors with a certain identity implies that collective intentionality exists. Again, this rests on the 
philosophy of Searle (ibid: 25, 26) who states that collective intentionality does not require “the idea that there 
exists some Hegelian world spirit, collective consciousness, or something equally implausible”. Rather, collective 
intentionality is intersubjective belief. Searle also constructs a central epistemological argument concerning ideas 
and physical reality that is a foundation for this thesis: “social facts in general, and institutional facts especially, are 
hierarchically structured. Institutional facts exist, so to speak, on top of brute physical facts” (ibid: 35) and “for 
social facts, the attitude that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of the phenomenon” (ibid: 33). 
9 One might question why the candidate has not chosen the term”Sea Power” for the present analysis. As will 
become evident in the empirical chapters, however, sea power is a more ideologically laden and normative term. 
The colonialist A. Mahan, who in practise founded sea power as a field of study, was an emminent theoretician on 
sea power at the tactical level, but probably failed to grasp the dynamics of an international political system in the 
20th century.    
10 Jervis, 1995: 47 
11 ”Naval Transformation Roadmap”, Secretary of the Navy 2003: 24. At the time of writing, the costs of such a 
project are uncertain. The CVN/CVNX carriers alone, however, are estimated at a total of 120 Billion dollars, the 
DDX destroyers some 75 Billion dollars, while the costs of the new Maritime Prepositioning Force of cargo ships 
remain an unknown factor in the equation. 
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hierarchy allowed the strongest state influence the international system on the merits of their 
national ideology through extraterritorial ambitions. In other words, principles as well as material 
interests are seen as vital contributions to foreign policy and the making of international institutions. 
As Peter Katzenstein has reminded us, "Collective expectations can have strong causal effects"12, 
and collective expectations are not always based on purely material utility-maximizing.  Neither 
factor should be given primacy a priori. If power is distributed by means of a hierarchy –or even 
through hegemony- then the ideology and preferences of the stronger state will contribute to the 
shaping of international institutions. On the question of state formation and nation-building13, the 
thesis will not seek to turn the theories of IR and CP on the head. However, I will apply 
contributions from both by attempting to analyse the following related questions; 
 
• To what degree did was preparation for an execution of war at sea a peculiar praxis of 
foreign policy? 
• In what ways were the states analysed here different actors in international maritime politics 
beyond varying material capabilities? Were these differences of such magnitude that they 
produced different foreign policy habitus14 or dispositions to act? 
                                                 
12 Katzenstein, 1996:7. As John Lewis Gaddis (1992/93:55) justly claimed in opposition to mechanic theories of 
international relations, international relations are created by “conscious entities capable of reacting to, and often 
modifying, the variables and conditions they encounter. They can at times see the future taking shape; they can 
devise, within limits, measures to hasten, retard or even reverse trends. If molecules had minds of their own, 
chemists would be much less successful in predicting their behaviour. It is no wonder that the effort to devise a 
“molecular” approach to the study of politics did not work out…The simple persistence of values in politics ought to 
be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more complicated than billiard balls”. 
13 The term state formation is used as synonymous to state building in the thesis. The term state-and nation-building 
is referring to the formation of the nation-state or the state-nation. The theoretical position on these processes is the 
same as in Rokkan, 1993, and Mann 1993.  
14 The use of habitus in the social sciences has been an object of much debate. The point of departure here is the 
importance of habit in social action. Charles Camic (1986:1044) defined habit as "a more or less self-actuating 
disposition or tendency to engage in a previously adopted or acquired form of action". In this thesis, habitus means a 
broad disposition and character that guides the behaviour of a collective actor (Camic calls this a "stable inner core" 
of the actor. In our terminology, it means a national equilibrium of identity within state borders that serves as a 
source for guiding behaviour.) For our purposes here, the emphasis will be how state formation and nation building 
in interplay with geopolitics created a basis for both reflective and less reflective behaviour. Once acquired, a habit 
has a self-sustaining quality up to a certain point. In other words, the interplay between ideology and interests might 
create a habitus that is enduring. At the same time, we will discuss how such dispositions to act change. In the same 
way as introducing the concept of "praxis", the term "habitus" in contemporary sociology brings forth the 
predominance of French social scientists (notably Bordieu), but one should keep in mind that "habit" as a kind of 
action was central also to Max Weber, although the very term habit remained in the background of his theoretical 
writings. However, he repeatedly returned to the term "Eingestellheit", understood as an inner disposition to act 
according to a pattern. Indeed, it seems evident that this was central to the emphasis Weber laid on path dependency. 
"The further we go back in history…social action, is determined in an ever more comprehensive sphere exclusively 
by the disposition toward the purely habitual" (Weber, Cited in Camic, 1986: 1059). In fact, Weber in the 
introduction to Economy and Society stated that "traditional action" (determined by ingrained habit) among the types 
of social action formed the great bulk of everyday action. Now, in sum this led Weber to develop a 
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• Thirdly, and most importantly, to what degree was the ideological and naval power of states 
connected?15 Did policy changes at the state level change relations among states in the 
maritime dimension of foreign policy, and if such alterations took place, did they constitute a 
change of the international state system?16 
 
If states are to be considered “different actors”, then we shall require that states with comparable 
interests carry out different policies within the same issue. That is, there will be empirical variations 
that interest in the form of brute material factors alone cannot explain. A change of the international 
system means a pronounced higher degree of institutionalisation of a particular principle at the 
international level. We shall here require that a change takes place when formal treaties that visibly 
changed state praxis and the relations between states are created. 
The main alternative to our hypotheses will be that ideas and ideology do not matter, in the sense 
that there is no need to complicate empirical analysis by introducing ideational variables. Thus, the 
alternative hypotheses will claim that there are no significant empirical variations in policies 
between states with similar interests. Material factors are not only necessary, but also sufficient 
variables that account for empirical observations. The major schools of thought with relevance to the 
subject will therefore be Marxism or neorealism. In the first, state autonomy hardly exists, in the 
latter states are “like units”, which makes a comparison of states theoretically irrelevant. In order to 
create a viable approach to address the hypotheses, we will have to look into some central concepts 
and theories of IR in the following part of the chapter. On the basis of this, chapter 2 will be an 
attempt at creating a new typology that combines ideational and material variables through different 
ideal types of extraterritorial policy. The empirical chapters will analyse historical trajectories 
through the use of these idealtypes, and the last chapter will address the theoretical and empirical 
utility of the approach created. 
The ideology of extraterritorial violence among states with overseas ambitions has often been 
                                                                                                                                                             
macrosociological approach where habit in fact played a central role, and this is strikingly visible in his comparative 
historical sociology (see Camic, 1986: 1062-1063 for a convincing discussion). At the same time, Weber stressed 
the differences between forms of rationality (see for example Ringer, 1997: 105-107). For our purposes; foreign 
policy certainly contain elements of both purposive-, value-, and traditional action. Therefore, we should also expect 
to see empirical deviations from our idealtypes; indeed, for a wberian sociologist, the deviations are crucial to the 
empirical analysis. Indeed, this entire thesis can be seen as a study of deviations from the ideal type of purposive 
rationality in foreign policy, and according to Ringer, 1997:154, “In a Weberian causal analysis, the focus would be 
upon the way in which a world view brought about a particular historical sequence and outcome, rather than 
possible alternatives” 
15 The power of states and their capacity to influence international institutions will be analysed by applying a 
framework similar to the IEMP – modell of Michael Mann, 1993 
16 See especially Wendt, 1999; chapters 3 and 6. 
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dubbed imperialism, since the most spectacular use of extraterritorial violence has occurred in 
contests of power between peoples, and since these contests often reflected an asymmetrical 
relationship of power. I will argue that the process of “imperialism”17 has gone through changes that 
to some degree have altered world order through the mechanisms of international institutions.18 
These norms and obligations regarding state praxis have been the result of state formation-processes, 
and at the same time they have changed and influenced states. By studying changes in the character 
of imperialism, and by seeing norms as significant, mono-causal explanations of imperialism or 
political development are by implication criticized throughout the thesis. 
Furthermore, I propose that these phenomena have important contributions to mainstream theories 
of comparative politics (CP) as well as international relations (IR). If this indeed is the case, my 
scholarly navigation in distant fields of study may bring back to the nest a few exotic cases worth 
discussing in the age of “globalisation”. It may not be true to the letters of the founding fathers of 
comparative, political sociology, but I certainly find it to be true to their spirit.19 In sum, this thesis 
does hardly reveal new facts previously undiscovered by historians, but it certainly gives a new 
framework for interpreting macro history. Thereby this analysis contributes to causal theory.20 
 
The second –and mainly nomothetic- purpose of this thesis thus is to construct a new model for 
interpreting and explaining the interplay between states on the international arena. Through this 
discussion, I believe, will emerge an approach that might best serve the empirical study of 
extraterritorial politics. A central assumption is that ideology21, understood as a source of social 
power to the degree that it creates a disposition to act in foreign policy, should be combined with 
                                                 
17 That empire and imperialism are contested and value-laden concepts is an understatement. Originally, imperialism 
was used from the 1860s to denote the aspirations of Napoleon III. Later it was applied to Great Power rivalry and 
the acquisition of colonial territories in Africa and Asia. Today the term is most often used to describe the 
domination of colonies by stronger states. Theories of why imperialism occurred can be divided into sociological 
ones (for example Schumpeter who sees imperialism as counter-productive), economic or Marxist ones (as Andre 
Gunder Frank, who sees imperialism as a result of the profit-seeking incentives inherent in capitalism), and strategic 
or political, which see the phenomenon caused by many factors. The difference between these schools of thought 
also lies in how broadly they define imperialism. Thus Marxists and neo-Marxists use the concept also in the sense 
of neo-colonialism, where the centre (or metropole) exploits or alternatively benefits from, its asymmetric 
exchanges with the periphery (or satellite). And yet, imperialism is also (increasingly, as far as I can see), applied to 
all forms of incursions into other states`s sovereignty. I will discuss the conceptual problems further in chapter 4, 
since imperialism in this thesis noted a special and intensive form of claims to extraterritorial sovereignty.  My own 
definition is rather similar to the definition in Abernethy, 2000: 20 
18 To be defined below 
19 See for example Rokkan, 1987: 55,  Wallerstein, 2000,  Tilly, 1984 
20 Ringer, 1997 
21 Ideology in the field of foreign policy is an elusive concept, but this does not make ideology a worthless 
theoretical category, it is reality itself that is elusive at this point. To quote Weber "On its earthly course an idea 
always and everywhere operates in opposition to its original meaning and thereby destroys itself" (Camic, 1986: 
1040). 
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materialist modalities of power in such a model. In all modesty, much is at stake on exactly this 
point. IR scholars have often claimed that they do not study states, but relations among states, and 
what has been called the state system (or sometimes “the international system” or “the international 
society”). In doing so, they need nothing more than some simple assumptions of what states are. By 
the 1980s, the prevailing assumption was that states were "like units", not functionally 
differentiated, and since they were parts of an anarchic state system, could be treated as firms in a 
market.22 While such an approach certainly has some merits, such a theory seem ill equipped to 
address fundamental changes in the state system, witness the fall of the Soviet Union and the other 
communist states in Europe. This critique of some of the more celebrated theories in IR was 
elegantly summed up by Professor Ian Clarke already prior to the revolution of 1989: 
 
"International relations may be practised in a constant framework of inter-state relations but the 
states themselves are changing, yielding a new substance to their contacts. Competing perspectives 
on the state- contractual, organic, liberal, Marxist, repressive, administrative and interventionist- 
reflect differences of theoretical interpretation, but also the heterogeneity of the world’s many states 
as well as the historical evolution of the state in recent centuries."23 
 
Interestingly, the contents and effects of extraterritorial sovereignty24 have gained more attention 
within the international relations literature than within mainstream comparative politics and macro 
sociology. The gap between the two traditions should not be unbridgeable, since political science is 
the study of power, where power is most clearly manifested in the distinctions between friend and 
foe. As several scholars within IR have recognised, the importance of extraterritorial sovereignty is 
                                                 
22 See Waltz, 1979 for the elagant and classical argument in favour of such a microeconomic assumption in IR. 
Thus, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are variations of the theory of the firm in a market, applied to 
states on the international arena. 
23 Clark, 1987: 211. The same author in 1999, when commenting upon globalization and its challenge to IR theory, 
stated that “The “domestic” is as much a part of the fabric of the international system as any abstracted 
“structure” of the relations between states..It is precisely in the synergy between the two that the dynamic of 
change is to be located” (Clark, 1999: 5 
24 See below. Extraterritorial sovereignty is a claim to hold sovereignty in a varying degree beyond the original, 
bounded and demarcated territory of the state. Today this can be applied to embassies and military bases placed on 
the territory of other states. It can also be applied to the personnel in these facilities in general. At the other end of 
the scale, we find extraterritorial sovereignty claims and practises in form of colonial rule, be it direct and indirect, 
and different forms of imperialism, be it formal or informal. This thesis will deal with such sea-borne “empires”, but 
particularly it will seek to analyse claims to state sovereignty at sea it self, including small islands and the seabed 
beyond the littoral. Imperialism is hardly a precise term in order to describe all instances of the latter phenomena. 
Thomson (1994) uses the term extraterritorial violence, without strictly defining what she means by extraterritorial. 
It is evident however, that she in practise means that extraterritorial is defined as activity at sea for the period she 
analyses.  
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vital to an understanding of world order(s), be it historical25orders or our temporary one. On the 
other hand, IR literature, as opposed to CP and historical sociology, has paid little attention to state-
building and its relationship with international institutions and imperialism (in the sense applied 
here, imperialism primarily is understood as formal, direct rule of “less developed countries”. The 
term “Paternalism” will be applied to post-colonial sentiments26). States are all too often taken as 
given in mainstream IR27, due to the concentration on international systems in the discipline.28 Thus, 
studies of extraterritorial sovereignty remain few. This is regrettable, since it is a highly substantial 
topic. The contestation and struggle for claims to maritime rights is a highly important aspect of 
Western European state formation and –consolidation, and the concept of the State presupposes the 
concept of the political. 
Furthermore, Otto Hintze noted land “(as opposed to naval) warfare’s negative impact”29 on 
representative assemblies and democratisation in Europe. Did naval strategy influence political 
regimes and vice versa? While this thesis is only a small step (at best) towards addressing this Big 
question, my aim here is to conceptualise, set forth hypotheses on and analyse the ideological impact 
on this field of foreign policy in Northern Europe and the United States. Even a brief overview of 
these phenomena indicates the importance of the subject. The discourses and praxis on rights to 
extraterritorial sovereignty laid the foundations for the ideology and justification of overseas 
empires.30 Maritime and overseas activities made for diverse and intense interactions between states 
                                                 
25 Thomson, 1994   Spruyt, 1994, Modelski and Thompson, 1988 
26 I will seek to define these concepts in chapter 2.   
27 I cannot see that there is a very substantial difference, for example, in how neorealism (e.g. Waltz, 1979) and the 
so-called regime literature and “liberal institutionalist school” (Krasner, 1983, Keohane, 1986) view the states. 
These states vary in their resources/power, but they behave by the same logic. They can be seen as rational actors on 
the market, and thereby micro-economic theory can explain their functioning in international relations. I think it is 
important to point pout that this generalisation does not apply to classical realism, as defined by Wæver, 1992. 
Wæver, 1992: 47-52 shows that classical realists like Morgenthau and Kissinger did not treat states as rational actors 
in a narrow sense. On the contrary, these authors shared a pessimism that was to some degree ontological and also 
concerned the limits of knowledge, thus these scholars climed that statesmen often relied more on visions and 
intuition than rationality and complete information. 
28 This is particularly evident in the literature of this ”American social Science” (Hoffman, 1977) from the late 
1970s. Today, as in the 1960s, domestic theories of politics is applied in the IR literature, but has so far failed to 
make a substantial breakthrough. But then again, there will perhaps never be “!a Theory” of international politics. 
29 Downing, 1992: 4. Although Downing`s contribution is impressive in many ways, it is characteristic that he in 
”The Military Revolution and Political Change” only briefly touches upon sea power and the entrepreneurship, 
financial problem-solving, technical innovations and organisation required to run a navy. The result of this, I 
propose, is a highly partial story. For example, England is interpreted in light of her land power;  ”Military 
organization in medieval England deviated somewhat from the classic medieval pattern in two regards: a higher 
proportion of infantry and a larger complement of mercenaries” (ibid: 159). Thus, the role sea power played in 
English power and wealth (greatly facilitating the strengthening of representative institutions) is ignored. Downing 
(ibid: 175) simply register that “Military expenditures peaked at 1.7 millions pounds in 1655, high by English 
standards, but per-capita taxation in England was only one-fourth that of Prussia in 1688, and England’s wealth 
greatly exceeded that of backward Prussia”. Could it be that the different political economies of sea power and land-
power accounted for parts of this difference? 
30 See for example Armitage, 2000 for this verdict in the case of the British Empire. 
  
Introduction-theme and theory 
 
 
            
 
 
 
15
in Europe that helped shape both state formation processes and international institutions, including 
the institutions of state practises shared by sovereign states. The increasing number of issues of 
extraterritorial sovereignty and sharing of this sovereignty created highly dynamic, but always 
contested, international institutions. Ocean policy is by its very nature one of the most international 
topics that any coastal state is forced to deal with through its foreign policy. Thus it is an ideal topic 
to concentrate on when analysing the interplay between national/ideology and crafting of 
international institutions, since this cluster of political issues has a long history that affects the 
majority of states. Furthermore, the modern state, according to Max Weber, is an organised 
monopoly of the use of relatively legitimate violence. The lack of analysis of the organisations of 
violence, largely armies, navies and air forces, is profound in mainstream social science.31 This 
seems to indicate that not only theory, but also ideology among social scientists determines what are 
being defined as “proper” subjects of inquiry.32 In this thesis, navies will be seen as vital 
components of state formations. An organisation without naval forces is vulnerable to exogenous 
pressure if that organisation claims sovereign rights in oceans, simply because such a state will not 
be able to perform the “functions of state” as described in international law (to be discussed later in 
this chapter), and because it will have limited abilities to protect freedom of transport at sea. 
Furthermore, as the military theoretician Julian Corbett pointed out in 1911, extraterritorial violence 
gave modern states the opportunity to wage limited wars. By projecting power against weak polities 
overseas, in particular, the state could annex resources in a relatively cheap way, or so it seemed in 
the imperial age. As Modelski and Thompson stated in their seminal work on sea power, “seapower 
is an essential component of world order because of what navies, and navies alone, can do”.33 Naval 
praxis is a concrete indicator of the ideological character of foreign policy. How, where and when 
states used (or did not use) extraterritorial power gives us valuable information on the habitus of 
state policy. 
Extraterritorial sovereignty seems to be of high relevance also from a contemporary view. A leading 
scholar in international law even claimed of the law of the sea that “No branch of international law 
has undergone more revolutionary changes during the past four decades.”34  The third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), lasting from 1974 till 1982 was by one observer 
coined “the biggest smash and grab since the European powers at the Berlin Conference in 1885 
carved up black Africa”.35 Today, even as the present texts of law give reasonably clear guidance on 
                                                 
31 See Giddens, 1987 for a similar view.   
32 See Neumann, 2002 and Ulriksen 2002 for similar conclusions. 
33 Modelski & Thomson, 1988: 11 
34 Shearer, 1994: 218 
35 Lord Ritchie Calder, cited in Ulfstein, 1982: 26 
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demarcation of zones at sea, sea territory and continental shelves, it is obvious that the regulation of 
resources and conflict at sea are far from solved by technical or political solutions. To some degree, 
the UNCLOS “regime”36 has created new problems. Results from this failure can be seen in the 
global crisis in the fisheries, increasing pollution in the seas, and in the conflicts regarding the Sprat 
Islands, the tough negotiations between states and international organisations concerning the 
utilisation of marine resources, the increased occurrence of piracy and armed attacks by non-state 
actors at sea and perhaps even in global hydrographical and climatic changes which might be of 
huge importance for the human condition. The fear of large-scale use of extraterritorial violence by 
non-state actors in 2004 prompted the US to introduce a 200-mile "maritime security zone", and to 
seek to encourage its allies to carry out similar increases in the extent of their monopolies of 
violence.37  Simultaneously (and paradoxically), more and more tasks that traditionally have been 
carried out by military organizations in the western world are now being outsourced to private 
actors. Even in the UK -the archetype of a naval power- a private firm trains the Royal Navy “in 
operating and maintaining its newest nuclear-powered submarines”.38 Furthermore, the role of 
maritime resources has at times been able to arouse strong passions, signalising the symbolic value 
often attached to distant waters and isles. Twenty years after the Falklands war, Argentine President 
Eduardo Duhalde thus could claim that “Las Malvinas are ours, stained with the blood and tears of 
our heroes”.39  The fact is that the 1982 conclusion of the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea led to an increase in national jurisdiction over oceans that gave incentives for claiming 
sovereignty over ever more marginal islands and islets. At the time of writing, a number of states 
have unsettled disputes over islands and ocean masses. These states include Russia, Norway, 
Denmark, Canada, Iceland, the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Argentina, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Croatia, Spain, UK, Morocco, Haiti, Cuba, Greece, Turkey, France (in 
the Indian Ocean), Madagascar, India, Mauritius, Iran, The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia , Botswana, Namibia, Bahrain, Qatar, Eritrea, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, China, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea.40 In 
fact, the extensions of (outer limits to) the national continental shelves are still disputed in many 
areas, with considerable economic significance. Below, for example, the UN has sought to map 
possible extensions to present continental shelves. 
                                                 
36 The so-called ”international regimes” will be discussed below 
37 See for example http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200412/s1267205.htm 
38 Singer, 2003: 12. Singer gives an impressive overview of the process of privatization of military tasks. And the 
trend has been increased after this publication. 
39 Aftenposten April 3rd 2002. 
40 See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/claims_2005.pdf, for updates on 
such disputes. 
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Figure 1.0: Possible extensions of present continental shelves under national jurisdiction beyond 
200 nautical miles  
 
 
The sea beds that could be extended as continental shelves under national jurisdiction are marked 
with light grey colour on the oceans in the map above. The potential for disputes in arctic waters is 
downplayed in this map.41 
The political history of maritime sovereignty matters for international relations as well as for the 
domestic political and economic institutions in coastal states. Furthermore, I will claim that the 
questions of maritime policies should be seen as embedded in a larger field of world politics.42 
Extraterritorial sovereignty, where maritime policy is a vital component, affects the relations 
between states and between state and citizens. In sum, extraterritorial sovereignty is indeed a facet 
of sovereignty. I therefore, at least partly, agree with the historians Cain and Hopkins who state that 
                                                 
41 Map taken from http://www.soc.soton.ac.uk/CHD/unclos 
42 See Modelski & Thompson, 1988: 13-14 for an interesting suggestion in this respect. 
            
 Introduction-theme and theory
 
 
 
           
 
 
18 
the distinguishing feature of imperialism “is not that it takes a specific economic, cultural or political 
form, but that it involves an incursion, or an attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another 
state”.43 As a matter of fact, extra-territorial sovereignty should be seen as embedded in world 
politics and in the foreign policy of every coastal state. But the present theories and concepts of 
maritime policies suffer from two main problems. Firstly, maritime policy is often studied as isolated 
phenomena where the political culture and general foreign policy is not taken sufficiently into 
consideration. Thus, scholars in international relations have too often made sweeping generalisations 
of such scope that empirical variations in time and space simply are ignored. Secondly, the 
traditional theoretical concepts of mare liberum and mare clausum, while still very valuable, are too 
wide to provide us with a thorough understanding of both state policy and international institutions 
regarding maritime world orders. In an attempt at addressing these two related challenges, chapter 2 
proposes a comparative typology based upon materialist state interests (degrees of overseas 
interests) and ideational national maritime principles (mare liberum and –clausum). This results in a  
way of analysing international relations where states are seen as different types of actors on the 
international arena. At the same time, this difference is not explained solely in terms of preferences, 
power and interests. In this perspective, state interests, the struggle over principles in international 
institutions and the culture of national policies are seen as entangling clusters of variables that 
interact. The result is international as well as national institutions mediated by national, historically 
formed configurations of thought. I propose that institutional political economy and historical 
institutionalism add explanatory power to international relations. How can such a theory be coherent 
and testable? I suggest that comparative design and –methods should be applied in order to craft 
testable hypotheses of limited constructivism.44 In other words, theories from both international 
relations and comparative politics are used in order to produce an approach to the study of ocean 
policies and maritime world orders. This does not mean that I propose a novel Theory of 
Comparative politics and international relations. Rather, I will construct a typology of ideal types 
with analytical potential for this aspect of national and international politics. Thus, I claim that 
among hegemons, large powers and small states alike, there will be a substantial degree of empirical 
                                                 
43 Cain and Hopkins, 2002: 54. I will present some major qualifications of this definition in chapter 2, where I will 
argue that the concept of empire and imperialism is applied too broadly by Cain and Hopkins.  For an extensive 
discussion of empire as concept, see Armitage, 2000: 27-39. “Rulers could claim imperial status on the grounds that 
they possessed a number of distinct territories which were united only under their headship. This conception of 
imperium as a compound of territories could, like the other meanings of the term, be traced back to the Roman 
Empire” (ibid: 33) 
44 "Constructivism" applied to IR is an old approach in this rather new discipline. I agree with Wendt (1999: 3) when 
he argues that "In the post-war period important constructivist approaches to international politics were advanced by 
Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas and Hedley Bull". Furthermore, macro-sociological theories of the 1970s undoubtedly can 
be seen as social constructivism applied to an international level (Esp. Rokkan`s conceptual map of Europe. 
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variation on maritime preferences and principles. 
 
What we have witnessed during the last five decades is a territorialisation of the seas. This has made 
ocean politics far more integrated into the process of territorial sovereignty than in previous epochs. 
I see no reason why this process should be reversed in a world of interdependence. Furthermore, the 
utilisation of marine resources have become more like territorial ones; witness the use of offshore 
oil- and gas-installations, the contestation of islands and the increasing importance of fish farming in 
the sea. And yet, the increase in the scope of formal national jurisdiction has not solved the 
international "tragedy of the commons" in maritime matters. On the contrary, globalizations seem to 
deepen some of the difficulties at reaching regional agreements of separating jurisdictions (see 
chapter 5).45 This is one reason why scholars in IR continue to be so preoccupied with international 
co-operation, institutions and regimes concerning extraterritorial sovereignty. In particular, I will 
argue that the case of maritime sovereignty and –international institutions illustrates the importance 
of hegemons in shaping world orders.46 
The relative lack of corresponding interest for the phenomena within CP, I will argue, represents a 
drawback for theoretical innovation on the theory of the modern state within historical sociology.47 I 
will claim that the Baltic and North East Atlantic was a centre of gravity for the formation of the 
modern North European state, and that the modern coastal state is not only a monopoly of violence 
within its territorial borders, but also an exporter of extraterritorial violence. Most students of both 
comparative and international politics are probably unaware, for example, that the early modern 
navies of Denmark-Norway and Sweden were equal in strength to the English navy, and stronger 
than the Spanish and Dutch navies till the late 16th century.48 It was this ability to utilise the sea for 
transportation and violence that to a significant degree determined the configurations of states and 
international institutions in Western Europe, and indeed to the territories at one time or the other 
controlled from Western Europe. The empirical data and theoretical analysis in this thesis represent 
                                                 
45 See Clark, 1999 and Sassen, 1996 for interesting analyses between ”globalization” and IR theory, and 
globalization and sovereignty. 
46 The latter term used in the same way as by Hedley Bull, 1977. State configurations and world orders, in my view, 
should particularly be studied in periods of transformation. Robert Cox wrote that “The notion of a framework for 
action or historical structure is a picture of a particular configuration of forces. This configuration does not 
determine actions in any direct, mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints. Individuals and groups may 
move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them. To the extent that they do 
successfully resist a prevailing historical structure they buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging 
configuration of forces, a rival structure” (Cox, 1993, cited by Sinclair, 1996: 8). 
47 As I will argue below, several sociologists actually have tried to link domestic and international levels of 
ananlysis. See for example Mann, 1993, and Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 2000. The latter`s ontological position more 
or less breaks down the dichotomy between international and domestic alltogether. 
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challenges to established theories and hypothesis on state-building, political development and state 
autonomy in comparative politics, and views on macro-change in international relations. I have not 
been able to avoid an extensive theoretical discussion in the first part of the analysis. I have found 
this necessary, in agreement with the position of Arthur Stinchcombe that “Theory ought to create 
the capacity to invent explanations. During the course of research in a particular substantive area, 
a sociologist is ordinarily confronted with phenomena for which there are no theories”.49   
 
If we are to study extraterritorial sovereignty, our theory must allow us to see the interplay between 
states and international institutions. Both are effects as well as results.50 Especially demanding 
theoretically is the boundary-transcendent character inherent in the phenomena of extraterritorial 
sovereignty. Thus, concepts like “the state” and “sovereignty” gain a quality that is not covered in 
mainstream political science. 
The phenomena dealt with in this thesis to a large degree have been neglected in comparative 
politics. On the other hand, I at least partly agree with Janice Thomson51, John Gerard Ruggie52, 
Barry Buzan and Richard Little53 that theories in International relations are ill equipped to explain 
the macro transformations of the international “system” and its units.54 However, these so-called 
“constructivists” have so far not developed alternative theories in the traditional social-scientific 
sense of the word.55 Another attempt at theoretical innovation in IR circles around the cognitive 
model, in which decision-making is seen as partly determined by ideas and perceptions that make up 
cognitive “maps” and knowledge-structures.56 The latter approach partly has influenced the micro-
perspective in this thesis beyond the conception of the rational, calculating statesman, and I believe 
that it is compatible with a macro-perspective as well. The problem is how to build theories, or at 
least substantial, testable hypotheses, on such a micro-foundation. If this is not possible, then the 
                                                                                                                                                             
48 The comparative strength of navies are documented and analysed by the Swedish historian Jan Glete in two 
magnificent works. See Glete, 1993 and 2000 
49 Stinchcombe, 1968: 3. See also Giddens, 1984 for a similar view. 
50 See Martin & Simmons, 2001: 451-460. 
51 Thomson, 1994 
52 Ruggie, 1986 and 1993 
53 Buzan & Little, 2000 
54 Sinclair, 1996: 5 declared that ”the demonstrated inadequasis of mainstream approaches to international relations 
place a premium on theoretical innovation in the study of international relations” 
55 The exchange of views between Robert Keohane and constructivists to a large degree reflects differences about 
what criteria such theories should meet.  
56 For a useful overview, see Matarese, 2001: 2-11. Matarese makes an original attempt at connecting these maps to 
historic experience and cultural variables. See also Holsti, 1970, 1962. Helen Milner (1997: 3) points out ”In the 
1960s and 1979s theories of international relations that focused domestic factors abounded”. When IR moved in 
more or less into two (rather similar) camps called neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism (more ”scientific” 
theories according to their proponents) domestic factors were driven out. 
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cognitive model and constructivism remain broad approaches and methodological guiding lines, 
which I believe most social scientists would deem as unsatisfactory if we are to interpret or explain 
macro-phenomena. To account for the empirical structuration of this data, we actually are in need 
for a blending of several disciplines in order to construct a coherent argument. In particular, I will 
argue that we should merge contributions from CP with some conception of an international 
“system”.57 Likewise, theoretical discussions later must be confronted with rather detailed narratives 
in a comparative and historical perspective, extending our habitual field of work in space and time58. 
Indeed, as the intensity and extent of European integration increases, the sharp academic and 
political division of internal and external politics is more blurred than it has been for centuries. 
Nowhere in the sciences is this more evident than in the field of IR, which I see as moving in a more 
sociological and historical direction now than during the Cold War.59 For CP, the interplay between 
domestic and international institutions is an ever more important field where it is necessary to build 
new theories.60 
Especially important when it comes to the understanding of “the state” itself, is a rather new trend in 
Northern European historiography, a trend which in turn seems to have been inspired by some of the 
scholars from the social sciences. This trend in historical science includes analysis the importance of 
merchant cities in the Nordic context, international trade, jurisdiction at sea, and navies and 
nations.61 As will be shown, some of these historians have provided us with material that not only 
challenges established views in historiography, but which should make social scientists look closer 
and more critically at some of the best theories of comparative politics as well. To simplify, IR`s 
systemic theories often lack dynamism. Macro-theories in CP often lack elaborated accounts of how 
exactly international institutions62 and processes affect domestic institutions.  
                                                 
57 Academic specialisation might in fact become an obstacle to new insights. See Morgenthau, 1946. 
58 As Douglas North (1990: vii) held, ”History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but 
because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions. And the past 
can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution”.  
59 See Spruyt, 1994, Thomson, 1996, Katzenstein et al, 1997 
60 For attempts, see Evans et al, 1992, Tsebelis, 1992,  and Milner, 1997 – the latter an IR scholar whose work 
should be seen as much as a work in CP as it is an example of Ir literature moving into the realm of CP. 
61 The sea is the pivot of all great empires, according to Aron, 1966. All the instances oh hegemony in Wallerstein`s 
history of the Moderen World-system (The Netherlands, England and USA) were predominant sea-powers . As 
France was defeated in the Napoleon Wars, so was Germany defeated in WWI and WWII by alliances with 
overwhelming sea power.  
62 In this thesis, I claim that international institutions have existed since the 15th Century. But as Eisenstadt (1985: 
6) has reminded us, another question is ”to what degrees any pattern of social institution in general and the macro-
sociological order in particular constitute ”systems””. This question has, and will continue to, arouse much debate. 
The central focus here is not on the character of the ”international system”, but rather the interaction between units 
on the international arena, and how this interaction produces international institutions, which in turn affect the states. 
A much more demanding overview is developed by Buzan & Little, 2000, who sees international systems as an 
enduring feature of politics throughout World History. Note also the debate in the World-systems analysis camp. 
Hereafter, the Modern world-system works by Wallerstein (I-III) will be referred to as TMWS I, II or III. 
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The empirical cases to be studied are those of a limited number of territories facing the Baltic and 
the North Sea, especially England, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
Iceland, all influenced to a large degree by the USA after WWII.  The connection between 
international maritime institutions and the political processes within and between these territories 
has not been examined in comparative politics, and only partially in IR. Thus, the thesis partly aims 
at giving a “new” perspective of state formation in these territories.  What I mean by “new” is that I 
bring together a historical narrative and theories of politics that hitherto have remained separated. In 
North European historiography, there is a growing body of literature on the connections between 
territories facing the Baltic and North Seas.63 I argue that the empirical data represent opportunities 
to expand theoretically from central themes to be found in Wallerstein, Tilly, and Mann.64 Likewise, 
mainstream IR theory is hardly equipped to account for the changes in the international state system 
in a lungue duree perspective.65 In this respect, the thesis aims at giving a theoretical contribution 
also to IR. In many ways, scholars within IR have already picked up important themes from their 
neighbours in CP.  Attempts at making a more sociological approach to international politics are in 
fact strikingly central to the discipline today; witness the debate after the publication of works as 
Alexander Wendt’s book “A Social Theory of International Politics”.66 However, I will argue that 
the current scholarly discourse largely echoes the discussion between rational choice institutionalism 
and historical institutionalism, a lively debate in political science since the late 1970s at least.67 To 
Max Weber, at least, it was obvious that both social norms and economic utility shaped individual 
behaviour, and those individual considerations of utility did not preclude strong social orders.68 
                                                 
63 See especially Hinkkanen and Kirby, 2000: 2 These authors of course point to the important works by Fernand 
Braudel on the Mediterranean, as well as to Archibald Lewis who claimed to detect the beginnings of an Atlantic-
North European destiny around the time of the collapse of the Roman Empire. ”And in the 1990s the Dutch historian 
Lex Heerma van Voss boldly advanced a notion of a ”North sea World” in the early modern period, in which he 
discerns certain shared characteristics within an open and active system of exchanges around the coasts of this sea. ” 
(ibid: 2). See also Glete, 1993, 2000. This historian is the first scholar, to my knowledge, that has produced an 
extensive analysis that integrates sea power and state formation in a way that is both theoretically interesting and 
empirically solid. 
64 These prominent scholars represent three distinctive, substantial and different approaches to the study of state 
formation. 
65 Arguments in favor of this postulate can be found in Spruyt, 1994 Thomson, 1994 Ruggie, 1986, 1993, Buzan & 
Little, 2000. Consider, for example, how restricted the influence from theories of international politics have been in 
other disciplines. Buzan and Little, 2000, use this argument in order to ”remake” the study of international 
institutions.  
66 Wendt, 1999 
67 As Peter Katzenstein (Katzenstein, 1996: 1) elegantly put in a recent publication "changing political 
circumstances and intellectual fashions reopen controversies that appeared to some to have been already settled". 
68 One argument made by Weber in ”Economy and Society” (1978: 33) is especially worthy of reiteration in this 
context. In a comment on Stammler, Weber notes; 
”But economic action, for instance, is oriented to knowledge of the relative scarcity of certain available means to 
want satisfaction, in relation to the actor’s state of needs and to the present and probable action of others, insofar as 
the latter affects the same resources. But at the same time, of course, the actor in his choice of economic procedures 
naturally orients himself in addition to the conventional and legal rules which he recognises as valid, that is, of 
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Despite the obvious strengths of rational choice theories, a central premise of this thesis is in fact 
that some of the most interesting elements constituting political institutions and –processes might 
slip away more or less unnoticed from the perspective of game theory.69 At the same time, attempts 
at presenting credible theoretical alternatives to game theory seem more awkward and less 
parsimonious compared to the elegant models so widely applied in current political economy. This 
thesis will discuss some possible ways of combining insights from game theory with sociological 
macro theory. Furthermore, this approach is distinct from neorealism because it seeks to “open up 
the black box” of neorealism. The state and state-society relations, I will argue, is a key to 
understand political changes both at state level and international level. In short, realism can explain 
how protection costs vary with the balance of power at the international level. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism can give us valuable insights into the value of information at the international level. 
But in order to see the form and meaning of changes and enduring structures of international 
relations, we will need to analyse the informal as well as formal constrains that shape how state 
leaders obtain and analyse information, and the differences among states in their ability to gain 
support for their policies. Looking into informal aspects influencing perception in decision-making, 
means that the thesis shares traits with social constructivism in IR. I would like to make myself very 
clear on the label constructivism, however. As we have seen above (and to which we will return), 
material and ideational motives lie behind social action. But this is nothing new in IR. Indeed, 
political realism, the theory often described as the most “systemic”, allegedly lending towards 
inspiration from the natural sciences, arose as criticism of too rationalistic an approach to the study 
of politics.70 
                                                                                                                                                             
which he knows that a violation on his part would call forth a given reaction of other persons.  Stammler succeeds in 
introducing a state of hopeless confusion into this very simple empirical situation, particularly in that he maintains 
that a causal relationship between an order and actual empirical action involves a contradiction in terms. It is true, of 
course, that there is no causal relationship between the normative validity of an order in the legal sense and any 
empirical process. In that context there is only the question whether the order as correctly interpreted in the legal 
sense ”applies” to the empirical situation. The question is whether in a normative sense it should be treated as valid 
and, if so, what the content of its normative prescriptions for this situation should be. But for sociological purposes, 
as distinguished from legal, it is only the probability of an orientation to the subjective belief in the validity of an 
order which constitutes the valid order itself. It is undeniable that, in the ordinary sense of the word ”causal”, there 
is a causal relationship between this probability and the relevant course of economic action”. After all, much work 
within IR that is seen as constructivism is not that radical in sociology. 
69 Criticising rational choice at times has become something of a sociological ritual. On rationality, see for example 
Tsebelis, 1990, Midtbø, 1990, Malnes, 1993, Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, Grendstad & Selle, 1996, Skocpol, 1994, 
Wildavsky, 1990, Cook & Levi, 1990, Elster, 1984 og 1989a,b,c,  Barry et al, 1982,  Malnes et al, 1992,  Hovi & 
Rasch, 1993 and Hovi, 1992. Hovi, in my opinion, has a good argument on the utility of the rational actor as an 
ideal-type. Nevertheless, a central theoretical premise of the present treatise is that rational choice theory has 
limitations in its ability to explain social phenomena. Still, I accept Elster`s (1986:27) reminder ”that you can`t beat 
something with nothing”. 
70 Rather than discussing the favourite themes of epistemology in the philosophy of science, I would rather assume 
that the nature of politics is, and the study of politics ought to be, much more like what Hans J. Morgenthau once 
envisaged it as (note the similarity with Weber); 
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I have structured the theoretical as well as the empirical analysis in the following way. 
My aim is firstly to discuss core concepts and comparative methodology that are central to this 
thesis, plus game theory and institutional theory applied to the study of state structures, and point out 
why the latter approaches have limits (for our purpose here) due to their lack of systematisation of 
endogenous factors of change. Secondly, I will propose an overall conceptual framework for an 
analysis of extraterritorial sovereignty that I see as an element of states as well as elements in 
international institutions.  I will do this through elaborating the weberian ideal types71 of the 
phenomena to be studied, that of extraterritorial sovereignty, and argue for my selection of units, 
presenting hypotheses on the interplay between domestic and international maritime institutions for 
these units. Thirdly, I will embark on an empirical examination of the Baltic and North Sea “world-
system”72, studying the institutionalization of extraterritorial organisations on the domestic level, 
and how the interplay between these apparatuses created international institutions. I believe it 
possible to show how early variations in state formation and interaction between the fragile polities 
of Northern Europe gave a lasting contribution to ideology in maritime questions.73 Indeed, the 
qualitative comparative method has its advantages in this kind of large scale analysis, although I do 
not necessarily agree with Hedley Bull’s verdict that scholars applying statistical analysis in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Politics must be understood through reason, yet it is not in reason that it finds its model. The principles of 
scientific reason are always simple, consistent, and abstract; the social world is always complicated, incongruous 
and concrete. To apply the former to the latter is either futile, in that the social reality remains impervious to the 
attack of that “one-eyed reason, deficient in its vision of depth”…Since reason in the form of causality reveals 
itself most plainly in nature, nature became the model of the social world and the natural sciences the image of 
what the social sciences one day will be...This was, however, a fallacious answer…The truth of the social sciences, 
then, is truth only under the particular perspective of the observer, yet under this perspective it is truth. And this is 
the only kind of truth to be had in the social sphere. Whoever seeks more will get less” (Morgenthau, 1946: 10, see 
also ibid: 126, 167  
This insight of Morgenthau should certainly not be interpreted as praise of post-structuralism, but it is an interesting 
example of how a scholar in the early years of postwar IR stressed the importance of the complexities of the 
empirical study of human societies. In fact, the distance between comparative history and early “realist” scholars 
like E.H: Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger were much less than the distance created by neorealism/neo-
liberal institutionalism. As Ole Wæver, 1992, argues, political realism proper did only develop in the 20th century. 
71 Ringer, 1997 is one of the most enlightening discussions of the methodology of Max Weber that I have come 
across. See for example ibid: 82-89 on “explanations” and J.S. Mill versus Max Weber on comparative 
methodology, and ibid: chapter 4 on Weber`s emphasis on interpretation as a central tenet of any causal explanation 
in the social sciences. 
72 The term is used by Bakka, 1998 
73 As Lipset (1964: 7) points out, Max Weber’s comparative method consisted of a path-dependency model, where 
differences among political systems were attributed to key historical events ”which set one process in motion in one 
country and a second in another”. Apart from identifying categories of such differences on the phenomenon of extra-
territorial sovereignty, we could –and should- extend the inquiry in order to ask whether these differences matters 
for international relations. The theoretician of Sea Power, A.T. Mahan discussed the phenomenon in the ambiguous 
concept of the ”National character”. In the words of Karl Deutsch (cited in Lipset, 1964: 4) ”Will...may be described 
as the set of constraints acquired from the memories and past experiences of the system, and applied to the selection 
and treatment of items in its later intake, recall or decisions”. 
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study of international relations will remain "as remote from the substance of international politics as 
the inmates of a Victorian nunnery were from the study of sex".74 
Fourthly, I intend to analyse the interplay between state preferences in the form of enduring 
ideologies and international institutions of maritime questions during the last two centuries. 
Ultimately, the analysis will be summarized both in an empirical and theoretical sense. As is often 
the case when ideal types are used in macro analysis in novel ways, the original contribution to 
nomothetic models is built upon large amounts of data. This is the case here, and the most 
provocative models are thus presented in the last chapter.  
 
One might easily point out the difficulties at attempting such a task.  
The relative lack of systematization of historical data and social scientific analysis of the empirical 
data on extraterritorial sovereignty addressed here is a puzzle in itself. Thus, Armitage notes that 
“the disjuncture between British history and the history of the British empire has been peculiarly 
abrupt and enduring”.75 Let us take the Scandinavian countries (which will be central to our 
argument) as further examples. In Denmark, the historian Hans Christian Bjerg has noted that; 
 
“Denmark commands a significant maritime geostrategic position. It is beyond dispute that this 
position has played a decisive role in the development of our country and has given it the essence of 
its historical identity. It’s curious, therefore, to observe that the maritime aspect of Danish history 
has been assigned a relatively humble position in historical literature, research, interpretation, and 
consciousness. Apparently, in the general consciousness of the Danish people, their country is more 
an agricultural nation than a maritime one”76 
 
Historians participated in nation-building, thus influencing the general population and later 
historians as well as social scientists. The same can be claimed for Norway, the naval historian 
Prytz-dahl noting how “Traditionally in Norway, however, there is a division between the study of 
                                                 
74 Hedley Bull, 1966: 366. However, I acknowledge that in macro theory in CP, and in IR in general, the scholar 
faces “the basic dilemma of social science: whether to explain trivial matters with exactitude or to treat significant 
matters with imprecision” (Gilpin, 1981: xiii). In this thesis, the latter (and Gilpin`s) approach is consciously chosen. 
75 Armitage, 2000: 15. ”For all of its avowed intentions to supersede the national historiographies of England, 
Scotland, Ireland and Wales, the New British history has not encompassed the settlements, provinces and 
dependencies of Greater Britain” (ibid: 21). We shall return to the word ”encompass” in our discussion of 
comparative research designs.  
76 Bjerg, 1992: 103 
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naval affairs and non-military, maritime history”.77 The history of the Norwegian Fisheries, written 
by the Norwegian economic historian Trygve Solhaug points out that censuses have not reflected the 
mixed work involving both fishing and farming along the Norwegian Coast, thereby understating the 
role of maritime resources in Norwegian social history.78 Recently, Norwegian social scientist Ståle 
Ulriksen79 has argued strongly that the Norwegian historical tradition has suppressed the maritime 
dimension of history since the writing of history was part of nation-building. Norwegian 
historiography has dominantly seen Norway as a peasant society, a distinct and self-supported 
entity, which political development could be explained from endogenous models of social change. 
As has been shown elsewhere, exports of raw materials and import of commodities over the sea has 
always been a necessary condition for survival in Norway, Iceland and Sweden. These processes 
were lasting and vital interactions with other “units”, creating structures in systemic relations with 
each other.80 Seen from a leading Swedish scholar, this connection between nation-building, 
historiography and social science bias could perhaps be generalised. At least partly, I support the 
Swedish historian Jan Glete when he says that; “The attempts at generalisations presented by most 
historical sociologists from Max Weber on are solidly based on continental experience; agriculture, 
feudalism, princes, armies and fiscal-military bureaucracies”.81 To our concern at a practical and 
theoretical level; how did the case of extraterritorial sovereignty inform our present discourses and 
practise on international co-operation and conflict? It is upon these aims that I have tried to structure 
the presentation. Before these aims are pursued, however, I shall have more to say about the 
methodological choices and design. 
 
                                                 
77 Prytz-dahl, 1992: 257 
78 Solhaug, 1976 
79 Ulriksen, 2002.  
80 It is remarkable to note that Dyrvik, 1991 is one of the few Norwegian historians to have led this fact guide his 
study of Norwegian history. Interestingly, his ”perspective” on Norwegian development after 1536 is very similar to 
Wallerstein`s world-system analyses programme.  
81 Glete, 2000: 61. Several works by Glete is of importance. His earlier work, Navies and Nations, is by some 
historians seen as a breakthrough in the study of maritime power and state building in Europe. For a comment, see 
Padfield, 1999. However, the historians too should be aware how the unclear distinction between empire and state 
has effected national historiography. The best discussion I have found of this phenomenon, which has bearings on 
this project, is Armitage (2000: 13-23). “The distinction between the “internal” histories of (mostly) European states 
and the “external” histories of (exclusively) European Empires obscured the fact that European states had 
themselves been created by processes of conquest, colonization and cultural change” (ibid: 14). And furthermore; 
“the history of territorial “extension” has been rigorously distinguished from the history of maritime “expansion”; 
sea space is supposed to constitute the difference between the former, which is part of the national question, and the 
colonial question as such. This would be true of the histories of Portugal, The Dutch republic, France and even 
Sweden, the bulk of whose empire lay close to home, around the shores of the Baltic Sea”(ibid: 15) 
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1.1 How states made international institutions, and vice versa 
In this dissertation I argue that state-building should be seen as a continual process.82 The same goes 
for the creation of international institutions. Thirdly, both processes are interwoven in a process of 
structuration. A central hypothesis thus is that states made international institutions and vice versa, a 
significant extension of both neorealism83 and the theory of state formation developed by Charles 
Tilly.84 If this is the case, one should not wonder why scholars within the tradition of international 
relations have started to re-examine the role of national institutions. Robert Keohane, for example, 
stated that “Some of us seek eventually to build an integrated theory of world politics, linking the 
domestic and international levels of analysis, rather than being content with unit-level and system-
level theories that are inconsistent with one another”85 
Bringing national institutions "back in" have taken two rather different forms within the discipline of 
IR.; one largely rationalistic, one largely built upon various strands of constructivism.86 Both forms 
will be examined here. Grand theories within IR are truly Grand theory.87 However, students of 
comparative politics certainly should pay attention to recent developments within IR. While 
rationalists like Helen Milner explicitly draws on comparative politics in order to study international 
institutions88, constructivists actually builds arguments that closely parallels those of the historical 
institutionalists within comparative politics. Comparativists can learn from both of these attempts, as 
well as contribute to them. Empirically, there seems to be a certain sense of appreciation that 
“national” and “international” represent a dichotomy that makes less sense in some areas.89 While 
my aim is not to sum up the debate on globalisation here, I think that it is sufficient to say that the 
interplay between what I label domestic and international institutions should be at the forefront of 
the agenda of the social sciences.90  
                                                 
82 In other words, the ”state” should be treated as a conceptual variable, as argued by Nettl, 1968 
83 Waltz, 1979 
84 Tilly, 1990, 1992 
85 Keohane, : 1986 23-24 
86 See Martin & Simmons, 2001, Ruggie, 1998 
87 Scholars within IR have pointed out the same. See especially Wæver, 1992 and Janice Thomson, 1994 
88 Rational choice and schools within institutionalism will be discussed in chapter 2. 
89 Some work have been carried out in which the meaning of ”international” is analysed, to be sure. Still, I find that 
this concept, initially coined by Jeremy Bentham in ”An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and legislation” in 
1780, is intelligible, especially when we start to consider spheres of law, treaties and negotiations. See also Clark, 
1999 
90 One of the best theoretical arguments in favor of this view that I have been able to found is Martin & Simmons, 
2001: 451-456. But see also Wallerstein, 2000 and Rokkan quoted in Tilly, 1984: 132 
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A rather challenging conceptual exercise is naturally to define what we mean by an international 
institution.91 Although we can cite hundreds of different sociological definitions of institution, 
translating the concept into international relations makes the concept even more contested, the latter 
problem is partly due to the strong theoretical disagreements whether, and how, institutions matter in 
international relations. Herein lies a tautological temptation; realists would probably prefer to define 
“International institution” so that it suits their conception of the nature of the international system, 
and likewise would institutionalists or idealists, although with a different outcome in terms of the 
central traits of international affairs. Most researchers of course prefer definitions that are in line 
with their more general hypotheses and theories. 
If (as idealists and some institutionalists will hold), there is no unbridgeable gap between “national” 
and “international”, then established concepts of institutions would perhaps point the way. Arthur 
Stinchcombe, in an influential work, defined an institution as “a structure in which powerful people 
are committed to some value or interest”.92 One should note here, that Stinchcombe`s definition is 
wide. Institutions can “be about” anything social; they can be built around any perceivable kind of 
values. But these values must be of importance to “powerful people”. In order not to slip into a 
debate on power at this point in the thesis, it should be sufficient to say that in order for institutions 
to exist in a state and in the relations between states, the central actors (whoever that might be in a 
given time or place), must substantially support the values or interests in question. If the label 
institution is to be historically valid, the open and inclusive definition given by Stinchcombe is 
probably justifiable. I will argue that not only states, but also non-governmental actors, cities and 
pressure groups have shaped international institutions, while a whole host of different actors have 
shaped domestic institutions. But the struggles between states and actors with a wholly different 
organisational structure were to a large degree won by states during the 17th century. Thus, states are 
given prominence in the following analysis. I will propose, however, that the contest between the 
Hanseatic League and the consolidating states of northern Europe to a large degree influenced 
regional efforts at state building. And even up till the middle of the 19th Century, the suppressing of 
piracy became an important aspect of foreign policy. Indeed, at the time of writing, piracy and 
terrorism are seen as substantial threats (and with some reason) against the maritime sectors of the 
modern states (see chapter 5). But how “firm” or concrete, how observable, should the phenomenon 
be before we call it an institution? According to Stinchcombe, an institution is a structure. He argues 
                                                 
91 The following use of definitions represents a choice where the openness of the concepts is seen as desireable. The 
reason for this preferance lies in the fact that this treatise will deal with a phenomena that changed its institutional 
content during a large span of time. 
92 Stinchcombe, 1968: 107 
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that the capacity to conceptualise structural phenomena is one of the primary skills that a sociologist 
needs in order to generate theories. He sees structural phenomena as characteristics “of a system of 
social relations and groups which cause differences in the way interactions among people affect 
these people”.93  Stinchcombe then defines structural phenomena as “phenomena which determine 
the form and substance of such systems of interaction”.94 I see no reason why this general definition 
of an institution should not be applicable to both domestic as well as international institutions. 
Power is a structural phenomenon in both settings. The actors and the system of relationship might 
differ, but so did the same variables differ in different epochs of time. So do the systems of 
relationships differ between political systems in space (otherwise comparative politics would be 
senseless). That Stinchcombe`s definition is valuable in its generality becomes apparent when one 
considers the theories of realism and Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)95. Hegemonies greatly 
shape the system of relationships in international relations.96 What must be remembered is that 
institutions at the international level should be defined “broadly as sets of practises and expectations 
rather than in terms of formal organizations with imposing headquarters buildings”97. Realists see 
the balance of power as a central institution. While also constructivists study institutions, it is, on the 
whole, quite common among realists to study the balance of power and hegemony based on material 
capabilities. Constructivists do not necessarily exclude such variables, to be sure, but they argue that 
the values of the hegemon shape international relations through the diffusion of ideas and beliefs.98 
Stinchcombe stresses that the key to institutionalising a value is to concentrate power in the hands of 
those who believe in the value.99 This is not at odds with the definition given by Douglas North, who 
sees institutions as “the rules of the game in a society”100, whether formal or informal101 rules. 
Neither realists102 nor institutionalists103, neither rationalists104 nor constructivists105 would argue on 
                                                 
93 Stinchcombe, 1968: 149 
94 ibid: 149 
95 I believe it was Susan Strange who once noted how the HST actually seems to be at odds with the balance of 
power theory. Thus, two important concepts within realism might seem to be incompatible. Kenneth Waltz, for 
example, would argue that the bipolar balance gives the highest degree of stability. However, HST is perhaps more 
dominant in political economy, while balance of power most often seem to concentrate on military capabilities 
alone. See Gilpin, 1987 for an overview.  
96 See for example Gilpin, 1987 
97 Keohane, : 1984: 246.  
98The constructivist approach sees states as social actors whose actions follow international or domestic rules. From 
this perspective, state behavior is driven by rules, norms, institutions, and identities.  Ruggie, 1993, for example 
argues that the point is not that there was, or if it was, an American hegemony after WWII, but that the hegemony 
was American 
99 Stinchcombe, 1968: 149-150 
100 North, 1990: 3 
101 While formal rules are shaped by human decisions, innformal rules should be seen as more or less tacit standards 
and norms for attitude and conduct. 
102 Realists would define power of balance as an institution, but will claim that rules play a lesser role in the 
international realm than in the national. 
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this basic insight, as far as I can see. From political science and comparative politics, one might 
argue that the study of politics is the study of institutions.106 Thus, the traditional gap between 
international politics and domestic politics should not be so significant as to strangle a valuable 
crossing of the borders of CP and IR. In this thesis, we treat hegemonies as international institutions. 
Since hegemony always will have a centre (located within a state), it should be feasible to analyse 
the interplay between domestic and international politics. Hegemonies also by their very nature 
influence, and in turn are influenced by, regional powers and peripheral states. Therefore, the study 
of hegemonies as manifestations of political, military and ideological power is both empirically 
exciting and theoretically promising. When I argue that the interplay between international and 
domestic political institutions concerning maritime sovereignty is the dominant theme in the present 
treatise, I hope to have argued above for a wide concept of political institutions. Keeping the central 
concept open enables us to study changes over time and across space, or as Stinchcombe express it; 
“The definition of a concept is a hypothesis that a certain sort of thing causes other things of interest 
to us”.107 Surely, the easiest thing to do is to criticise concepts or definitions. I could find other (and 
more recent) definitions of “institutions”. Douglas North defines them as “the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, the humanely devised constraints that shape human interaction”.108 
Somewhat more narrowly, March and Olsen argue that “political institutions define the framework 
within which politics takes place”.109 Even more precise, perhaps, is Jack Knight who says that 
“First an institution is a set of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways. Second, for a 
set of rules to be an institution, knowledge of these rules must be shared by the members of the 
relevant community or society”.110 Although not all will agree with the last distinction drawn by 
Knight, the authors all share common ground. Institutions are broader patterns of human 
interactions, opposed to organisations that could also be seen as bodies of agency with the potential 
to act of their own. Secondly, these scholars all see institutions as rules, or even limitations, that 
                                                                                                                                                             
103 Compare Stinchcombe`s discussion of sunk costs (ibid: 120-121) with neo-liberal institutionalism on 
international co-operation and why institutions are stable, even in international politics 
104 Scholars ”firmly within the rationalist camp” have stated that ”Researching the ways in which institutions do 
this-how do they enhance path dependence, and under what conditions?-would be intriguing” (Martin&Simmons, 
2001: 454 
105 Constructivists in IR would hold that ”ideas and norms matter”. See Ruggie, 1993 and Alexander Wendt, 1999 
106 Thelen & Steinmo, 1992 
107 Stinchcombe, 1968: 38. His discussion in ibid; 38-41 parallels my own argument. Keeping concepts open to 
change in light of later observation of empirical data is not unnatural. Stinchcombe is also right in pointing out that 
it is useless to discuss concepts totally separated from theory. The theoretical approach here would probably be 
categorised as historicist explanations. I will return to the theories applied here that justifies the short discussion of 
the concept of international institutions. 
108 North, 1990: 3 
109 March & Olsen, 1989: 18 
110 Knight, 1992: 2-3 
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regulate or constrain human behaviour.111 Or to quote Giddens, “Institutions by definition are the 
more enduring features of social life”.112 The latter scholar has also criticised structuralists for only 
seeing the constraining, and not the enabling, features of social structures. This view of structures is 
interesting for the present analysis, and might serve as a way of evaluating IR theories through the 
study of how or whether international structures changed the opportunities presented to different 
actors in this system. My point is that the real challenge lays not so much in defining institutions, 
structure and power. The challenge (of which this scholar is interested) is to try to tease out the 
mechanisms between the domestic and international levels at which political institutions might 
operate. One could indeed separate many different levels at both the international and national level. 
This is perhaps not as theoretically unattainable, as it is inconvenient, producing a framework too 
complex and unpractical in empirical work. I am not aiming at a theory that can explain everything. 
Rather, the approach lies in (a) separating a distinct set of international institutions within one policy 
area, (b) study the main ideological institutions at the domestic level that influence and are 
influenced by state policy in this area, and (c) try to grasp analytically the interplay between (a) and 
(b). This is easier said than done. Therefore, I intend to draw some lessons from comparative 
designs applied to macro-theory (in 1.2), and return to the question of international institutions in 
1.3. 
 
1.2 The issue of design in Comparative historical sociology; Some 
methodological considerations with bearing on this analysis 
The sections below try to shed light on the problem of design through Charles Tilly`s113 
categorisation of large-scale comparative work. In this passage, my aim is to clarify the purpose of 
the design chosen here, and to lie out the weakness and strength of this particular approach. 
It might be argued that all social research is comparative in one way or the other. However, 
according to Charles Ragin114, “in social science the term comparative method typically is used in a 
                                                 
111 See Milner, 1997: 18 
112 I will return to Giddens on structuration later in this chapter. He has argued that ”The most deeply embedded 
structural properties, implicated in the reproduction of societal totalities, I call structural principles. Those practises 
which have the greatest time-space extension within such totalities can be referred to as institutions”. 
In passing, one should also note that the concept of institutions is important for Jürgen Habermas` (1996:23) concept 
of ”the lifeworld”.; ”The authority of powerful institutions encounters actors within their social lifeworld…The 
lifeworld, of which institutions form a part, comes into view as a complex of interpenetrating cultural traditions, 
social orders and personal identities”.  
113 Tilly, 1984: 80-143 
114 Ragin, 1987:1 
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narrow sense to refer to a specific kind of comparison – the comparison of large macrosocial units”. 
As in this thesis, comparative qualitative comparisons try to see cases as wholes, and are historically 
interpretive.115 Another highly interesting way to emphasise the distinctiveness of comparative 
social science is to underline its multilevel character116. This nature of comparative qualitative 
method is also reflected in this analysis. I basically agree with Ragin, writing on qualitative 
comparisons of macro-units in 1987 that “Over the last twenty years, some of the most celebrated 
works in the social sciences (from Barrington Moore’s Social origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy to Wallerstein`s Modern World System) have come out of this tradition”.117 One of the 
legacies of Immanuel Wallerstein`s works is the way he approached the unit-of analysis problem. To 
a large extent, this problematisation of ontological entities left a considerable imprint on 
comparative politics.118 But the comparative method is intimately connected to the choice of unit. 
Wallerstein` s point (or protest)119 was that social scientists too eagerly clung to the concept of 
“society” and state, treating these as ontologies that easily could be seen as distinct units in the 
(more or less implicit) Parsonian manner of viewing societies as social systems. Wallerstein, and 
even more so Andre Gunder Frank’s global history,120 runs into opposing problems of design. Social 
inquiry must be anchored in space.121 Holistic interpretations cannot be carried out without some 
limitations of scope; attempts at explaining it all might easily end up in explaining nothing.122 
Before I proceed with any further elaboration of this theme, I will continue by discussing Charles 
Tilly`s types of comparative design. 
Tilly123 proposes that such questions must start by classifying the different sorts of propositions at 
which one might aim a comparative analysis. He divides these propositions into two dimensions of 
comparison; share of all instances and multiplicity of forms. In the former, “the statement resulting 
from a comparison can range from a single instance (getting the characteristics of the case at hand 
right) to all instances of the phenomenon (getting the characteristics of all cases right)”.124 The latter 
include the dimension that statements emerging from a comparison “range from single (all instances 
                                                 
115 This parallels Ragin`s (1987:3) argument, where the definition of interpretive work “Leans heavily on Weber” 
(ibid: 3) 
116 See Rokkan, 1966: 19-20 and Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 50-51 
117 Ragin, 1987: 2 
118 Bakka, 1998: 3 
119 For a compilation of methodological works by Wallerstein, see Wallerstein, 2000 
120 Frank, 1998 
121 See also Tilly, 1975 who sets up 4 ”rules for better theory” of studies of European political development. 
122 For critical assesments of Wallerstein`s world-system analysis, see O`Brien, 1984: 53, DuPlessis, 1987, 
Stinchcombe, 1982: 1395, Washbrook, 1990: 490, Hobden, 1998,  Worsley, 1980, Gorin, 1985, Sen, 1985, Klink, 
1990: 184, Driver, 1991: 275, Giddens, 1987: 167, Keohane, 1984:42-43, Brenner, 1977,  Skocpol, 1977,  Sylvan, 
1981, Brenner, 1977, Kimmel, 1990: 110, Friedmann, 1983: 500-501, Chirot, 1982: 562, Zolberg, 1981: 255  
123 Tilly 1984: 81 
124 Tilly, 1984: 81 
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of a phenomenon have common properties) to multiple (many forms of the phenomenon exist)”.125  
This simplification of the two dimensions of variation can then naturally be cross-classified. 
 
Figure 1.2; types of comparisons based on two sets of propositions126 
 
                                                   Multiplicity of forms 
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                               ALL 
 
 
This classification is basically a conceptualising of strategies of comparison. Furthermore, we must 
stress at this point that this typology actually classifies large-scale comparisons. 
(a) The pure individualising comparison thus takes the form of the “uniqueness of history”. The case 
in question (in the purest form the single-N case study) is thoroughly studied as a case on its own. Its 
common properties with other instances are minimised. Rather, the depth of the unit is studied. That 
is not to say that the approach is not comparative in its nature. Tilly cites Bendix` study of British 
and German workers as an example of this strategy, where Bendix tries to contrast the phenomenon 
as a means of grasping the peculiarities of each case. 
(b) A universalising comparison identifies common properties among all instances of a 
phenomenon. “It aims to establish that every instance of a phenomenon follows essentially the same 
rule”.127 Political economy and econometrics might be fields of study in line with this level of 
ambitions. Typical cases are “the economic effects of elections and change of government”128 or the 
conditions for “economic take-off”.  
(c) On the other side, moving from single to multiple on the propositions of multiplicity of forms, 
we then find the variation-finding comparison. “It is supposed to establish a principle of variation 
                                                 
125 ibid: 81 
126 Tilly, 1984: 81 
127 Tilly, 1984: 82 
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in the character or intensity of a phenomenon by examining systematic differences among 
instances”.129 Tilly here uses Jeffrey Paige’s Agrarian Revolution as an example. I find that Theda 
Skocpol`s study of “Social Revolutions” as an example resembling this ideal-type of comparison. 
By the use of the methodological rules of John Stuart Mill, Skocpol explains the positive and 
negative cases of revolution. 
(d) The fourth use of comparison essentially is none of the above mentioned, it is encompassing. “it 
places different instances at various locations within the same system, on the way to explaining the 
characteristics as a function of their varying relationships to the system as a whole”.130 Not 
surprisingly, Tilly places Wallerstein`s world-system analysis into this form of comparison. 
Interestingly, Tilly also sees Rokkan`s work with the “conceptual map of Europe” as an example of 
the latter category.131 
I will make some more comments on the encompassing type of comparison, since it bears some 
resemblances to the design in this dissertation. Let me first make a critical remark on Tilly`s use of 
the encompassing-category. The concept is rather ill defined. Tilly does not elaborate what he means 
by “system” and “function of”. This is regrettable, since many forms of comparative work within 
this category do not necessarily employ functional explanations; not all modes of research deduces 
results from the system down to the unit level. In Rokkan, for example, it is from my point of view 
at least, rather obvious that his conceptual map is not an attempt at creating a functional explanation, 
and I can not see that the use of his model necessarily leads to functional explanations either.132 In 
Wallerstein`s case on the other hand, the term functional can probably be used with some 
justification. Connected to this point is the use of the word system. I find that one does not 
necessarily have to view the encompassing comparison as systemic theory. As in Rokkan`s case, the 
conceptual map is rather built on a limited number of geopolitical variables that, according to the 
author, partly explain variations in state building and the structuring of mass politics. This said, I 
nevertheless find the strategy of comparison that Tilly labels as encompassing, to be highly 
interesting. Let me make a few remarks why this is so. 
Firstly, encompassing comparisons can be applied to different levels of explanation and analysis. 
This opens up for social inquiry that avoids mono-causal explanations. The usefulness of such a 
                                                                                                                                                             
128 See for example Midtbø, 1995. 
129 Tilly, 1984: 82, my emphasis 
130 ibid: 83, my emphasis. Note that Tilly sees all the mentioned scholars as ”mostly” applying the one or the other 
as these types of comparison. ”My aim is not to summarize or assess the complete work of any of these scholars, or 
even to offer full evaluations of the works I do discuss; it is to show strategies of comparison in action”, Ibid: 85 
131 Encompassing comparisons also have much in common with contextualized comparisons, see Mahoney et al, 
2003: 13 
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strategy is evident in studies where we see national phenomena as somewhat linked to international 
or transnational causes. In other words, our level of analysis might be domestic groups, institutions 
or whatever, while we look for explanations beyond the domestic society and polity. 
Secondly, it follows from the above that encompassing comparisons might be more useful if we 
accept that diffusion is a typical, not untypical, phenomenon in the real world of politics and social 
change. In an age of “globalisation”, this should make us critical to the notion that 
internationalisation renders comparative analysis obsolete. Rather, encompassing comparisons 
actually can be applied as a fruitful way of accounting for national variations of phenomena that 
partly is derived from international trends, events and structures.133  
Thirdly, encompassing comparisons is built on propositions that in themselves are theoretically 
interesting. If we accept that each “sub-unit” of the international or regional system contributes to, 
and is affected by the “system” of which it is part, then theoretical explanations must reach a 
corresponding level of sophistication. In other words, while it is easy to criticise the model building 
of Wallerstein and Rokkan (to mention a few, one could easily add most systemic theories in IR as 
well), their contributions are significant theoretically, more than what is recognised at times. If 
comparative politics and IR theory are to move beyond statist models, then encompassing 
comparisons might be a way of moving ahead, of merging theoretical explanations and use them as 
building blocks in concrete analysis. But doing this is not an easy task. This is evident in Tilly`s own 
treatment of the encompassing comparison. If I understand Tilly correctly, he sees these strategies of 
comparison as examples of the primacy of structures and external factors; “They select locations 
within the structure or process and explain similarities or differences among these locations as 
consequences of their relationships to the whole”.134 If encompassing comparisons simply means a 
mechanical deduction from system to unit, then this kind of inquiry is neither innovative nor very 
promising because it becomes deterministic. The way that Tilly defines encompassing comparisons 
is based on the practise of a few scholars, and the concept is actually arrived at from the study of 
these scholars. Tilly certainly is right in issuing the warning that “it leads effortlessly to functional 
explanations, in which a unit behaves in a certain way because of the consequences of its behaviour 
                                                                                                                                                             
132 See Rokkan, 1999 
133 One might also criticise some, but not by any means all, of the literature on globalisation as teleological. 
Argueably, the territories of civilisation have been more or less globalised during the past 800 years. In some sense, 
aspects of these complex processes could be described as de-globalization. Think of the authority of the Holy 
Roman Church in the Middle Ages, the use of latin in international relations and in the church till the 18th century, 
the later use of French language in the 19th century, the Royal dependency upon rich bankers, the use of mercenaries 
to wage war, and the truly international commitments of commercial trading companies etc. 
134 Tilly, 1984: 125 
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for the system as a whole”.135 Yes, indeed it does, once this type of comparison is defined in the way 
it has been above. As will be shown in the theoretical chapter, I will apply neither functional 
explanations nor pure systemic theories, but I still insist on the value of what Tilly classifies as 
encompassing comparisons. The reasons were listed above. Let me nevertheless be specific on the 
core presumption why I think this is a promising strategy. Neither polities, nations, national 
institutions, economies nor any other social or political phenomena worth studying in comparative 
politics exist in a milieu totally protected by the “state” boundaries or frontiers. If we assume that 
they do, we apply a systemic theory (and functional explanations) to a “national” society, which I 
find to be an incomplete view of politics, and perhaps more so than approaches where the national is 
combined with the international level of explanation. While I am not going to claim that 
encompassing comparisons are wonder-tools of political inquiry, it is nevertheless a good starting 
point for large-scale comparisons, since an encompassing comparison yields explanations that can 
be tested empirically at the local and regional level, while simultaneously allowing for a 
contribution to nomothetic theory. Guenther Roth once said of Max Weber that he "rejected the 
prevalent volutionary and mono-causal theories, whether idealist or materialist, mechanistic or 
organicist; he fought both the reductionism of social scientists and the surface approach of 
historians, both the persistent search for hidden "deeper" causes and the ingrained aversion against 
historically transcendent concepts".136 
As Tilly asserted of Rokkan “he made a decisive move from generalising comparison, in which the 
cases stood as logically independent instances of the same phenomenon, to the preparation of a 
complete map of a single interdependent system".”137 Political “development” or transformations 
cannot be reduced to the expression of the population`s expression or political culture alone. Here, 
Tilly is in line with the argument I am proposing. He quotes an unpublished paper by Rokkan late in 
his career (1976), which is of interest to us at this point. Here, “Rokkan explained that he turned to 
the cartographic effort out of dissatisfaction with the sorts of models of cleavage structure and of 
democratisation he had presented in his “Citizens, elections, Parties”138 since it was; 
 
“Too atomizing: it treated each case in isolation, without taking account of its connections with its 
surroundings, of the geopolitical position of the area in question. I began to study the links in space 
among the different cases, and became convinced of the decisive importance of interregional 
                                                 
135 ibid: 125-126 
136 Roth, 1968: XXXV 
137 Tilly, 1984: 129 
138 Tilly, 1984. 131-132 
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relationships, both in the process of nation-building and in the further structuring of mass 
mobilization”139 
 
This statement is highly interesting, because it might be seen as meeting Wallerstein half-way, 
Rokkan accepting the critique mounted against modernisation theory, while still refusing global 
schemes of the study of political development. From an ideographic point of view, there hardly is 
any limit as to what "should" be added to such a typology: an account of crucial events, alliances, 
war-making and diffusion of ideas and ideology. On the way, however, the parsimonius character of 
Rokkan`s schemes is lost. Nonetheless, in order to produce better explanations (and not weaker) 
models and theories, these must be evaluated against empirical “facts”. The main problem with an 
encompassing comparison is “testing” it empirically. This is of course connected to the kind of 
theory involved together with the design of the analysis. In Wallerstein` s case, it is difficult to find 
criteria for a discussion of “systemicness”, that is; where and when did a “World-system” really 
come into reality? In Rokkan`s “Conceptual map”, which is a very interesting work of political 
geography, one could probably ask how much more one could possibly gain from the map other 
than a rather general starting point to create hypotheses. 
While I certainly share some of the views in such criticisms as above, I will nevertheless argue that 
these encompassing cmparisons have certain theoretical virtues that have often been ignored. 
Encompassing strategies facilitate a theoretical merge of different (and divided) disciplines. One 
might propose, for example, that regime theory in IR might be highly compatible with a regional 
analysis of politics. For example, Robert Keohane (1984) and many of his followers in the camp of 
"neo-liberal institutionalism", have applied rational choice-theory to explain behaviour within 
international regimes. The units (states) all contribute to the project, but state behaviour is not 
simply deduced from the system (the regime). Is this account of international institutions based on a 
functional explanation? I believe not. This is of particular importance to the study of extraterritorial 
sovereignty. By international law, states are requested to resolve their disputes peacefully and this 
often result in intra-regional co-operation and conflict at the same time. The international law of the 
sea, as it is laid down in UNCLOS of 1982, specifically facilitates regional regimes for solving 
difficult processes of the sharing of sovereignty. Moreover, patterns of regional conflict and 
cooperation are often enduring, warranting a historical perspective. This link between encompassing 
comparisons and international institutions is interesting at a theoretical level. I think it makes a lot of 
                                                 
139 Rokkan, 1976: 9, quoted in Tilly, 1984: 132. Emphasis in original text 
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sense intuitively also. Encompassing comparisons makes it possible to study diffusion and cross-
national movements and influences. The accusation that globalisation has rendered comparative 
methods obsolete when using macro-theory is less than obvious when it comes to encompassing 
comparisons. In this thesis, for example, I will argue that the territories facing the North- and Baltic 
Seas were influenced by, and themselves partly participated in creating, international institutions and 
–regimes. Or compared to Wallerstein; is it not so that replacing the exchange between “periphery, 
semi-periphery and core” with particular international institutions will make comparisons in space 
more feasible, adding nuance and historical sensitivity to large scale comparisons? Encompassing 
comparisons are also in line with the methodological approach advocated by King, Keohane and 
Verba140 that they have labelled the mixed-selection procedure. By adopting this research strategy, 
the analyst is forced to include maximum variations on both independent and dependent variables. 
In this way, one assures that cases with rare “values” are included. In other words, “peculiar”, or 
rare cases are included in the analysis.  
Not only are encompassing comparisons ontologically, theoretically and methodologically 
promising (if demanding) but they also appear empirically sensible. The problem is of course the 
definition, the exact demarcation, of the “unit” or the “system” to be studied. As Wallerstein has 
reminded us, political or territorial entities are physically demarcated, while economic and social 
systems have a far less visible manifestation. Discerning these structures remains a vital undertaking 
for the social scientist, according to Stinchcombe. At this point, I will argue that analysis carried out 
within the framework of an encompassing framework actually is considered seriously also by 
scholars within IR. Neo-functionalism and studies of international regimes for example, can deal 
with policy within an international organisation composed by a group of states within a larger region 
(analysis of European integration is perhaps the most obvious example).141  
Therefore I will argue that macro-theories of comparative politics and historical sociology are 
closest to IR when an encompassing design is applied. Likewise, the study of international systems 
and – co-operation can be done in a comparative fashion. The beauty of the comparative design lies 
in the ability to isolate cause and effect, to become more historically and contextually sensitive, but 
more than anything for IR; to be able to study the interplay between the international and domestic 
levels of analysis. But my view obviously can be challenged. Is it not so that traditional theories of 
the international state-system and international regimes are far more straightforward, simpler and 
                                                 
140 King et al, 1994: 143-144 
141 The Reguonal Security Complex Theory as developed by Buzan and Waever (2003) is also a very promising 
application of an encompassing comparison-type of analysis. Moreover, these scholars demonstrate that an 
empirical investigation of a region builds abridge between national and global levels of analysis.  
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powerful without bringing the domestic level back in the explanatory schemas? I will argue that they 
are not, and part of the explanation why is given by Robert Keohane in the quotation above. The 
empirical data in this dissertation indicates that theories of international politics will be insufficient 
without integrating a theoretically informed conception of the modern state in the analytical model. 
The failure to reach an agreement on the Law of the Sea in 1981 for example, cannot be explained 
without taking into account domestic politics in the participating states at the UNCLOS. Likewise, 
the international system actually has changed over the last 500 or 600 years, a finding that is 
inconvenient for some of the most known theories of international politics like neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism, in the sense that it reduces the application of those theories.142 In this 
treatise, I will try to show that extraterritorial sovereignty is an excellent indicator of these changes, 
of the degree of order in the international system, and that this order is a vital component of world 
politics. On this latter point I am close to John Gerard Ruggie143 and above all Hedley Bull.144  
 
1.3 The challenge of explaining macro-change in international relations 
The field of study labelled international relations (IR) or international politics, has often been 
divided into the neat categories of realism, idealism/liberalism, socialism and constructivism. 
Together, such a typology in reality simplifies a variety of divergent ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. If we are to reduce the variation into some common denominator, we have to cut 
through a maze of scholarship on IR theory. According to Ole Waever,145 the most important 
difference between liberalism and realism in IR is the dominant historical optimism of the former, 
and the corresponding pessimism in the latter. In the words of Professor Ian Clark, 
liberalism/idealism constitutes a “whig” interpretation of history, whereas realism is interpreted as a 
“tory” interpretation of history, which “even gives expression to a regressive view of the world”.146 
Whereas liberalists see human rights, free trade and democracy as both ultimate and concrete goals 
of foreign policy, political realists are often portrayed as cool analysts of the national interest and the 
regional and international balance of power. However, this classical distinction between liberalists 
and realists should not be taken too literally as expressions of values and worldviews. In particular, 
it should be evident from the present treatise that liberalists might be just as –or even much more – 
prone to use brute force to achieve objectives in foreign policy as are realists. Ideals (liberalism) and 
necessity (realism) both can be potent sources for an activist foreign policy. 
                                                 
142 i.e. Waltz, 1979. See Ruggie, 1986, and Ruggie, 1998: 3 in particular. 
143 Ruggie, 1986 
144 Bull, 1977 
145 See Waever, 1992: chapters 1-4 
            
 Introduction-theme and theory
 
 
 
           
 
 
40 
As seen in the previous section, the development of IR made neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism into the two most dominant camps within IR from the end of the 1970s. I will 
postulate that neorealism hardly is an adequate tool of understanding changes in the international 
system. The point is not so much that the assumptions of Kenneth Waltz are implausible, but rather 
that his theory closes the study of international relations, thus excluding many highly substantial 
questions. Given its reliance on micro-economic theory and categorical divisions of levels of 
analysis, neorealism lays itself open to attack from several quarters. Firstly, state preferances are 
treated as given. This means that the particular content and meaning of state action can always be 
traced back to the same source of action; protection of given state interests (or national interests, to 
use the common term). Out of this, neorealism secondly points out that the anatomy of the 
international system basically is the same as an open market with free competition. In other words, 
international relations are anarchic. In connection with this point, neorealism is not well equipped to 
handle the possibility that the international system can in fact take on forms of hierarchy, or at least 
hierarchy within anarchy.147 Why explanations without reference to domestic politics will not do, 
should be laid out somewhat more detailed also theoretically. While neorealism is elegant and 
parsimonious, it is at the same time narrow in its analytical scope. Thus, one cannot resist the 
temptation to ask whether neorealism is a progressive step away from classical realism. The almost 
hermeneutical interest in the actual conduct of policy-makers, their praxis, which we find in some of 
the writings of Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger has been lost on the way. More specifically, 
the issues of domestic politics and identity are left un-examined by the big neo-theories of IR. This 
is unfortunate, since most sociologists today agree that social action to a large degree is culturally 
biased. Perhaps this is also the most essential reason why the theoretical debates in IR have become 
so intense during the last two decades. Neorealism and institutionalism, the latter in form of the so-
called neoliberal institutionalism, in the 1980s converged around the same image of the state as a 
rational actor (or firm) that could be studied through a fitting of the theory of the market. This 
sharing of a crucial assumption left the entire field open to criticism from various stands of 
constructivism during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the sheer amount of work laid down within 
this tradition seemingly makes a closer analysis of (neo) institutionalism worthwhile. 
                                                                                                                                                             
146 Clark, 1998: 7 
147 The latter being closer to what Martin Wight (1977) once called “suzereign systems”, as opposed to sovereign 
systems. 
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There is a rich tradition of studying international institutions, international organisations (IO) and 
international regimes within the field of IR. I will not be able to refer to the entire body of work in 
this field; that has been done elsewhere in voluminous publications.148 
One could reasonably argue that the mainstream theories on the so-called international regimes were 
most ready at hand for the present analysis. The social science-literature on international regimes is 
considerable in its scope and richness. It has also been applied to questions of the utilisation of 
marine resources. The Norwegian social scientist Arild Underdal, for example, in his study of the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) defined a regime as “A set of mutual 
expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, 
which has been accepted by a group of states”.149 The focus is state-centric, which suits the modern 
era of nation-states and international law well. In the institutionalist, or neo-liberal institutionalist 
school in IR, there has been a whole literature devoted to the study of what makes international 
regimes possible, and what maintains an international regime once established, as well as studies of 
regime failure, of course. Typically, this literature uses micro-economic theory applied to the 
behaviour of states. Robert Keohane, a central scholar on regimes, has thus summed up the rational-
choice programme for the study of international regimes; 
 
“International regimes help to make governments` expectations consistent with one another. 
Regimes are developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements 
they will be able to make mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or 
impossible to attain. In other words, regimes are valuable to governments where, in their absence, 
certain mutually beneficial agreements would be impossible to consummate. In such situations, ad 
hoc joint action would be inferior to results of negotiation within a regime context”.150 
 
Realists have typically criticised this programme on the grounds that it overlooks the relative gain-
logic of states when it comes to co-operation. States hardly want to co-operate if other states gain 
more than themselves by the regime.151 This realist standpoint seems to have serious difficulties in 
explaining the extent of international co-operation in the post- WW2 era. While realism converges 
                                                 
148 see Martin& Simmons, 2001, Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner, 1999,   Krasner, 1983 for some overviews. 
149 Underdal, 1980: 17. Different definitions abound, of course. One standars definition was introduced by Stephen 
Krasner in the book ”International rehgimes”, 1983:1 ”International regimes are defined as principles, norms rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”. 
150 Keohane, 1989: 108 
151 For an overview, see Mearsheimer, 2000 
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with Wallerstein in seeing co-operation as fostered by a hegemon that benefits at a maximum rate by 
the co-operation, they can hardly explain cases where the hegemon sets up or maintains regimes at a 
particularly high cost benefiting other states more than the stronger state itself in the long run. Nor 
can realism explain why regimes set up on strategic grounds at a mature phase continue to thrive 
after the initial strategic raison d`etre has vanished (e.g. NATO in the 1990s). Keohane has 
addressed this question with considerable vigour. As far as I understand him, the basic explanation 
rests on the value of important information;  
 
“(realism) fails to take into account that states conceptions of their interests, and of how their 
objectives should be pursued, depend not merely on national interests and the distribution of world 
power, but on the quantity, quality, and distribution of information…Information, as well as power, 
is a significant systemic variable in world politics.”152 
 
Against Keohane, one might argue that modern states in the era of high-tech intelligence, 
sophisticated bureaucracies and an international information network where non-state actors such as 
the media play important roles, have access to considerable information without intimate 
cooperation with other states in multilateral forums. Thus, apart from the fact that information 
matters and reduces costs, the general effectiveness of international regimes is contested.153 Realists 
would argue that international organisations and –regimes are just veils covering up power politics. 
In an effort to conceptualise what role international regimes played in international relations, 
Krasner and other suggested that regimes could be conceived of “as intervening variables standing 
between basic causal variables (most prominently, power and interests) and outcomes and 
behaviour”.154 Although this conception of regimes might correspond to reality as seen from 
observers in the western world, it leaves open the question if regime theory has given a significant 
contribution to IR when compared to realism, and if so, what that contribution actually represents. 
Keohane argued that regimes matter under certain conditions.155 Perhaps the most fundamental 
critique (in my view), against the literature on international regimes, was raised by Susan Strange in 
                                                 
152 Keohane, 1984 : 245 
153 See for example Gallarotti, 2001, Mearsheimer, 2000, and especially important, Strange, 1983. Wæver, 1992 also 
gives an accessible and elegant overview. My most central question is not whether information matters. Rather, I 
would argue that how this information is transformed into policymaking in the single states. How information is 
processed matters too. 
154 Krasner, 1983: 5 
155 Keohane, 1983 
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1983.156 Although I reject some of the harshest objections she raised, I nevertheless have come to 
accept two of the dragons she warns against. These are as follows: the use of regime theory is 
“value-biased”, and that it “distorts by overemphazising the static and underemphazising the 
dynamic element of change in world politics”.157 
This is perhaps a minor criticism against empirical analysis of international regimes, in the sense 
that all macrotheory is biased one way or the other. More serious is the claim that to study regimes 
in international politics, which Strange views as an anarchical, is seeing world politics as far more 
patterned than it actually is. Strange continues to say that; 
 
“Not only does using this word regime distort reality by implying an exaggerated measure of 
predictability and order in the system as it is, it is also value-loaded in that it takes for granted that 
what everyone wants is more and better regimes…is not political activity as often directed by the 
desire to achieve change, to get more justice and more freedom from a system, as it is by the desire 
to get more wealth or to assure security for the haves by reinforcing order?”.158 
 
The last sentence in that quotation points to a major objection to the literature on international 
regimes. This scholarship, according to Strange, tends to exaggerate the static quality of 
arrangements for managing the “international system”. Combined with a state-centric view, the 
regime-scholars have tended to see states as equivalents to firms on a free market. Thus, 
international regimes are often portrayed as the pareto-effective or pareto-optimal outcomes of 
international negotiations. Regimes are stability, and regimes change little over time.159 At this point 
objections to Strange certainly could be raised. Of course there has been serious work on regime 
change, the role of science, technology, new knowledge, "epistemic communities" and linkage 
politics etc. in this literature. And Keohane has certainly reacted to this criticism from realism. He 
actually crafted a theory of international institutions that sought to cut off this critique; 
 
                                                 
156 Susan Strange ”Cave! Hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis”, in Krasner, Stephen (1983) ”International 
Regimes”, Ithaca, Cornell University Press 
157 Strange, 1983: 337 
158 Strange, 1983: 346. But the use of the term equilibrium does not necessarily mean harmony or stability. In 
Thomas Schelling`s (1978: 26) apt prose; ”the Body of a hanged man is in equilibrium when it finally stops 
swinging, but nobody is going to insist that the man is all right”. This quotation from strange indicates that she sees 
a substantial  ideological reason to criticise regime theory also. Such a criticism is not my central concern. 
159 Ruggie, 1998: chapter 3 broadens an ontological criticism into an epistemological one as well. 
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“International institutions help to realize common interests in world politics. An argument for this 
view has been made here not by smuggling in cosmopolitan preferences under the rubric of “world 
welfare” or “global interests”, but by relying on realist assumptions that states are egoistic, 
rational actors operating on the basis of their own conceptions of self-interest”160 
 
I think the point made by Strange still is valid in the sense that regime theory certainly has its limits. 
The wider the scope in time and space of an analysis, most scholars with empirical sensitivity will 
probably find that regime theory does not explain profound changes in the international system. 
Indeed, the elegant and strong theory developed by Keohane cannot explain how (states) own 
conceptions of self-interest vary. Keohane and Waltz actually share the same, reductionist theory of 
the state whereby states can be seen as rational actors on a market. The theories are thus not stronger 
than what applying micro-economic, neo-classical style, allows them to be.161 Now, in defence of 
the assumption that states for analytical purposes could be treated as rational unitary actors, one 
might claim that it makes for parsimonius models with much explanatory power. This is reflected in 
common language and international law, where the state is often equated as a person in the 
international community. In my view, however, the problem is not so much the logic of 
reductionism of neoliberal institutionalism or neorealism in itself. The real problem is the limited 
ideographic validity of the analysis possible with these theories. Indeed, the theory of games is being 
stretched too far, and in this criticism I am certainly not alone. One scholar on the application of 
game theory in political science (an approach often criticised for being too reductionist in itself), 
Alex Coram, has criticised the attempts at building grand theory on the model of the state as a 
utility-maximizing actor as being too simplifying:“This also tends to make too close an analogy with 
the firm and to treat the state as if it were attempting to maximize…in a competitive market”162 
In order to go further, and I believe this is a meaningful approach, we need to open up the same 
black box that is shared by neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism; that of the state. However, the 
perspective of foreign policy habitus can go well with a moderate stance of constructivism within 
the study of international institutions, since constructivists in IR will argue that what constitutes 
dominant states (e.g. domestic institutions, beliefs and culture that comparativists see as results of 
state-building), is utterly important for the nature of the institution or regime in question.  
                                                 
160 Keohane, 1984: 245 
161 Ruggie, 1998 thus labels both neorealism and neoliberalism as neo-utilitarian theories. 
162 Coram, 2001: 13 
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At best, regimes might be seen as situations of temporary equilibria within given issue-areas. In this 
context, the concept of international regimes is useful for analytical and comparative purposes. 
Krasner`s concept of institutions as following a punctuated equilibrium is probably quite sound (and 
certainly in line with institutional theories built on the metaphor of path-dependency).  But regime 
theory itself can hardly explain the punctuation of this equilibrium. 
It would nevertheless be folly to dismiss the entire body of literature on international regimes as 
worthless. I am in particular to build upon a point where the literature on international co-operation, 
realism and world-systems analysis shares common ground. The role of hegemonies in fostering 
international co-operation is vital to the understanding of international institutions in the maritime 
field. The maritime institutions, embedded in world-orders, cannot be adequately analysed without 
looking into the values and principles that hegemons (in particular the Netherlands,163 Britain and 
the US) tried to enhance through the influence upon international regimes and institutions. Robert 
Keohane has argued that “nonhegemonic cooperation is difficult, since it must take place among 
independent states that are motivated more by their own conceptions of self-interest than by 
devotion to the common good”.164 Accordingly, we should expect a more anarchic international 
system in the absence of hegemons, and more hierarchical structures in the presence of leadership by 
a strong state. This is a vital contribution from neoliberal institutionalism in the sense that it opens 
up for different orders than the anarchy explained by Waltz. As seen from what have been labelled 
the neo-liberal institutionalist school in IR then, hegemons can serve a benign function by helping 
other states to adjust their policies.165 Hegemons take the costs of fostering and supervising co-
operation in order to enhance their own influence. Although HST perhaps is contradicting the theory 
of the balance of power166, several realists have also pointed out that hegemons shape world politics, 
and whatever international institutions there might exist, the politics of the strongest states are what 
matter most to the foundations and content of international institutions167 Thus, realists will assume 
that hegemons are likely to pull out of the institution if they do not see their national interests served 
by it at a given point (in neo-liberal institutionalism, a central hypothesis is that institutions are more 
durable than that. The virtues of shared information and reduced transaction costs make institutions 
persist).  
To the central scholar in world-system analysis, the state-system is only a superstructure, no single 
state being strong enough to temper the basis of the world-economy. From this follows that 
                                                 
163 Whether the Netherlands ever was a hegemon is contested. See Gilpin, 1987: p 73-74, footnote nr 8 
164 Keohane, 1984: 244 
165 Note still that Keohane hardly is a proponent for Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST). 
166 See Strange, ”The Retreat of the State” 
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international institutions by and large are devices of camouflage for the strongest powers. 
International institutions are the means for the hegemonic power to “impose its rules and its wishes 
in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even cultural arenas”,168 a less benign 
interpretation of international institutions, and one with some similarity to political realism. 
Of the three schools so briefly commented upon here, I find the arguments on hegemony set forth by 
Robert Keohane to be the strongest. It is also compatible with Krasner’s concept of punctuated 
equilibria, and more generally speaking, with historical institutionalism. Only strong states (be it by 
unilateral or multilateral alliances) have been strong enough to break out of the dilemma of 
collective action, if we by this dilemma refer to the situations where many states are involved and 
where co-operation is not already institutionalised. The point is that we then need to focus on the 
critical historical junctures where institutions are created, as well as beliefs, values and principles 
which the strongest powers wanted to lay down in the particular institution. But neither neorealism 
nor neo-liberal institutionalism delivers strong explanatory mechanisms for the study of macro 
changes. From their common assumption that the state in IR theory can be treated as a rational 
unitary actor in a perfect market, both strands of thought run into serious problems, since the 
international institutions (the balance of power and various regimes) is more or less taken for 
granted at the outset; the units and the structures are there, and hardly require explanation.169 
However, the scholarly as indeed the political debates between idealists/utopians and "realists" is 
sometimes obscuring the fact that both "realists" (implicit) and "liberals" (explicit) have one central 
assumption in common; beliefs matter in international relations. It is not, as sometimes argued, that 
realists deny the importance of ideas and beliefs in foreign policy. On the contrary, a theory of 
realism is impossible without such an assumption. As Ian Clark elegantly demonstrated, the validity 
of political realism depends on the degree to which its conception of the international order 
corresponds to the ideas and mentalities of the makers and executors of foreign policy.170 Alexander 
Wendt was later to formulate this in the slogan that "anarchy is what states make of it".171 The realist 
scholar that seeks to explain an event, or the realist politician that seeks to analyse the actions of 
other statesman are both depending on the assumption that the actors in question will behave 
                                                                                                                                                             
167 See Gilpin, 1987: 72-80 
168 Wallerstein, 2000: 255 
169 Note that this is different from world-systems analysis and theories of long-cycle hegemony in the international 
system. It is also very typical of neorealists an liberal institutionalists to claim that since they study international 
relations, they hardly need a theory of the state-. The fallacy lies in the fact that they thereby produce a double 
negative heuristics. They apply reductionism both to their analysis of the units as well as the relations between the 
units. Moreover, these theories do not produce explanations of what constitutes institutions. 
170 Clark, 1998 
171 This is not exactly the view adopted in this thesis. Ideas do not matter all the way down, but they matter along 
brute material factors. 
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according to "the objective" laws of realism. In other words, realism might serve as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, perhaps imprisoning scholars and politicians in their own ideas, or worse, as historian 
Lewis Mumford once wrote: "This is utopianism with a vengeance; the nihilistic perfection of 
nothingness".172  
Recent publications in the research front concerning international political economy seem to signal a 
shift from the concept of regimes to the study of the phenomena categorised under the more 
inclusive concept of international institutions.173 Any student of comparative politics will be familiar 
with the terrain when IR scholars now assert that international institutions should be seen “as both 
the object of strategic choice and a constraint on actors` behaviour”.174 Helen V. Milner even sees an 
“emerging synthesis of International, American and Comparative Politics”.175 In this framework, 
international institutions are seen as both causes and effects.176 And, in line with Krasner`s177 
important contribution, reaching one of several possible equilibria is only one challenge states face 
when they co-operate. Thus, institutions can perhaps be seen as increasing the path dependency of 
actors. In the words of Martin & Simmons; “once a particular equilibrium is chosen, institutions 
lock it in”178. But here one should be careful not to slip into the same fallacy as the static regime-
framework. It is important to study the changes brought to institutions also from within. In this 
context, domestic politics within states that participate in the international institution might make 
that institution more dynamic than we usually perceive domestic institutions to be. Participating in 
international institutions can change the state. One might even conceive that international 
institutions might change state behaviour by substituting for domestic practises.179 States and 
international institutions can both be seen as dependent and independent variables.  
                                                 
172 Cited in Clark, 1989: 89. As Clark aptly shows, it seems that Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr and 
Henry Kissinger were all too aware of this dilemma in realism. Clark therefore calls realism the tradition of despair; 
despair because classical realist scholars saw the problem of integrating the moral and political spheres as an 
impossible task. This naturally robbed political realism of the vision of ultimate ends, although all these scholars 
saw power as a mean, and not an end in itself. Furthermore, both Morgenthau, 1944 and Kissinger, 1957, seem to 
stress uncertainty more than certainty, intuition more than rationality. Famous realists have been much more prone 
to reflect this uncertainty than their self-conscious programmatic declarations often reflected. Perhaps it became that 
way because these were basically European scholars that sought influence in a quite different political culture: the 
USA. 
173 See Katzenstein et al, 1999  Martin & Simmons, 2001 
174 Martin & Simmons in Katzenstein et al, 1999: 89 
175 Martin in Katzenstein et al, 1999: 119-146, See also, in the same volume, the articles by Garrett and by March & 
Olsen 
176 Martin & Simmons, 2001: 451 
177 Krasner, 1991 
178 Martin & Simmons, 2001: 454 
179 See Martin & Simmons, 2001: 455-456 and Milner, 1997 
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This line of reasoning closely resembles the architecture found in the theory of structuration as 
developed by Anthony Giddens.180 Giddens stated that an entire book primarily dealing with 
structuration could be seen as an “extended reflection” upon the phrase Marx made that “Men make 
history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing”.181 Structuration theory is very “realistic”, 
in the sense that it`s main concept-structure, is seen as both “rules and resources recursively 
implicated in social reproduction”.182 Can this social theory be applied to macro-theory in CP or the 
study of international institutions? 
A few words of caution could of course be appropriate. The sheer complexity of the theory creates 
problems, making one scholar comment that it is not “particularly enlightening”.183 Both Wendt and 
Dessler claim that structuration theory should be less abstract.184 At the same time, both these 
authors are concerned with how actors located in a structure “where he/she make decision and while 
doing so reproduce and/or change structures”.185  To our concern here, sovereignty seems to be the 
phenomenon most clearly linking the state and its groups with the “international society”. Nicholas 
Onuf once applied the concepts of structuration theory (of which he also had critical remarks) to the 
relationship between state and international institutions. He maintained that just as individuals and 
societies make, construct, or constitute each other, so do states and the international system.186 The 
level of abstraction is still quite high, though. 
Perhaps the phenomenon and concept of sovereignty itself might prove to be a link at this point. I 
will focus on the concept as a tool for sociological analysis in the following, since the notion of 
sovereignty is pivotal for domestic and international politics alike. Let me clarify what I mean by the 
concept of sovereignty in this thesis, although extraterritorial sovereignty and not sovereignty at 
large constitutes what is to be explained in chapters 3-5. 
Extraterritorial sovereignty is a continuiation of the aspirations for national sovereignty. 
By extraterritorial  sovereignty, I am referring to state claims to use the  authority of a monopoly of 
violence that extends to cover overseas187 territories and sea areas. Sea areas include sea 
                                                 
180 See Giddens, 1976, 1979 and 1984 
181 Giddens, 1984: xxi 
182 Giddens, 1984:xxxi 
183 Bakka, 1998 
184 Wendt, 1987, Dessler, 1989, Larsen, 2000: 472-474 
185 Larsen, 2000: 473 
186 Onuf, 1995 
187 By overseas I mean territories which are divided from the mother country by salt water. 
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territories, exclusive economic zones, fishery protection zones and sea-lines of communication at the 
high seas.188 
 
I will give some general remarks on territorial sovereignty, plus examples of state practise on 
extraterritorial sovereignty, in order to illustrate the nature of extra-territorial sovereignty as opposed 
to the traditional concept of sovereignty. 
By focusing on the practise of sovereignty, it will seem that I am deliberately shying away from the 
discourses on sovereignty in philosophy and political theory. However, one should not draw the 
conclusion that there is an unbridgeable gap between law and state praxis on the one side, and 
political theory on the other. I hope the opposite will be evidenced below.  Rather, I aim at avoiding 
the, at times incredibly archaic, theoretical debate on sovereignty. The reason for this is that there 
have been few extensive treaties on extra-territorial sovereignty in political theory, whereas we 
have numerous judicial statements demonstrating a philosophical way of arguing in law on the sea. 
Furthermore, the purpose of my approach is to get closer to an understanding of how territorial and 
extraterritorial sovereignty have been empirically linked. Sovereignty, I claim, is an institution, a 
practise that has gone through numerous changes, due to material and ideational incentives of the 
most dominant actors on the international arena. At present, it is often specified in international 
regimes.189 In earlier epochs, this was not the case, thus weakening Ruggie`s claim190 that the state 
system after 1648 always included multi-lateralism.191 However, one of the main considerations will 
be to analyse the relation between international order and state autonomy. If neo-liberal 
institutionalism and hegemonic theory are to be empirically supported, we should find evidence that 
international regimes increasingly have helped to create order in the case of maritime management. 
This should also demonstrate that the modern state is embedded in institutional arrangements that 
serve as both rules and resources. That is, structures that are both restricting and enabling state 
activities, both decreasing and increasing state sovereignty and –autonomy. If the opposite is 
demonstrated, I must discuss whether this supports World-systems theory or traditional realist 
theory. Perhaps the research-field of extra-territorial sovereignty is particularly suitable for a critique 
                                                 
188 Extraterritorial sovereignty is a wider concept than maritime sovereignty. For example, extraterritorial 
sovereignty applies to certain rights that parties might enjoy in specified territories.  
189 See Clark, 1989: 37 
190 See Ruggie, 1993 
191 That is, multilateralism was a principle applied by western leaders towards entities that they considered to be 
sovereign states. What Ruggie is silent on, is all the territories and peoples that were not included in this category. 
Thus, he stretches his argument too far, in my opinion, since territories and nations not defined as civilised, political 
communities were often treated in a harsh way by strong states. Again, attempts at criticising realism ignore too 
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of orthodox concepts of sovereignty, as applied in realist theory. To what degree is there really a 
fixed border of inside and outside? And if not, how can sovereignty be seen as a residual variable?192  
In spite of the criticism mounted against the concept of sovereignty, there is reason to question 
whether international law, constitutions and democracy might function without the institutions 
traditionally held to represent sovereignty. One of the most fundamental aspects of the existence of 
the state is its occupation of a territorial area, within which state laws operate. Within these 
demarcations (through borders, and to some extent frontiers) the supreme de jure authority is 
granted the state apparatus, either by popular consent or imposition. From this follows the general 
principle of territorial sovereignty, which implies that within a domain, jurisdiction is practised by 
the state over persons and property in a way that excludes other states.193 This judicial concept of 
sovereignty bears some resemblance to the patrimonial view of ownership in private law. Earlier 
theoreticians within the field of international law thus often used principles from private law in 
connection with private property on the territorial sovereignty of states. To some degree, such 
analogies are still used on the principle of sovereignty.194 In a certain sense, this still is useful.195  
Max Huber, as judge in the The Island of Palmas Arbitration, thus stated that; ”Sovereignty in the 
relation between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the Globe is 
the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of the State”  (ICJ, 
1975, 12). 
State, or state-sponsored, activity in an adequate scale, which definitely shows the execution of 
authority, is a fundamental hallmark of territorial sovereignty. 
It is this Huber refers to as “functions of the state”, in a judicial meaning of the term. This does not 
mean that state sovereignty cannot be shared. As I will show, states and other organisations sharing 
sovereignty can be found in various constellations throughout the history of the Northeast Atlantic. 
In practise, we find that states often take up commercial activities and support settlement by its 
population in areas over which it claims authority. One example is the case of Svalbard, where both 
Russia and Norway have supported local communities to preserve their influence at the island.  
Territory can be leased or leant from one state to another, like UK leased its British bases in the 
West- Atlantic to the USA in 1940, in exchange for 50 American destroyers, badly needed in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
easily lessons from classical realism. Although both Ruggie, 1993 and Wendt, 1999 have produced impressive 
arguments, I find that they both are more idealistic than they perhaps are willing to admit. 
192 To Ian Clark (1999), the separation of domestic and international is the ”Great Divide” in the study of politics. 
193 Shearer, 1994;144 
194 See for eample Kratochwil, 1992 
195  See for instance the Court`s verdict  in the case for the international court in 1986 concering the republic of 
Burkina Faso in Mali (ICJ 1986, 554, §§ 20-26 
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war against Germany. A more recent example is that of China leasing Hong Kong to UK for a 
period of 99 years from 1898. In other words, UK could execute territorial sovereignty over British 
Hong Kong for a limited period of time, while China according to the treaty could regain this 
sovereignty in 1997196  
From a judicial point of view, then, one can also conceptualise the ways states can establish 
sovereignty. These are occupation, annexation, accretion, prescription and cession. Effective 
control and authority is required either way a state might claim sovereignty over an area.  In the case 
of occupation, it consists in establishing control and authority of an area not under the sovereignty of 
any other state, or an area abandoned by the state former in control. In the Eastern Greenland case 
(of interest to us here), The Permanent Court of International Justice laid it down that occupation, to 
be effective, requires on the part of the appropriating state, an intention or will to act as sovereign 
and the adequate exercise or display of sovereignty.197 In This particular case, Norway and Denmark 
disputed title to Eastern Greenland, and “Denmark was able to prove circumstances which 
established these two elements on its part”.198 Occupation does not make sense in traditional law of 
the sea, but as in the next case, an occupation of an island or a coastal state also typically will 
include sovereignty or sovereign rights of the sea around the state. 
Annexation is “a method of acquiring territorial sovereignty which is resorted to in two sets of 
circumstances”.199  Where the territory has been conquered or subjugated by the annexing state, or 
where the territory is in a position of virtual subordination to the annexing state at the time the 
latter’s intention of annexation is declared”. In international law, the intention of the annexing state 
must be explicitly stated. The former example of annexation is the most typical, as in times of war, 
whilst the latter more seldom occurs.200 Annexing sea territory is hardly found in the 20th century, 
but from annexing land territory, an added sea territory or economic zone naturally might follow. 
Gaining sovereignty through accretion of new areas occurs when new territory is added, mainly 
through natural cause (This might take place when new landscapes or islands appear because of 
volcanoes or wind blown sand extends the territory of a land state). In international law, no formal 
                                                 
196 Shearer, 1994; 145 
197 1933 PCIJ series A/B, No. 53 
198 Shearer, 1994: 147. In fact, the Norwegian claim to eastern Greenland seems totally absurd to us today. The 
claim seems to have been deduced from the ”Norwegian” settlement at Greenland, which perished sometime in the 
13th century, unknown for what reasons. The sentiments aroused in Norway over this matter were quite 
extraordinary. 
199 Shearer, 1994: 152 
200 One example, however, is the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. Naturally, the United Nations Charter 
restricts the legality of most earlier types of annexation. 
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act or assertion of title is deemed necessary in these cases. One should note that claiming 
sovereignty over sea areas does not fall into this category.  
Cession is a rather important way of acquiring territorial sovereignty. The state has the right to 
transfer its territory. This may be the result of a voluntary act, or it may be conducted as a result of 
war where territory is handed over to the successful opponent. The Russian sale of Alaska to the US 
in 1867, and the exchange of Heligoland for Zanzibar by Germany and Great Britain in 1890 might 
illustrate voluntary cession.201 
To me it is pretty obvious that cession also could include sovereignty of the territorial sea, or 
sovereign rights in an ocean area, and this type of cession does not necessarily require simultaneous 
cession of land territory. Typically, these kinds of cessions of ocean areas might be negotiated 
voluntarily, as in the negotiations between Iceland and Norway in 1979-80. 
Title by prescription, which is controversial among scholars of international law, is the result of 
peaceable exercise of de facto sovereignty for a very long period over territory subject to the 
sovereignty of another.202 There might be instances in negotiations on law of the sea, where this 
phenomenon occurs. One example is the bargaining on quotas in national economic zones. 
Typically, other states (as Poland and Western Germany) from the 1960s claim that since their 
vessels have been fishing in an area for decades or centuries, they have a right to extract resources 
from the same area, also when it (eg. Norway) has been included in the other coastal state`s zone of 
jurisdiction. 
Apart from the definitions and concepts of international law, social scientists need some concept of 
the state as a residual variable.203 This can be connected to the degree of sovereignty on part of the 
state. Recently, Stephen Krasner (1999) has made such an attempt in conceptualising sovereignty. 
From a realist point of view, Krasner argues that degrees of sovereignty are determined by the 
outcomes of rational “rulers” in interaction; “Outcomes in the international system are determined 
by rulers whose violation of, or adherence to, international principles or rules is based on 
calculations of material and ideational interests...Organized hypocrisy is the normal state of 
affairs”204 
The weakness of Krasner`s theory of sovereignty is that it not adequately accounts for how different 
sources of intervention in states affairs matter in different eras of history (I can not see that he 
                                                 
201 Shearer, 1994: 153 
202 Sheareer, 1994: 153-154 
203 See Nettl, 1968 
204 Krasner, 1999: 9 
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systematically explores the degree to which interdependence is the main reason for decreasing 
stateness after 1945, while low degrees of stateness in earlier times might have been the result of 
tense competitions between states. The way I interpret Krasner, his version of realism accounts for 
variations in sovereignty across time and space). Nonmaterial factors matter for states as well. This 
is simply due to the authoritative resources rulers must posses in order to uphold surveillance and 
control of the society/societies over which the state claims sovereignty. This affects the state’s 
ability to reflexive monitoring of the functioning of the organisation and societies within state 
boundaries or frontiers, as stressed by Giddens as vital aspects of the state.205 It is also important at 
an international level, since nonmaterial factors as ideology can change the way particular states 
perceive each other. As Alexander Wendt argues, ideas and ideology is constitutive for states as 
actors.206 In Giddens` terms, ideas and ideology might threaten or strengthen the attempts on part of 
the Government to establish reflexive monitoring of the society within the state borders. 
Perhaps this is a useful start in order to conseptualise the state as a unit through different aspects of 
the term sovereignty. However, these external perspectives on stateness say little about how states 
will react to external impulses, or to what degree states and their institutions might impose reactions 
from other units. For example, different states will differ sharply in their reactions to the same 
ideological or cultural impulse. Different states will choose various strategies in order to cope with 
international economic and military competition. The Mongolia and US are both states, but it is 
hardly an exaggeration when I claim that they behave differently in international relations.207 
In order to systematise the differences in beliefs, values and interests, we actually need to look into 
preference formation within states. Rational choice theorists will argue that this changes the subject; 
preferences become something to be explained, not something explaining.208 The debate on 
rationality is, as we have already mentioned, vast and rich. But one should note that even prominent 
scholars within rational choice, like Jon Elster, have warned against treating large institutions as 
rational actors.209 Even though, at an individual level, there are limits to what rational choice can 
                                                 
205 Giddens, 1987 
206 Wendt, 1999 
207 Methodological individualists would blame me here, since the processes to be studied here were carried out by 
individuals, and not collectives as the states mentioned. IR scholars that cling to the notion of the state as a unitary, 
rational actor might also note this sentence, and compare it with my later criticism of their own model. Truth is that 
although the metaphor of saying that states ”want” or ”wish”, the use of the state as a subject in international law, 
are broad categories of language. The same broad categories might nevertheless say very little that is sociologically 
meaningful about what that state ”IS”, or how it ”WORKS”. In other words, my point is that the state as a unitary, 
rational actor might be heuristically useful in many respects, but that it is a theoretical position with clear limits. 
Nevertheless, the use of the names of individual states as a linguistic simplification to represent the sum of actions 
that result in foreign policy, have immense practical value in international law and -politics.  
208 Krasner, 1999 
209 For a very interesting comment to the contrary, see John Searle, ”The Social Construction of Reality”, where the 
philosopher argue in favour of collective intentionally. 
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explain (I cannot will what I will), limitations are even more profound when dealing with such huge 
complexities as the state. A counter-argument will of course be that it does not matter, so long as the 
theory of strategic interaction produces good explanations and predictions. Perhaps a reasonable 
view of agency is to see all social actors as purposeful actors, acting on self-interest, but also out of 
social norms, a logic of expected consequenses as well as out of the logic of appropriateness. The 
problem with the latter distinction of James March and Johan Olsen is to specify when the different 
logics of action apply. I will adopt a weak assumption of individual rationality. Agents do not appear 
in a vacuum, their preferences will not “drop from the sky”.210 As Weber commented in an earlier 
footnote in this chapter, an agent also operates within a social structure. The most important 
structures here are the various structures of the state. 
Acts and actors are parts of a state structure, which is itself part of the structures of international 
relations. To understand negotiators that represent given states at the conference table without taking 
into account the particular state they represent, simply will gain insufficient explanations of their 
behaviour.211  
My assumption here is that individuals acting on behalf of their state or their interest group acts 
upon the interests, beliefs, values and norms inherent in the institution they represent. What it means 
to act on behalf of UK, Iceland or IBM thus cannot be separated from what that institution is. And 
what that institution is cannot be explained without reference to what constitutes the institution in 
question. The central approach to this question here will be that of historical institutionalism as it 
has been applied in comparative politics and historical sociology. This approach has taken various 
forms within scholarship, to be sure. What these approaches have in common is that they confront 
“issues of both historical contingency and “path dependency” that other theoretical perspectives 
obscure”212. This kind of approach is consistent with the definition of institutions borrowed from 
Stinchcombe that I have mentioned earlier. It includes both formal organisations and informal rules 
and procedures that structure conduct. But in order to be more precise on how historical 
institutionalism might gain answers that rational choice cannot give, we shall have a closer look at a 
rationalist line of thought on the interplay between domestic institutions and international 
institutions that have developed within IR in the recent years.  
 
                                                 
210 Wildavsky, 1990 
211 See Pardo, 1983. It is so obvious, in my mind, that any theory entirely based upon a theory of the international 
system will be unable to explain state interactions and foreign policy. 
212 Steinmo & Thelen, 1992: 2 
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1.4 Opening the "black box" of IR Theory: two competing groups of 
approaches on domestic actors and institutions in foreign policy 
Several leading scholars today agree that the dichotomy “domestic/national” versus “international” 
is being eroded by increased “interdependence”213, “internationalisation”214 and/or 
“globalisation”.215 These perceptions foster increased attention on theories and methods that seek to 
capture mechanisms operational in the interplay between domestic and international political 
institutions. As mentioned, these theories are largely divided between rationalistic analysis on the 
one hand, and more reflexive/constructivist/institutionalist modes of thought on the other hand, 
although there is a number of approaches (for example in institutionalist political economy), that do 
not fit neatly into either camp. Given the shortcomings of some of the grand theories in IR based on 
rational-choice analysis of the state as an actor, scholars within the rationalistic camp have been 
tempted to construct models that increase the ideographic validity of game theoretical analysis 
applied to foreign policy. 
I am going to suggest some propositions below that are of interest to the phenomena to be studied 
here. A crucial point will be taken up below to sum up the limitations of the use of insights from the 
rationalistic models. As Milner suggests,216 “symbolic costs” might be of grave importance in 
domestic institutions in ways that severely affects international co-operation.  
 
1.4.1 Rational actors 
It is important to address game theory at this point, since it can be portrayed as a universal theory.217 
Game Theory (or the theory of games) is the formal theory of strategic action between maximising 
agents. Game theory is indifferent to what the players wish to maximise (indeed, this might seem 
like a weakness in what game theory might offer for social scientists, but the fact is often overlooked 
by its critics). Applied to social interaction, a political process can be seen as a game when the 
players studied i∈N, they choose a strategy si∈Si, their payoff for any strategy (given the others 
players strategies) vi∈Vi and the players have information. Thus, a game simply applies to any 
situation where; 
                                                 
213 Keohane, 1984 was one of the scholars who made this term known to a wider audience 
214 Keohane & Milner, 1993 is probably one of the most systematic elaborations on this phenomenon 
215 Katzenstein, 1996, Katzenstein et al, 1999, Tilly, 2000, Milner, 1997, Held et al, 1999, Clark, 1999 to mention a 
few examples. 
216 Milner, 1997: 46-47 
217 Mahoney et al, 2003: 19-23 is a good discussion of the relationship between rational choice and comparative 
historical analysis. 
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One aspect of these assumptions is the possibility to see the best reply strategy in terms of 
evolutionary stability.218 Game theory might actually support an interpretation of state formation as 
an evolutionary process in which the most capable states survive in a self-help system of 
international “anarchy”.219 Evolutionary stable strategies occur from learning from repeated 
interactions, and the types of entities that do not survive the first interaction do not come to 
dominate the system. This opens up a possible link between micro and macro levels of explanation 
in the social sciences. Rationality in people and large organisations does not necessarily result from 
the strategic brilliance in a universe of Scrooges, but because entities that are good at adapting to 
their environment are more likely to survive in competition with others. Failure to adapt to the 
international competition or to international institutions can result in loss of sovereignty in various 
forms220, dismantling of the state or in social revolutions that fundamentally alters the constitutive 
elements of that state as an actor.221   
The development of so-called two-level games seems to have been motivated by a certain sense of 
dissatisfaction with the “state-as-an-unitary-actor” model in IR. Two-level-games (or more 
generally, two-level models of international and domestic politics) seek to find better accounts of 
international negotiations and processes in IOs by taking domestic negotiations and institutions into 
account. The central challenge to any such attempt is of course to “model” the perspective.  
Weighty arguments have been set up against such attempts, one scholar asking whether the study of 
International politics can do without the “Model of the State as a Rational, Unitary Actor” at all.222 
The relevance of domestic politics in order to understand international negotiations have been 
dismissed, even by scholars often credited as being in the front of research on the subject.223 Robert 
Axelrod reached worldwide fame by his computer-tournaments, from which he constructed an 
argument explaining why international co-operation would occur as the results of reiterated games 
                                                 
218 I am indebted to Professor Alex Coram for his comments on this aspect of hawk-dove games. 
219 The parallel to political realism and Charles Tilly’s work on state formation is clear 
220 E.G. a neorealist assumption 
221 As described by Skocpol, 1979.  
222 Underdal, 1984 b. A central problem in trying to embrace both domestic and transnational politics lies in a 
complexity that easily leads scholarly analysis into rather chaotic or highly detailed narratives of political processes. 
223 Axelrod, 1984 is a good example. Axelrod argues that the state preferences can be a result of endlessly complex 
domestic bargaining, different alliances and changing party or state coalitions, but this does not matter because the 
environment of the state sees the state as a unitary actor. The same assumption is more or less found in international 
law, where states are explicitly spoken of as being ”international persons” (Brown, 1994: 5-7). The latter fact is 
often used by IR-theoreticians to underpin their arguments in favour of the rational unitary state-model. However, 
there is also a growing body of international law that is dealing with non-state actors, while international law is also 
γ= [N,S,V,I] 
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between units. The question is whether these results can be applied to interaction between highly 
complex organisations like states.224 Empirical analysis of international negotiations based on such a 
model leads to anomalies. Sometimes the crafting of international treaties and regimes hinge on 
some crucial states, and quite often it is simply impossible to interpret the behaviour of these states 
without taking into account domestic interests and political processes.225 Perhaps the main problem 
is not the conceptual apparatus of game theory (which actually can be coupled with a weak226 or thin 
theory of individual rationality), but with the coupling of game-theoretic models 
with “state as an actor” ontology.227 I find that the latter suggestion is a main feature in the 
theoretical debate within the field of IR today.228  However, one should note that Axelrod`s findings 
have been subject to intense debate also among game theorists. There are actually three weaknesses 
in the assumption that tit-for tat- strategies will be superior (in addition to the obvious fact that states 
and other large institutions are not computers, bees or ants). 
Firstly, applying Tit-for tat strategies are complex when n>2. If one player defects amongst many 
other cooperative players, the collective good is no longer produced,229 the efforts of cooperation are 
in vain, strictly speaking. 
Secondly, Playing Tit-for-tat is not feasible if punishment is costly. In this case, state x`s threat of 
defecting if state y does not co-operate, will not be credible. For small states, for example, its ability 
to inflict costs to large powers has been limited (of course there are exceptions, but seldom without 
enormous costs to the small nation). 
                                                                                                                                                             
increasingly becoming national law (esp. In Europe), thus further eroding the distinction between domestic and 
international. See Wæver, 1992: 52-54, and also Hovi & Rasch, 1993: 28-31 
224 Using game-theory to analyse each case of negotiation, then coding the negotiations from the concepts of game-
theory I analysed the occurrence of tit-for-tat behaviour in seventeen international negotiations between states in 
matters concerning the law of the Sea. Although I controlled for various other variables, I could not find any support 
for Axelrod`s argument applied to state-level negotiations, even among close allies and culturally similar states 
interacting repeatedly in the same issue-area (Stensli, 1999). For a penetrating theoretical critique of Axelrod`s 
theory on co-operation, see Doyle, 1997. 
225 This is argued by for example Arvid Pardo, 1983 applied to UNCLOS III (the third conference on the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Pardo was a central figure in the UNCLOS III negotiations. 
226 Elster (1985: 2-3) gives a definition of a weak notion on rationality in this way; ”We must require, first, that the 
reasons are reasons for the action, secondly, that the reasons do in fact cause the action for which they are reasons, 
and thirdly, that the reasons cause the action ”in the right way”. Implicit in these requirements is also a consistency 
requirement for the desires and beliefs themselves” 
227 Skjærseth, 1994 points to this, albeit in a different language. He claims that it is a paradox that many game-
theoreticians in political science seem to hold a position as methodological individualists; they actually apply game 
theory to collectives as states or other institutions as actors. Thus, I would argue that two-level models based on the 
assumption of individual rationality are far closer to the ideal of methodological individualism than its theoretical 
competitors. Another side of the question is of course how desirable such a proximity to the ideal of methodological 
individualism is. See Hovi, 1992 
228 See Wendt, 1999, Ruggie, 1993 and 1986, Katzenstein et al, 1996, Katzenstein et al 1999, Martin and Simmons, 
2001 
229 Think os pollution agreements for the Mediterrenean or the Baltic Sea, in which a result depends upon the 
cooperation of all states at the sea-board. 
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Thirdly, it follows from the above that it might pay to defect, particularly in games that the player 
knows will be played a finite number of times.  
The preferences of the state as an actor should not be treated as given, if one wishes to give precise 
explanations of empirical processes. A scholar that followed UNCLOS III closely, remarked on the 
US domestic debate at the time that “Some proponents of the treaty tend to speak more often of 
“interests”, while some opponents tend to speak more often of “principles””.230  Not only does 
Oxman’s statement point to the cleavage in US ocean policy. It also hints at the role of symbolic 
values that embed US administrations, in this instance the Republican administration in the 1980s. 
Several authors stress the same; for Congress and members of the Reagan administration, it was the 
principles of the deep Seabed regime that were impossible to accept.231 Nevertheless, the rigour, the 
concepts and the line of reasoning in rational models often provide clear standpoints from which 
theoretical debates can start and from which they can develop in a fruitful manner. Robert Putnam232 
and his colleagues233 have been pioneers in this respect.234 
The central point for Putnam was to capture the interactive process in which the statesman or the 
official negotiating on behalf of his state took into consideration both his domestic interests, as well 
as the domestic situation of his “opponent” at the other side of the negotiation table. That this 
theoretical effort has been a victim of both criticism, as well as silence, is something of a surprise. 
According to Ole Wæver, IR (an “American social science”, Hoffman coined it 235), has lost its 
contextual and historical sensitivity.236 Indeed, one might easily argue that IR partly lost some of its 
earlier insights as rational models achieved hegemonic positions. In the 1960s and 1970s “theories 
of international relations that focused on domestic factors abounded”.237 After all, Henry Kissinger 
in 1957 wrote that  
 
“the acid test of a policy however, is its ability to obtain domestic support. This has two aspects: the 
problem of legitimizing a policy within the governmental apparatus, which is a problem of 
                                                 
230 Oxman, 1983: 129 
231 See also Nye, 1983 and Pardo, 1983 
232 Putnam, 1988 
233 Evans et al, 1993 
234 Keohane, 1989: 173 
235 Hoffman, 1977 
236 Wæver, 1992, see also Buzan and Little, 2000, Thomson 1994 for similar verdicts 
237 Milner, 1997: 3 
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bureaucratic rationality; and that of harmonizing it with the national experience, which is a 
problem of historical development”.238 
 
Thus, academic attempts at linking domestic and international politics should not be seen 
exclusively as motivated by globalisation or increased interdependence. Political actors have had to 
analyse the interplay between domestic and international political institutions all the way. One of 
the best historical analyses that illuminate this fact that I have come across is Fritz Stern’s (1977) 
analysis of Bismarck’s policies, and the way that Bismarck mixed state security and economic 
policy. Stern concludes on Bismarck that  
“Like other statesmen, he may on occasion have talked as if the domestic and foreign realms were 
separate or separatable, but he knew that the world was not that simple, not for him and not for his 
foreign protagonists. Diplomacy was the art of obtaining possible ends abroad within the clear 
constraints at home”.239 
 
The point is the same as in Evans, Jacobson and Putnam’s240 elaboration of Putnam’s model; 
international negotiations is a double-edged diplomacy, which is another way of stating that 
international negotiations, be it in an institutionalised setting or not, is where domestic and 
international politics meet.241 The model also seems to have intuitive appeal. Empirically, evidence 
in favour of the perspective abounds. Thus Schmidt wrote of the UNCLOS III negotiations and the 
American negotiating delegation that; “Interagency disputes in Washington rubbed off on United 
States negotiators, and their dilemma was compounded by the fact that they had to arrive both at a 
position that was negotiable with the G-77 and a result that would pass muster in the Senate”.242 
Putnam and his collaborators have suggested some general, conceptual variables that might facilitate 
agreement on the international level and ratification on the domestic level. They call this the win-set; 
                                                 
238 Kissinger, 1957: 326 
239 Stern, 1977: 309 
240 Evans et al, 1993 
241 But there is more than a nuance of difference between Kissinger`s statement on domestic politics and rationalistic 
models of two-level games. In the last statement contained in the quotation from Kissinger, he links the domestic 
acceptance or rejection of international agreements to national experience and ”historical development”. The 
historical sensitivity of Kissinger`s  ”A World Restored” makes it more akin to sociology than systemic theories and 
rational-choice models in IR.  
242 Schmidt. 1989: 59 
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the agreement that will be agreed upon at the international level and simultaneously gain the 
required support domestically so that an effective agreement actually can come of real.243  
Although Putnam’s model initially aroused attention and optimism, other scholars remained 
sceptical, and it proved hard to proceed further than what the team behind the concept of “Double –
edged Diplomacy” did initially.244 Professor Helen Milner’s “Interests, Institutions and Information” 
(1997) is an attempt at improvement and systematisation of the two-level game-metaphor. Her 
central aim is no less than to “explain the likelihood and terms of cooperation among nations”; 245 
International cooperation is often understood in ways similar to the definition by Keohane where 
cooperation is seen as occurring when “actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated 
preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination”.246 Milner adds to this and similar 
definitions by pointing out that cooperation also can take other forms, as tacit communication, as 
opposed to explicit bargaining. There are a number of substantial points of domestic politics and 
international co-operation that she does not address, however.  
Firstly, her conclusion that “polyarchy makes international co-operation less likely” should make us 
aware of one central limitation of the explanatory power of the model. It cannot say anything of the 
reasons for the differences between the countries in question, and why these differences are smaller 
or larger from case to case. It is not unreasonable to assume theoretically that the internal qualities of 
political institutions and interest groups, historical relationships between states etc, explains much of 
the international interaction.  For example, it has been claimed in IR literature that democracies do 
not fight each other.247 Although the mechanisms resulting in this empirical fact are not clear-cut, it 
seems to have a lot to do with both internal qualities of the state, and how perceptions and 
reputations count.248 In this thesis, I suspect that both perceptions of “the other” as well as symbolic 
aspects of the sovereignty of the polities vary due to different historical trajectories. 
Secondly, that the influence of the legislative branch diminishes, as the legislature’s ideal-point is 
closer to the preferred outcome of the foreign country, is taken as a mathematical fact. It is 
important to point out, in my view that this to a large degree depends on the overall relationship and 
                                                 
243 Evans et al discuss, for example the role of domestic demands. Some of their hypotheses are not entirely original. 
Thomas Schelling (1971: 28) for example wrote that ”When national representatives go to international negotiations 
knowing that there is a wide range of potential agreement within which the outcome will depend on bargaining, they 
seem often to create a bargaining position by public statements calculated to arouse a public opinion that permits no 
concessions to be made”. One might discuss to what extent Government can create such ”public opinion”, but Evans 
et al, 1993 nevertheless sets forth the hypothesis that strong domestic demands is an advantage for the negotiator at 
the international level. 
244 For attempts, see Mayer, 1992,  Iida, 1993 a,b,  Alt & Eichengreen 1989,  Tsebelis, 1990, Lohmann, 1993,  
Pahre, 1994,  Downs and Rocke, 1995, Mo, 1991,  1994,  1995 
245 Milner, 1997: 7 
246 Keohane, 1984: 51-52 
247 See for example, Doyle, 1993 
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powers of the executive versus the legislative. If the legislative, C, is strong, and less hawkish than 
the executive, P, is it then not reasonable to believe that C is able to pull P in its own direction? If 
we simultaneously take into account the relationship between C and F in the foreign country, Milner 
treats the impact of anticipated reaction in a rather mechanical way. Most importantly, Milner has 
probably not analysed fully how the influence of domestic politics varies with different structures of 
the international game that is played. Her assertion that hawkish legislatures decrease the likelihood 
of international co-operation does not apply to all international interaction. Schelling was right in 
assuming that important cleavages in the polity might prove beneficial in international bargaining. 
This can be proved by seeing the two-level game as a sequence of moves in a co-operative game.  
 
1.4.2 What rational Choice cannot explain 
The problems in Milner’s theory is firstly the lack of systematic treatment of the effects of different 
political regimes and domestic institutional configurations in states, and secondly the tendency 
towards tautological statements.  
Regarding the first point, she just state that “domestic politics is rarely a pure hierarchy with a 
unitary decision maker, even in non-democratic systems”249. But the implications are not elaborated. 
The problem with this is the limitations it necessarily places on the validity of the model in both 
time and space. Likewise one might argue that the model makes less sense in authoritarian regimes 
in the third world than in the modern state (that is to say, the more centralised the state, the lesser the 
significance of the two-level model). And finally, even among western democracies there can be 
significant differences as to the relationshipo between the executive and legislative branches.  
Perhaps a more fundamental critique could be raised against what I see as a tendency towards 
tautological statements in the model (which is not the same as saying that the implications of the 
model are wholly tautological). That “the degree of divided government and the preferences of the 
executive”250 are critical when it comes to predicting state behaviour is not really a very original 
thesis. She nevertheless interprets this in the opposite direction than Schelling251 and Putnam252; 
Milner suggests that problems of international co-operation increase as the division between the 
executive branch and the median legislator grows. She simply states that divisions at home seem to 
                                                                                                                                                             
248 See for example, Owen, 2000 
249 Milner, 1997: 12 
250 ibid: 235 
251 Schelling, 1960 
252 Putnam, 1988 
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undermine the state’s bargaining leverage at the international level.253 Schelling early stated that 
divisions at home could be exploited internationally in all cases where the opponents had true 
incentives for reaching an agreement. A good example of this was the negotiations between Iceland 
and Norway on the 200-mile EEZ around Jan Mayen. The dominant view in Norway was that 
Iceland had outplayed its opponent; 
 
“The Icelanders have played well. They have even managed to exploit their domestic split to their 
own foreign policy advantage. Norway, on the other hand, has totally blown its chances. If this case 
does not lead to consequences in the Parliament, it is simply unbelievable”254 
 
Milner’s hypothesis that the preferences of political executives are important,255 is not particularly  
original. The more “hawkish” the Government, the less likely are initiatives for international co-
operation in the given area.  
It is of course important to bear in mind that Milner’s is a simplifying model. It is also true that “the 
test of the theory should be whether it provides valuable insights and helps produce testable 
hypotheses to explain real world phenomena”256. Milner has produced such testable hypotheses. 
When I treat them sceptically, it is because I expect them to be negated to a considerable extent 
when confronted with empirical evidence, partly because the model is too limited. There are a 
number of questions (in my mind some of the most important ones) that are not – or to a very 
limited degree- touched upon by her two-level model. 
Generally, the model257 to some degree says the obvious. In his conclusion on formal, game-
theoretical models of negotiation, Jon Elster, for example, stated that “I will leave it, therefore, at 
this point. Fortunately, in a sense, not much is lost, since the theory has few robust results”.258  
                                                 
253 Milner, 1997;236 
254 Sunnmørsposten August 15 1979. On the whole, I am in fact uncertain if not Schelling conceptualised the 
strategic interaction of states in a clearer way than any other scholar has done ever after. For example, Schelling 
points to the role of credible threats. It is actually not hard to conceive that the executive in country X finds it easier 
to present an agreement to the legislative and pressure groups if it can point out that opposition to the agreement was 
even harsher in country Y. 
An example is found in the negotiations between Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands on fishery regulation of 
1996. In the Icelandic secretary of state`s statement to the Allting (parliament) October 31 1996, he points to this 
aspect; ”This agreement was discussed in detail in the Althingi when it was concluded. It is clear that not everyone 
was satisfied with the outcome, but it is worth remembering that the agreement was heavily criticised by Norwegian 
interest groups as well” (INFO JAN 1997 Icelandic State Dept.) 
255 Milner, 1997: 236 
256 Milner, 1997: 248 
257 Brams, (1995: 5), a proponent of rational choice in political science, stated that ”not only may elaborate models 
cloak the essential features of a problem in a fog, but they also may be almost as opaque as the real world we wish 
to understand” 
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In general, institutions are a lot harder to change than the preferences of the involved actors.  
At this point I find it appropriate to point out that the choices of important political institutions is not 
always “controlled” in any simple meaning of the word (some Marxists would certainly disagree at 
this point). The point is simply that the two-level models, in spite of their value in other respects, 
cannot explain why domestic institutions change. Helen Milner has made a fine contribution to the 
interplay between domestic and international politics. If we are to explain outcomes of political 
processes through the model elaborated by Helen Milner, we are destined to detailed case studies. It 
certainly is possible to compare these cases, but such an undertaking will be highly demanding. 
Firstly, the studies must be carried out case-by-case, where the case in question must be seen as an 
isolated event. Secondly, comparing these events means treating them as units. This is not per 
definition impossible, for example through Boolean techniques. While negotiations can be 
institutionalised, they are often not, which means that some negotiations have a high level of 
institutionalised environment, others not.259 If we are to gain a better understanding of the interplay 
between states and international institutions, studying formal, isolated negotiations will be both 
particularistic and leave many untold stories of the enduring features of both domestic and 
international politics.  
 
1.4.3 Historical institutionalism – an alternative framework 
By historical institutionalism260, I refer to the body of work within comparative politics with the 
same theoretical core as Steinmo and Thelen refer to: “a theoretical project aimed at the middle 
range that confronts issues of both historical contingency and “path dependency” that other 
theoretical perspectives obscure”261. This school defines institutions broadly, in a fashion similar to 
what I have done on previous pages. In the words of Thelen and Steinmo, “institutionalists are 
interested in the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define 
their interests and structure their relations of power to other groups”.262 
When historical institutionalism is applied in research on public policy, it more or less corresponds 
to what some authors have coined the “institutional-political process perspective”263 in the study of 
public policy.  In this approach, the state and state structures occupy centre stage. What makes this 
                                                                                                                                                             
258 Elster 1989a: 146 
259 According to March & Olsen, 1989, levels of institutionalisation influence the logic of action to a considerable 
degree. This remains an interesting theory (see below).  
260 Definitions of institutions are discussed in chapter 1. 
261 Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 1-2 
262 ibid: 2 
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line of work akin to historical institutionalism lies in its focus on the effects of state formation 
processes. Applying historical analysis, this comparative approach explains differences between 
political systems that can account for different results in policy processes. If we compare this line of 
thought with rational choice-perspectives on international relations (and systemic theories of the 
same subject that assume that the units are unitary and rational), a central difference between them is 
that the comparative perspective shows that states do differ in vital aspects. They are not “like 
units”, as assumed in neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism.  
Historical institutionalism can be seen as a type of middle ground between grand theories and 
models that describe individual behaviour. Important questions in this perspective in comparative 
politics will be how different societal and political institutions in different territories help explain 
both changes and persisting cross-national differences in policy outcomes. This programme has been 
carried out in many policy areas by scholars from comparative politics/historical sociology, but 
surprisingly little has been done in order to explain the international effects of these “national” 
differences, and vice versa. Only with globalisation studies, it seems, is the latter becoming an 
expanding area of research.264 In my opinion, the effects of institution-building and different 
institutional configurations should enable us to study the difference between “states as actors” on the 
international arena. The point is that historical institutionalism argues that “institutions play a much 
greater role in shaping politics, and political history more generally, than that suggested by a narrow 
rational choice model”.265 If we for example share some of the same basic assumptions as Helen 
Milner of how domestic politics matters to international institutions, from a historical 
institutionalism- perspective, we would add that it is vital to study how institutions and individuals 
define their self-interest. Not only are strategies, but also the goals actors pursue, the principles they 
believe in and try to harmonise with interests, shaped by institutional context. In short, institutions 
matter even more than Milner and other rational-choice theorists argue. Rational choice treats 
preference formation as exogenous, while historical institutionalists treat it as endogenous.  
In fact, one might plausibly argue that historical institutionalism means that we are able to get closer 
to the constitution of the subject we are studying than approaches from universal theories. The two 
latter theories actually derive at hypotheses from a very limited number of assumptions.  By 
studying institutions, the scholar tries to link outcomes, behaviour and preferences with context. 
                                                                                                                                                             
263 Heidenheimer at al, 1990: 9 
264 The ”political culture”-literature in Comparative politics has occasionally been an exception  in this respect. See 
for example Lipset, 1964 and Ellis, 1993. For a recent and refreshing attempt, see Matarese, 2001 
265 ibid: 7 
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That economists, such as Barry Eichengreen, rejects this as fuzzy logic266, perhaps has to do with the 
fact that economic models actually were created to study situations where utility ultimately could be 
measured in money-a calculable unit.267 Transferring these models to politics means that we could 
too mechanically apply them on situations where the main parameter is power, a variable much 
more different to conceptualise, to say measure.  
What is lost compared to rational choice is the precision and elegancy of formal models based on 
simple assumptions. This loss surrounds the debate on the so-called New institutionalism, which in 
fact is a label applied to various approaches within “economics, organization theory, political 
science and public choice, history and sociology-united by little more than a common scepticism 
toward atomistic accounts of social processes and a common conviction that institutional 
arrangements and social processes matter”.268  
A major controversy within this so-called new institutionalism hinges on the definition of 
institutions. For example, the question whether institutions reflect preferences of individuals or 
corporate actors, remains contested. This debate easily slips into the familiar struggle between 
methodological individualism and –collectivism within the social sciences. Dimaggio and Powell 
claim that the sociological approach within the new institutionalism is marked by its inclination to 
see action as structured by shared systems of rules that “both constrain the inclination and capacity 
of actors to optimise as well as privilege some groups”.269 Although there are similarities between 
neo-institutionalists and historical institutionalists, the latter group often study historical changes.  
In turning to historical institutionalism, the scholar does not fall back on ad-hoc hypotheses or 
anecdotal evidence. On the contrary, in a historic study of institutions, the scholar is bound to face 
                                                 
266 Eichengreen, 1999 well illustrates the rational choice paradigm in economics. In this article, it becomes apparent 
that economists go much further than for example Jon Elster in simplifying assumptions of human behaviour. 
267 Schelling`s (1967: 238) words that ”For the social scientist, what is rudimentary and conceptual…about game 
theory…will be, for a long time, the most valuable” ring true even today. Consider how models of coalition 
formation and negotiations with a high degree of mathematical precision yield modest empirical value. Elster, 
(1989b: 52), a leading proponent of rational choice theory thus concluded that “Although there are many theories of 
coalition formation, I think it is fair to say that none of them is very satisfactory” 
268 Powell and Dimaggio, 1991: 3. As these authors suggest, the study of international regimes has turned into the 
same mode of inquiry. What divides the study of regimes from pure rational-choice models is the emphasis on 
norms in the former line of work. However, one should be careful in overstating this difference, especially after the 
increasing use of constructivist ideas in IR. 
269 Powell and Dimaggio, 1991: 11. Note that the notion of the rational actor is not completely tossed aboard here. 
Game-theorists within political science would hardly disagree on this point. Much more crucial is the study of 
changes in institutions. The use of cognitive “scripts” and “maps” as explaining institutional rearrangements does 
not seem totally convincing to this author. There is no doubt that such mental modes of thought and action exist, but 
in my view, this is a catchall theoretical position that hardly can be falsified. At the very least, such theoretical 
concepts seem to have limited potential for generalisation or comparison if they are not anchored in a theory of 
political culture or institutions that has elements of scientific realism. In other words, I will argue that the relativism 
of constructivism must be somewhat limited. A very ambitious form of such limited constructivism can be found in 
the grid-group analysis as elaborated by Ellis and Wildavsky. In chapter 4 I will argue that the use of ideal-types (in 
a weberian sense) might be fruitful at a macro-level if the ideal-types are based upon concrete historical experience. 
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empirical evidence and the necessity of systematising huge amounts of textual information. As a 
matter of fact, he or she sees as problematic what rational choice takes as given or simply assumes. 
In the words of Wildavsky270, preferences just don’t drop from the sky. On the other hand, social 
processes are also change. Milner and other rational choice theorists see institutions as rational units. 
Whether they study institutional rearrangements or wars, they assume it to result from the interplay 
between rational actors. The virtue of historical institutionalism is to explain how institutional 
structures help shape policy processes by defining principles and preferences. As claimed by March 
and Olsen; 
 
“Understanding the transformation of political institutions requires recognizing that there are 
frequently multiple, not necessarily consistent, intentions, that intentions are often ambiguous, that 
intentions are part of a system of values, goals, and attitudes that embeds intention in a structure of 
other beliefs and aspirations”271 
 
This is not to say that historical institutionalism is without problems.  
Comparing historical institutionalism to rational choice also highlights the weakness of attempts to 
formulate a coherent Theory of institutions with anything resembling the clarity found in game 
models. Perhaps parsimonious designs to some degree must be sacrificed in order to explain 
preference formation. After all, as Powell and Dimaggio, have remarked, “Studies of organizational 
and political change routinely point to findings that are hard to square with either rational-actor or 
functionalist accounts”.272 Central challenges in institutional theory are the problems of explaining 
institutional change and linking micro/meso and macro levels of explanation.273 This, I assume, is a 
weakness in institutional theory. 
Historical institutionalists, like Stephen Krasner in his model of punctuated equilibrium, will argue 
that functioning institutions shape politics, but in situations when institutions are created and suffer 
breakdown, will hold that politics shape institutions. The problem, As Thelen and Steinmo point out, 
is that these models “explain everything until they explain nothing”.274 Institutionalist perspectives 
can easily lead to static views of politics. In a model of path-dependency where critical junctures are 
highlighted, political leaders tend to become mere reflections of structures, rather than boundary-
                                                 
270 Wildavsky, 1990 
271 March and Olsen, 1989: 65-66. The controversy around the theoretical concepts elaborated by these authors, the 
”logic of expected consequences” and ”logic of appropriateness”, is substantial. See Krasner, 1999 for an 
application of them in a discussion of sovereignty as an institution. 
272 Powell & Dimaggio, 1991: 3 
273 See for example Di Maggio and Powell,  
274 Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 15 
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transcending actors. They become “gardeners rather than engineers”, in the words of Johan P. Olsen. 
Thus, both actors and gradual change are pushed into the background. 275 In order to remedy this, 
one can conceive of external changes as producing changes in institutions.276 If historical 
institutionalism cannot explain institutional dynamism through other ways than pointing to external 
influences, then "“external change” naturally becomes paramount in order to explain changes in 
institutions. This, in my view, is the prime justification for macro-theory.  
 
However, I will argue that elements from both game theory and the two-level metaphor inform our 
analysis of the interplay between states and international institutions. State leaders certainly can be 
seen as players in large games, both over their domestic as well as international resources. The Two-
level metaphor is one attempt to grasp the interplay of domestic and international concerns that state 
leaders try to meet. However, it is not only formal institutions that mediate political decisions, but 
also institutions of a more informal character. One central assumption in comparative politics is that 
political culture also matters, thus making the international arena inhabitated by different types of 
actors. This approach is not entirely incompatible with rationalistic analyses, since informal 
restraints can be seen as transaction costs in different polities as well as costs that affect behaviour 
among states. Douglas North, in one famous work, has sought to clarify the nature of how culture 
matters;277 
 
“Where do informal constraints come from? They come from socially transmitted information and 
are a part of the heritage that we call culture…the cultural filter provides continuity so that the 
informal solution to exchange problems in the past carries over into the present and makes those 
informal constraints important sources of continuity in long-run societal change” 
History should therefore be seen as path-dependent. I will use the most important tools from the 
theories above to investigate one particular aspect of what constitutes states; their maritime 
sovereignty. In this thesis, the theoretical concept of path dependency is of outmost importance. 
Both on the international and domestic levels of analysis, the philosophies of mare clausum and 
mare liberum served as principle justifications of state policies and as principles for international 
institutions regulating maritime policies. 
                                                 
275 Johan P. Olsen: “The political organization of Europe: Differentiation and unification”, The Stein Rokkan 
Memorial Lecture, University of Bergen September 16th 2005.  
276 see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 18-20 
277 North, 1990: 37 
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Is it possible to say that the international institutions regulating state behaviour at sea is an important 
aspect of world orders and to our understanding of world politics? In order to try to answer these 
questions, we firstly need to develop a general theoretical model of foreign policy where ideology 
and material national interests in the realm of maritime policies both are given the status they 
deserve. The next step will be to explore how empirical evidence can serve to construct a typology 
of states according to this general model. In other words, we will have to pursue the difficult task of 
ensuring that our ideal-types have the highest possible local and regional validity.  
States are institutions. At the international level, states form institutions of a general as well as an 
issue-specific character. The efficiency and impact of institutions depend on the transaction costs 
inherent in interaction. I see transaction costs as consisting of two clusters of variables.278 One is the 
availability of, and costliness in processing information. How states collect and interpret 
information, and how this information is put to use, however, cannot be deduced from theories of 
firms on perfect markets. The formulation and pursuit of national interests will be seen as modified 
by ideology in this thesis. The second main source of transaction costs is the cost of protecting 
rights, including preferences, principles and property. For states, the costs of protection depend on 
the nature of the international system. The ability to protect is a result of international competition as 
well as the internal strength of the state, to a large degree determined by bureaucratic efficiency, 
legitimacy, and the strength of civil society and to what degree the state is embedded in society. The 
availability of information depends upon the degree of co-operation at the international level, but it 
also depends upon the same abilities of the state as mentioned in the previous. The latter to a large 
degree should be seen as a result of the political culture and political principles the state embodies, 
since I see these as mechanisms that influence the procession of information within the state.279 This 
is how domestic and international politics are seen as entwined in this thesis. In addition to the role 
played by war-making in determining state formation (Tilly), other international institutions have 
mattered. These institutions to a varying degree have been influenced by how strong powers have 
applied ideological, economic, military and political power (Mann). Game theory alone cannot 
explain preferences, only the interaction between units given a set of preferences (not a small 
contribution, to be sure).  Historical institutionalism thus should be applied both at the national as 
well as international level in order to explain the principles that make institutions. What are lacking 
are concepts of political culture as influencing state information processing and decision-making. 
The term political culture is ambiguous. Thus, I will restrict the analysis in the following chapter to 
                                                 
278 This is a modified version of the argument by North, 1990: 27 
279 Thus, I believe Martha finnemore has exaggerated the role of international norms, and that almost all systemic 
theories of international relations have underplayed the role of domestic politics.  
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those aspects of political culture that have affected state policies over extraterritorial sovereignty and 
use of violence at sea. In other words, I am setting out to construct a relevant model with 
explanatory power where the material interests that were at the core of national interests in the 
foreign policy decision-makin process are seen as constituted partly by ideational factors. In the 
sector of maritime foreign policy, the main ideational variable can be interpreted in the light of two 
old sets of principles; mare clausum and mare liberum. 
 
2 Extraterritorial Sovereignty – Idealtypes and the Selection of 
Cases 
“Historians, it has been said, spend the first third of their career attacking the errors of their elders, the 
second third putting forward their own, more convincing interpretations to replace them, and the last third 
defending historical truth against the misguided iconoclasm of their younger colleagues”   
Richard J. Evans280 
 
In this chapter, we face the intriguing question of what state principles mattered in state policies and 
international institutions of extraterritorial sovereignty. Thus, we will construct ideal-types (in the 
weberian sense) in order to analyse these. Particularly, the aim is to set forth hypothesis of how 
these principles were distributed among different types of states. Before we proceed to the 
hypotheses in the form of typologies, we must  
• Clarify the structure of the explanation we seek to construct, which in turn is intimately  
              connected to how to: 
• Explain what the principles of mare liberum and mare clausum have meant historically. 
The latter must be done in order to construct valid ideal types, and we are therefore at the juncture 
which is the only time where empirics serve theory and not the other way around, according to 
Weber. 
In contrast to the brief elaboration on the view of sovereignty in section 1.3, Grotius argued in 
“Mare liberum” that the sea couldn’t be seen as an extension of the land territory.281 The sea, he 
argued, cannot be territorialized; it should be seen as open to all, be it merchant companies or states. 
The sea cannot be inhabited, thus it cannot be parted among territorial sovereigns through borders or 
even frontiers. Grotius was one of the firsts to attack extensive claims to sovereignty. He based his 
                                                 
280 Evans, 1997: 12 
281 Actually, the conflicting views on this point were well illustrated in the discourses of extraterritorial sovereignty 
in France and England in the aftermath of the Hundred Years` War. See for example du Jourdin, 1993: 110 
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criticism on two grounds. Firstly it is impossible for any nation effectively to take it into possession 
by occupation. Secondly nature does not give a right to anybody to appropriate things that may be 
used by everybody. The open sea thus is a res gentium or res extra commercium. Being an ideology, 
mare liberum nevertheless suited Dutch economic interests. “As the greatest Seaborne carriers of the 
world for over a century”282, the Dutch were moved by interests as well as ethical principles when 
they argued in favour of free trade and commerce. Still, mare liberum was an enduring principle in 
Dutch thinking, a genuine reflection of the wishes to be at peace. And peace clearly also was 
beneficial for the Republic.283 Thus, Pieter de la Court in 1662 wrote that “Above all things war, and 
chiefly by sea, is most prejudicial (and peace very beneficial) for Holland”.284  
Empirically, the ideal-typical opposite in the form of mare clausum gained ground in the 20th 
Century, while mare clausum was established as state praxis in Britain long before this.285 Grotius 
actually foresaw John Selden on this point, since he insisted that”closed seas” was to be treated 
almost as lakes (Grotius undoubtedly had the Zuyder Sea in mind).286 Territory is based on the Latin 
terms terra, meaning, “land” or “earth”.287 But in modern law, the concept of territory has come to 
embrace spaces or areas, including the air, sea and outer space.  The concept of extending functions 
of state sovereignty over sea territory thus emerged gradually. This is not to say that extra-territorial 
sovereignty is the same phenomenon as territorial sovereignty. If it were, the distinction between 
them would be empirically insignificant. The existence of an extensive body of the law of the sea as 
a particular field within international law points to the fact that state practise here has differed from 
that of territorial sovereignty. It is also evidence of the existence of what I call the evolving 
international institution on sovereignty at sea. The latter is important, and I argue that the ideological 
struggle on the contents of this institution has been the two main schools represented by mare 
liberum and mare clausum. The empirical relevance of these two ideal types will be demonstrated in 
2.1 
A much more difficult task is to show how state experience, ideas and beliefs helped shape 
individual states conceptions of the competing frameworks for the international institution for 
maritime sovereignty. This task should be seen as a simplifying step. When I claim that state X`s 
claim to extraterritorial sovereignty was dominated by the doctrine of mare liberum, that does not 
                                                 
282 Boxer, 1965: 90 
283 Note the similarity, ideologically, with Adam Smith and his critique of restrictions on trade 
284 Quoted in Boxer, 1965: 84 
285 As I will return to, there actually is some degree of conceptual confusion on this point. What England did already 
prior to the 17th Century was to make unilateral demands to mare clausum , while often rejecting other states the 
same rights. This resambles what Stephen Krasner (1999) has named “organized hypocrisy”. 
286 As Armitage, 2000, reminds us, these debates were pan-european. However, Selden and Grotius are the most 
dominant proponents for two distinctly different ideologies of the oceans. 
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mean that state X did not have interests in the direction of mare clausum. I will simply argue in 2.1 
that historical experience up till 1950 made national institutions cling to one doctrine more than the 
other. The empirical deviations from the ideal types are interesting parts of the empirical 
explanation. I argue that modern states had a more or less coherent ideological claim to one or the 
other set of ideas on how to regulate the use of the oceans. How is it possible to separate these 
“ideological claims” from preferences on utility? I argue that the claims signify principles that often 
overrule more short-term sectoral interests. One example of this is the US withdrawal from the 
regime set up by UNCLOS. The proposed regime on the utilisation of deep seabed resources was 
simply incompatible with the ideology of the Reagan administration. Another example, that also 
signals the importance of overseas interests in general, is the British reluctance to join the European 
Community. The legacy of empire and the concern for the dominions within the Commonwealth 
was not simply economic interests that closed the window to “Europe”. What was at stake was the 
British view of itself and its role in the world; the very concept of sovereignty in a British setting. In 
the international system,  the institutions of the Commonwealth could simply not be disregarded at 
this point in history, whereas the Commonwealth lost significance in British discourses leading up to 
membership in EEC in 1973.288 Critics will argue that other factors, presumably geopolitical ones, 
mattered more than some ideological framework that was “tailored to suit the national interest”. 
Conceptualising “historical experience” means that geopolitics and alliances are included as a vital 
part of the analysis, since power politics certainly influenced and were influenced by state 
preferences. But the central ontological assumption is that ideas were part of what constituted 
national or economic interests. Material incentives, I assume, seldom exist independently from 
perceptions. That is exactly why I try to single out the most defining historical experience in the 
categories in 2.2. At this stage I will set forth the central hypotheses of the thesis. I simply argue that 
no grand theories can explain the evolving international institution of maritime sovereignty, but that 
                                                                                                                                                             
287 See Gottman, 1973: 5-7 
288 See Lloyd, 1996,  Lloyd, 1993,  Cain and Hopkins, 2002. Lloyd, 1996: 353 states that “Britain had watched 
Continental efforts to bring countries in western Europe closer together after 1945 with a detchment that reflected 
her belief that the Commonwealth, and good relations with the United States were far more important than 
developments on the wrong side of the English Channel…After the six countries had worked out the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, Macmillan proposed that Britain` s interests and and those of a number of other west European countries 
should be recognized by bringing them into the customs union for industrial products but allowing them unrestricted 
free trade in agricultural products. This proposal would give Britain a much larger tariff-free market for industrial 
products than the Commonwealth could provide, and at the same time would allow her to import the low-cost  food 
which successful Commonwealth farmers produced”.(my italics) Clearly, this was unacceptable to de Gaulle. At the 
same time, the importance of the Commonwealth for the other members were illustrated by the rejection of Britain`s 
application. According to Lloyd (ibid: 354) “it had been a distinct shock to find that Britain wanted to join a west 
European community whose members were linked together more closely than members of the Commonwealth had 
been for some time”. After the dissolution of Empire, negotiations with EEC was much easier; “in the 1971-72 
negotiations little attention was paid to the Commonwealth” (ibid: 374). See also Young, 1990: 226-228 on the 
relationship between France and Great Britain . 
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the history of the nation states themselves must be taken seriously. This history cannot possibly be 
explained by rational choice, unless we are to construct a narrative of a never-ending number of 
interactions. Historical experience conceptualised in the most parsimonious way possible, shaped 
institutions and thus preferences, influencing state ocean policy, which in turn shaped, and was 
shaped by, the international institution of maritime sovereignty. That is also why I use weberian 
ideal-types in order to take into account the longue duree process of preference formation that took 
place also before the remarkable territorialisation of the seas that began in 1945. Since elites shaped 
national institutions as well as international ones, and these institutions in turn helped shape 
preferences. The argument can be illustrated as in Figure 2.01. 
 
Figure 2.01; The structure of the causal argument - process between stateformation and 
international institutions 
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Comments to figure 2.01: This model should not be seen as an assumption of linear development of distinct 
phases in an ordered chronology. The logic is as follows. State formation was conditioned by internal and 
external (0-I) interaction between various actors. Inherent in the argument is an assumption that in the initial 
phases of state building (before 1648), state-building efforts were affected by international interaction (0-I), 
that is, interaction with other states, monarchs, city-leagues, guilds, the Church etc. But the early states of 
Northern Europe, to generalise, were not formed in an environment of international institutions, if we by that 
term refer to enduring patterns. For coastal states, state formation meant that they formed state institutions 
that embodied principles and preferences for the exercise of maritime sovereignty (II). These institutions are 
operationalised (see below) as State principles (III). These principles were, through international interaction 
(IV), mediated and became contributions to Specific international institutions on maritime sovereignty (V). In 
turn, these outcomes (VI) shaped national institutions of maritime sovereignty (II). It might be argued that 
states that were late-comers faced an international environment where international institutions already were 
formed. This certainly is the case, which means that late state formations faced “outcomes” (VI) already in 
their phase I and II in their state building experiences. 
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In this thesis, I claim that state policies on oceans consisted of, and were based upon, mare liberum 
and –clausum principles. At the same time, mare liberum and mare clausum have been elements in 
all international institutions regulating transportation, the use of violence and resource extraction at 
sea. How pronounced state ideology was in foreign policy to a large degree depended upon the 
content of international institutions and –hegemony. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to build 
theoretical concepts and hypotheses by viewing maritime concepts and policies as embedded in 
foreign policy in different categories of states. The central theoretical assumption about foreign 
policy and international relations thus is that ideas and material interests both matter. This is a truly 
weberian approach to foreign policy analysis, of course, but it is also an approach that has gained 
increased attention within IR in recent years. Alexander Wendt has sought to address this at a highly 
theoretical level: "…the content of interests are in turn constituted in important part by ideas. The 
constitutive as opposed to causal nature of this claim bears emphasis".289 While Wendt from this 
premise tries to show that the international "anarchy" can take on different forms, my attempt here is 
more modest in that I seek to construct idealtypes of different foreign policy dispositions as well as a 
corresponding categorisation of polities. Mare liberum and -clausum are central categories also in 
describing and interpreting the international institution. When we see the state principles and 
preferences for these international institutions, I claim that we cannot solely deduce these policies 
from a simple cost-benefit analysis that state leaders carry out when it comes to assessing different 
designs of international institutions (although state leaders undoubtedly do make assessments of 
utility). Their choices were not always, or even dominantly, made under circumstances of their own 
choosing. The balance of power as well as the historical experiences and particular domestic 
institutions served as both geopolitical realities and structures that guided decision-behaviour. It was 
action guided by reason, which is much more than applying the standards of maximising utility or 
assessing relative gains. To put it simple, the states in this thesis are not seen as “like units”, their 
conduct not studied as they were converging on a single logic law of action. To illustrate the 
institutional “levels of analysis”, we can map our concepts as in figure 2.02. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
289 Wendt, 1999: 135 
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Figure 2.02; Concepts applied to Levels of analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments, figure 2.02: the figure shows an orthodox level-of-analysis division between state and 
international institutions. Here both levels are seen as the same system through the interaction between states 
and international institutiuons. Mare liberum and –clausum are phenomena on both levels in the system. The 
international level does not determine state preferences, as a system “determines” the behaviour of its units. 
The preferences and principles of the units, embedded in the national experience as well as interests, also 
shape the international institutions. These preferences and principles are mediated through international 
interaction which is anticipated by state leaders. Thus, the international level also influences the national 
interest via the balance of power, rules, norms and organisations. The reader will see the influence of Kenneth 
Waltz and his division of levels of analysis in the figure, but an important difference is that the domestic level 
is seen as vital here in order to analyse state interaction. 
 
2.1 Ideology; Two ideal types of views on sovereignty at sea and how the 
process of state building shaped institutions and preferences  
This examination of the emerging customary practises and international law of the sea has one 
central aim; to establish two ideological ideal-types of extra-territorial sovereignty. These ideal-
types are constructed from historical accounts of jurisdiction at sea, and when their formal meaning 
has been elaborated sufficiently, I will briefly sketch how these can be understood as state 
principles.290 Next, it will be pertinent to sum up the theoretical discussions and the different forms 
of extra-territorial sovereignty into a conceptual categorisation of the connection between the effects 
                                                 
290 This historical overview is deliberately narrow compared to the later analysis. We should not be seduced into 
believing that the origins of the concepts and state or imperial practises of maritime principles ”explain” the present. 
The great historian Marc Bloch indeed warned against such uses of history.” In popular usage, an origin is a 
beginning which explains…. Worse still, a beginning which is a complete explanation. There lies the ambiguity, 
there the danger! …A historical phenomenon can never be understood apart from its moment in time” (Bloch, 1953: 
30-35). Armitage (2000: 5) sums up the reason why I do not depend heavily on the medieval or Roman uses of the 
concepts, while the same usages nevertheless represent a not insignificant background understanding; “the context 
within which a concept emerges does not determine its future usage, though the history of its usage across time will 
reveal a great deal about the history of the later contexts within which it was deployed. The origins of a concept, as 
any other object of historical inquiry, are not necessarily connected to any later outcome, causally or otherwise: 
aetiology is not simply teleology in reverse”.Nevertheless. instances of continuity certainly will be found here; 
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of historically formed institutions and main principles of maritime sovereignty. This constellation of 
ideal-types should be seen as specified hypothesis on what we should expect to find in our analysis 
of the North East Atlantic. 
 
The approach to conceptualise mare liberum and mare clausum taken here is Euro centric. It needs 
to be so, since the European experience shaped the classical terms themselves. A further vital 
prerequisite to the application of these ideal types lies in the requirement that they need to hold the 
highest possible regional validity. In an enquiry of Northern Europe, I can therefore see no reason 
how we can do without the historical emergence of these concepts within the very same region. This 
is certainly not to claim that there were not maritime laws outside of “Europe” at the time of the 
Roman Empire. For example, in India the oldest treaty of inter-State relations probably dates from 
early period of the Buddhist Mauryan Empire of the fourth century B.C. This treatise, Kautiya`s 
Artashastra, makes numerous references to maritime regulations.291 The sea route between China 
and India was in common use already in the 5th Century A.D, and the importance of this route made 
for a customary set of rules in order to fight maritime anarchy and piracy. However, it is not 
Eurocentric to claim that for the international institutions, these historic legacies would have less 
impact than those that originated in the Atlantic and in European waters. 
Making a very broad historical overview, it seems clear that for the Romans, the basic principles of 
mare liberum were dominant, since the sea essentially was seen as a highway for transport and 
passage. In the Roman lawyer Celsus (ca. AD 200), we find this expressed with clarity.292 The 
lawyer Ulpinus explicitly states that fishing cannot, “not even outside the entrance of my house”, be 
denied any other man. Marcianus follows this up when he describes the sea as a juris gentium- a 
common property. But the Romans also made exceptions.293 Nobody should use the ocean in a way 
that could exclude others from the use of it. If this situation should occur, the government must 
interfere.294 These were considerations that Grotius, Selden and other lawyers took up to debate in 
the 17th century (indeed we might say that the same theoretical and political discourse exists today). 
And we should note that Selden`s interpretation of Roman law in some respects achieve a high 
degree of correspondence. Some Roman lawyers claimed that the beach (litus) and harbours were 
                                                                                                                                                             
institutiuons were created in a certain time and space, and these dimensions shaped the particular content and 
workings of these institutions. 
291 See Alexandrowicz, 1998: 248. 
292 Ræstad, 1912: 4-6. The outline below is to a considerable degree based on Ræstad, 1912, Gottman, 1973 and 
Fulton, 1976.  
293 Gottman, 1973 
294 Ræstad, 1912: 7 
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populi Romani, the common property of the Roman people. The same controversy and conceptual 
disagreement arose in the questions regarding lakes and rivers. And at some points the Romans of 
course restricted the notion of the sea as a common property, enemies or peoples with hostile 
intentions could not be allowed to sail the ocean. From the same line of argument follows the 
Roman claim to have the right to cleanse the Mediterranean of pirates, since pirates interfered in the 
use of the highways of the ocean.295 But the basic philosophy was that the ocean was more of an 
international than a “national” area of law. In practise, the Romans actually followed this principle 
by refraiming from imperialism at sea. The Roman principle of mare liberum partly survived the fall 
of the Empire, but mainly in the Italian societies. Only gradually, according to Ræstad, the concept 
of sea territory evolved. Where did this idea come from? In the Eastern Empire, Ræstad suggests, 
ocean fishing and the production of salt belonged to the state. Thus Emperor Leon VI (886-911) 
decided that every landowner should have the exclusive right to fish in the extension of his property 
(interestingly, this notion also is represented in the Old Icelandic law of the Gragasa).296 Although 
there was no agreed way to fix the extension of the territorial sea, a praxis evolved both in The 
Ottoman Empire and in Byzantium, where the right of coastal fishing was exclusively granted the 
inhabitants of the land, excluding strangers. The development of sea territory in the Italian cities 
seems to result from the need for laws to protect trade from piracy. Later on, the Pope banned all 
piracy within the dominion of the church, called Mare Ecclesia or Mare Pontificis Romani. Ræstad 
also suggests that fishing within this area were excluded all but the inhabitants of the church state 
and the citizens of Rome. Bartolus a Saxoferrato (d 1357), seen as founding father of Italian science 
of law, was the first to formulate in a comprehensive way the right granted to coastal states to 
uphold jurisdiction over the contiguous waters of a territorial polis.  He also, on the basis of Roman 
law, sought to justify the extension of this sovereignty to 100 millarias.297 Bodin (1577/1992) quite 
correctly was to estimate 100 millarias to 30 lieues in his Les Six Livres de la Republique. The point 
is that the fall of Rome with its power in the entire Mediterranean created the parcelling up of the 
Mediterranean into sea territories of coastal proto-“states”, dominantly city-states. No single 
political community had the power to clean up an entire region of pirates “to the benefit of all”. The 
Holy Roman Empire did not employ any significant units of sea power during the middle Ages. And 
it was only when the message reached Europe that Columbus had "discovered" America, that the 
Pope tried to claim global authority concerning the oceans. In a bull from May 4, 1493, the Pope 
granted the King of Spain and his Crown the property right to all islands and territories that could 
                                                 
295 Ræstad, 1912: 9 
296 Karlsson, 2000 
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later be found west of a meridian. This meridian was drawn from pole to pole 100 sea miles west of 
the Azores and the islands of Cap Verde. In the bull, it was also prohibited to visit or trade in these 
territories without permission from the Spanish king. The Portuguese King did not put up with this, 
and through the treaty of Tordesilla in June 1494, the Bull was revised to benefit the Crown of 
Portugal. This development of course aroused bitter opposing views on the role of jurisdiction over 
the sea. Not only were the flood of bullion and other goods making the economic significance more 
substantial, but in the eyes of other nations, the Iberian states seemed to behave as colonisers of the 
sea themselves.298  
At this point, it is worthwhile to pose the question of what, if any, rules on the sea existed beyond 
Rome, or to be more specific; in the northeast Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, areas that only were 
contiguous to areas under the influence of Roman law.  
In the territories that now constitute France, England and Germany, the Roman principle of mare 
liberum was gemeines recht throughout the middle Ages.299 Even along the coasts of Denmark, there 
does not seem to have been restrictions on fishing by strangers. Ræstad300 suggests that this stems 
from the fact that, except from the herring fisheries at Skåne where participation was granted 
strangers from ancient times, Danish fishermen in the Middle Ages primarily harvested their catches 
in waters further away from Danish territory. Now, moving further north and to the Northwest, we 
arrive at an interesting finding. In Iceland, Norway, Scotland and (presumably) Sweden, the rules 
were the opposite of those in England and continental Europe.301 In these areas, fishing was 
exclusively for the local population. While Ræstad is unclear on the position in Sweden, he is 
undoubtedly right that parts of Scotland, Iceland and Norway really had a population that depended 
entirely on fishing along the coast.302 How important this was to be later in the Nordic-influenced 
structuration of the International law of the sea will be demonstrated later in the thesis. The point is 
that tradition and law existed very early in these North-Atlantic communities that excluded the rights 
of foreigners (or even people from other counties) to fish outside the territory of the coastal 
                                                                                                                                                             
297 Ræstad, 1912: 14-15. 100 millarias was seen as a distance covered in less than two days of navigation. It is 
approximately 148 kilometres. 
298 Du Jourdin, 1993: 112,  Ræstad, 1912: 20 
299 Not that there were not exceptions, for example concerning whaling, perhaps a remnant of Nordic law. 
300 Ræstad, 1912: 22 
301 According to Stein Rokkan, 1999, the geopolitical distance from Rome and the dorsal spine of Europe mattered 
in the process of state building. He clearly saw all the Nordic countries as much less influenced by Roman law than 
the other continental European states, claiming that this is one of the main dividing lines among European countries 
when it comes to different trajectories of state formation. It is interesting to note that on the concept of sea territory, 
Denmark among the Nordic countries ”were closer to Rome” than the other Nordic countries. Ræstad argues that 
this explains little in the case of the law of the sea. In his opinion, one could hardly claim that Denmark was more 
influenced by Roman law than Scotland or the other Nordic countries. 
302 See also Armitage, 2000: 107 
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communities. How come Scotland took this position? It seems that mare clausum stood much 
stronger in parts of Northern Scotland and the Scottish islands. This suggests that Scottish law of the 
sea was influenced by Norwegian authorities, since the same territories at times were under the 
Norwegian crown in the Middle Ages, as will be shown in a later chapter. If this argument is to be 
valid, we must be able to show that there were created national laws under the Norwegian crown, 
and that these were actually enforced along the territory controlled by the King. As most students of 
Norwegian history know, this indeed was the case. In the old Gulathingslov (111), we find rules of 
inheritance of the King. The rule is based on a mid-line in the ocean, indicating that the Norwegian 
King had sovereign rights on the “Norwegian” side of the mid-line between Norway and other 
kingdoms.303 This law can be compared to the Old Icelandic set of laws gathered in the Gragasa. In 
this law (Koningsbok, ch 85), it is stated that Icelanders should not make statements in trials abroad 
or east of the mid-ocean. The same particular phrasing (“fyrir austan(vestan) mitthaf”) in the laws of 
both Iceland and Norway indicates diffusion or even a reciprocal treaty. And actually we find 
similar judicial propositions in English law. In an English book of law dating from the end of the 
13th century, Le Mirroir des Justices, we find the same concept of the mid-ocean. The idea of the 
mid-ocean as a demarcation of some issues on extra-territorial sovereignty is even found in 
Grotius.304 But we should be careful in interpreting these texts of law. For the practise of relations 
between sovereigns, its importance was limited, and it was soon to disappear as law even in 
Northern Europe.305 However, we should note a central empirical point when it comes to applying 
mare clausum. Mare clausum need not be only a “defensive” policy of protecting maritime 
resources along coasts of a state. If a state with overseas possessions (colonies, sovereignty over 
smaller islands) claims mare clausum, it might actually take on an offensive attitude. Thus the 
“mother country” will lay down principles applied for its own coast also for its overseas possessions. 
This kind of policy is in line with an offensive sort of mare clausum-policy, because it will exclude 
other actors from the freedom to use the seas in question.  
The interesting thing about the concept of the mid-ocean is of course the idea behind it. As opposed 
to the practise of navigating in the Mediterranean, the Nordic countries were used to navigation in 
the open seas.306 A result of this, in addition to the laws of fishing near the coast, was rules also for 
                                                 
303 Ræstad, 1912: 24-25. That this mare clausum views survived long after the Norwegian influence had ceased to 
exist in Scotland, does not mean that the earlier Norwegian extraterritorial sovereignty explains the phenomenon. 
Clearly, the mare clausum principle applied to home waters suited Scottish fishing interests. The Kingdoms of 
England and Scotland prior to the regal union of 1603 had differing interests when it came to maritime rights and 
principles. 
304 Ræstad, 1912: 26 
305 Gottman, 1973 
306 Braudel, 1995/1966 confirms the statement on navigation in the Mediterrenean.  
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the distant waters between territorial kingdoms. Thus the Gulathing law (144) regulated the property 
right to the finder of wreckage in the sea, and the killing of whale at the open ocean (a djupi). 
Otherwise, the law of the sea (or rather, the practise of sovereigns in Northern Europe in these 
matters), regulated the relations between Norway and other territories in part built on principles 
equal to these found in Grotius centuries later. What is of importance is to note the differences 
between the national laws in the 13th century and Mare liberum. Foreign vessels were to be taxed in 
Norwegian harbours, and navigating north of Bergen to the Northern county of Hålogaland was 
prohibited any foreigners. Fishing was for the native population exclusively. The King also had the 
right to levy fines in cases where Norwegians were molested or killed by foreigners at sea (i 
kaupferđum) and even in foreign harbours.307 It also seems to have been a common view among 
Scandinavians that the coastal kingdom had some right to provide protection for vessels navigating 
along the coast of the sovereign. Thus, King Haakon of Norway in the winter of 1247-48 
complained to the Council of Lübeck on the grounds that they allowed Norwegian merchants to be 
plundered near the harbour of the town.308 Likewise, 40 years later the Lübeck council was accusing 
the Norwegian King of letting the same thing happen to German merchants near the Norwegian 
harbours.309 Ræstad also cites English and Russian 14th century sources indicating that state practise 
in the Northern waters conceptually had distinctions between the sea territory (aqua) and the open 
ocean (in libero mari). The Icelandic law seems to have been especially detailed on regulations 
concerning the extraction of resources along the coast, but the main point has hopefully been made 
clear. There actually were laws concerning extra-territorial sovereignty and sovereign rights in 
Northern Europe in the middle Ages. After the Law of King Magnus Lagabøtr (legislator), 
Norwegian efforts to jurisdiction at sea was aiming at protecting the trade of fish from Northern 
Norway, but the weakening of the Norwegian Monarch aborted any efficient jurisdiction. 
The early use of sovereign prerogatives in England and France also was to damage mare clausum, 
since the French and English monarchs out of strategic reasons restricted the use of larger ships for 
use in exports. The result of this was that independent merchant cities gained a superior position in 
trade in Northern Europe, since they did not have to protect a population scattered over an extensive 
territory with poor internal communications. This was one of the reasons why Hanseatic cities were 
to interfere in the sovereignty of the Scandinavian monarchs from the 12th century, especially since 
Norway initially was dependent on trade with England.310 And it is evident, in the historical text of 
                                                 
307 Ræstad, 1912: 29-30 
308 Dipl. Norwegicum, IX: 1-2 
309 Dipl. Norwegicum, XIX: 220 
310 In a letter to King Haakon V dated april 16th 1313, King Edward II clearly states that; ”Non enim 
possumus..tolerare, quod naves de regno nostro, quæ semper promptæ ad nostrum servitum esse debent, extra idem 
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Kongespeilet, that the Norwegians increasingly saw the use of own ships for export and import as a 
very risky business, partly due to the extent of piracy. The Norwegian sovereign in his trade policy 
was trying to limit private control with imports, since this could result in imports of luxuries in a 
time of dearth. This might also be said to have created conflicts not only between the King and the 
German cities, but also between the native Bergen merchants and the Sovereign as well as the 
Hanseatic cities. A limited success for the Norwegian merchants was not achieved until 1545.311 In 
the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland, the question of sovereignty was even more 
contested. The Norwegians were seen as upholders of the property right of the Nordic sea. Although 
the Karelians and the bjarmers, nomadic peoples partly living in the Arctic regions for parts of the 
year, never really came under Norwegian sovereignty, they were seen as Careli infideles, not 
included in international law as subjects thereof. Thus the Pope granted King Haakon Haakonssøn 
the right to make war on his heathen neighbours. In reality this was interpreted as a right of Nordic 
sovereignty, and the practise should mean that the Crown had the right to refuse foreigners from 
gaining a foothold in the barren region of Finnmark and Troms. Sea faring in the area was an 
exclusive privilege of Norway and later Denmark-Norway. A reflection of this is found in various 
European sources.312 Foreign vessels travelled to Russia round North Cape for sure, but the Danish-
Norwegian crown was, in accordance with the Haderslev agreement of 1583, to give permission to 
such voyages. This regulation more or less corresponded to the line Iceland-southern Hålogaland. 
The Norwegian, and later Danish, kings simply claimed that these Northern waters were something 
of a Norwegian lake (utrisque littoris quo contineteur ratione, or fretum nostrum Norvagicum). 
Extra-territorial claims to the southern part of the Norwegian Sea and the North sea was 
considerably less ambitious. But England under Elisabeth was to challenge this claim, as she 
challenged Portugal and Spain on extra-territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the ambitions of 
Russia and Sweden strengthened the view of the Oldenburg monarchy that Danish-Norwegian 
sovereignty in these areas had to be underpinned and defended. The notion of this sea territory was 
named the “King`s streams” (Kongens strømme); the belt of water around the coast was a natural 
extension of the land territory, and thus it was under the jurisdiction of the Sovereign. Interestingly, 
we actually find the same term used in English sources referring to the territorial sea in the 16th 
century; King’s river and King’s streme.313 From 1544, we find in Danish and Norwegian sources 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regnum, ad partes remotas, se divertant sine nostra licentia speciali”. The Norwegian historian Arnold Ræstad mus 
be credited for the way he has used a large number of European sources to reconstruct this.  
311 Ræstad, 1912: 97 
312 Ræstad, 1912: 152. The most important map dates 1467 
313 Ræstad, 1912: 170 
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that naval vessels were sent out patrolling to keep “The King’s streme clean”.314 In correspondence 
between the monarchs in Northern Europe, we increasingly trace the distinction between the 
territorial sea and the open sea, although the exact demarcation of the two zones was unclear. It 
seems, according to Ræstad, that by the territorial sea, the sovereigns of the north were referring to 
the sea in the very vicinity of the shore and the area around the harbours. However, in some letters 
of the Danish admiralty, claims extending to as much as 6 and 9 sea miles are also found. Certainly, 
the territorial sea or the King’s streme, did not extend further than the line of sight.315  
But the Nordic countries were not forming the centre of gravity of international “law” of the sea in 
the 16th and 17th centuries. Whereas the concept of mare liberum in practise was used in Northern 
Europe already in the 13th century, the same notion was not in use among Spanish or Italian lawyers. 
This is not surprising, given the commercial interests of their superiors. In many ways, it was a 
“pick-and choose”-politics, where different arguments were applied in law in order to suit the 
interests of the state or particular merchant companies more or less connected to the political 
sovereign. Thus England naturally contested the Iberian concept of the use of sea that was built on 
the Tordesillas treaty of 1494.316 Different “national” customs became increasingly important in the 
course of the 16th and 17th centuries. Especially the rising English and Dutch powers became the 
leading stars in conceptualising the law of the sea. Economic and military power was translated into 
scholarly works and disputes of extra-territorial sovereignty. And to some degree we must say that it 
was not surprising that exactly Dutch and English interests also were to clash on the concepts of the 
use of the sea. In England, according to Ræstad, the opinion gradually shifted in favour of the old 
Norwegian-Scottish system of jurisdiction. This obviously was a result of the ever more intensive 
Dutch fisheries along the English coast, and the poor results of English fishermen, as these faced an 
obstacle in coastal fishing at Scotland and Norway.317  Increased competition from other states made 
the English lean more towards mare clausum.318 
The claim to mare clausum by Christian IV of Denmark-Norway resulted in clashes between 
English and Danish-Norwegian interests. The Danish monarch actually sailed to the coast of 
Finnmark in the summer of 1599319 and confiscated four vessels from Hull, followed by a series of 
diplomatic note-exchanges and negotiations. The Oldenburg monarchy followed up the claim to 
mare clausum by continued naval patrolling off Vardø in the following summers. The most 
                                                 
314 Dipl. Norwegicum, XVI: 783-4 
315 Scotland actually seems to have been the only European country with exact lines of demarcation of the territorial 
sea, but the length of it seems to hav varied between 14 and 80 miles during the 16th century 
316 Gottman, 1973 
317 Ræstad, 1912: 193-4 
318 Armitage, 2000: 104-105 
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important outcome of the conflict was negotiations in Bremen in 1602, where the two powers 
presented their views on jurisdiction at sea.320 The significance of this meeting lies in the theoretical 
and judicial contributions to development of relations between states in the field of law of the sea. 
The English negotiators denied any extensive claim of sovereign parts on behalf of Denmark-
Norway in the sea between Iceland and Norway,321 but nevertheless presented a modified version of 
mare liberum. This point of view can be found in the instructions to the English delegates; 
 
“Though propertie of Sea in some small distance from the coast, maie yeild some oversight and 
jurisdiction, yet use not Princes to forbid passage or fishing, as is well seen in our Seas of England 
and Ireland…neither is it to be allowed that propertie of the Sea in whatsoever distance is 
consequent to the banks, as it hapneth in small rivers”.322 
 
Thus, the English view was that the coastal state had some rights to jurisdiction and obligations to 
offer protection close to the coast. Free passage (later to be called free and innocent passage in 
international law), and the rights of fishing could not, however, be forbidden other states, not even 
within these narrow coastal waters.323 In a larger context, one should note the very intense activities 
of negotiations between the Oldenburg monarchy and England concerning fishing and trade at 
Iceland, Lapland and the Faroe islands around 1585 and 1602.324 These were conferences aiming at 
establishing treaties regulating relations between states. Although the practise of violating 
agreements was notorious, the Monarchs nevertheless laid down considerable efforts in order to 
solve conflicts peacefully. The relations between England and Denmark were much improved in this 
respect following the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603. This marks a turning point for the views on 
extra-territorial sovereignty in the Northeast Atlantic. The “new” English policy was built on the 
theories of John Dee325, converging with the Danish-Norwegian views in important aspects (but note 
                                                                                                                                                             
319 Ræstad, 1912: 196-197 
320 Fulton, 1976 
321 Armitage, 2000: 108 
322 Ræstad, 1912: 201 
323 Arguments in favor of British extraterritorial sovereignty was especially elaborated by John Dee in his works 
from 1576 till 1597. He was concerned to establish ”the legality of Elizabeth`s claims to the islands of the northern 
Atlantic (including Britain, Ireland, Iceland, Greenland and Friesland) on the basis of her descent from King Arthur, 
the last emperor of these isles” (Armitage, 2000: 106) 
324 Detailed accounts of this is to be found in Ræstad, 1912, and in Bjørgo et al, 1995 
325 ”Soon after his accession to the English throne in 1603, James began to enforce Scottish policies of mare 
clausum in all of the ”British” seas around the coasts of England and Scotland, and thus reversed the more 
liberal Elizebethan policies that had allowed foreign access to English waters for both fishing and navigation” 
(Armitage, 2000: 108-109). See also Fulton, 1976: 76-85, 105-7, 124-5. Fulton (ibid: 10) even claims that this 
reversal of policies was ”the beginning of the English pretension to the sovereignty of the sea” 
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that Selden`s works were kept secret for a long time due to English fears that it would create harsh 
reactions from other sovereigns. Thus, it was possible for Christian IV to execute some jurisdiction 
and ban foreign fishing at Iceland and the Faroe Islands). Perhaps a more nuanced interpretation of 
the changes in English policy is to see the elements of mare liberum it contained as claims to 
English freedom to use the oceans and to exclude others from the same rights.326 In other words, I 
propose that elements of mare clausum (which we will analyse later in this thesis) had a long 
tradition in English views of extra-territorial sovereignty.327 Mare Britannicum had historical roots 
from the First Navigation Acts under Richard II in 1381, and was reiterated under Henry VII (1489) 
and Henry VIII (1540).328 Furthermore, in the case of England, overseas colonies later created a 
political economy that fostered very substantial exceptions from the mare-liberum principle. Perhaps 
this effect also could be generalised to European colonial states at large from the 17th century. A 
comment concerning the Napoleonic Wars by the Danish Naval historian Ole Feldbæk is worth 
quoting in length here.329 
 
“European states in the eighteenth century were always concerned to tighten the economic bonds 
with their colonies: they attempted to do this, with varying success, by means of a closed 
“mercantilist” system. In wartime, states which were weak at sea therefore suffered severely if 
communications with their colonies could be cut effectively. They usually reacted by trying to 
liberalise their “mercantilist” systems so as to maintain communication with the aid of neutral 
shipping. Their adverseries on the other hand would have a vital interest in preventing this 
challenge to their command of the sea”.330 
 
                                                 
326 Armitage (2000: 102) goes a long way to insist that the history of Britain` s maritime doctrines is a history of  
Britain itself; ”Claims to jurisdiction over the foreshore, home waters, fishing and navigation around Britain were 
specifically British instances of wider European debates..The ideological history of the British Empire can, to a 
large extent, be reconstructed from the history of these maritime disputes” 
327 Thus, I think it is historically inaccurate to claim, as many scholars do, that mare liberum was the dominant 
international “regime” uptil the 20th century (for an example of this view held by a distinguished scholar, see Nye, 
1983). Mare liberum, as it was sometimes claimed by the British Empire, was more rhetoric than real. Colonial 
powers in fact were applying mare clausum of their own coasts as well as overseas. Again, freedom for the Great 
power, at the expanse of all others.  Perhaps the Dutch republic, manifested through the writings of Grotius, is the 
sole example of a European colonial power that actually worried about practising to some degree what they 
preached in European waters. However, this standard of action did not apply to the same degree outside Europe. 
328 du Jourdin, 1993: 113-114 
329 I hold it justifiable beacuse it sheds light on the use of the principles. Thus, I believe one should be very careful 
in interpreting the international institutions of extraterritorial rights as “regimes” of either mare liberum or –clausum 
prior to WWII (see chapter one on regimes, and footnote above). 
330 Feldbæk, 1996: 265 
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The mechanism that Feldbæk points to can be generalised into the axiom that strong European sea 
powers actually practised mare clausum in times of tension and war, while colonial powers that at 
the same time were weaker sea powers, thus tried to counteract through mare liberum.331  
 
Improvements in navigational techniques, technological innovations, increased geographical 
knowledge and the increased resource-extraction from the seas made for incentives to mare clausum. 
In the first ten to fifteen years of the 17th century, whaling became an important industry in the 
waters of Northern Europe. It was actually the Basques in France and Spain that were the pioneers. 
This whaling activity spread from Newfoundland to the East off Iceland, where they encountered 
strong Dutch and English interests. Spitzbergen, discovered by Willem Barents in 1596, was 
reported to contain fjords and bays rich on whale. The entire part of the Northeast Atlantic soon 
experienced fierce competition in whaling, largely conducted by Dutch and English companies such 
as The English Muscovite Company. This immediately resulted in letters from Christian IV to 
England, France, Spain and the Netherlands, that whaling off Iceland, The Faroe Islands and 
Norway was prohibited to “strangers”.332 Whaling off Spitzbergen would only be allowed so far as 
the parties accepted Norwegian sovereignty of the Islands. As a sign of the difference in the views 
on the law of the sea, this claim was accepted by the English King and refused by the Dutch (as 
always the latter were more liberalist in their views) , seemingly also by the French Monarch. The 
outcome of the entire process was a sharing of sovereignty at Spitzbergen by 1637 between The 
Netherlands, England and Denmark-Norway. In claiming mare clausum, the Danish King was not 
alone. Karl IX of Sweden in 1608 gave the town of Göteborg the privilege to fish in the “North 
Sea”. The scene was set for numerous clashes between the Authorities of Denmark-Norway and 
Sweden off the Norwegian coasts. The Swedes also were of the opinion that they could grant 
privileges in the North Sea to fishers from other states, as they did to the benefit of the Dutch.333 
Ræstad is very clear that this maritime conflict was the sole most important cause of the Kalmar 
war. The peace treaty of Copenhagen from 1613, where the English King had served as middleman, 
settled the case in favour of Norway. King Gustav Adolf of Sweden thus deprived himself and his 
successors of any claims to the coastal area that now comprises the coast of Northern Norway. 
As the Swedish State rose to the dominant position in Scandinavia, the claim to mare clausum on 
behalf of Denmark-Norway was somewhat weakened. The de facto power of the Swedish monarch 
                                                 
331 Indeed, this inclination towards mare liberum will probably be found in all smaller states negatively affected by 
restrictions on sea-borne trade and transportation.  
332 Ræstad, 1912: 220 
333 Ræstad, 1912: 228-229 
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was reflected in dimensions of extra-territorial sovereignty, but most visibly in the Baltic Sea. 
Moreover, the Danish-Norwegian Navy (fellesflåten) remained a significant fleet in a European 
perspective up to the battles with the English fleet led by Adm. Nelson in 1807 
The above excursus is sufficient in order for us to understand the context in which our two ideal-
types were systematically elaborated for the discourses of the early modern period. The two 
concepts are Mare Liberum, as worked out by Hugo Grotius, and Mare Clausum, as described and 
argued by especially John Selden and several other of his contemporary English lawyers. They were 
naturally drawing on various sources from Roman law as well as from medieval lawyers, but are 
usually credited as “the founding fathers” of these two schools of thought on the Law of the Sea.334 
In their time, and the centuries to come, their concepts, ideas and lines of argumentation helped 
shape discourses on extraterritorial sovereignty in broad terms. There is little doubt that his treatise 
on Mare liberum remained the dominant conceptual framework within discourses on the Law of the 
Sea. Selden`s contributions are much less celebrated, but his views have partly been fulfilled in the 
20th century335, a fact to which we will return later. Since Grotius`thought is particularly influential 
up to the latter part of the 20th century, a closer investigation on his work on the law of the sea is 
justified. 
 
Hugo Grotius` (1583-1645) writings reflect the turbulent circumstances of the period in which he 
lived. The enlargement of Dutch Maritime power in the face of Iberian and English obstruction is 
most illustrating in our analysis, needless to say.336 His “Mare Liberum” was published in 1609.337 
In Grotius we find a concept of an international society, primarily consisting of states. The “core” of 
this society is the Christian states, but somewhat unorthodoxically for his time, Grotius also meant 
that non-Christian communities belonged to the society, if not from positive volitional law, then 
through natural law.338 Indeed, the significance that Grotius ascribed to “just war”, mare liberum and 
                                                 
334 Grotius actually blended natural and positive law in a rather eclectic way. See Aalexandrowicz, 1998: 241-2 
335 Fulfilled in the sense that both international law and state practise to an increasing degree is in line with some of 
Selden`s theoretical principles. The application of mare classum was much more paternalistic in the colonial age 
than in the post – WWII era, I will claim. 
336 Kingsbury and Roberts, 1992. 
337 Grotius also wrote a defence of chapter 5 in Mare liberum against Wolwood`s criticism. This later treatise was 
only published in 1872. See Bull, et al, 1992 
338 But here there were qualifications, to be sure ”love is not due to all in the same degree…a greater love is due to 
a father than to a stranger”, Grotius quoted in Kingsbury and Roberts, 1992: 14. These double standards, these 
different dispostions to act in foreign policy, was a mark also of Dutch state policy. In effect, it meant that all 
powers with overseas interests could claim different principles in different regions. However, norms restricted the 
application of double standards. In the Dutch case, it seems that the Calvinists , heavily involved in the VOC, paid a 
not unconsiderable degree of attention on whether their actions could be justified. 
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free trade can be seen as fitting like a glove to the Dutch commercial interests, a view taken by 
Wallerstein, as well as by Röling, a professor of international law; 
 
“ (it).. could reasonably lead to a better world, while it did not in any way restrict the endeavour of 
subjugating the non-European nations to European authority. Grotius` system could afford a pretext 
for every desired act of violence. Thus the phase was inaugurated in which the aggressive conduct 
of States could be dressed up in terms of the preservation of law and order and of the costly duty of 
upholding justice”339 
 
Furthermore, Rousseau later argued, not untruthfully, that Grotius favoured tyrants340 (and that to a 
larger degree than Hobbes. Indeed, there is little reason to doubt that “both Mare Liberum and De 
Jure Belli ac pacis owe much to their author’s political ambitions”.341 However, as Roelofsen342 
suggests, there was more to Grotius`claim to Mare Liberum than Dutch commercial interests. 
Although the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) had established monopolies in the East Indies343, 
hardly in line with Grotius concepts of free trade, there is little doubt that the “arrogance” of 
Portuguese and especially Spanish fleets was the direct occasion leading to the juridical problem 
Grotius set out to solve.344 VOC was not only a commercial venture, like its English counterpart, but 
an instrument of warfare against the Iberian empires.345 Grotius had to tread warily in order to raise 
an indictment of Portugal without at the same time compromising the Dutch position. Mare Liberum 
suited both purposes.346 And from the general rules he sets out, the inevitable conclusions are 
naturally drawn in favour of the Dutch competition with Portugal in the East Indies.347  
If we leave aside these serious limitations of the applicability of Grotius thoughts, there is little 
doubt that Grotius works had an enormous influence on international relations as well as on 
deliberations of politics in sovereign, western states, as well as in Russia.348  In his formulations of 
                                                 
339 Röling, quoted in Kingsbury and Roberts, 1992: 42. Compare this to Wallerstein` s assertion that liberalism 
always benefits the Hegemon 
340 Rousseau, The Social Contract,1993,200-201 
341 Roelofsen, 1992: 97 
342 Roelofsen, 1992 
343 These monopolies were built upon treaties concluded with Indonesian chiefs and rulers.  
344 See Alexandrowitz, 1998: 259 for a description of the circumstances in which grotius wrote the thesis 
345 Roelofsen, 1992: 105 
346 Roelofsen, 1992: 107 
347 See also O`Connell, 1982: 9-10,  Brown, 1994: 7 
348 See in particular Bull, 1992, and Butler, 1992 
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so-called human voluntary law, or positive law, and in applying it on the international state of affairs 
of his time, he was able to draw upon the earlier described Roman idea of jus gentium.349 
The direct occasion turning Grotius to the phenomenon of extraterritorial sovereignty actually was a 
case against a group of shareholders in the VOC. These Shareholders supported the action of an 
Admiral of the Company who had captured a Portuguese ship in the straits of Malacca. This line of 
behaviour seemed objectionable in the eyes of the Mennonite shareholders, which regarded any kind 
of violence as contrary to Christ’s teachings. With this division among the shareholders, the 
directors of the company turned to Grotius for a legal opinion.350 His “solution” appeared in De jure 
Praedae in 1606, where he claimed that the prize was not a mere act of piracy “but a legitimate act 
of war, (since it) had occurred in the course of a just war”.351 
The actual publication of the text Mare Liberum seems to have been prompted by negotiations 
between Spain and Holland, which culminated in the truce of Antwerp (1609).352 In this work, he 
laid down what has become the so-called grotian principle on the law of the sea; 
 
“The vagrant waters of the ocean are thus necessarily free. The right of occupation, again, rests 
upon the fact that most things become exhausted by promiscuous use and that appropriation 
consequently is the condition of their utility to human beings. But this is not the case with the sea; it 
can be exhausted by neither navigation nor by fishing, that is to say, in neither of the two ways it can 
be used”353 
 
In the Northern European context, Mare Liberum proved important in Anglo-Dutch relations. 
Economic rivalry on issues like Arctic whaling and herring fisheries in waters that The English 
considered as English dominium led to serious incidents and direct clashes. The argumentation of 
Grotius on freedom of fishing provided the basis for Dutch negotiators for sixty years as far as the 
British claims to a dominium maris in the North Sea and the waters off Spitzbergen were 
concerned.354 The effects of Mare Liberum were significant from the outset. Shortly after its 
publication, King James I in May 1609 proclaimed that foreigners would be allowed to fish in the 
                                                 
349 Bull, 1992: 73 
350 Butler, 1992: 209-210 
351 Roelofsen, 1992: 142-143 
352 Butler, 1992: 210 
353 Colombos, 1968: 62-63 
354 Roelofsen, 1992 
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seas of England, Scotland and Ireland only when authorised by England.355 Four years later, the 
English King granted the English Muscovite Company an exclusive monopoly over whaling in the 
seas around Spitzbergen.356 Clearly, the English had to put up an argumentation of Mare Clausum, 
before entering serious negotiations on these disputes with the Dutch. This was to be the position of 
Mare Clausum. A Scottish jurist and Professor of Civil Law, William Welwood, thus published a 
partial response to Grotius in 1613 entitled An Abridgement of all Sea-lawes, where he challenged 
Grotius`thesis that the sea could not be the subject of ownership by a single sovereign.357 Naturally, 
Welwood partly draw on the coastal communities’ dependency of coastal fishing in his claim for 
Mare clausum. “As God had divided the earth after the flood, so he had divided the sea, which 
therefore could be distinguished by boundaries, despite its fluidity”358, Welwood argued (in the only 
response to Mare liberum that Grotius ever replied to). 
Grotius`reply to these English arguments was elaborated in Defensis capitis Quiunti Maris Liberi, 
which however remained unpublished until 1864.359 While Welwood returned to the dispute in 
1615, the most famous response to Mare liberum came in 1617-1618 from John Selden. Mare 
Clausum (published first in 1635) defended the British standpoints. The sea, Selden claimed, under 
the law of nations is as capable of private dominion as is the land. 
Selden argued that the king of Great Britain was lord of all the sea inseparably and “perpetually 
appendant to the British Empire”.360 One should be careful, however, to see Selden`s concept as 
signs of a lasting British policy.361 There is little doubt that Selden362 articulated a position that 
corresponded with England’s political and economic interests at the time. England was still inferior 
to Holland in naval terms at the time of King James I, the monarch that actually commissioned 
Selden to present a response to Holland, Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, the philosophy 
underpinning extraterritorial maritime claims to sovereignty was introduced, making a conceptual 
and theoretical debate of claims to maritime sovereignty up to the present age. That the English view 
on extraterritorial sovereignty eventually would have a huge impact, is beyond doubt.The later 
English occasisional embrace of mare liberum-principles was to include crucial elements of the 
                                                 
355 Gottman, 1973 
356 Butler, 1992: 210-211 
357 Butler, 1992: 210 
358 Armitage, 2000: 110 
359 Butler, 1992: 210-211 
360 Butler, 1992: 211 
361 Nevertheless, it also resonates rather well with theories of property right that also became highly influential in 
Britain. ”Locke`s may therefore have been the first, and perhaps only, theory of propery in seventeenth-century 
England that was explicitly Protestant in its orientation..and applicable to colonial as well as municipal contexts” 
(Armitage, 2000: 98) 
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mare clausum doctrine set forth by the lawyer employed by King James I. In fact, one might argue 
that the question of dominium and imperium regarding the seas was so utterly important that in the 
words of a respected historian “Selden` s work provided the foundation for later claims to dominion 
over the seas in the name of a “British Empire”363 
Other lawyers entered the debate on both sides in the scholarly “battle of the books” regarding 
maritime jurisdiction, including the Portuguese Freitas.364 In his De Justo Imperio Lustitanorum 
Asiatico (1625), published the same year as De Jure Belli ac Pacis by Grotius. The latter contained 
his more mature views on the freedom of the seas as part of his analysis of the Law of Nations.  
The core of Grotius view came gradually to be the foundation of the dominant justification on the 
use of the high seas. That is, states may, neither individually nor collectively, acquire the high seas 
by occupation (what was to be counted as the high seas and what belonged to colonial powers was 
another matter). This follows from the position that the seas are res communis omnium or re extra 
commercium. In his view, the principle of the freedom of the seas was nothing other than a “correct 
conclusion” drawn from “the principles of nature”, or “common consent”. 365 The law of nations, 
according to Grotius, rests on the latter. He based his argument on the notion that by the Law of 
Nations, navigation is free to all persons whatsoever. “Every nation is free to travel to every other 
nation, and to trade with it”.366 W. Butler explains the core of the intricate, if not necessarily 
sophisticated by our standards, reasoning of Grotius thus; 
 
“The axiom was laid down by God himself through nature, for since not every place is supplied with 
the necessities of life, some excel in some things and others in something else. By “divine justice” it 
was brought about that one people should supply needs of others. Those who deny this law and 
remove the opportunities for mutual service do violence to Nature herself”.367 
 
So maritime expansion and the trade system were institutions of God! There is a clear tendency in 
Grotius to see this freedom as facilitating utility to everyone concerned.  
                                                                                                                                                             
362 Selden undoubtedly was indebted to Welwood for his arguments, but the impact of Selden`s work was more 
important.  
363 Armitage, 2000: 119 
364 See Alexandrowicz, 1998: 164-166 
365 Selden did in fact not dispute this latter axiom. 
366 Grotius, the freedom of the Seas, : 7 
367 Butler, 1992: 213 
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But then Grotius concentrated on the physical properties of water, perhaps making his lasting 
contribution to discourses on extraterritorial sovereignty. Encompassing the entire planet, the seas 
(as the air) belonged to the communia, an international society.368 The sea cannot be divided and 
appropriated as other property can. Use of the sea by one country for navigation does not make the 
sea un-navigable for others.369 The opposite is often true of most movables. Furthermore, occupation 
of the seas followed by a situation of custody or ownership is physically impossible. The oceans and 
parts of it are part of a corporeal whole, and lines demarcating them express only a desire or 
intention to occupy rather than the capability to do so. The functions of sovereignty cannot be 
performed at sea, or at least at the high seas (thus, defining mare liberum in line with Grotius, it is 
difficult to see how England could be seen as a mare liberum-actor).  
 
It is nevertheless important to note that Grotius also conceded that coastal appropriations for 
purposes of use could and should be allowed. This point is important because it is reflected in 
discourses of extraterritorial sovereignty, and because it is illuminating the concept of sovereignty 
per se. The point, according to the “Miracle of Holland”, was that no part of the seas could be in 
exclusive ownership. On the other hand, the sovereign of a maritime state has a duty to protect the 
right of all nations to free navigation in adjacent waters, from “which it follows that navigation is 
free not by command of the ruler but by command of the law of nations”.370 
While no state had the right to ownership to the sea (dominium), he recognised the coastal state’s 
right of imperium, or sovereignty, defined by Grotius as rights of protection and jurisdiction. This 
sovereignty must then be performed in accordance with the law of nations. While there is no sharp 
line (dominium-imperium) here, the point is highly interesting, since it notes a differentiation of 
sovereignty itself. These dimensions of sovereignty, in all aspects of interpretation, have followed 
negotiations on sovereignty at sea ever since. Grotius is especially relevant, since he treats the 
seabed and the seawaters as mediums with equal status. The right of imperium within the territorial 
sea was formulated and more or less accepted as extending to three nautical miles (more or less 
corresponding to the range of coastal artillery at the time) in juridical form by the Dutch lawyer 
Bynkershoek in 1737. This principle reached common international recognition in the 19th century, 
                                                 
368 Bull, 1977 saw Grotius as a central contributor to the institutionalist ”Grotian” school in IR. I believe that this 
interpretation actually is solid. The idea of an international community based on freedom makes Grotius highly 
interesting for our later typlogy. One could reasonably claim that his ideas on norms of behaviour meant a less 
dogmatic view of state sovereignty than most of his opponents. But this is not incompatible with the view that states 
are the principal actors of international relations, and that the pursuit of freedom and wealth is a right to be granted 
states on the international arena as it is for individuals on a national one. 
369 Armitage, 2000: 109 
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while state praxis naturally continued to be diverse. More or less, however, the rule was that 
jurisdiction of the coastal state was within the 3-mile limit, including the right to fish.371 In reality, 
the vessels of other states had relatively free access to fishing and navigation within these territorial 
waters. 372 This principle was much debated and contested during the 17th century however. It 
remains a fact that later British philosophers took Selden`s classical treatise further in the direction 
of British rights to both dominium and imperium of European seas.373 A conceptual ambiguity 
nevertheless prevailed. Just as earlier theorists were haunted by the wish to justify both dominium 
and imperium, later theorists and humanists in European powers were to be torn between two 
irreconcilable goals; liberty and empire. 
We have then arrived at the point where (a) the historically created maritime ideologies should be 
analytically combined with (b) the most crucial historical experiences and state preferences that in 
sum would shape national principles on ocean policy. Many words of warning should naturally be 
issued here, since we clearly are dealing with combinations of ideal-types. It is certainly the case 
that the concrete content of mare liberum and mare clausum have changed in time and space. For 
example, it has, as will be demonstrated in a later chapter, been possible to combine claims to 
territorial waters along the coast to protect fishing with strong defences of the freedom of the high 
seas. Any coastal state would prefer to have it both ways.374 But politics is often about prioritising 
between goals where it is simply not possible to have the best of both worlds. Therefore, I hold that 
the regulation of the uses of the seas for ocean faring375 of all sorts is the most crucial issue in ocean 
politics through history at large. What distinguishes the present situation from earlier times is rather 
the territorialisation of the narrow sea adjacent to coasts. However, if we are to single out THE most 
important distinction between coastal states that have determined state principles and preferences on 
ocean politics, I suggest that we look into the distinction between states with various degrees of 
overseas interests.  Thus, I propose to combine the maritime principle (mare liberum – mare 
clausum) as ideology, with the variable of material interests (degrees of overseas interests) as in 
Figure 2.1.1, which produces four different ideal-typical categories of dominant foreign policy 
habituses (see below); 
                                                                                                                                                             
370 Butler, 1992: 214 
371 Fleischer, 1977 
372 Andresen, 1987: 13 
373 Armitage, 2000: 121-124 gives an overview of these. One of these was Sir William Petty, who found his 
”Hobbesian solution to the problem of competing sovereignties as a northern European mare clausum centred on 
England” (ibid: 151) 
374 The point is evidenced by the exclusive economic zone, an entirely new concept introduced at the UNCLOS III 
negotiations. More interesting is the effect of such a combination of mare clausum and mare liberum.   
375 The term is broad, but covers the right to free and innocent passage in modern terminology. Oceanfaring is 
applied to both fishing vessels, scientific expeditions, merchant fleets and military fleets.  
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Figure 2.1.1; Main groups of variables 
                                                                                                   “Ideology”- variable376 
 
 
The utility of this simple typology as a first step rests in its openness. At this stage in our enquiry, 
we should be sensitive to different historical trajectories within our conceptual framework. And then 
again, one could easily split up this structural equation into a number of additional columns. 
However, there is no mechanical relationship from the “independent variables” to the dependent 
variable in the figure above. Thus, my main point so far is that the ideological doctrines of mare 
liberum and mare clausum are less “given” than what the figure indicates. I have simply chosen to 
see ideology as a binary variable, because mare clausum and mare liberum have been clear 
alternatives of justifying state policy at different times and under different circumstances. I suspect 
that both state interests (overseas-not overseas) and state principles in the form of more or less 
recognised references on the international arena (liberum-clausum), are results not only of the 
international position of the state in the state system, but that they to a large degree reflect the 
habitus in the foreign policy of the state. Habitus is an ambiguous concept. However, I wish to 
express that the different experiences of state building made states into different geopolitical 
entities, in the sense that different historical trajectories made for different dispositions to act in 
particular ways through foreign policy. Likewise, at critical historical junctures, states might 
change this habitus-often through the results of wars. These changes could affect regional security 
complexes. One needs only think of Scandinavia as an example, where Denmark and Denmark-
                                                 
376 Mare liberum and mare clausum thus are both state principles as well as contents of international institutions. The 
content of these international institutions thus partly reflect both international interaction as well as state preferences 
of the most influential powers mediated by the same international interaction (see figure 2.1.0). I find this way of 
placing the variables in a four-cell table containing textual data more illustrating than what orthodox methodology 
demands of presentations of descriptive data.  
 
 
Mare Liberum                  Mare Clausum 
Overseas 
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existent 
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Norway fought numerous devastating wars with Sweden, and where both Sweden and Denmark 
were significant colonial powers until the 18th century. This stands in sharp contrast to the Nordic 
"zone of peace" of the 20th century. Likewise, the historical junctures in state formation at times 
influenced the content of international institutions. Here, the example of the US after 1941 is 
illustrative. 
The argument in structuration logic is somewhat circular. However, the main point is that there is a 
huge amount of empirical variation in each of the cells in the four categories in the figure that are 
not explained by dichotomies as depicted in the figure. 
I divide overseas interests into four simple categories on the main material variable; overseas 
interests. Of course this is a crude division of categories. Thus overseas interests should be seen 
primarily as the “aussen” side of the state policy, while the ideological position mare clausum-mare 
liberum also holds an “innen” side (of the political culture) of the units.  
On the domestic side, the distinction can shed light on why different maritime principles came to 
dominate the foreign policy of individual states. Typically, this makes for a highly interesting 
comparative enquiry. For example, we should pose the question whether US maritime policy after 
WWII reflects the difference to the former European great powers with colonial experiences. The 
colonial legacy might very well be of significance. The ties to former colonies sometimes made it 
difficult for European states to disentangle them from a paternalist sentiment in their foreign policy. 
Both governments and pressure groups might have been inclined to state the principles of their 
homeland on an extraterritorial basis; they should be followed in the mother country as well as in the 
third world or in “white dominions”. While this might have been a predominantly paternalistic 
policy after WWII, it was certainly more aggressive and arrogant in the fierce competition of the 
18th and 19th Centuries. That is not to say that norms did not modify the policies of these states as 
well. Britain is an illuminating case in this respect. When the Whigs came to office in 1806, they 
began to practise their anti-slavery policy. This actually resulted in payments to Portugal and Spain 
to stop their slave trading. A slave “squadron” was set up to control the Atlantic and free slaves, 
costing 2% of British Government peacetime spending for years.377 
At the same time, I wish to hypothese that also states with low degrees of overseas interests could 
hold principles that are lending either to mare clausum or mare liberum. Coastal states, be it 
                                                 
377 See Lloyd, 1996: 129-130. It is nevertheless commonplace among theoreticians in the social sciences to project 
traits of the 19th century British Empire back to the 17th and 18th centuries. Needless to say, this produces a more 
benign interpretation of the English trajectory than that described here. 
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peripheries or semi-peripheries378 that depend on open sea-lanes of communication for security and 
exports and imports to a far larger degree than local fishing interests, will lean more to the doctrine 
of mare liberum than to that of mare clausum. Typically, this must have been the case, I suggest, for 
some of the dominions in the Commonwealth for many years after WWII. Likewise, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that also western states themselves did not contribute significantly to the 
maritime ion, but that nevertheless were dependent on an open international economy, band-
wagoned behind powerful mare liberum states in the last half of the 20th century. 
On the other hand, it would be entirely rational for Governments and pressure groups in small 
coastal states depending on their fishing industry to lean towards mare clausum if those fishing 
resources are extracted from the waters adjacent to the shoreline. Typically, one should expect that 
this nevertheless gave small coastal states a dilemma. On the one hand, they wanted to maximise 
their national jurisdiction over coastal resources, on the other hand, they depended on powerful 
states in order to secure such an outcome. Thus, a complex process of continous and at times 
implicit bargaining took place between small states and large powers. Summing up these concepts, 
we end up with hypotheses on where to look for connections between the historical legacy of states 
and their dominant principles on maritime foreign policy.  
Thus, I set forth the hypothesis that the claims to different natures of international institutions 
regulating the maritime world order has been fundamental to the foreign policies of maritime powers 
and coastal states alike. If we combine the maritime principles that we see as ideology, with material 
interests in the form of overseas interests, we still need to clarify interests in a way that is open to 
evaluation (i.e: ideas do not matter “all the way down”). If we are to compare polities in space and 
time, this demarcation must be robust enough to serve our analytical purposes. In other words, this 
categorization within the typology cannot be highly detailed and elaborate as to produce a tool 
unsuited for the empirical and larger theoretical aim. I therefore set forth the following categories for 
overseas interests and corresponding values for the categorization of units. 
 
 
 
                                                 
378 Again, the concepts from Wallerstein are used as signifying different degrees of influence on the world scene in 
line with Michael Mann`s IEMP-model. That is to say, while Wallerstein sees the core, semi-periphery and 
periphery as categories which powers are largely defined in economic terms, I see the categories as indicating both 
economic, military, political and ideologic power. In line with Mann, I hold that neither of these sources of social 
power should be given primacy. 
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Table 2.1: Rules for categorization of states according to degree of overseas interests 
 
 
Both “brute” material factors as well as more contingent ones are included in the criteria. But both 
classes of attributes are observable social facts. The criteria reflect the difficulty one inevitably 
encounters when considering how to operationalize degrees of interests. For example, is there an 
accurate AND exact dividing point between strong political overseas interests and overseas interests 
in the form of strong economic interest? Any attempt at creating such definite criteria could be 
criticised. On the other hand, I claim that the above rules are reasonable. A legacy of former 
overseas empire often had the effect that the territory had closer economic ties to its former colonies 
or dependencies. It is reasonable, furthermore, to claim that there is a difference between having a 
strong merchant fleet without overseas naval bases and a large power navy on the one side, and on 
the other side indeed maintaining several or many overseas bases and being one of the strongest 
naval powers.  Now, combining these categories with the division between mare clausum and mare 
liberum, pure ideal types of maritime ideology, a typology of 8 ideal types is constructed. 
 
 
 
 
Strong political overseas 
interests 
1. sea-going navy that in quantity is among the three largest navies among
the polities covered here 
2. possess more than one overseas naval bases 
Overseas interests in the 
form of strong economic 
interest 
1. Merchant navy that in quantity is among the three largest merchant  
navies among the polities covered here OR  
2. legacy of a former hegemonic ambition 
Indirect overseas interests 1. Significant merchant navy (among the 5 largest merchant navies among
the polities covered here), OR by  
2. being a tax haven OR being  
3. a territory often used as flag of convenience for overseas shipping 
companies, OR by  
4. having political ties to former overseas dependencies or colonies 
No dominant overseas 
interests  
1. Merchant navy not among the 5 largest among the polities covered    
here OR 
2. Annual fish catches in metric tons among the five largest fish catches of
the polities covered here 
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Figure 2.1.2; Maritime principles, overseas interests and foreign policy dispositions 
                                                                                
                                                                                            Principles                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                        Mare liberum              Mare clausum 
 
 
 
 
 
Degree of overseas interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 8 categories are pure ideal types of state foreign policy habitus. The alternative hypothesis to 
the ones we presented in chapter one was that ideologies do not matter to any significant degree. 
Now, the typology above will be used to demonstrate that ideas do matter; they explain differences 
among units with the same degree of overseas interests. In substitute for saying that there is one 
category of states according to each category of interests, we propose that there are two for each 
category of interests. The model should then be able to investigate whether the “principles” 
(ideology) are necessary variables to explain empirical variance. Let us see what the 8 idealtypes 
represent. 
There are two idealtypes of states with strong political overseas interests. The first is international 
liberalism, which refers to the notion of a liberal international political economy. I think it is right to 
emphasis two main elements of this ideological structure. Both these elements stem from the classic 
writing of Adam Smith. The first is anti-mercantilism (at least in principle). The second is anti-
colonialism, in the sense that trade between all territories should be free. Although there are 
Strong political  
overseas interests 
International  
liberalism 
Paternalism or 
imperialism 
Overseas interests in  
the form of strong 
economic interest 
Bandwagoning 
liberalism 
Bandwagoning  
mare clausum 
Indirect overseas  
interests 
Former small empires
Tax havens and  
flags of convenience 
Post-colonial 
territories clinging
to dependency 
No dominant overseas 
interests  
Bandwagoning 
peripheries 
Sovereignty- 
seeking  
peripheries 
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empirical variations among units in this class (and paradoxes379 abound in their internal efforts to 
reconcile principles), I claim that they all endorsed the free international market. Of course they all 
faced crisis in which they sought to defend their home industry through policies to some part marked 
by temporary mercantilism, but this has not been the dominant justification and self-understanding 
of their polis. Nevertheless, these tensions between political practise and political principles have 
often resulted in paradoxes, which perhaps is more evident in the Dutch Republic and the US than in 
most other sea powers. At times, principles had to yield to national interests, but this seldom 
occurred without a collective, national feeling of guilt. Ideas mattered for these units. Opposed to the 
other major powers, the international liberalists increasingly came to see colonies under direct rule 
and the yielding of own sovereignty to supranational organisations as a threat against the ideal 
principles of free trade, prosperity and peace. Attempts at restricting international commerce were 
thus something “unnatural”380, since the freedom to barter and trade and to de-centralised decision-
making was seen as embodied in natural law. 
Historically, few powerful states have consistently claimed these principles. However, I find that the 
principles nicely illustrate difference in attitudes from the other category of states with important 
overseas interests, which is paternalism or imperialism. 
Imperialism – empire- hegemony- paternalism; all are contested concepts.  Conceptually, hegemons 
might thrive without formal empire. Informal empires might thrive without colonies The main 
hypothesis in the table above is that states with strong overseas interests might have developed a 
mare-clausum justification of their policy. This position is probably found in states seeking empire. 
Furthermore, I expect that “paternalism” is a word that describes mature forms of imperialism, or a 
post-imperial sentiment. States with overseas colonies developed, more or less, sentiments where the 
colonial power had special responsibilities in their colonies or former colonies. Thus, a natural 
consequence was that the principles with support in the colonial power also should be extended to 
the colonies. At times the imperial powers included special restrictions, especially on the rights of 
other states to trade and interact with the colony in question. Imperialists more or less felt free to 
make incursions to a very substantial degree into the sovereignty of other states or potential states. 
They did so by justifying the rights of states, as “international persons”, to gain property. Thus, their 
actions could gain wealth and security, and not only for themselves. Colonies could gain as well, 
and be “modernized”. Especially when it came to religious conversion, imperialism then could even 
                                                 
379 See for example, Ellis, 1993: 24-26 on US political culture 
380 This does, again, not mean that they were free of the tendency towards ”Blue-water Lockeanism” (see below).  
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be interpreted as part of the “white man’s burden”.381 Accordingly, the “civilised” nations developed 
the colonies and more inferior states when these did not have the ability to do so themselves.382 That 
these enforced policies were not necessarily welcome or very advantageous for the dependency was 
of less interest, since they did not have the strength to realise their claims.383  
From a contemporary point of view, we nevertheless should be careful in interpreting the present 
foreign policies of the earlier imperialist states as results of their past in a determinist fashion. 
Colonialism in the classic sense belongs to the past, at least if we by imperialism refer to the direct 
rule or exploitation of weaker nations. However, we have not defined imperialism in this sense in 
the discussions above. The defining mark of imperialism is its incursion into the sovereignty of other 
states.384 What has changed is the form and content of incursions into sovereignty. Conceptually, 
then, the problem with the term “Empire” and “Imperialism” is indeed the various forms and 
contents attached to the concepts. Cain and Hopkins have simply not operationalised what types and 
forms of “incursions” into other states sovereignty that should count as imperialist incursions. In 
order not to end up in a thesis primarily discussing the theoretical concepts themselves, I choose to 
see imperialism and paternalism as two ideal-types that should be used to describe two different, but 
related, dispositions to act and two distinct but related bases for justifying these acts in foreign 
policy. In the empirical analysis in this thesis, I restrict imperialism to mean a direct or indirect rule 
of extraterritorial units, where this rule it self violates democracy in the dependency.385 Although 
this turn perhaps invites further conceptual discussions, I will claim that it is a reasonable ideal-type 
that is both historically sensitive and theoretically consistent. I believe it to be consistent, because 
imperialism only exists when the colonies, dominions or dependencies that form part of the empire 
remain in empire against their own will.386 In sum, colonialism in this meaning does not exist in 
                                                 
381 In his Second Treatise of the two Treaties of Government (1690), John Locke developed a theory of property that 
had a lasting contribution in justifying Westeren colonialism. Firstly, Locke claimed that Aboriginal peoples were in 
a pre-political ”state of nature”. Opposed to the ”civilized” nations (which had come to a higher stage in historical 
development), these pre-political societies had no established system of property and government. Secondly, these 
”primitive” peoples had property rights only in the products of their labour. Based on these assumptions, Locke 
drew the conclusion that Europeans were free to acquire property rights to vacant land. And then again, the 
aboriginal peoples would be better off with conversion to the European commercial system, sharing in the greater 
abundance of commodities and jobs. And fourthly, since the primitive societies had not institutionalised property 
and government, it followed that they were not political societies, making it justifiable for Europeans to deal with 
them not on a nation-to nation-basis but as individuals under natural law! See Tully, 1998: 350-4 
382 Often the justification was based on explicit or implicit racism, in the form of the survival of the fittest or the 
racial hierarchy of the nations. See Quinn, 2002: 7-9 
383 On the ”right and duty” to civilize in the case of France, for example, see Quinn, 2002: 5-6 
384 Cain and Hopkins, 2002. 
385 Inherent in this way of seeing imperialism is the built-in assumption that imperialism is non-democratic. This 
does not mean that a colonial power is an autocracy, but it means that an imperial power (in this sense) that claims 
to be deomocratic, conduct a foreign policy, indeed a policy in general, towards the colony that have undemocratic 
consequenses for the latter. 
386 In the words of John Adams, ”An Empire is a despotism”, cited in Kilian, 1998: 307 
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relationships where the colony is free to secede from the empire.387 It is also possible, through the 
above definition, to have democratic structures in the colony itself while it at the same time is part of 
the empire. The phenomenon of imperialism nevertheless exists in this situation if the imperial 
power does not grant the dependency the right to leave the empire388 (which in turn perhaps will be a 
threat towards the internal democracy of the colony). Such a polis should simply not be seen as a 
community ruled by the will of its people, it is to a large degree ruled by the colonial power. 
Simultaneously, the definition opens up for the possibility that the imperial power grants the 
dependency sovereignty, thus opening up a period of political transition for the former colony. In 
accordance with my definition above, I claim that imperialism nevertheless has ceased to exist in 
such a situation (the distinction might seem artificial, but it is not, neither judicially nor theoretically 
speaking). Although empire and imperialism are bound to remain contested concepts, I nevertheless 
believe it to be necessary to restrict their meanings. The arguments by Abernethy parallel this 
approach.389 
When scholars apply the terms empire and imperialism to include relationships that cannot be 
included in my more strict definition above, they probably do so from pragmatic reasons. 
Imperialism and empire are well-known concepts. They describe a historical phenomenon, and 
evoke interest and invite debate when applied to contemporary relationships between states and 
nations. However, I have chosen the term paternalism to describe the attitude and practises of post-
imperial states. Paternalism signifies extraterritorial sovereignty de jure and de facto, but it is a 
weaker form of these claims than is imperialism. Paternalists, in an ideal-typical sense, are shaped 
by their past through their images of themselves as great powers. This image is still evident in their 
national pride, symbolic sentiments and in their special interest and involvement in the political, 
economic and social developments of their former colonies. I wish to give it a far more empirical 
and concrete content later in the thesis. At this point, the existence of the paternalist disposition to 
act and to shape international institutions remains a hypothesis. Still, I believe the colonial legacy 
has left significant imprints on the foreign policy-dispositions of former empires. As decolonisation 
and national independence became global, and as human rights became important elements of what 
constitutes the modern, democratic state, former empires in the Western world also were influenced 
by what Abernethy labels a guilt complex; “ a desire to atone for past sins has probably played a 
                                                 
387 The term ”free” is naturally debatable here.  
388 Where this wish is expressed by the political leadership of the colony or by its people through elections or 
referendum. 
389 Abernethy, 2000: 19-22 is one of the best attempts I have yet seen at trying to introduce conceptual clarity in this 
line of work. As with my definitions here, Abernethy’s approach is distinctively political, focusing on the coercive 
elements and capabilities of regulation in the relationships between empire and colony.  
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role, however sublimated, in the foreign policy of former metropoles”.390 All the same, guilt may 
occur side by side with a sense of superiority. Thus, it is something of a historical paradox that 
Western commentators apply demanding moral standards when evaluating the foreign policy of their 
own countries and its allies, while “developing countries” not infrequently are assessed by lower 
standards.391 
It is useful to contrast liberalism and paternalism as ideal types, since the difference between the two 
theoretically should be of great significance to the nature of hegemonies, both categories by 
necessity including great powers. Schematically, some differing features of the two idealtypes are 
summed up in figure 2.1.3. 
 
Figure 2.1.3: Defining characteristics of international liberalism and paternalism 
 
                International liberalism                                Paternalism 
¾ No significant, enduring history of overseas
colonies with direct rule  
 
¾ Tendency to support principles of  
formal equality between states and nations
 
¾ High degree of free market policy  
colouring economic principles 
 
¾ More inclined to support mare liberum  
rather than mare clausum principles in 
international institutions 
¾ Imperial or former imperial power with  
overseas colonies for more than a decade 
 
¾ Tendency to see states and nations ordered on the 
basis of hierarchy 
 
¾ Higher degree of protectionism within the  
empire 
 
¾ Often choosing a pick and choose approach 
to international institutions that favour the  
national interest, or outright use of power to  
ensure dominance in markets or control of  
territories and sea lanes 
 
 
                                                 
390 Abernethy, 2000: 383 
391 ibid: 383-4. Abernethy does not extend his interesting remarks on these points into a discussion. In my view, this 
mixture of guilt and superiority is highly interesting and potentially substantial. 
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There are also two categories of states among the polities with strong economic overseas interests. 
The band-wagoning states depended upon stronger powers that more or less protected their interests 
to a larger degree than other major powers had the power or motivation to do. Band-wagoning states 
in this thesis have in common a rather pronounced overseas interest that had economic but not 
primarily political manifestations. This can to a large degree be seen in their significant merchant 
navies. Nevertheless, some bandwagoning states also had strong coastal interests (i.e: fishing, 
offshore activity), which made them into opportunists in the sense that they wanted both mare 
liberum and mare clausum – the challenge for these states was to find a middle ground. However, I 
propose that this last group of states ought to be labelled band wagoning mare clausum nations. 
The third interest-category is the one of polities with only indirect overseas interests. Tax havens 
and flags of convenience territories were not necessarily directly dependent upon the protection of 
their maritime rights, but were territories that gained from liberal practises and institutions on the 
international arena. For example, these territories benefitted from their domestic ability as bankers 
and financers, which in turn depended on international liberalism. The former small empires had the 
same maritime ideology and same degree of overseas interests, but predominantly out of different 
reasons. In these territories, a bandwagoning logic appeared, coupled to indirect overseas interests 
that partly were legacies of former imperial traditions. 
Lastly, there are also two categories of states with no dominant overseas interests. 
Post-colonioal territories clinging to dependency were territories that actually insisted upon 
remaining parts of the motherland (colonial power) or dominion in the post-colonial age. They did 
this either out of economic or security political interests. For example, threats from other powers 
could make these territories calculate trhat they were actually better off with reamaining formally 
within the orbit of their colonial masters or protectors. 
The peripheries are states that naturally also are heavily influenced by major powers in the 
international system and dependent upon the balance of power. However, they had very limited 
overseas interests. The peripheries that also had limited coastal resources became predominantly 
mare liberum, or bandwagoning peripheries. On the other hand, one group of peripheries was 
characterized by being som dependent upon their coastal maritime community that they sought to 
carve out as much sovereignty over these resources as possible, often by opposing major powers by 
peaceful means. The latter category is the sovereignty seeking peripheries.  
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These ideal types are hypotheses of what can be summed up as dispositions to act392 on the policy 
area of maritime resources in a broad sense. The broad sense rests in the fact that for large powers 
and the states affected by large powers alike, extraterritorial sovereignty was represented not only by 
ocean politics. Rather, ocean policy is a trait of the principles of sovereignty claimed by any 
sovereign or sovereignty-seeking organisation. Particularly, extraterritorial sovereignty is connected 
to imperialism, since imperialism left an imprint on centre and periphery in the international system. 
Conceptually, Cain and Hopkins have grasped the essence of imperialism when they claimed that, 
“The distinguishing feature of imperialism is not that it takes a specific economic, cultural or 
political form, but that it involves an incursion, or an attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of 
another state”.393 I choose the same standpoint as the authors just cited, but with some 
qualifications. The above is not a totally adequate definition of imperialism, and it is hardly a 
distinguishing feature that allows us to separate imperialism from other related relationships 
between nations, in my view. Many state and non-state actions means incursions into the 
sovereignty of another state. In this thesis, I shall see imperialism as intended incursions by actors 
(primarily states) on the international arena, in the aim of increasing the economic, military and 
political power of the mother country (which does not mean that imperialism always was a suited 
mean to reach such aims).394 However, I do have a major point of criticism against the definition by 
Cain and Hopkins that is not remedied by the above qualifications. If imperialism includes all these 
forms and levels of incursions into the sovereignty of other units, then imperialism is an incredibly 
broad concept. This is the reason why I introduce the concept paternalism to signify the post-
imperial condition as a label for the European historical large powers and for polities whose foreign 
policy was marked by the colonial legacy.  
As usual in a data-reducing typology, there will be unites at the borderlines between categories. This 
is inevitable in empirical analysis guided by ideal types. Particularly challenging, yet also valuable, 
are the cases of territories yhat have had historical trajectories that in some cases clearly have made 
them cross over from one type to another. For example, it is tempting to investigate how former 
colonies and dominions behaved in ocean politics after gaining independence. Furthermore, even 
large powers experiencing defeat in international competition were temporarily or permanently 
altered.  
                                                 
392 The term ”dispositions to act” is translated from Norwegian “handlingsdisposisjoner”. I have borrowed it from 
professor Odd Bjørn Fure (Address Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, Bergen, February 25th 2002) 
393 Cain& Hopkins, 2002: 54 
394 Seeing it the other way around makes little sense, in my view. But a central point must include that the territory 
occupied by the empire was inhabited by other peoples at the time of occupation. Thus, future claims to 
independence could take different forms by the nation in question. 
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Although I have pledged that this openness to historical development is a virtue inherent in the 
scheme, there is also reason to expect a closer connection to macro theories. I wish to point out the 
most crucial element concerning the international level in such a study. Both IR-scholars and world-
system theoreticians converge around the importance of international hegemons. In turn, the 
ideological, institutional and economic composition of these hegemons always influences world 
order and international institutions. Hegemons have had the largest influence on the creation of 
international institutions for regulating the maritime world order. In the 17th Century, The Dutch 
Republic was successful in forging international relations in their own interests for a short period, 
although this hegemony was constantly under pressure, and perhaps never achieved a stable 
foothold. 
The centre of gravity on this question came to rest on England. In 1587 Russia had claimed the 
principle of the freedom of the sea (“The Sea is God’s road”).395 As we already have noted, Queen 
Elizabeth I affirmed the same principle, but this was to a large degree due to Spanish protests against 
Drake’s expedition. The early inconsistenty of English claims to extra-territorial principles can be 
seen by how Stuart policies reversed the trend,396 until a formal standpoint of mare liberum was 
seemingly realised after the House of Orange succeeded to the English throne in 1689.397 That Dutch 
interpretations had rested on the same doctrine all along has been shown above. However, the praxis 
of England through wars and diplomacy was mare clausum, despite rhetoric of free trade. This will 
be demonstrated in our empirical analysis.  
 
With the maritime revolution and overseas expansion reaching its maturity, naval power and 
shipping interests in the 19th century maintained European influence upon institutions of maritime 
extraterritorial institutions. What is more, the British Naval hegemony of the 19th Century ensured398 
that at the entrance of the 20th Century, mare liberum as the dominant judicial principle was applied 
in a way that suited the British Empire. In other words, praxs was built on highly selective 
interpretations of international law. We should note, however, that mare liberum remained a 
principle, and to a lesser degree international law. State power dominated, not international law or 
                                                 
395 Butler, 1992: 211 
396 Ræstad, 1912 
397 Butler, 1992: 211-212 
398 See Nye, 1983 for a comment upon the shift between world orders and the different meanings of naval hegemony 
at various times. I cannot but disagree with Nye on one central point. Scholars of international regimes project the 
present into the past when they interpret mare liberum as an international regime prior to the 20th Century. The 
critique of regime theory set forth by Susan Strange, 1983 certainly applies to this wide application of the term 
international regimes (see 1.3). I think it is more appropriate to see state practise and agreements as international 
institutions.  
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regimes. This also means that the big powers dominated the interpretation and praxis of extra-
territorial sovereignty. Although there existed international institutions of maritime sovereignty prior 
to the 20th Century, there did not exist earlier international regimes in the same issue- area. For 
international regimes to exist, a formalisation of the existence of, and multilateral cooperation to 
uphold, the institution must be established and maintained. 
 
Germany and the US were latecomers on the arena of maritime sovereignty; indeed they were late 
state formations compared to the early European states. The first ships of what generously could be 
labelled a German Navy were set afloat as late as 1848.399 The American Congress laid the modest 
ground of a US NAVY through the Rhode Island resolution in 1775, commissioning two ships in 
October the same year.400 One further macro-aspect of the history of the hegemonic USA separates 
it from the Netherlands and Britain. The US never had a colonial empire resembling that of the 
European overseas empire.401 Germany, although being a latecomer as state and as a competitor in 
the race for colonies, lost its colonies after WWI. Did these different national trajectories affect state 
policies on international maritime institutions? I suggest that they did, and that the American 
hegemony of present thus is crucially different than the British up till WWII. The dominance of 
mare liberum enforced by colonial powers, that perhaps suited core states more than peripheries, 
should be possible to evaluate against the background of weaker coastal states. This is the task set 
for chapters 4-5, but I hope the elaboration above is sufficient at this point to make probable the 
categorisation of units that follows in 2.2. Furthermore, if the territorialisation of the seas from 1945 
on suited peripheries more than large powers, how could this be explained? Was the American 
hegemony so different from the hegemonic aspirations of the Netherlands, Britain and Germany that 
it altered world politics? If what matters is not the existence of hegemony, but what state is 
hegemon402, then it should be evidenced through the material presented here.403 
 
 
                                                 
399 Gildea, 1996 
400 Howarth, 1991:7 
401 The historian Geir Lundestad (1996) has called the US ”an empire by invitation”, but uses empire in another 
sense than I. Surely the US has had global interests since WW2, but this ”empire” does not resemble the sea-borne 
empires of the Netherlands and Britain. Lundestad`s point is that US influence, partly through a strong military 
presence, largely came about through official negotiations with the host country. There could be substantial benefits 
for the host country for such co-operation. For discussions of formal versus informal empires, see Cain and Hopkins, 
2002: 53-56 
402 This is the hypothesis set forth by John Gerard Ruggie, 1993. 
403 One should note that the position taken here is not as Gramscian as that taken by Cox, 1993.  
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2.2 Extraterritorial state interests – units and hypotheses 
Moving from conceptual and theoretical framework to concrete hypotheses of the connections 
between maritime principles and state-building experiences demands that we arrive at a 
categorisation of units within the typology. This is the ultimate aim for this chapter, but the results 
are certainly not the last words on how these units developed their foreign policy habitus and how 
they participated in the crafting of international institutions. Rather, the ordering of units into 
idealtypes forms the hypotheses that the empirical analysis will be bult upon. 
 
2.2.1 State principles and preferences 
From what has been elaborated on extra-territorial sovereignty above, it should be clear that the 
meaning of the term has varied in time, and that it still is a many-faceted concept. How could the 
phenomenon of extra-territorial sovereignty be married to the more general framework on state 
autonomy with its connection to the state- and world-system? My aim here is firstly (in 2.2.2) to 
discuss the utility of the framework and try to place different territories into the typological map. 
The states or countries that belong to the central cluster of units, the North East Atlantic, are 
England/Great Britain, Ireland, The Netherlands, Finland, Iceland, Germany, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden as well as the USA (the territories with the weakest polities at times had no influence on 
international institutions in this area). These countries in turn form nodes of communication and 
interaction with various other units.404  
Nevertheless, in order to increase the validity of the theoretical framework itself, I include a 
discussion of the units that are to be studied in 2.2.2. In an analysis of the countries facing the North 
East Atlantic, it is thus time to construct an ideal-typical conceptual map that allows us to connect 
our overall theoretical framework to the phenomenon of extra-territorial sovereignty with reference 
to the particular countries in our study. Effective jurisdiction in the territorial sea, including the 
ability to regulate trade in harbours of the state, corresponds to materialist incentives that 
predominantly created a bias in favour of a policy of mare clausum. Mare clausum, it will be 
                                                 
404 Demarcation and definition of the unit is indeed a central methodological problem in this study as in area-studies 
and historical studies on coastal communities. See for example Braudel, 1996. There is no doubt that The 
Netherlands, France, and later the EEC/EU all have been important participants in the North East Atlantic. It is also 
impossible to exclude brief analysis of the Baltic Sea even in a study primarily dealing with the Atlantic, since the 
connections between these seas at times have been unavoidable. On the other hand, this line of reasoning ends up in 
the methodological rules of Andre Gunder Frank, 1998, who in a critique of Eurocentrist scholarship has argued that 
all history and social scientific work must deal with the Globe as a unit. Thus, Frank believes that one avoids 
constructing a history of Europe, where all other peoples become the people without history. In other words, all 
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remembered from 2.1, comes in two principally different configurations; the defensive and the 
offensive claim to territorial sovereignty. The ability de facto to use the sea lines of communication 
off the state, that is; to conduct sea-borne trade and exports and imports from other states and 
organisations, correspond to materialist incentives that predominantly creates a bias in favour of a 
policy of mare liberum. But then again, mare liberum does not mean that it only is the preferred 
principle for large economic powers. They are just as important for peripheries and bandwagoning 
states heavily dependent upon exports and imports, with large merchant fleets or strong economic 
overseas interests. These are variables that in turn are dependent upon both international factors of 
the state system and the world economy. But the states, in varying degrees to be sure, also affected 
the external arena in this field of international relations. They were not only affected by the 
structuration of the emerging international order, but they were, at times, important players on the 
arena, taking part in the crafting of international structures. State leaders, politicians, officers, guilds, 
cities, merchant companies, state companies, professions and unions were the rational actors that for 
practical reasons can be designated as a single unit under the name of their state or region.  
But it follows that these units we call states were internally structured also in other respects than by 
some logic of being states in the “core”, “semi-periphery”, “periphery” or being more or less 
politically and militarily strong, measured by some index of realist theory. These internal structures 
in their turn affected how other state elites perceived the other unit. Indeed, structures also influence 
the cognition of policymakers, political parties, the media, pressure groups and the opinion in 
general.  
This “national image” represents a knowledge structure that must be taken into account when 
studying international as well as domestic political institutions.405 But there is more to it than 
perceptions, ideas don’t matter “all the way down” as more radical constructivists seem to argue.406 
The point is that the internal composition of states (economy, civil society and political regime to 
mention a few crude indicators) also constitutes the state as an actor. Although, on the external 
                                                                                                                                                             
social scientific and historical studies which are not global are euro-centric, according to Frank He seems less aware 
that his approach makes other nations into peoples without history, that is, the entire region of Northern Europe.. 
405 See Matarese, 2001: 2-12 for a discussion of the cognitive model of foreign policy and myths. Matarese (ibid: 2) 
defines the national image as ”a relatively coherent, emotionally charged, and conceptually interlocking set of ideas 
that give order to a people’s vision of the world and the place of their country within it” 
406 At this point there is no disagreement with Matarese (ibid: 3, 2) who says that “although cognitions are of course 
the property of individuals, they become relevant for the student of foreign-policy decision making if they are 
widely shared”, and further states that the national image is rooted in material factors, such as ”history, geography, 
resources and national values”. However, building theory from such assumptions demand that we try to single out 
explanatory variables and apply them in the form of comparative typologies. Again, the weberian methodology 
should make it possible for us to interpret as well as to explain. Although it is not possible to determine Mahan`s 
“national character” from such comparative typologies, it can highlight whether or not dispositions to act occur in 
patterns.  
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arena, the state must be recognised as such, it is not unlikely that the structure of the state and the 
peoples and territory that it tries to be sovereign over, create incentives for particular policies and 
particular action at the international level. Over time, a pattern -a structural component of foreign 
policy- emerges out of this complexity.  
 
The question is how these structures affect state behaviour in the form of foreign policy. A typology 
trying to take into account so various sets of factors nevertheless is a conscious act of data- 
reduction.  But this reductionism appears on the level of hypothesis, and must be confronted with, in 
a detailed historical narrative, the structuration of extra-territorial sovereignty on the part of the 
coastal state and of the international order or disorder regulating international regimes. I claim that 
the most interesting fault line lies on the frontier of transportation and other, more territorialized 
resources. In sum, whether the categorisation of each, single unit in the scheme is correct, is an 
empirical question. The utility of this preliminary ordering of units and variables lies in the 
possibility to extract the cases that make for the most fruitful comparisons, and to discuss deviations 
from the idealtypes.  
Without pertaining to introduce a ready-made Theory of how maritime variables affected, and was 
affected by, state building and –consolidation in the North east Atlantic system, I propose to 
illustrate the typology by the following configurations of territories (section 2.2.2 of this chapter is a 
discussion of these hypotheses). 
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Figure 2.2.1; A typology of units 
 
 Mare Liberum Mare Clausum 
Strong political  
overseas interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“International Liberalism”:  
The USA 1898-2001 
The Dutch Republic 1579-1806 
The Hanseatic League 1298-1536 
“Paternalism”;  
England/Great Britain 
Imperial Germany 1880-1918 
Sweden 1630-1905 
Denmark 1500-1917 
The Third Reich 1933-1945 
France  
The Spanish sea-borne empire 
The Portuguese sea-borne empire 
Overseas interests in  
the form of strong  
economic interest 
“Bandwagoning liberalism” 
The Netherlands 1806--- 
West Germany 1949-1990 
Germany from 1990 
The USA 1815-1898 
“bandwagoning mare clausum” 
Norway 1905--- 
 
Indirect overseas  
interests 
“Former small empires, Tax havens an
flags of convenience ”; 
Liechtenstein 
Switzerland 
Panama 
Sweden 1905- 
Denmark 1917- 
 
 
“Post-colonial territories clinging to 
dependency”;  
Jersey 
Gibraltar 
 
No dominant overseas  
interests  
”Bandwagoning peripheries“ 
Guyana from 1968 
Mauritius from 1968 
   
 
“Sovereignty-seeking Peripheries”; 
Iceland after 1925 
Norway ---1905 
Peru after 1947 
Argentina from 1967 
Brazil from 1966 
Cameroon from 1962,  
Chile from 1948,  
 Uruguay from 1969 
 
The grouping of states as units into the different categories represents hypotheses. By combining 
material interest in an idealtypical differentiation with the two ideological idealtypes, we propose 
that it is possible to find clear similarities between the countries within each category, and 
Main principles 
Interests 
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differences between the different categories. However, we must refine the selection of units and 
discuss whether all categories are suitable for the empirical and theoretical purpose of this study. 
 
2.2.2 Selection of the units based on hypotheses 
We have borrowed from a rich menu of social science theory thus far. History has shaped what the 
states are, as it has changed the outlook of the international system. But there is a balance between 
the uniqueness of history and generalisations, to be sure. Models are tools to interpret history, 
without explicit models we will drown in empirical details. Nevertheless, I propose a modest level 
of abstraction. The structure of the argument was sketched in Figure 2.01. To link this structural 
argument with our empirical analysis, I suggest a simple model for a middle-range comparative 
inquiry into the extraterritorial policies and international institution of extraterritorial, maritime 
sovereignty. The model is constructed from ideal types in the weberian sense, but these ideal types 
are influenced by empirical data. That is the only way to ensure that their relevance is probable. 
Even at this modest level of abstraction, however, categorisation means loss of data. But the virtues 
of models are NOT that we can read out the facts from them. They are not dense narratives of “wie 
es eigentlich gewesen ist”. However, there is ample reason to suggest that our enquiry should be 
reduced further in order to improve the quality of the analysis. This is a thesis on Northern Europe 
and the US. I think the typology in Figure 2.2.1 illustrates that we hardly need write a global story in 
order to analyse the historical significance that maritime interests had on state formation, and in 
turn, how these experiences affected the crafting of international institutions regulating maritime 
resources.  
So far I have claimed that, for reasons of simplicity, coastal states can be divided into six main 
categories as geopolitical units. In the following, I will argue on empirical and methodological 
grounds which territories will be included in the empirical analysis in this analysis.   
1. In order to produce a useful design for the study of Northern Europe, we should end up with 
units in each of the two categories of main principles, so that our enquiry might analyse how 
ideology influenced policymaking among states with similar degrees of overseas interests.407  
2. Moreover, these units should be restricted to a total number of units that we are capable of 
analysing in a qualitative way. This is always a contested part of designing comparative 
                                                 
407 In other words, the simple typology makes us examine variation in outcomes 
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macro-research. The best we can do is to be conscious as to what cases are included and 
what cases are to be excluded from a comparison resembling the encompassing comparison 
described in chapter 1.  
3. The units chosen must be relevant to the empirical reach of the analysis. This means that no 
relevant units concerning Northern Europe should be excluded,408 while all units of 
negligible relevance to Northern Europe can be left out without sacrificing the critical 
evaluation of the concepts and hypotheses. The territories excluded from the analysis thus 
cannot be said to limit the fruitfulness of the conceptual framework applied, or more 
importantly, to limit the critical evaluation of theory applied to Northern Europe.  
 
With these principles of design in mind, I will move from each geopolitical type and argue for the 
selection of the units. 
 
In the upper left column of the typology, portraying “International liberalism” we find geopolitical 
entities and political cultures whose internal norms and foreign policy-justifications were both 
heavily dependent upon notions of “negative“409 liberty and freedom, and especially free markets. In 
this category we only find two traditional territorial units - that of USA from 1941 and the Dutch 
Republic 1579-1806, plus one non-territorial organisation, the Hanseatic League (1298-1587).410 
The years 1579 and 1806 should of course be commented upon. One might reasonably argue that the 
Dutch republic was not consolidated until 1588 or 1590, but I have chosen the year of the Union of 
Utrecht as a meaningful starting point in which to treat the Dutch Republic as a unit.411  
Its name was actually changed to the Batavian Republic in 1795, but according to a prominent 
scholar on the Republic, this was “a renewal, certainly, but not yet a sweeping away of the 
Republic”.412 Thus it is sensible to speak of “The Dutch republic” till at least 1806, if not till 1808. 
More substantial at this point; the Dutch republic should be included in the analysis. It clearly 
belongs to a central part of the story of maritime Northern Europe. The Republic was an aspiring 
                                                 
408 Russia/USSR is excluded, for example, and I claim that this is justifiable although this ”unit” certainly has made 
extraterritorial claims and incursions into the sovereignty of other states. Nevertheless, I will argue that its principal 
influence from its overseas interests upon Northern Europe has not been dramatic. I agree with Curtin (2000: 41) 
that ”Though Russia was geographically European, its earlier history and orientation often departed from the general 
pattern, and its empire building was overland, not overseas”. 
409 It is negative in the sense that it emphasises freedom of opportunities. 
410 The first two units make an odd couple at first sight. However, I think it can be justified to mark out some highly 
interesting features of how the Dutch Republic and the US have been viewed by commentators outside of these 
territories. As Toqueville was impressed by North America, so were contemporaries of the Dutch Republic 
astonished by its degree of toleration and freedom. On the D. republic, see Israel, 1998: 1 
411 See Israel, 1998: 196-205, and Downing, 1992: 231-2 
412 Israel, 1998: 1121 
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hegemon up till the rise of England as a major sea power (see 3.2), and continued to influence 
maritime transportation and commerce till the end of the 18th Century. Indeed, the Dutch republic 
fostered the author of Mare Liberum, struggled with England and Spain over the economic 
hegemony of Europe, later on gave the English throne part of its ideological flavour and to a large 
degree influenced the early state-formation processes of the Nordic countries.413 Nevertheless, I 
argue that the Dutch colonial experience was different than that of Britain. The breadth, and 
particularly the intensity, of its colonial experience was less than those of the other European 
imperial powers. C.R. Boxer, for example, flatly stated that “Although the VOC`s sphere of activity 
extended from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan, only in certain regions were the Dutch able to 
exercise an effective monopoly for any length of time”.414 When it comes to industry, the Republic 
was highly advanced (for example in ship-building), but Jonathan Israel415 thinks that Wallerstein`s 
(1980) claim that the United Provinces became the leading producer of industrial products of the 
17th Century is an exaggeration. In a comparative perspective, the Dutch republic also was a society 
that was tolerant and relatively free for its age. Although its states were oligarchic, Downing notes 
that “representative government and broad personal freedoms nonetheless existed, and served as a 
basis for liberal democracy in the following centuries”.416 As with the US later, the Dutch republic 
sought to reconcile different values and principles, which on occasions led to opportunistic policies. 
However, the ideological outlook of the Republic was different from France and Great Britain.417 In 
a certain sense, the Dutch republic as a federation, forged under unfavourable circumstances, 
resembled the USA in its creed. The puritans that sailed from the old world aboard Mayflower left 
an imprint on what the US would be. The political process that made the United Provinces into a 
federal republic also bears an uncanny resemblance to later US state building.  Boxer418 for example, 
notes how ”the militant Calvinists claimed then-and have often since received- the credit for forging 
a nation under God’s blessing and with His active support”. A further similarity between the Dutch 
republic and the USA after 1898 lies in the will to enforce its principles through resort to arms when 
they deemed it necessary. In other words, international liberalism here in no way means that these 
                                                 
413 Bosscher, 1985: 97-122 
414 Boxer, 1965: 92 
415 Israel, 1989: 114-115   
416 Downing, 1992: 215. Boxer (1965: 11) writes that ”each one of the seven provincial states were sovereign. In 
Holland the States were composed of delegations nominated by the regents of eighteen towns, and one further 
delegation nominated by the provincial nobility. Every town could send as large a delegation as it liked”, and 
”Foreign policy was in the hands of the States-general at the Hague, since by the uniuon of Urtrecht in 1579 the 
rebelious provinces had agreed to present, in this sphere at least, a united front to the outside world”. As USA and 
the Hanseatic League, the Dutch republic was a federation.  
417 Boxer, 1965: 121 noted this ideological distinctiveness; ”This vogue for biblical phraseology was not confined to 
Dutch Calvinists, but they seem to have carried it further and used it longer than elsewhere in Europe” 
418 1965: 29 
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states were "pacifist" or even moderate in waging wars. It was just that they needed to see their wars 
as "just" wars; whenever large scale violence should be used, it had to suit the ideology of the polity 
that waged it. 
But above all when it comes to international regulations; the Republic was a mare liberum nation. 
As early as 1608, the states of Holland formulated its claims to freedom of the seas.419 
Especially for the conduct of Dutch policy in Northern waters, the Dutch never got the same flavour 
of paternalism as did Britain. Furthermore, this should also be seen as a result of its weakened sea 
power. On the 18th Century, Boxer writes “the sea-power of both the VOC and its fatherland 
declined noticeably during the struggle for Java”.420 On the Napoleonic Wars, Feldbæk thus 
concludes that; “When the Netherlands entered the Revolutionary wars on the French side against 
Great Britain the links between the Netherlands and its overseas possessions were cut”.421 Thus, the 
increased dependence upon neutral ships, weakened sea power (in the strict military sense) and 
claims to mare liberum on behalf of the republic were all entwined.  
Although the Netherlands from 1806 is placed among the bandwagoning liberalist, reflecting its 
lesser importance in the 20th century, we should expect Netherlands to be influenced by its past as a 
former major power also in the post-WWII international arena. According to our criteria of overseas 
interests earlier in this chapter, the Netherlands nevertheless was such a minor maritime power 
during parts of the 19th century, that it does not meet the criteria for “strong overseas interests” from 
1860 till 1925 (see appendix II). 
 
The Hanseatic League (1298-1536)422 is the only non-state actor in our typology. In many ways, it 
should also be seen as a non-territorial and truly extra-territorial maritime unit.423 This league of 
                                                 
419 Boxer, 1965: 90 
420 Boxer, 1965: 105 
421 Feldbæk, 1996: 266 
422 Note that we will deal with the League in chapter 5.1. It is certainly worthwhile to discuss the duration of this 
city-league as an entity. The city of Lübeck was founded in 1159 (Dollinger, 1998), while the influence of the 
German cities was serious in Norway already from the 1180s. Indeed, the question of when the League actually 
should be seen as a rather coherent League is a subject of historiographic debates. However, there is little doubt that 
by 1298, German merchants in the Baltic did not longer operate as individual traders (see Spruyt, 1994: 122 for a 
similar argument, despite the fact that the term Hanse was used prior to 1298). Dollinger (1998:10-12) lets history of 
the League span from the formation of Lübeck in 1159 till the last Hansetag in 1669. But the duration of the Hanse 
as a unit in this ananlysis should be limited further. Dollinger (1998: 11) for example, emphasize that “Seit der Mitte 
des 13. Jahrhunderts hatten die Hansen nahezu das handelsmonopol in beiden Meeren”, while “Seit dem Beginn des 
16. Jahrhunderts lag der Niedergang der Hanse offen zutage” 
423 The historiography on the Hanse is rich. See for example, Nedkvitne, 1984, Helle, 1991, Postan, 1973, 
Christiansen, 1997, Karlsson, 2000, Bjørgo et al, 1995, Miskimin, 1975, Nash 1929, Lunden, 1967, Schreiner, 1941 
and 1935, Ropp, 1961, Reynolds, 1974, Scammell, 1981 and above all else, Dollinger, 1998. To my knowledge, the 
only in-depth analysis (to be a bit generous) of the League by a political scientist is the study by Spruyt, 1994: 109-
128. This lack of analysis of the role of the League in state formation in Europe, is probably due to the fact that the 
City-League was not recognized as a sovereign entity at Westphalia, 1648. Perhaps the League was incompatible 
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maritime cities was a formidable power in Northern Europe for at least three centuries. This is 
evidenced by the volume and intensity of its trade, its incursions into the sovereignty of the weaker 
Nordic kingdoms, and by its role as an entrepeneur of naval warfare. The League practised trade to a 
degree that to its contemporaries, it seemed like a much more powerful actor on the international 
arena than the most powerful transnational corporation does for small states today. It waged war424, 
largely through hired naval personnel, with England, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.425 At 
the peak of its power, it was able to play the leading role in choosing the Monarch in Denmark,426 to 
dominate trade in Sweden and Novgorod totally, and gain territorial concessions in Norway (see 
chapter 3.1).427 The League was an aggressive liberalist, but above all an international liberalist 
using the freedom of the seas for its commerce and transportation. The League might have said to 
make incursions into the “sovereignty” of its contemporary Nordic Monarchs, but these incursions 
were largely restricted to the economic sphere. And these incursions were without exception (as far 
as I can see) aimed at upholding its trade by resisting attempts by monarchs to gain control of 
commerce. 
To our perspective today, the League at first sight is only a historically interesting case of extra-
territorial struggles. But as I will argue later, this League of cities to a large degree was a catalyst in 
Nordic state building. It will simply not do to dismiss the League as a loose federation of cities that 
is not entitled to be treated as an actor or a unit in comparative analysis.428 The League was more 
than a loose federation. As Spruyt points out, the Hansa had the ability to “send emissaries, sign 
treaties, collect revenue and enforce hansetag decisions”.429 The influence of the state-formation of 
England, Denmark, Norway and Sweden is incomplete without an analysis of the role played by the 
Hansa. I will claim that the mare clausum-policies often to be found in Northern Europe to a large 
degree were influenced by the historic lessons taught these countries by the German City-league. 
Furthermore, the Hanseatic League offers an interesting case when it comes to state-formation and 
sovereignty; why did this kind of organization disappear from the international arena? In accordance 
with Tilly`s theory on state formation,430 we should expect it to be ultimately inferior in waging war 
compared to sovereign states. Therefore, I shall include the Hanseatic League in my analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
with the logic of territorial sovereignty in the world order after Westphalia. Dollinger (1998: 9) certainly points to 
the ambiguity of a political and economic confederation that at the same time was not a “juristischen person”. 
424 Glete, 2000 
425 Bjørgo et al, 1995 
426 Dollinger, 1998 
427 Nash, 1929, Scammell, 1981, Reynolds, 1974, Miskimin, 1975 
428 Spruyt, 1994: 126-127 points out that the institutions of the Hansa was no more loose than those of contemporary 
states. 
429 Spruyt, 1994: 126 
430 Tilly, 1992 
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However, the League as a major player on the international scene only existed in pre-Grotian times, 
so to speak. Mare liberum and mare clausum as formal categories did not exist at the time of the 
League that makes us able to draw analogies to the later units. Therefore, I have chosen to include 
the League in the introduction of the first empirical chapter, but I do this in order to describe the 
context of the emerging modern states in the 17th century rather than to include the Hansa as a unit 
on which to draw definitive conclusions from. 
 
The role of the USA is less controversial. There can be little doubt that the US played a major role in 
structuring international institutions after The Second World War. Thus, IR-scholars and world-
system scholars alike would prefer to include USA in the analysis.431 Indeed, the US was a central 
component of the world polity after WWII, and thus any analysis not containing North America 
should be seen as incomplete. Moreover, the US did not play a major role in European crises until 
the 20th century. However, I propose that in the world after 1945, the importance and influence of 
the US is of such scale that a study of the interplay between state formation and international 
institutions simply must include USA. From the perspective of contemporary history, the US is too 
important to be left out of the thesis. Yet, as a central aspect of the theoretical contribution I try to 
give, the US makes for a highly interesting case to be compared to other historical major powers. 
Opposed to the European powers, a crucial distinction lies in the fact that “the United States was the 
first major colony successfully to revolt against colonial rule”.432 This also shows how ambiguous 
the concept of bandwagoning is when applied to the US in the 19th century. Nevertheleess, for the 
major part of that century, relations between Britain and the US improved (after the Napoleonic 
Wars). 
The US enjoined hegemonic power after WW2. However, this hegemony had no history of 
controlling a vast colonial empire as the European states. Although the Philippines, Puerto Rico and 
Guam were de facto colonized by the US in 1899433, an overseas empire never became as central an 
aspect in the history of US foreign policy as in the case of Britain. The intensity of American 
colonialism as well as its breadth was very limited.434 Even Theodore Roosevelt soon agreed that the 
                                                 
431 Wallerstein, 1974, Gilpin, 1987 
432 Lipset, 1964: 2.  The American historical journey was different from the European one from the outset. This 
shaped their identtity and polity. Hoggenboom (2002: 43) thus writes that ”Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
century, Americans were self-consciously republican. They created a republican empire of liberty” 
433 Brogan, 1999: 440-441, Hildebrand, 1999: 224 
434 The colonial experience was a disappointment. The missionary creed was weakened as the Americans discovered 
that the Spaniards already had converted the natives of the Philippines to Christianity. Next, American rule fostered 
armed resistance. Hugh Brogan (1999: 441) thus writes that “the shameful, though not unprecedented, sight of 
Uncle Sam behaving like George III roused widespread opposition within America”. Furthermore, the islands were 
valueless as markets and expensive to defend.  
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Philippines had been a mistake.435 In some ways, this can be seen as a confirmation of the earlier 
tradition of US foreign policy. Its early “neutralism” reduced its internal tensions. Lipset, for 
example, writes that “the subsequent heavy immigration from all parts of Europe in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century reinforced these neutralist tendencies, since it gave rise to ethnic pressure 
groups that reacted sharply to American policies which affected their homelands”436. Lipset 
compares this dynamique to a similar one in Switzerland.  This multi-national entity could not 
participate in “European national and religious quarrels without running the risk of 
disintegration”.437 Moreover, the freedom of the seas was the second of Wilson’s fourteen points. It 
was a blatant statement against Great Britain. This is part of the explanation why the European race 
for empire and the balance of power politics seemed alien to American politicians, while at the same 
time US foreign policy was seen by its proponents as ethically superior compared to those of the old 
great powers.438 This makes the US a case worthwhile and essential to the present treatise. Indeed, 
the discussions on the freedom of the seas after WWI (the “Naval Battle of Paris”) are apt 
illustrations of the differences in the foreign policy-ideologies of the US and Britain. Asking what 
exactly Wilson meant by “freedom of the seas”, Lloyd George received a shockingly frank answer; 
“absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war, 
except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of 
international covenants”439 It was the US interpretation of freedom of the seas held since 
independence. 
Indeed the defence of freedom, conceived in the North American fashion, has been paramount to US 
foreign policy.440 This does not necessarily mean that this missionary creed was seen as benign by 
other peoples. On the contrary, our typology points to the differences of political cultures between 
Europe and the US.441 In the Reagan Administration, James Watt, who once compared 
environmentalism to Nazism, was made Secretary of the Interior. His mission, he stated, was to 
                                                 
435 Curtin, 2000: ”The annexation of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines was an anomaly justified to the public 
mainly on strategic grounds” 
436 Lipset, 1964: 66 
437 ibid: 66 
438 When US scholars and politicians did not hold this view, it often led to controversy, as in the case of Henry 
Kissinger serving as Secretary of State. On Franklin D. Roosevelt`s policy in WWII. Brogan (1999: 577) writes that 
he “could not teach the Americans the realpolitik he was practising: it would have shocked them too much”.  
439 Cited in Howarth,  1999: 323 
440 Perhaps this belief in freedom is a characteristic trait of the national imagination itself;  ”I have always believed 
that this anointed land was set apart in an uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this great continent here 
between the oceans to be found by people from every corner of the earth who had a special love of faith and 
freedom”, Ronald Reagan, cited in Matarese, 2001: 61 
441 Perhaps the US should be seen as liberal towards liberals, and not so liberal towards actors it did not see as liberal 
itself. Liberalism is of course an ambiguous concept, and perhaps especially so in the North American context. 
Huntington, 1981 thus stated that political practise invariably must fail to measure up to the values espoused in the 
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“mine more, drill more, cut more timber, to use our resources rather than keep them locked up”.442 
Still, the American way of life was seen by Americans to be the only model worth emulating, and 
“perhaps this was the most characteristic trait: there was a missionary of some kind in almost every 
American breast”.443 Furthermore, I believe it is wrong, in the Marxian manner, to see this as mere 
hypocrisy and rhetoric camouflage of capitalist interests. This is not to deny that this missionary 
creed might be brutal. The US has been prone to fits of “moral crusading” and to support 
movements for the “elimination of evil”444. At its core, however, the ideals of freedom are central 
parts of what the US was and is; “At the bottom of all American patriotism lay, and lies to the 
present day, the commitment to freedom – the favourite word, the favourite idea, the favourite boast. 
This freedom was a very concrete thing, the essential stuff of the American historical experience”.445 
Still, this liberalism could only be the stuff of a superpower when it was combined with a sense of 
communality; the federal state and foreign policy had to be embedded in civil society.446 These 
ideals have to be balanced against pragmatic assessments of national interests, a lasting paradox in 
US foreign policy to this day.447 And domestic ideology travelled around the world, through the 
structures of economic, military and political power.448 This makes both the Dutch Republic and the 
USA after 1941 into highly substantial cases to be studied. In sum, for their similarities and their 
differences, both the Dutch republic and USA after WWII were major powers claiming mare 
liberum. I will also argue that the Hanseatic League was a unit, and that although its importance 
might be disputed in creating international institutions, I will argue in 3.1 that it did so indirectly, 
through its huge impact upon the state-formation processes in Northern Europe. Above all, it is a 
mistake to see international studies and comparative politics through systemic models that do not 
take non-state actors into consideration. Both current and historical concerns seem to justify such a 
reminder. Historically, the rather introvert US foreign policy from 1776 till the 1890s makes it 
difficult to place the US within one category. It did not meet the criteria we have set for a state with 
strong political interests in this period. Nevertheless, it did have strong overseas economic interests, 
witness its large merchant navy (see appendix III). Thus, in spite of the war with Britain, we have 
                                                                                                                                                             
American creed. Lipset, 1979 sees an ambiguity between egalitarianism and liberalism in every American. See also 
Ellis, 1993 for a use of the Grid-group concepts applied to the US context. 
442 Brogan, 1999: 689 
443 Brogan, 1999: 437 
444 Ellis, 1993: 24 
445 Brogan, 1999: 319 
446 Ellis, 1993: 13. According to Lipset, 1964, what makes the United States exceptional is that the “left” does not 
reject individual freedom and the right does not reject equality.  
447 Writing on the debate about the foreign policy of the Clinton Administration, for example, Sokolsky, 1998: 77 
state ”the Clinton administration’s ”pragmatic internationalism” represents the kind of approach which has always 
characterized US foreign policy, one of great ideals and uneasy compromises”. 
448 Note the similarity with Michael Mann`s (1986. 1993) IEMP-concept of power. 
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placed it in the category of bandwagoning liberalism from 1776 till 1898. Thereafter, the US is 
labelled an international liberalist. An interesting question then arises; has US foreign policy habitus 
changed after “the war on terrorism” from 2001? We will address this difficult problem in chapter 5. 
 
Moving to the upper right column, we find the geopolitical type of states that resembled a policy of 
Imperialism, and in an even more enduring perspective, Paternalism.  
Apart from the critique that USA should be seen as an imperialist/paternalist (a view that is probably 
adopted by many on the left449), I claim that this category includes territories that were aggressive 
actors of extraterritorial policies and territories that must be said to have such a past. The central 
question is why these states predominantly can be said to have claimed mare clausum more than the 
opposite principle. I propose that the historical trajectories of these units made them much more 
explicitly into conquering states on the international arena than the international liberalists. In the 
race for colonies, all these entities were aggressive actors at the international level, making them lay 
down mercantilist policies that in effect tried to encompass overseas territories as formal parts of 
their empire. 
Later on, several of these imperialist nations restricted their praxis. Partly these changes were results 
of domestic changes, partly they were the outcome of competition from states with different 
principles, and partly, perhaps, imperialism itself was self-defeating in the long run. Generalising, I 
would claim that this history made colonial powers and former colonial empires turn into a 
disposition to act that nevertheless was somewhat paternalist in its nature.450 However, this 
theoretical trajectory does not necessarily apply to all major powers claiming mare clausum, as we 
will return to below. 
 
                                                 
449 Probably one does not have to be ”leftist” in order to hold such a view. Many would subscribe to the present 
informal ”empire” of the US as an example of what Chalmers Johnson (2000: 65) has named ”stealth imperialism”. 
But my point is not to refute such vague notions of imperialism and extraterritorial claims to sovereignty. What I 
argue is that the “imperialism” of Russia and the US, for example, was of a different nature and character than the 
“imperialists” and “paternalists”. Curtin (2000: 41) claim that “In neither case was desire for territorial empire the 
main intent, though both Russia and the United States participated along with the others-Russia extensively in the 
Caucasus, Central Asia and Korea, and the United States equally dramatically in the 1840s by annexing most of 
northwestern Mexico and moving overseas in the 1890s by seizing the Philippines and Puerto Rico”. The expansion 
of the US, and, as Curtin (ibid: 42 rightly claims), of Russia, was much more strategically motivated than those of 
England and France. 
450 I believe it to be difficult to explain the policies of France and Britain otherwise. Consider for example the 
significance of Algeria and Indochina for French foreign (and domestic) policy after WWII, and the significance of 
the Suez crisis for both countries. In the entire period from 1948 till 1960, British forces were deployed in Malaya 
”in the Emergency” or ”counter-insurgency” campaign in Malaya” (Curtis, 1995: 56). Although Britain was 
weakened, in a comparative perspective, after 1945, the Labour Government stressed the importance of keeping its 
status as a great power. Ernest Bevin, according to Curtis, 19995: 10, once explained to the Soviet Foreign minister 
that “just as a British Admiral, when he saw an island, instinctively wanted to grab it, so the Soviet government, if 
they saw a piece of land, wanted to acquire it”.  
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Perhaps England and later Great Britain451 fits this ideal-type closely (in a weberian, not a 
normative meaning of the word). Britannia452 “Ruled the waves” in more than one sense453, creating 
an overseas empire unparalleled in world history,454 since it both had the naval force and financial 
strength to create empire.455 Clearly, a study of Northern Europe must include Britain. In this 
respect, the historical legacy of the Empire is highly interesting in a comparison of Britain with the 
US and the Netherlands, since the imperial legacy somewhat continued through the Commonwealth 
well into the 20th century.456 Whereas both England/Britain and the Dutch Republic were maritime 
hegemons and both have histories of controlling a colonial empire overseas, I nevertheless claim 
that the Dutch republic and Britain were to be different geopolitical entities on ocean policy. This is 
perhaps the most controversial statement thus far, but I suspect this difference to be a result of the 
difference of the Dutch and English457 colonial experiences.458 That there was a manifest difference 
in the maritime policy between the two is beyond doubt. England was entirely dependent upon her 
strong Navy for survival. Thus, English policy at times was uncompromising. In the Napoleon wars, 
for example, “her Navy swept the French Navy from the seas but her insistence on her own 
interpretation of “maritime rights” offended her allies as much as the French”459 One historian 
interprets the the war of 1812 as a war fought because of differing interpretations of mare liberum, 
and with an ultimate result that “ended with both views unchanged”.460 While the Treaty of Paris in 
1856 can be seen as a turning point when it comes to restricting prize taking, the most dominant 
claims of Britain were maritime ones.461 At the same time, the difference between UK and the US 
should be emphasized to a far larger degree than contemporary commentators are inclined to.462 The 
                                                 
451 Indeed Great Britain (restricting it to include the British Isles) could be seen as an empire in itself. See Armitage, 
2000: 24 
452 For a discussion of the origins of the phrase ”Empire of Great Britain”, see Armitage, 2000: 41-47 
453 ”The myth was persistent not least because it enshrined an inescapable truth: the British Empire was an empire of 
the seas, and without the Royal Navy’s mastery of the oceans, it could never have become the global empire upon 
which the sun never set” (Armitage, 2000: 100) And it was a convenient way to see the empire, since ”An empire of 
the seas would not be prey to the overextension and military dictatorship which had hastened the collapse of the 
Roman Empire, nor would it bring the tyranny, depopulation and impoverishment which had hastened the decline of 
Spain” (ibid: 100-101 
454 “The Navy dominated the seas of the whole world to an extent that had no parallel”, Lloyd, 1996: 138 
455 Brogan, 1999: 75 
456 Indeed, the invasion of the Falklands in 1982 is an interesting act of extraterritorial state action that is perhaps not 
totally reducible to rationally calculated national interests. Likewise, the statements made by Argentine President 
Eduardo Duhalde in a memorial speech on April 2nd 2002 illustrate the symbolic value that can be attached to rather 
remote islands as objects of extraterritorial claims. (Aftenposten, April 3rd 2002). 
457 Armitage, 2000: 187 termed Britain`s mare clausum policy ”blue-water Lockeanism” 
458 Boxer, 1965: 92, Cain and Hopkins, 2002 
459 Chamberlain, 1988: 7. The treaty of ”Armed Neutrality” between Prussia, Russia, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and 
Portugal in 1780 was a direct response to the right claimed by Britain to seize enemy goods on neutral ships.  
460 Howarth, 1999: 324 
461 This included the insistence upon the neutralization of the Black sea, where Russia’s fleet was to cease to exist. 
See Chamberlain, 1988: 110. 
462 Brogan, 1999: 484 
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British Empire did not practise real liberalism in transnational affairs. Tomlinsson, for example, 
writes that; “Even the liberal international economy of the second half of the nineteenth century was 
underpinned...by a judicious use of formal and informal techniques of imperialism to provide 
appropriate public institutions”.463 Lloyd George told President Wilson`s representative that “Great 
Britain would spend her last guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United States or any other 
power”.464 The reply was again frank; neither the US nor any other country would submit to Great 
Britain’s complete domination of the seas any more than to Germany’s domination of the land. The 
personal advisor of President Wilson, colonel House, described the US-British views of each other 
in the following way after WWI: “The relations of the two countries are beginning to assume the 
same character as that of England and Germany before the war”.465 One could critisize the view that 
Britain predominantly was a mare clausum large power by pointing out that Britain in a comparative 
perspective was rather liberal in the period from 1856 till the outbreak of WWI. As a society, Britain 
did have liberal traits, but if we take a look at its praxis as a naval and imperial power, and its 
preferences for international institutions regulating maritime matters, it cannot be labelled an 
international liberalist. 
It was ill received in American opinion when Britain forced the abandonment of the freedom of the 
seas in 1919. An introduction of mare liberum simply would have negated Britain`s strategic 
position off continental Europe and threaten its imperial network. This shows the difference between 
UK and USA, a difference that was also evident after WWII.466 Britain owed her survival in WWI 
from her “success in using the Royal Navy to starve her enemy while preventing him from starving 
her”.467 Partly, she also survived WWII by means of a strong navy and the not insignificant support 
from her dominions.468 
 
Germany was a core state with claims to hegemony from ca 1880 till 1918, and indeed in the period 
of the Third Reich. However, the country lost its overseas colonial empire after WW1.469 Thus the 
Weimar republic certainly does not fit neatly into the category of paternalists, while I will argue that 
                                                 
463 Tomlinsson, 2001: 358 
464 Lloyd George, cited in Howarth, 1999: 324 
465 Edward House, cited in Howarth, 1999: 325.  
466 See Louis, 2001: 343 
467 Brogan, 1999: 484 
468 This support was also evidence of the significance of the empire to the dominions. While the US pressed for 
changes in imperial matters after the Atlantic Charter in 1941, “partnership” with the dominions became the new 
creed of the empire. And the dominion subjects paid a price; “Of 30000 British merchant seamen who perished in 
the war an astounding 5000 were believed to have been of colonial origin. In explanation for such a high casualty 
rate, it was offered that colonial personnel were largely employed in the engine rooms of the old coal-burning 
ships”, Jeffrey, 2001: 312 
469 See Lloyd, 1996: 283, 279-281, Cain & Hopkins, 2002: 573-574 
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Imperial Germany does.470 Moreover, the German colonial experience lasted only significantly from 
1882-1883471. Furthermore, the British hegemony ensured that German patronage often was 
abrupted, as in 1890 in the cases of Zanzibar, Uganda and Kenya, and in southern Africa in 1898. 
Thus, I have separated “Germany” into several different geopolitical types depending upon its 
political regime at different epochs. I find that Imperial Germany, from ca 1880 till 1918 clearly fits 
into the imperialist category,472 and should be included in order to make for a fruitful comparison. 
The short-lived nature of the German colonial experience suggests that it is a special case that 
should be examined. The Weimar republic certainly does not fit into the same category, and is 
consequently excluded.473 
Moreover, I believe that the opportunistic and highly curious ideological foreign policy of The Third 
Reich is not a typical case for comparison of foreign policy to illustrate the interplay between state 
formation and international institutions. While a unique case of a revolutionary foreign policy, 
Adolph Hitler and his staunchest followers simply wanted to make the Reich itself into the most 
significant international institution. Moreover, Hitler was less preoccupied with overseas empire474 
than he was with creating “lebensraum” in the East,475 an idea that perhaps was the result of the 
blending of his racial ideology, selective interpretation of Teutonic history and his experience as an 
army corporal.476 Thus, I leave the Third Reich out of the comparison. But Imperial Germany 
certainly had overseas and colonial interests that make it comparable to the other units. It turned 
form a continental, landwards Empire into a truly overseas one. Klaus Hildebrand (1999: 233) has 
                                                 
470 Stoecker, 1986: 21 states that ”It was only with the transition to protectionism and the promulgation of 
Bismarck`s anti-socialist law in 1878/79 that the colonial issue became a matter of interest to important sections of 
the German ruling classes”. 
471 Gildea, 1996: 330. Stoecker, 1986: 21 stresses that “A colonial movementled by National liberal and Free 
conservative politicians began, which resulted in the foundations of the German Colonial Association on 6 
December 1882” 
472 Under William II, the maritime ambitions of Imperial Germany were ready for take-off, especially with the 
launching of its huge Naval programme from 1898. Its aim signalled the warning to Britain. See du Jourdin, 1993: 
125. Hildebrand, 1999: 232 states that “ was die Erben Bismarcks im “Neuen Kurs” eingeleitet hatten, der anfangs 
noch im kontinentalen Rahmen geblieben war, das wurde nunmehr durch die Flottenpolitik des Wilhelminismus 
endgültig zu einem todernstern Spiel um Weltmacht oder Untergang” 
473 This does not mean that I claim that there were not significant incentives for colonial revisionism in the Weimar 
republic. That strong interests in Germany sought to re-establish Germany as a colonial power is nevertheless 
beyond doubt. Partly, German banks for example, proposed that Germany should co-operate with the other 
European colonial powers in administrating colonies. Germany was, in the words of German Foreign Minister 
Stressmann in 1926 a ”Volk ohne Raum” (see Stoecker, 1986: 315-316). The Western Powers seem to have hoped 
that they could divert Germany` s imperialism in an eastward direction, especially against USSR. In practise, 
however, Germany’s state practise under the Weimar republic was moderate in terms of colonial policy. 
474 This is of course not to say that Hitler and his followers also planned for an overseas empire! On the contrary, 
Hitler wanted colonies for their natural resources, and thought that what could be done in Europe would be easier to 
achieve in Africa. See Stoecker, 1986: 402-414. I simply argue that this dream of Hitler was not as central as his 
drang nach osten. 
475 du Jourdin, 1993: 126 
476 See for example Kershaw, 2000 
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captured the German urge at the turn of the century to capture a “Platz in der Sonne”.477 The 
colonial adventures should therefore be seen as embedded in a distinct trait of Wilhelmine foreign 
policy. The Tirpitz fleet programme was a gigantic one, and “mit der Existenz diesen 
furchtgebietenden Waffe Deutschlands sollte seine wahre Autonomie als Grossmacht zur Geltung 
kommen”.478 Colonies could receive German emigrants, strengthen German capitalism and be a 
hindrance to socialism and domestic tension.479 The mare clausum incentives behind imperialism are 
well illustrated in the case of imperial Germany. The strongest domestic supporters of German 
imperialism were to be found among the people who were the most eager spokesmen for high tariffs 
on industrial goods, notably among representatives of the coal and steel industry and the largest 
German bank, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, and the financer Bleichröder.480 Although the colonial 
question was not in the forefront of the policies of Bismarck, he laid the ground for an elitist polity 
in the united Germany that later was to become a colonial power (witness the divide and rule in 
domestic politics by Bismarck. Critical voices were often co-opted. “He even thought of hiring Karl 
Marx”)481. This is the most important background for Bismarck’s decision in 1884 to embark of a 
policy of colonial annexations.482 Furthermore Stoecker483 emphasize the favourable international 
situation in 1884 that facilitated the decision by Bismarck. There were still territories to grab in 
Africa, Asia and Oceania, and the relationships between Britain and Russia and France were strained 
in the aftermath of the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. This led to the German colonisation in 
South West Africa, Cameroon, Togo and German East Africa in the period between 1885 and 
1906.484  
                                                 
477 The historian Thomas Nipperday supports this in the following interpretation; ”Weltpolitik was not just the policy 
of the Kaiser or of the ”ruling cartel”, it was the policy of the Germans, the fleet was the Kaiser’s fleet, to be sure, 
but it was also the fleet of the Germans. The German Middle classes became imperialistic voluntarily and of their 
own free will” (cited in Evans, 1997: 32).  
478 Hildebrand, 1999: 236 
479 See Stoecker, 1986: 22-23 
480 See Stoecker, 1986 and Stern, 1977. Fritz Stern, 1977, convincingly demonstrates the close relationship between 
finance and Bismarck. This analysis also sheds light on the increasingly aggressive and anti-Semitic sentiment in 
Germany from 1871.  
481 Stern, 1977: 277 
482 Nationalist sentiments meant that laissez-faire doctrines were tossed over board. In contrast to the 1850s and 60s, 
Stern (1977: 208) states, ”Interest groups clamoured for ”national” protection, influential academics, organized in a 
League for social reform, demanded an end to manchesterism and a new activist state..Bismarck came to believe 
that a program of what he called state socialism would forestall revolutionary or democratic socialism. Bismarck 
had always been an interventionist and paternalist; economic necessity, political calculation and personal 
predilection combined to set his course in the late 1870s and throughout the 1880s” 
483 Stoecker, 1986: 31-32 
484 Stoecker, 1986; 39-113 
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Sweden played a major part in the struggle for dominance in the Baltic more or less from 1630 till 
1809.485 This is (at least outside Scandinavia) easily forgotten, but Sweden was a strong regional 
power until the Great Nordic war. In effect, Sweden dominated the Baltic Sea in co-operation with 
the Dutch until the early 18th century. One might argue that the Swedish Navy did not play a direct 
role outside the Baltic, but without it, the Swedish armies “would not have achieved their 
conquests”.486 It was paramount to build a strong Navy; strong enough at least, to safeguard lines of 
communication between Stockholm and its armies in Germany.487 That the geographical distance 
between the motherland and the rest of the Swedish Empire was limited does not mean that it was 
not an empire.488 Under Gustavus Adolphus, its fleet increased from 50 till 90 powerful sea-going 
fighting ships. And the Swedish empire grew by deliberate acts of Royal policy, primarily motivated 
by national security and strategy.489 Those who would dismiss “small states” from comparative 
analysis might easily end up ignoring vital impulses and influences from these states on the 
international arena. This is especially true for Northern Europe. Glete, for example, makes this 
point.490 
 
For Sweden, mare clausum in the Baltic was the only mean to gain security (as it almost constantly 
was threatened by Russia to the east and Denmark from south-west. In fact, for two centuries, the 
two mare clausum kingdoms of Sweden and Denmark were locked into a near permanent hostility, a 
relationship that illustrates the clashes that occur among paternalist states with close geographical 
proximity).491 Sweden also participated in the colonial adventure through its own company, the 
Swedish East India Company, first established in 1731.492 This company existed up till 1813.493  
Furthermore, Finland in effect was a Swedish province till 1809, and Sweden was the dominant part 
of the Swedish-Norwegian union from 1814 till 1905. What makes Sweden interesting in a 
comparative perspective is its role as a smaller, more regional power than the other units within the 
                                                 
485 Swedishinfluence over regional affairs certainly diminished after the Great Nordic war, to be sure. The last 
Swedish soldiers particiåating in a war on the European continent fought under Bernadotte in the 1813-campaign 
against Napoleon. 
486 Du jourdin, 1993: 122 
487 Downing, 1992: 195 
488 See Armitage, 2000: 15 
489 Roberts, 1973: 1-3. To claim that economic considerations did not matter for the Swedes is probably an 
exaggeration, however. What is rather clear is that Swedish imperialism became a heavy burden on the Swedish and 
Finnish populations. 
490 Glete, 1993: 110 
491 Lundkvist, 1973: 31. A qualification should perhaps be in order when we deal with the relationship between 
Denmark and Sweden. Although these two kingdoms on several occasions were at war with each other, they also 
had common interests in controlling trade and transportation in the Baltic. Thus, ”from the 1570s to the 1640s 
Sweden and Denmark-Norway lived with a shared dominium maris baltici, that is, a shared monopoly on violence 
and the right to enforce protection at sea” 
492 See Hallberg et al, 1994. The first Swedish expedition to China took place in 1732-33. 
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same geopolitical category. Although the role of Sweden certainly was much less significant after 
1800, it nevertheless makes it valuable as a case worth comparing. Thus Sweden up till 1905 is 
included in the analysis as belonging to the category of “paternalist and imperialist” foreign policy. 
Finland is treated as part of Sweden until 1809. 
 
Although France till 1789 certainly participated in the colonial struggles, it actually seemed to lose 
interest in colonies to a significant degree after the revolution. The comment of one prominent 
historian of empires reflects this fact well; “The French had lost interest in colonies: Napoleon 
showed a few flickers of concern about the world outside of Europe, but they soon died away”.494 Its 
fate as a colonial power somewhat reappears in the Fourth republic from 1946 till 1958, but neither 
of these epochs determined state formation or the crafting of international maritime institutions in 
Northern Europe in a way comparable to the other great powers.495 France was consistently much 
more a landwards empire-nation, looking to the East for its most formidable foes and existential 
challenges. There were substantial periods when the struggle with England was the most important, 
for sure, but the overseas interests never shaped France in a way similar to Britain or the US. In the 
modern era, French monarchs never achieved command of the European seas. France, in fact, could 
have been the leading sea power or the greatest land power, but she could not be both.496 Another 
internal reason for the lack of imperial ambitions rests in the economy of France. As a large country 
with a huge agricultural sector, she did not have the same incentives for external expansion, as did 
states like Portugal or England.  
The Congress of Vienna in 1815 stripped France of her colonies, with the exceptions of Martinique 
and Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Reunion near Madagascar and some minor stations.497 Although 
France gained increased influence later (notably in Northern Africa and Indochina), her impact as a 
maritime power in Northern Europe was not dominant after 1815. This makes it a less interesting 
example than England. France simply did not take a leading role in shaping the international 
maritime institutions. From 1870 till 1910, France accounted for only 5% of world shipping, 
compared to the British share of 45%, and “Long after iron ships were the norm, France still used 
                                                                                                                                                             
493 Koninckx, 1996: 255 
494 Lloyd, 1996: 112 
495 In his history of the ”French Overseas Empire”, Quinn, 2002: 5 writes that 2 I have euphemistically called 
France`s overseas presence the French Overseas Empire. In a strict sense, it was an empire only during the 
Napoleonic conquests…Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Togo and Cameroon were ”protectorates” and the most 
complicated of all French North African holdings; Algeria was technically part of France for much of its recent 
history. Thus what began as a monarchy ended as a republic, and it was not an empire, except briefly in the 19th 
century” 
496 Quinn, 2002: 67. Geopolitically, she was much easier overextended than England. 
497 Quinn, 2002: 107 
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wooden frames to reduce its considerable stores of seasoned wood”.498 This is not to deny that 
France certainly had a considerable overseas empire. When we add that it definitely was a 
mercantilist499 one, it does seem reasonable to categorise France as a historically imperialist and 
later paternalistic power. The French 5th republic after 1958 sought to play a much more independent 
role in international affairs than Germany in the same period. I nevertheless think it is right to claim 
that its overseas interests have been moderate, although its commitments to Northern Africa (notably 
Algeria) at times have played a part in French identity and foreign policy. However, France after 
1958 have been far less interested in Northern Europe and the North Atlantic. Geographically and 
culturally, it is not part of Northern Europe. On these grounds, I exclude France from the study of 
maritime interests and institutions in Northern Europe. The same logic essentially is behind the 
exclusion of Spain and Portugal from the empirical analysis. Clearly, they were paternalist powers 
in their imperial heydays, but they do not belong to the North European subcomplex. 
 
Denmark certainly belongs to Northern Europe, but its historical role as a maritime state is perhaps 
more dubious to contemporary observers. This, however, is an understatement of Danish influence 
in the region. Denmark under King Hans ( r. 1481-1513) “was one of the European pioneers in 
creating strong sailing navies”.500 The combined Danish-Norwegian Fleet up till the Napoleonic 
wars, for example, was one of the strongest in Europe.501 Denmark was a strong regional power up 
till the Napoleonic wars with a claim to Dominus maris Baltici. The struggle with the Hanseatic 
League was a formative experience for Denmark-Norway, and strengthened the mare-clausum-
inclination of these territories.502 Denmark-Norway was weakened both by its struggle with the 
League, Sweden and its entanglements on the continent. However, it regained strength in the 17th 
century, where its maritime empire spread to the Antilles and the Indies.503 Its most extreme claims 
to mare clausum were in fact enduring till the middle of the 19th Century. It was only in 1857 that 
Denmark gave up its sound and Belt dues and promised in future not to hinder the passage of foreign 
                                                 
498 Quinn, 2002: 110 
499 See Boulle, 1996: 233-236 
500 Glete, 2000: 116 
501 See chapter 5 
502 Although Scandinavian politics at times were highly competitive, and at times violent, the Swedish and Danish 
monarchs also had shared interests. I believe it to be no exaggeration to claim that the earlier experience with the 
incursions of the Hansa on trade in these countries had an enduring impact. Glete (1993: 114) stated, ”Early modern 
Danish and Swedish kings were of course no 19th century free traders. Their openness to foreign trade was based on 
combinations of old fears of being exploited by the north German trading cities, the weakness of their own 
commercial groups and the balance of power between them”  
503 du Jourdin, 1993: 122 
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vessels on their passage through Øresund or the Belts.504 Although not extensively analysed by 
scholars, The Danish East India Company was active till the early 19th Century.505  The Danes also 
had a small “empire” in the West Indies that included St.Thomas (occupied in 1672), St.Jan (1718) 
and St.Croix (1733).506 
In effect, Denmark was also sovereign over Norway until 1814 and over Iceland till 1944. Its role as 
Crown over Greenland and the Faroe Islands also makes Denmark a highly interesting example of a 
formerly paternalist regional power claiming mare clausum. In short, Denmark is included in our 
thesis. Denmark belongs to the category of European states that at times dominated smaller states, 
and has remained a central actor in the North East Atlantic. 
In the Northern European context from the 18th Century, England and Denmark were both able to 
sustain their economies on a varied basis. This basis enabled them to become sea powers, with 
colonial ambitions and overseas trade. Scotland,507 Norway, Ireland, the Faroe islands and Shetland 
did not have the power or economic basis to uphold their sovereignty during the turbulent centuries 
up to the 19th century of a more consolidated European state-system. A suitable, and definite, 
endpoint for Denmark as a paternalist in foreign policy was the handing over of its possessions in 
the West Indies in the second decade of the 20th century, although Danish foreign policy ambitions 
had been reduced 50 years prior to this event. 
In the category where overseas interests in the form of strong economic (but not political) interest 
are combined with mare liberum, we find the “bandwagoning liberalists”. 
What strikes one in this broad category is the diverse configuration of states that it contains. They all 
have in common low or non-existent political overseas interests. At the same time I have claimed 
that they more or less have stuck to the principle of mare liberum because of their economic 
interests through a significant merchant fleet, or simply as a result of a former imperial legacy that 
continued to uphold ties to overseas territories. Theoretically, this combination of economic 
overseas interests and mare liberum occurred in sovereign states that are depending on larger powers 
for their economic thriving or for security, if not for both. These relationships were of such 
importance for the band-wagoning states that they did not risk sacrifice their good relations because 
of differing interpretations of the maritime world order. Firstly, they benefited more from their 
                                                 
504 See Killham, 1993: 21. The fact is that many maritime nations, included the US paid Denmark a fortune for this 
abandonment of this old tax-collecting system. The amount was not less than 30.476.000 rix-dollars. For details, see 
Olsen et al, 1958. 
505 Koninckx, 1996: 255 
506 Hernæs, 1995: 182. Hernæs, 1992: 85 estimates that the total export of Slaves carried on Danish ships between 
1660 and 1806 amounted to approximately 100.000 persons. 
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relationship with the hegemon in this way. Secondly, it followed that the principles of extraterritorial 
sovereignty as laid down by the hegemon was not totally damaging the band-wagoning state, 
because it had a varied economic basis, or because its maritime economy in itself benefited from the 
existing order. 
 
The USA from 1776 till 1898 has been discussed above, and we concluded, with some doubt, that 
the US belonged to this category for that period, although the exact historical demarcation is 
difficult. The US in this period had a large merchant navy (see appendix III), but no legacy of being 
an imperial power. 
West Germany from 1949 till 1990 certainly depended upon the US for its security. Moreover, it 
also participated in the European integration process, however slow and painstaking that process 
actually was. This situation is not principally changed after the reunion of east and west in 1990. 
What has changed in German foreign Policy, apart from the general modifications of the 
geopolitical situation in Europe, is its very prominent role in the EU. My hypotheses on Germany at 
large after 1949 is that it has clung to relatively liberal concepts of international economic orders, 
including that of international institutions regulating maritime institutions. Both its relations with the 
US and the European Community have made this paramount for Germany. At the same time its 
maritime interests have been moderate compared to other industries. In military terms, the low 
interest overseas has been profoundly German through its very low naval profile. Moreover, 
Germany does not meet the criteria for strong economic overseas interest set earlier in this chapter 
(see appendix III). West Germany (1949-1990) and Germany (after 1990) are therefore not included 
in the analysis. 
The Netherlands after 1806 make for a highly interesting case, with its legacy of having aspired to 
a maritime hegemony. It certainly belongs to Northern Europe geographically and culturally, and it 
certainly has had maritime interests both overseas and certainly also at the regional level. The 
Netherlands also had a low degree of overseas interests after the war, although its historic legacy 
might have played a part in its maritime foreign policy. On the other hand, I claim at this point that it 
was a bandwagoning state after WWII. For its security, it was totally dependent upon the 
superpower, being a loyal member of NATO. Economically it also depended upon the US as well as 
its allies in the European Community. I propose that this made the Netherlands a state that 
dominantly stuck with the concept of mare liberum. This hypothesis makes for two related and 
                                                                                                                                                             
507 The decline of Scottish influence is nevertheless an interesting case. The Scots actually did try to become a 
colonial power in the late 1690s through the establishment of a commercial centre at Darien on the Panama Isthmus. 
This effort led to financial disaster, thus contributing to the decline of Scotland. See Lloyd, 1996: 58. 
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interesting questions. Firstly, the Netherlands probably differed from the Nordic countries on 
maritime policies in the postwar era, since it remained an international liberalist. Secondly, the 
transition from a former liberalist with a high degree of overseas interests into a bandwagoning state 
should lead us into an enquiry as to how the Netherlands as a polity coped with the abandonment of 
empire. In sum The Netherlands certainly is relevant and interesting as a case to be included in our 
analysis 
 
The existence of a combination of significant economic overseas interests and a predominant mare 
clausum ideology is rare, indeed. Only Norway in the periods 1880-1918 and after 1950 seems to 
meet the criteria we have set, indeed it seems to meet the criteria for the entire period after 1905. It 
is the only clear-cut bandwagoning mare clausum nation among the cases covered here, but it has 
been so for only a limited time. This makes Norway into an interesting case of comparison. Clearly, 
Norwegian authorities sought to carve out as much freedom for its merchant fleet as possible. As 
appendix III shows, Norway was almost equal to the US in terms of being a world carrier at the 
oceans. This made it strive for mare liberum, but not at the expense of mare clausum for the coastal 
ocean masses and eventually the seabed. Especially the fishery sector must have been instrumental 
in producing material incentives for mare clausum, but was there also a historical heritage that 
mattered in favour of mare clausum? 
 
Among the states with only indirect overseas interests (significant merchant navy or tax havens, or 
flag of convenience-territory, or having close ties to an overseas territory as a result of having been a 
small empire-nation) are Panama (flag of convenience), Switzerland and Liechtenstein (tax 
havens), Sweden 1905-(former small empire and significant merchant navy on a European scale) 
and Denmark 1917-(former small empire with close ties to overseas territories). The first three units 
represent an overriding concern for an international order based on free trade. Liechtenstein is a 
clear case, and likewise Switzerland, both countries that have been deeply suspicious of being 
integrated in international organisations. In a maritime sense, Panama is also a case that falls into 
this category, through its interests in insurance, banking, and maintenance of transport facilities and 
registration of ships under the flag of Panama (thus, Panama is used as a flag of convenience). 
Measured by deadweight tons, Panama was the 6th largest shipping nation in 1975, while it actually 
was the largest in the world by 1997.508 As Liechtenstein and Switzerland have been rather passive 
                                                 
508 See Coulter and Goldman, 1998: 49. Panama thus serves as the best example of a (maritime) tax haven. But the 
relevance of the category is aptly illustrated by the fact that in 1997, Liberia is second, Cyprus fourth, Bahamas 
fifth, Malta seventh and Singapore ninth after Panama among the largest shipping countries categorised by flag. 
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towards international organisations, Panama has been reluctant in its relation with the US. But 
obviously, they only serve to illustrate the utility of the typology so far, and are not included in the 
analysis. Sweden has been a landward nation, but perhaps even more so after 1905 than in previous 
centuries..509 This does not mean that sea power and maritime interests have not been important for 
its political history, far from it. Sweden, however, did not principally acquire its status in the state 
system or the world system on the basis of maritime power. Expansion has traditionally been 
conducted on land territory, where Finland has been a buffer inbetween the two more powerful 
states of Sweden and Russia. This means that Swedish influence on the Northeast Atlantic have been 
less than the others in the typology. In the Baltic setting, on the other hand, Sweden cannot be left 
out of the story. I suspect that its ability to reach dominis mare baltici was vital for the state-building 
processes of Northern Europe. The most interesting question is whether this actually mattered in 
Swedish maritime foreign policy after 1905. At that year the Union between Sweden and Ireland 
was dissolved peacefully, and neutrality and moderation has been the hallmark of Swedish foreign 
policy ever after. 510 This is the reason why I have categorised Sweden as a former small empire 
after 1905. Sweden also had a significant merchant navy after 1905, when seen in a regional 
perspective. However, the distinctiveness of Swedish political history suggests that Sweden might 
be critical case for testing our hypotheses. Thus, I include Sweden as a case in the same category as 
its neighbour Denmark. Denmark also was a former small empire, and it did have a significant 
merchant navy but a small navy in the 20th century. What makes Denmark interesting in this study, 
is that it kept very close political ties to her former dependencies in the Atlantic throughout the 
century. Clearly, then, Denmark belongs in our further analysis.   
The Post-colonial territories clinging to dependency is represented by Jersey and Gibraltar. Jersey is 
an example of a territory that has remained a formal dependency in the post-colonial age. Enjoying 
tax sovereignty and export-protection by British tariff barriers, this territory hardly is on the road to 
independence. The question of Gibraltar is not resolved either. In the population of some 280000 
inhabitants, though, there is a clear majority in favour of staying under the British Crown (which 
Gibraltar has been since 1713, when the King of Spain ceded sovereignty “in perpetuity” to Great 
                                                                                                                                                             
Comparing the top 10 country flags, it is also striking to note, as do Coulter et al, that as all the powers with a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council plus Japan were among the top ten in 1975, today Japan is the only 
“large” power on the list. 
509 The term is borrowed from Rokkan, 1999. See also Flora, 1987. 
510 One exception, perhaps, occurred in the case of the Åland islands. Sweden dispatched a military force to the 
islands in 1918. However, Sweden abided by the 1921 decision of the League of Nations that (since the population 
overwhelmingly wanted to become part of Sweden, the Swedes argued that the principle of self-determination 
should apply) the islands were awarded to Finland. The League required the Finns to guarantee the rights of the 
inhabitants to govern themselves and keep their Swedish language and culture. See Killham, 1993: 47 and 
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Britain).511 Neither the tax havens nor the Post-colonial dependencies can be said to be directly 
relevant to our present study, however, and is therefore excluded from further analysis. 
Among the bandwagoning peripheries, we find Guyana, from 1966, and Mauritius from 1968. 
They belong to the geopolitical category of bandwagoning peripheries in the immediate years after 
they gained status as dominions in the Commonwealth.512 They more or less bandwagoned behind 
the remnants of British Empire in their first years of independence, and thus claimed mare liberum 
in the sense that they wanted to be free of restrictions on their transportation and commerce. 
However, their effect on the maritime institutions can at best be seen to have been indirect, through 
their membership in the British Commonwealth. They are not relevant to the present study, and we 
do not lose empirical material for a critical evaluation of the concepts by omitting them from the 
analysis. 
The last category of states were sovereignty-seeking peripheries. They have in common a special 
emphasis on state sovereignty that was manifested in claims to mare clausum after WWII. With low 
or non-existent overseas interests and strong incentives for securing their coastal resources, these 
peripheries pressed as hard as they dared to territorialize their adjacent seas, also beyond the narrow 
confinements of the territorial sea. But these claims nevertheless had to be based on a carefully 
monitored assessment of what was possible to gain at the international arena. Too stark demands 
could jeopardise their position, especially since several of these coastal peripheries were also 
dependent upon larger powers for their security and economic interaction. However, one critical 
aspect of the sovereignty-seeking peripheries as opposed to the bandwagoning states was the sheer 
importance of their coastal resources. These resources made their policy demands in the area of 
maritime resources more active and pronounced than with most bandwagoning states. Typically, the 
states in this category also became more self-conscious on the international arena in time. If the 
international situation thus changed in their favour, they acted more aggressively in a mare clausum-
fashion than what one should expect from small states. Similarly, their incentives to do so increased 
in proportion with any increase in the importance of their coastal resources (typically in times of 
increased competition for the resources, or when technology or new information made further 
resource extraction possible). These claims to sovereignty of own maritime resources should be seen 
as embedded in a foreign-policy disposition that also combined the realpolitik of the weak with the 
moral claims of states that never have played dominant roles on the international arena. While their 
policies had to be attuned to the hegemons and to regional powers, the sovereignty-seeking 
                                                                                                                                                             
Petersson, 1991: 21. The islands were de-militarised and seen as neutral territory. The autonomy of the Åland 
islands was increased further in 1991.  
511 TIME April 15, 2002: 46; ”We Pledge Allegiance” 
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peripheries with minor exceptions never have been in a position to dominate other nations. Thus, we 
might find a tendency among these peripheries to emphasise their distance from power politics. The 
self-image of the peripheries is that of a benign, peace-loving nation, and they often claim to have a 
special understanding of the rights of weaker nations. Inherent in such a disposition is also 
scepticism towards the stronger powers.513 Thus, a central theme in the policies of the peripheries is 
to emphasise international law and –organisations. At the same time, these peripheries were 
sovereignty-seekers. This made them try to extend and strengthen their own political autonomy, 
which at times collided with other peripheries and less organised peoples. The sovereignty-seeking 
peripheries, in other words, certainly also could be nationalistic. When opportunity permitted, this 
nationalism could find outlets in the form of claiming sovereignty of varying degrees in distant, 
barren regions of less interest to larger powers, but especially over their coastal areas. This means 
that our typology should not be interpreted as a categorisation of more or less ethical policies. On 
the contrary, there is reason to expect that also peripheries and bandwagoning states have imitated 
certain traits of power politics on a small scale, whenever opportunity permitted. Thus, small coastal 
states have been opportunists on the international arena, as have more powerful polities.  
Argentine from 1967, Peru from 1947, Brazil from 1966, Cameroon from 1962, Chile from 
1948 and Uruguay from 1969 are all cases that I claim belong to this category of states. With the 
de-colonisation process, the strengthening of the UN system514 and the advantages that the Cold war 
could give them on occasions, all these states set forth extensive claims for increasing their 
territorial seas.515 However, the impact these states had on maritime institutions in Northern Europe 
is negligible. They are therefore not relevant for the present treatise, and are therefore excluded from 
further analysis. 
Norway -1905, Iceland and Ireland are all small coastal states with a history of being provinces 
(or without national sovereignty as parts of a larger polity) in unions with stronger regional powers, 
respectively Denmark (Norway 1536-1814, Iceland 1380-1944), Sweden (Norway in a union with 
Sweden from 1814 till 1905) and Britain. Thus, Ireland was the only of these states with a history of 
being subdued not only to a regional, but a hegemonic maritime power. Ireland is thus treated as 
intimately connected to Britain at large. There actually are similarities in the state building 
experiences of all these three countries. In security policy, both Iceland and Norway have been 
                                                                                                                                                             
512 Lloyd, 1996: 328-329 sums up the meaning of the term dominion, and how this meaning was altered.  
513 See Fure, 1997 for an excellent empirical demonstration of these tendencies in Norway. Peripheries in 20th 
century Europe (i.e: Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Denmark) were often keen supporters of the League of Nations 
and later UN.  
514 According to Lloyd, 1996: 320 “The United Nations was not formally much more committed to the ending of 
imperial rule than the League of nations had been, but the belief was growing that it was hard to justify and also that 
rule over dependent territories separated from the imperial centre by salt water was particularly hard to justify”. 
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protected by NATO, and in practise by the US since the signing of The North Atlantic Treaty in 
1949. Up till 1940 Iceland depended upon Denmark for protection, while Norway in the period from 
its independence from Sweden in 1905 till the German attack in April 1940 based its security on 
neutrality coupled with an implicit faith that the Royal Navy would guard its freedom in the event of 
crisis.  Ireland remained neutral, but geopolitically, none of the superpowers wanted to change this 
status.516  
Economically, there are both similarities and dissimilarities between these peripheries.  
Iceland and Norway were both predominant coastal fishing-nations, but wanted to extend their zone 
of sovereign rights as the pressure on fishing resources increased, and as the opportunity to exploit 
oil and gas on the continental shelf was opened up in the 20th century. Economically, what makes 
Norway special is the size of its merchant fleet since the 18th century, and its strong interests in 
offshore oil and gas-production since the mid 1970s. Neither Ireland nor Iceland had a similar 
economic basis, but share the property of fishing industries. In Ireland, however, agriculture (and 
from the 1990s – electronic industry) mattered far more than in Iceland and Norway. When one adds 
that Ireland has not had a huge merchant fleet, one should be cautious to interpret Ireland as a 
dominantly maritime economy.  
 
At this point, I exclude Ireland from the analysis, in the sense that Ireland will be commented upon 
under the question of overseas and foreign policy considerations of Britain. More interesting cases 
when it comes to international maritime institutions and state building are Iceland and Norway till 
1905. Thus, both are included. Having chosen the cases that are relevant to our study of Northern 
Europe, we have ended up with cases that cover all the geopolitical types inferred from our central 
concepts. We thus end up with the Typology of cases as in figure 2.2.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
515 See Prescott, 1975; p 72, table 3 
516 Ireland remained a “neutral dominion” as a part of the British Empire after 1922, but in practise its line of 
neutrality can be seen as a secession from the Empire. This was an implication of the Statute of Westminster. 
Germany supported this neutrality, hoping this neutral line would have important effects on other dominions. See 
Jeffrey, 2001: 309 
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Figure 2.2.2; Typology of units for the study of Northern Europe and the USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
517 Year of Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour 
518 Iceland achieved home rule in 1918, but remained in union with Denmark uptil 1944. The question of the status 
of the Faroe Islands reached a compromise in 1948, keeping the islands as part of Denmark, but with substantial 
autonomy. The latter is also true of Greenland. The Faroe Islands thus chose to remain outside of EEC, while 
Greenland in a referendum in 1982 left the Community, thus making it a unique territory in the history of European 
integration.  
519 Norway gained full independence after the Union with Sweden. 
520 Union with Norway dissolved 1905. 
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I intend to explain why the typology above creates the hypothesis for our empirical material.  
Strong powers (both militarily and economically speaking) could claim both mare clausum and mare 
liberum principles in their maritime foreign policy. This difference cannot be attributed to the degree 
of overseas interests alone, I propose. I assume that all large powers to be analysed here in fact had 
overseas interests.  
But these interests were interpreted differently, thus making for the empirical variation among them; 
some became international liberalists, other imperialists, later gaining a pattern of paternalism. 
These variations cannot be explained by materialism alone.  
 
Smaller powers have also held both mare liberum and –clausum principles, according to their 
relationships with larger powers. These relationships should be seen as consisting of security- and 
economic ties of dependency. The nature of these dependencies, largely attributable to the balance 
of power and the international hegemony, worked structurally in favour of either mare liberum or 
mare clausum.  
But even among the more marginal polities, we do find significant empirical variations in 
extraterritorial strategies. Again, historical materialism is not sufficient as a mode of explanation.  
 
If these hypotheses are correct, we should be able to infer some interesting conclusions. Thus, the 
case of extra-territorial sovereignty in Northern Europe would show that the content of sovereignty 
has undergone profound changes over time and that the structures of the international system have 
changed as well. The rules that constitute “international relations” have changed the relations 
themselves.  
 
This would question realist theories of international Relations. It would also belie Immanuel 
Wallerstein`s notion of the modern world-system as a theory with sufficient explanatory power in 
this region for the 20th century, since we find that states in the periphery actually benefits vastly 
from the co-operation. A typical finding that will signify this change of the international system will 
be if we actually can prove that peripheries gained more (in relative terms) than did the core states.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
521 Year of full national independence from the personalunion with Denmark. 
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Furthermore, we should also find examples where the dependency of the periphery is explicitly 
recognised by materially more powerful states to a degree that enables the weaker state to prosper. 
Next, Charles Tilly`s thesis on Coercion and Capital in European state formation-processes should 
be somehow modified. The nature of both coercion and capital has changed so dramatically that 
“soft power” weakens the notion that “war made states and states made war” AD 990-1990.  
 
In addition, the importance of naval power will perhaps add nuances to Tilly`s concept of warfare 
and its implications for the empirical variation of European state formations. I will therefore lay 
some emphasis on naval power and naval organisations in the sense that extraterritorial violence is 
seen as a state praxis that influenced state formation through ideology. In a very important sense, 
whether naval power became a central facet of national ideology or not was central to the identity 
that served as a basis for foreign policy decisionmakers. Above all, such a typology allows us to 
examine how national ideologies and material interests constituted national interests and how these 
influenced, and was influenced by, international institutions. 
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3 States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and 
Ideology 
 The City-League lost to the sovereign nation-state as the dominant type of polity in North Western 
Europe, but the Hanseatic League influenced state formation in Northern Europe in the early modern 
period in an important manner through its contribution to a competitive environment. Thus we will 
begin this chapter by analysing what impact the League had upon the formation of maritime 
ideology in the emerging states of northern Europe.522 In order to control trade routes, the kingdoms 
of Northern Europe needed some kind of naval power, since all the vital international routes went by 
sea. In order to apply naval power effectively, however, kingdoms and cities would ultimately face 
the costs of purchasing or organising extraterritorial means of violence. The initial incentive to do 
so, was often spurred by incursions into the sovereignty the monarch perceived as his. The Dutch 
Republic was the only political organisation to survive with an inclination to develop a mare liberum 
principle. This is an interesting phenomenon, since the Hanseatic league at various times was at war 
with England (1470-1474), Spain, The Netherlands (predominantly with Holland of course, 1438-
1441), Norway (1429), Denmark (1370, 1426-1435, 1616) and Sweden (1567-1570).523  
 
As Norbert Elias and Jan Glete have emphasised, control of the means of violence in this period is 
perhaps better understood as a phenomenon partly outside of the realm of the state as an 
organisation.524 However, Slavic and Finnish raids on the coasts of Denmark and Sweden (Karelian 
Finns) seem to have been important incentives for the monarchs of Sweden and Denmark to 
strengthen their sea power, with Denmark gaining a foothold in Estonia. 525 King Birger of Sweden 
concentrated on Finland and Karelen, in 1295 being able to announce to the traders in Lübeck and 
other Hanseatic towns that he had converted the Karelians to Christianity, and thus “protected the 
                                                 
522 Qoted in Spruyt, 1994: 128. One should absolutely be aware that the autonomy of Hansa cities and Kontors, and 
their relationships to sovereigns varied in space and time. We will try to focus on the position vis a vis "national" 
authorities in the territories covered here rather than giving an overall view of the Hanse itself. 
523 These years indicate wars, but it is important to point out that there were thousands of armed clashes and 
plunderings between the early states and the League in the same period.  
524 Elias, 1950: 295 "In the Middle Ages England had not a navy in the proper sense of the word". See also Glete, 
2000. Furthermore, Postan, 1973: 113 notes that ”most of the piratical acts in medieval records were committed not 
by professional pirates practising their occupation in all seasons, but by merchants who turned pirate and sometimes 
acted as privateers under official letters of mark. Thy either were pressed into service by their princes or turned to 
privateering while trade was at a standstill” 
525 I must readily admit that comparative analysis of territories in the Middle Ages is a more demanding task than 
comparing modern states. As will become evident in the following pages, the very transnational character of the 
league, the use of private violence and the loose organisational structure of the dynastic states make borders and the 
limitations of state politics in space blurred. Treating these territories AS IF they were states would be historically 
incorrect. Thus, a comaparative analysis of states in Early Modern Northern Europe should analytically reflect this 
pre-modern pattern of politics. 
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kingdom and made the sea safe”.526 Norway and Sweden were united in a personalunion from 1319. 
At the same time Denmark entered a period of internal strife, the country being without undisputed 
sovereigns through most of the 1330s. This union faced different challenges as Denmark gradually 
regained its strength, and as the German sea- cities challenged the Swedish attempt to control the sea 
trade at Novgorod.527 In 1360 the Danish king Valdemar won back Skåne. The result of the struggle 
for power was the Kalmarunion from 1397, when Erik of Pommern became king of Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway.528 In many ways, this was an alliance of foreign policy, aimed at co-ordinating 
common Scandinavian interests in the Baltic, and to counter the pressure from the German 
principalities and merchant cities. Neither of the Scandinavian countries had state machinery or 
economic resources to resist this pressure on their own.529 The Kalmarunion, however, covered an 
area larger than any European state at the time. The Polish-Lithuanien union of 1386 was created in 
order to resist the challenge of the Germans.530 Why was the Hanseatic League, backed by powerful 
German interests, seen as so formidable a challenge that the Scandinavian kingdoms were united, 
and what were the effects on political sentralization in these territories? 
 
All early records point to the League having been originally formed as a “merchant league”. In 
Norway the first records mention “Hansa mercatorum Alemannie in 1343, in Novgorod in 1350; 
“theutonicorum Hansa mercatories”.531  The league was clearly established to protect German trade 
from the many bands of pirates in the Baltic Sea,532 for it was mainly round the Baltic that the first 
                                                 
526 Christiansen, 1997: 120  
527 Postan, 1973 
528 Reynolds, 1974: 98 
529 Bjørgo et al, 1995:100 
530 The reasons for the Polish-Lithuanian union are complex. I nevertheless support this view. Zamoyski, 1994: 43-
45 states that on the question of electing the new Polish Monarch, ”they did not want the Habsburg, because he was 
an agent of the German hegemony” 
531 Nash, 1929: 2 
532 The lawless conditions in Medieval Northern Europe are evident in a number of sources. See Karlson, 2000 and 
Christiansen, 1997: 64, the latter stating that ”by 1158 a generation of coastal raids had brought Denmark low. 
Piracy was so unchecked that all the villages along the eastern coast, from Vendsyssel to the Eider, were empty of 
inhabitants, and the countryside lay untilled…the Wendish slave-markets were thronged with Danish captives at this 
time”. Although the Church played a role in creating order in Medieval Europe, this thesis, and a number of other 
works, testifies that this was a fragile order, even in relations between Christian peoples. The state of affairs in 
Northern Europe had traits of a Hobbesian culture of anarchy, as described by Alexander Wendt, 1999. The problem 
of creating order was not made easier by the fact that the demarcation of sovereignty was not yet clearly established 
or, far from it, recognised. This is not to indicate that the Church did not play a role in ordering relations between 
monarchs. The relatively peaceful 13th century might serve as a contrast between these relations and the relations 
between Christian monarchs and the lands of the heathen. Danish fleets attacked Finland in 1191 and 1202, Estonia 
in 1194 and 1197, Ösel in 1206 and Prussia in 1210.  The crusading spirit of the Swedish archbishop also went well 
with the prospect of increasing revenue and patronage. For a detailed overview of the Northern crusades, see 
Christiansen, 1997 
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German merchants made their voyages. (Hanse means “fellowship” in Middle High German).533 
There existed no common laws of navigation534, testified in the huge Danish effort in building new 
stone and brick towers in the Great Belt, western Zealand and other places along the coast, as well as 
establishing coastal patrols.535  The concept Hanseatic City should be used referring to any city 
under the leadership of Lübeck (founded in 1143) in questions regarding policies of trade.536 Over 
the next two centuries, about 150 cities were connected to the Hansa.537 How important was this 
organisation and its trade? As Postan reminds us, the data available also makes it difficult to 
compare trade between different centuries prior to the 19th century:  
 
“From this point of view, more relevant than any attempt at a measurement of foreign trade are the 
simple historical facts indicating the place of trade in medieval life – the existence of specialised 
economies, the number and relative wealth of towns, the attention paid by kings and parliaments to 
trade and navigation, the readiness to engage in political and military conflicts on behalf of 
trade”.538 
After the founding of the German League of cities, the heads of the Hansa539 turned their eyes 
towards the very flourishing trade round the Baltic coasts.540 Contrary to what claimed in 
Wallerstein`s research programme, long-distance trade in essentials existed prior to the 16th 
                                                 
533 Kurlansky, 1997: 26 
534 This is, as will be shown in the chapter on Law of the sea, a somewhat erroneous statement, since there existed 
some national laws. One example is the laws of Magnus Lagabøte in Norway at the end of the 13th century. The 
failure of these laws largely stemmed from the fact that there did not exist any lockean culture of anarchy, as 
described by Alexander Wendt, 1999 
535 ”After their defeat off Falster in 1172, Slav raiding fleets never ventured into Danish waters again”, Christiansen, 
1997: 67 
536 Postan, 1973: 159: ”Of this first generation of new German towns none could rival Lübeck. It soon drew to itself 
the trade which had previously gone overland to Bardowiek, replaced Schleswig as the chief starting point for sea 
journeying across the Eastern baltic, established itself in the fisheries of Southern Scandinavia and the island of 
Rügen, and in the rising trade with Bergen and the interior of sweden. By degrees  the old overland routes as well as 
the old Scandinavian sea routes fell into desuetude, and the bulk of the trade with the east was forced into the 
channel which ran along the south coast of the Baltic and across the foot of the Jutland peninsuela – the channel 
which Lübeck served and dominated” 
537 Reynolds, 1974: 98 
538 Postan, 1973: 105. ”These new towns had a double function…they connected the lands of the west with the 
sources of Slavonic goods..The second function was to serve as an outlet for the goods of the newly colonised lands. 
Bremen and, above all, Hamburg collected corn from the regions of Weser and the Elbe, and exported it to the west. 
Lübeck and Hamburg became the centres of the fishing industry of the Western Baltic, the salt trade of the Elbe, and 
the forste goods of Brandenburg”, Postan, 1973: 159 
539 Spruyt 1994: 119. The institutions of the Hansa and its relationships with the feudal order is well analysed in 
Spruyt, 1994: 120-129, and in Dollinger, 1998: 116-154 
540 At that time the herring spawned in the Baltic off the Pomeranian coast and the islands of Rügen, Bornholm and 
Gotland. So important was the herring trade in medieval Europe that changes in the spawning ground led to the rise 
of the Netherlands and the ruin of many of the Baltic towns in the early fifteenth century. 
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century541. Novgorod, lying as it did on the direct trade route from the Black Sea and the Bosphorus 
to the Baltic, and near the junction of four great waterways, provided the Hansa with oriental 
merchandise as well as with all the varied products of the country itself. The great forests provided 
timber, furs, tar and pitch, honey and wax.542  
 
The Hansa in Norway and Iceland 
Most scholars agree that a Norwegian543 state was established in the tenth to twelfth centuries.544 In 
some basic terms of sovereignty, it nevertheless was a very fragile polity. The fact is that The Hansa 
threatened the economic base of Norway, and remained in a strong position in Bergen up to 1600.545 
According to Nedkvitne, German merchants began to trade in Norway with goods to and from the 
Baltic from ca 1200. In the latter part of the same century, Norway became a link in German trading 
between The Baltic and Western Europe.546. Prior to the middle of the tenth century, The Baltic Sea 
had been a Scandinavian-Slavic ocean. The rise of the Hanseatic League was due to the taking over 
of this trade route.547 Postan548 even claims that the cogs and the hulks could displace as much as 
400 to 500 tons. It could also be used as a fighting ship.549 At the same time, tensions between 
                                                 
541 This finding supports Frank, 1994: 3 in that ”In our view, Amin and Wallerstein continue in the footsteps of Polanyi 
and Finley and under-estimate the importance of capital accumulation via trade and the market in the ancient world 
system. Therefore, they do not see participation in the system the same way we do and look for the ”incorporation” of 
peoples and their societies and economies into the world-system long after we see them as having long since been part 
and parcel of the historical development of the world system…Abu-Lughod seems closer to the ..still dominant position, 
despite her reference to a ”13th century world-system”. Note also that Braudel ”do not share Immanuel Wallerstein`s 
fascination with the sixteenth century. Braudel is inclined to see the European world-economy as having taken shape 
very early on”. Miskimin states that “Even in the most dismal and bleak centuries of the Middle Ages, long-distance 
trade was undertaken..By the beginning of the thirteenth century, however, trade had become more a way of life than 
uncertain adventure, and regular institutions and trade routes had been devised by medieval merchants for their 
convenience and profitMiskinen, 1975:116 
542 Postan, 1973: 98-99. ”From the middle of the fourteenth century onwards eastern timber shipped from the Baltic, 
and more especially from Danzig, all but ousted from the western markets the other types of ”white” timber, ibid: 98 
543 This section in the chapter is slightly biased towards interpreting the incursions of the League from a Norwegian 
historiography point of view. I must insist that this partly is justifiable because Norway, and particularly Bergen, 
was a vital node in cross-national trade in the middle Ages. 
544 See Aarebrot, 1982, Andersen, 1977, Holmsen & Simensen, 1967, Bagge, 1986, Helle, 1983 
545 Nedkvitne, 1984: 197 
546 Nedkvitne, 1984: 17 
547 The Norwegian elite simply did not have the resources to equip sufficient numbers of larger ships to compete 
with the Germans on these longer trade routes. Constructing, equipping and manning a larger vessel demanded 
material resources and skill. For overseas expeditions, one needed crews of trained warriors for protection, and a 
complicated technique of building and maintenance of ships. The persons who controlled these ships “had to be 
landowners, lords of retinues, the masters of populous communities”, Christiansen, 1997: 15-17 
548 Postan, 1973: 120 
549 Christiansen, 1997: 90-91 discusses the comparative advantage of the Hansa Kogge.  
According to Postan, the ability to transport huge quantities of products and to wage war at sea was vital in this 
period. The salt industries of western France illustrates how sea power was indispensable in the many conflicts that 
could arise because of competition in trade; ” In the first half of the fifteenth century, we find it frequented by great 
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Denmark and Norway did much to put Norway on a comparatively bad footing compared to German 
and Dutch overseas merchants. The Baltic was an ideal place for take-off for a company gaining 
profits from fisheries. It also was a very navigable sea once ice melted.550 
First opening up the market in eastern Norway, the Germans then seriously turned to Bergen, 
situated strategically on the Western Coast of Norway. This city had already become a node of trade 
between Norwegian cities, Skåne, Iceland and the other islands controlled by the Norwegian King. 
From Bergen the King then exported commodities to England and Continental Europe, giving 
Bergen a privileged position.551  Iceland had succumbed to the power of the Norwegian king in 
1262. The Icelandic historian Gunnar Karlsson552 has recently shown that Norway exported 600 tons 
of goods annually to the small community at Iceland, which lacked wood for ship-building.  There is 
little doubt that although the Norwegian crown was weakened by internal strife between contenders 
to the throne, the country benefited from its Atlantic islands. At times, it ruled over Orkney, 
Shetland and the Hebrides, the Isle of Man and even parts of the Scottish mainland.553 Iceland kept 
autonomy as a law district, however. It was usually defined as a tax-land (Skattland) or tributary to 
Norway or the Norwegian King, together with the other north Atlantic islands.554  
The dependency on import of grain was to seriously undermine the position of the Norwegian 
Crown.555 The export of grain from Prussia and the eastern Baltic grew after the Black Death. We 
should also note that the worsening climate in itself not was the only reason why Norwegian cereal 
production ceased to be competitive.556 Of importance in deepening the dependency on the Germans 
is also the damage to the direct trade between English and Norwegian merchants.557 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
salt-fleets of all the northern nations. Hanseatic ”bay fleets” sailed there several times a year, and Dutch and English 
ships and merchants also resorted there in large numbers. By that time Bay salt also entered northern politics as well 
as northern trade. The lawless and riotous life of this salt ”Klondyke” generated international conflicts and quarrels, 
and the safety of the ”Bay route” preoccupied the Hanseatics throughout the fifteenth century and gave rise to at 
least one war – that between England and the hanse in the middle of the fifteenth century” (Postan, 1973: 101) 
550 The economy of the sea lines of communication was of course also superior to overland journeys. Thus, in the 
11th century, the 200-mile overland journey from Hamburg to Wollin took a week, whereas the 1000 miles sea 
journey from Oldenburg to Novgorod only took twice as long. See Christiansen, 1997: 14-15 
551 Helle, 1991: 46-47 
552 Karlsson, 2000: 50-51 
553 Karlsson, 2000: 79, Bjørgo et al, 1995 
554 Karlsson, 2000: 95 
555 Helle, 1991: 66, Nash, 1929, Miskimin, 1975 
556 “In the long run, the German agrarian crisis, by reducing the price of grain, gave the Hanse towns an 
opportunity to extend their control of the Norwegians..Control of the grain trade enabled German merchants to 
regulate the prices paid by Norwegian hunters and fishermen; by extending credit on grain purchases, they could 
compound the bondage through the pressure of debt” (Miskinen, 1975: 59) 
557 Earlier in the 13th century, relations between England and Norway had been favourable, and a regular pattern of 
economic cooperation existed. See especially Lorentzen, 1959: 58 
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Germans could fix prices of grain sold to Norway558, and serve as middlemen selling the 
commodities bought in Norway to England.  
The stagnating Norwegian seafaring also damaged Iceland, since it decreased the import of vital 
goods as well as the export of fish.559 Prior to the early modern period, the export of wool to 
Flanders via English ships had been the chief source of income at Iceland.560 The wool production 
continued to be of significant importance to the Icelandic economy, but during the 15th century, the 
rich fishing fields off Iceland came to the forefront. English fishermen are first mentioned in 
Icelandic sources in 1412.561 In Icelandic historiography, the 15th century has been named the 
“English century”, due to the fact that up to 100 English fishing boats went to Iceland annually, 
most often protected by armed forces. This resulted in numerous clashes, or small cod wars, between 
Icelanders and Englishmen. But it also led to outright punitive expeditions against officials and 
civilians.562 Indeed, English fishing off Iceland was the beginning of what many Icelanders came to 
see as "foreign exploitation" of fishing grounds around the country, which was to last uninterrupted 
until the late 1970s. Here, the English ambitions had become so strong that many Icelanders allied 
with the Hansa. King Christian III of Denmark (1534-59) changed the Crowns`s Icelandic policy 
such that Germans gradually retreated from Iceland, however. For Iceland, this gave peace, but 
economic decline, since the Crown in Copenhagen created a monopoly of the trade at Iceland. When 
the German trade at this island came to a final end in 1620, it was to be completely taken over by the 
newly established "Iceland, Faroe and Nordic Trade Company", administered from Copenhagen and 
running the trade with Iceland, Faroe and northern Norway.563  
The commercialisation of the entire Northern European trading system initially favoured the 
Hanseatic League. It was able to achieve a firm grip on the perhaps most important foundation for 
taxation in Norway.564 How important was this lack of an efficient monopoly of taxation? Estimates 
of the monetary significance are bound to be uncertain, but Nedkvitne argues that the export of 
stockfish from Bergen alone amounted to an average that must have been between 1000 to 2000 tons 
pr. year. The corresponding amount of silver to this amount of fish was 2.5- 5 tons.565 Knut Helle 
has suggested that the export from Norway to English and Baltic Sea board cities totalled around 
                                                 
558 Nedkvitne, 1984: 166-167 leaves no doubt that the import of grain covered a vital part of the Norwegian 
population`s need for grain and grainproducts in the later middle ages. Miskimin, 1975: 58-59 supports this strongly 
559 Bjørgo et al, 1995: 124-125 
560 Lorentzen, 1959: 66 
561 Karlsson, 2000: 118 
562 Karlsson, 2000: 121 
563 Karlsson, 2000: 139-141 
564 Miskimin, 1975: 59 ”So successful was this policy that the Germans by the early fifteenth century could claim 
total hegemony over international shipping at Bergen”. 
565 Nedkvitne, 1984: 168 
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3000 tons annually.566 If one compares this to the total incomes of the King based on taxation as late 
as in 1520, Nedkvitne further estimates that the income of the administration amounted to only 130 
tons of stockfish.567 The reason for the inconsistency of the Monarch’s trade policy largely stemmed 
from the earlier mentioned dependence upon imports of grain from the Hanseatic cities.  According 
to the account by Schreider, threats of blocking the import of grain was the direct reason for the 
privileges given to the League in 1278, 1285, 1312, 1318, 1332, 1343 and 1350.568 Furthermore, The 
Hansa fought hard to keep all competitors out of the market. To keep English merchants out of the 
profitable trade in Bergen, the Hansa burnt down all the English merchanthouses in Bergen in 1393. 
The closure of English trade in Bergen was the start of a Northatlantic reorientation of the English 
trade.569 Iceland became the central focus of English fishery, resulting in a further incentive to build 
a modern fleet.570 This did not mean that the trade between Bergen and England ceased, but rather 
that it was dominated by the German merchants for long periods.571  The use of the Vitalian brothers 
as mercenaries proved to be a mixed blessing also for the Hansa.572 In 1429, however, the Hanseatic 
League established an effective blockade of the Norwegian ports. The Vitalinians, the pirates in 
service of the Hansa, totally crushed the Norwegian Leidang-fleet at Bergen, a further testimony of 
the loss of a Norwegian monopoly of violence.573  
The laws of the Hansa were in direct opposition to “national” laws. Both at the Lübeck Kontor in 
Bergen and the Rostock Kontors in the towns of Oslo and Tønsberg in eastern Norway (as in many 
other cities with hansa Kontors), the Germans established what we can call extraterritorial zones, 
isolated from the “native” territorial society.574 Of special importance were the Maritime laws, 
regulating exchanges, employment, force majeur and fixing of prices. An argument against the 
portrait of the powerful Hansa could be that the Church certainly was stronger than the state, 
anyway. Evidence shows this claim has limited value in the case of Norway (including the North 
East Atlantic islands Iceland and Greenland after 1260) since King Sverre from 1152/1153.575 Later, 
it was the Norwegian National council (riksrådet), in accordance with the Danish-Norwegian Union 
                                                 
566 Helle, 1991: 46 
567 Ibid: 167 
568 Schreiner, 1935: 31, 91, 26, 30, 53, 54-59 
569 Several Norwegian historians seem to support this conclusion. See Nedkvitne, 1984: 105, Bugge, 1923,  
Schreiner, 1941. This statement is also supported by Postan, 1973.: 218 
570 Bjørgo et al, 1997:122-123 
571 For a detailed analysis of the fluctuations of English trade with Bergen, see Nedkvitne, 1984: 124-130 
572 Nash, 1929: 78-79 
573 Prytz-Dahl, 1978, Ropp, 1961: 53-58. Helle, 1991, Christiansen, 1997: 181 finds that Sweden, Norway and 
Novgorod were dependent on the League by 1300 ”to some extent”.  Postan, 1973: 154 is even clearer; ”By that 
time the Germans had come to dominate the international economy of Northern Europe. The 13th century was indeed 
their century”. Miskimin, 1975 is also clear on this point. 
574 Helle, 1991: 87, Nash, 1929, Miskimin, 1975: 58 
575 Helle, 1991: 63, Christiansen, 1997: 181 
            
 States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology
 
 
 
           
 
 
142 
Treaty of 1450 that should have the last word in questions of waging war, and on privileges to 
foreigners within the borders of the Kingdom. To a large extent we must say that it was external 
events that made the hanseatic grip on Norway disappear.  
 
The Hansa, Sweden and Finland 
For many years, Skåne was the bone of contention in Scandinavia. In 1331, Magnus of Sweden 
repealed the ancient privileges of the German merchants in Skåne, and it took the League twelve 
years of diplomacy to win them back. It was only by playing off Sweden against Denmark, and 
Denmark against Sweden, that the League managed to maintain its footing on the peninsula.  
Only after the struggles of power in Denmark 1534-36 was the Hansa sufficiently weakened in 
Scandinavia for national economic policy to become unrestrained by this non-governmental 
organisation.576 The last Hansa Diet was called in February 1630, at Lübeck, but was only attended 
by representatives from Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg. By this time, the religious wars had 
damaged German territories significantly, also influencing German trade.  
Wallerstein is right in the basic premise that Swedish political and economic development between 
1599 and 1697 was remarkable.577 Even a rudimentary reading of historiography of European 
economic history shows that Sweden was a backward country in the later Middle Ages, one 
historian stating that Sweden “occupied the position almost of a German colony”578. Wallerstein 
describes579 how the German (or rather hanseatic) monopoly was broken in the middle of the 16th 
century, and how trade (especially with the Dutch and Scots) increased Swedish exports and 
revenue. He then explains how Sweden, through a community of interests between the Swedish 
aristocracy and the Vasa dynasty, seized initiative when the window of opportunity opened around 
1600. In this respect, Sweden was different than most areas in Eastern Europe, because “When the 
first signs of economic downturn began to hit Europe in the seventeenth century, a strong 
personality like Gustavus Adolphus (1611-1632) was able to use the crisis to strengthen the Swedish 
State still further and launch an economic transformation”.580  
                                                 
576 Ibid: 111 
577 Several scholars, as diverse as  Eli Heckscher, 1968 and Perry Anderson, 1974,  asserts the same. See also 
Miskimin, 1975,  Postan, 1973, Christiansen, 1997, Reynolds, 1974 
578 Roberts, 1958 II: 20 
579 TMWS II: 203-221 
580 TMWS II: 204 
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A change of control with international commodity chains, and demands for raw materials (especially 
copper and later iron, but also tar, naval stores, and partly wood581 and grain exports) made a leap 
forward possible for Sweden. Wallerstein`s description of how Gustavus Adolphus and Axel 
Oxenstierna successfully introduced improvements in taxation, administration and military reforms 
and thus built a stronger Swedish state582 is accurate (but has fairly little to do with his general 
theoretical model). Thus, the eventual decline of Sweden is explained only from international 
economic factors. Sweden had profited not merely from her strategic location but from the increased 
weakness of the peripheral zones of Eastern Europe in the 17th century. This created opportunities 
for a rather aggressive mare clausum foreign policy. Wallerstein here cites the Polish historian 
Marian Malowist, who has portrayed Sweden as a parasite living on the weakness of her neighbours. 
Wallerstein thus gives the lasting influence of Swedish development for European history less 
significance than Perry Anderson does.583  In Wallerstein`s words “Sweden was as strong a state as 
her economy would permit”.584 According to Wallerstein, real choices did not lie behind the game of 
what Perry Anderson calls “corrupt aristocratic parliamentarism”585 in Sweden. An economic basis 
certainly was important for politial consolidation that could make expansion feasible. It is, in my 
opinion, clear that Heckscher has the same basic description of Swedish economic development as 
has Wallerstein. “The steady expansion of foreign trade tended to end Sweden’s economic isolation 
and to lead the country into the mainstream of general European development”586. The difference 
lies in a more internal perspective applied by Heckscher. This presents some aspects of the story that 
are left out by Wallerstein. In particular, Heckscher stresses that agricultural output was vital for 
domestic consumption. Heckscher here points to the profound effects that bad harvests had in 1650-
51 and in the 1690s.587 Export goods surely were vital, since it was the only source for foreign 
exchange, but the basis of the economy nevertheless was agriculture.588 Heckscher goes far in 
stressing the truly international impulses that made the Swedish development possible; “Almost 
every innovation in the Swedish economy had its origins in the initiative of the immigrants”.589  
Quite clearly, this resource also had political as well as economic consequences. Göteborg, 
according to the Swedish historian, was planned almost as a Dutch colony. The first City Council 
                                                 
581 Heckscher, 1968, gives the latter export industry little importance in his treatment of Swedish economy at this 
time. 
582 TMWS II: 207-208 
583 Anderson, 1974 
584 TMWS II: 221 
585 Anderson, 1974: 190 
586 Heckscher, 1968: 80 
587 ibid. 81 
588 ibid: 84 
589 Hecksher, 1968: 101-103 
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contained ten Dutchmen, one Scotsman and seven Swedes.590 To these impulses one can add the 
natural resources that Sweden had at her disposal, especially copper and iron. Particularly 
advantageous was the supply of wood for fuel in the iron- and steel-industry, while exports of timber 
played a much more limited role.591 In these respects, Heckscher`s analysis does not differ much 
from that of Wallerstein, but it is evident that also ideological factors are given prominence by 
Heckscher.592 Sweden and Holland were the two leading protestant powers on the European 
mainland, maintaining intimate political connections after ca. 1600. Nevertheless, the case of 
Sweden illustrates the limits in explanatory mechanisms in the world-system approach.593 In a 
comment on world-system analysis and geopolitical analysis, Tilly comments that they “lack 
convincing accounts of the actual mechanisms relating position within the world to the organization 
and practice of particular states”.594 The case of Sweden is easier to interpret in the light of Michael 
Mann`s IEMP-model, since Sweden`s ties with the protestant powers on the continent is important 
in order to account for the rise of Sweden to the status of a first-class European power. Of main 
concern to us is the legacy of the Hanseatic League; the rulers of Sweden knew that they would have 
to pay dearly if other powers reached dominis maris baltici. Thus, Sweden was to remain a mare 
clausum – state throughout its time as a major European power. The territory of Finland upto 1809 
can only be seen as a province of Sweden. Finland was highly rural, with very few towns in the 
traditional meaning of the word until the foundation of the castle of Viborg in 1293. German 
merchants heavily influenced earlier small towns, like Åbo.595  Moreover, in the early modern 
period, the Swedish rulers treated Finland as a highly peripheral territory. A royal trading “policy” 
including Finland only took form with the first serious competition of the shores of the Gulf of 
Finland between the Monarch of Sweden and the League. The trade and barter along these shores 
were to be controlled from Stockholm, resulting in Royal decrees from 1347 onwards.596 In practise, 
Finland was no independent polity. The Swedish policy of mare clausum thus also applied for 
Finland. Therefore, I believe it to be appropriate to see Finland as a territory that was both directly, 
but most of all indirectly, influenced by the incursions of the Hanseatic League. 
                                                 
590 ibid; 107 
591 Ibid: 94-101. Tar was the third most important export commodity, though it was a ”mer trifle next to iron and 
copper” (ibid: 100) 
592 ibid: see esp. Pp104-105 
593 For example, Wallerstein has relatively little to say theoretically about differences between semi-peripheries. His 
theory can hardly explain why some core states become hegemonic and others not. One interpretation of this is that 
state structures have minor significance. Although Wallerstein certainly is able to give credible empirical 
explanations in such cases, my criticism at this point rests on the lack of consistent  theoretical explanations of the 
different trajectories of different states. 
594 Tilly, 1992: 11 
595 Jaakkola, 1932: 178. According to this author, Åbo should be seen as the equivalent to a Finnish „Capitol”, but 
given the comparative insignificance of this small town, this shoul perhaps be seen as a slight exaggeration.  
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The Hanseatic League, England, Ireland, and the Rise of Dutch power 
The treaty between Barbarossa of Germany and Henry II of England marks the first real expansion 
of the league. From that date onwards it was to grow year by year till, with the Treaty of Stralsund in 
1370, it was recognised as one of the greatest powers in Europe.597 English privileges granted to the 
German merchants were continually confirmed; repealed and reconfirmed by successive English 
kings up to the time of Elizabeth. In large part, the ultimate disintegration of the Hansa as an actor 
was fuelled by the rivalry between the Hansa and England. We find many examples of enduring 
strain in the relationship between the Hansa and the English sovereign.598  
One of the first successful attacks on the League was begun in 1488 in the reign of Henry VII599 by 
forbidding the export of wool from England except in English bottoms.600 As Clark Reynolds has 
argued, Henry VII marks a major change in English history, also in the sense that he made the 
Crown an instrument of English maritime expansion.601 Before Henry VII, independent shippers had 
had to provide what amounted to private navies to protect their vessels from rivals, pirates and the 
emerging navies of France and Spain. The Kings of England had to depend upon baronial 
aristocracy that owned these merchant navies fleets and thus were subject to their policies. Henry 
started building warships under direct control of the sovereign, and initiated the Navigation acts in 
1486 and 1489, creating tariffs and other rules that he enforced. This was obviously a challenge to 
the League. It was also a very central aspect of English State building. For war at sea he built great 
battleships, supplemented and eventually replaced by the all-sail galleons. To support these in any 
fleet action, to scout and operate inshore, Henry also created a flotilla of smaller escorts and 
auxiliaries.602 The King constructed shipyards, iron foundries for cannon and fortifications along the 
                                                                                                                                                             
596 Jaakkola, 1932: 178 
597 Nash, 1929: 12 
598 Hakluyt, 1995: 121-122. The Norwegian state was left utterly weakened to a degree that altered the political 
geography of Northern Europe. The Hebrides and the Isle of Man was given to the King of Scotland already in 
1266. More vital to the economy was the later loss of Danish-Norwegian sovereignty over Shetland, The Orkney 
Islands (1468) and The Faroe Islands (1469) to Scotland. See Helle, 1991: 65. and Bjørgo et al, 1995: 116-121. A 
deal was struck in relation with the marriage between the King of Scotland and the Princess of Denmark, Denmark 
later gaining in negotiations with France, Scotland serving as mediator in these talks. 
599 Prior to this, English resistance seems to have been somewhat fragmented and counter-productive. Writing on the 
English policy, Postan, 1973: 216 assures that ”Not only were the merchants unable to rely on the latent power of 
English arms, but that power itself became a mer instrument of predating sea-war and piracy. There were easy and 
substantial gains to be derived from attacks on hanseatic shipping, and the Council not only did nothing to stop 
piracy on the high seas but itself directly and indirectly contributed to its extension. It was largely under the 
auspices of influential members of the Council that the first great attacks on Hanseatic shipping in the Bay took 
place in 1449. The outburst of piracy helped to consolidate Lübeck`s anti-English policy and to cement the unity of 
the hanseatic League and led to a naval war which threw the entire trade and navigation on the North sea into 
chaos” 
600 Nash, 1929: 106. 
601 Reynolds, 1974: 136 
602 ibid: 137 
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English coast. The Navy Royal was the first line of defence for the sovereign state of England. Is 
there much truth in the often taken-for-granted assumption of social scientists that this was a cheap 
defence that made the burdens of military service comparatively light for the English society? I 
believe not, and I think it is wrong to see England as a territory that was safe from invasions and 
incursions ever since 1066. In the middle Ages, waterways were easy to utilise for transportation 
compared to transport on land. Thus, both England and Scotland were repeatedly invaded by sea. As 
the historian N.A.M. Rodger has pointed out, “English governments have been overthrown by 
seaborne invasions at least nine times since the Norman conquest: in 1139, 1153, 1326, 1399, 1460, 
1470, 1471, 1485 and 1688”.603 But I believe that these occurences made for a military build-up in 
England that profundly shaped its political institutions. Comparatively speaking, seapower 
facilitated a path towards nationbuilding and ultimately democratisation. The main point is not that 
England was protected by the sea and thus could concentrate on commerce and industry. Essentially, 
producing seapower to protect the isles laid an important institutional foundation for both a modern 
state and overseas ambitions. A pure military regime can protect itself through the use or threat of 
force by means of armies. On the other hand, navies were much more demanding and once built, 
operated in a far more autonomous manner than did contemporary armies. This necessitated a 
greater degree of bureaucratic, political and social integration than armies (that were comparatively 
were easy to organise), since the navy required leaders at the tactical level that had to be highly 
loyal.604 But there was no unilinear “development” in this institutional building in England or in any 
other European state. Thus, later British Monarchs to a highly varying degree were able to build 
coalitions of the necessary interest groups in order to reach consensus on what type of navy England 
ought to have. Although the Hanseatic League never was a military threat towards the English 
motherland, England early experienced fierce competition with the Germans in distant markets and 
fishing grounds. For example, the burning of English Merchant establishments in Bergen made the 
English voyage to Iceland, which in turn demanded improved vessels and navigational skills that 
ultimately resulted in a material and organisational basis for its Navy and its merchant fleet. It is a 
fact that prior to this development, the English "sea power" was very modest by contemporary 
European standards. Thus, the economic competition with other monarchs but above all with the 
Hanseatic league was instrumental, in the sense that it gave important inputs for later British views 
on sovereignty at sea. It also created a momentum that enhanced English maritime skills. 
                                                 
603 Rodger, 1997: 429 
604 Rodger, 1997: 432 thus has a highly interesting suggestion of the effects of authoritarian rule, since “This we 
may suggest, is why Spain failed the naval test in the sixteenth Century, just as France failed in the eighteenth, 
Germany and Russia in the twentieth” 
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Ireland in the early modern period should be studied in light of its relationships with England and 
Scotland rather than from its sparse interaction with the Hanseatic League. Prior to the early 17th 
Century, when Ireland gradually came under English rule, hostilities between Irish/Celtic 
communities and English conquerers of land were numerous and often bitter.605 The polity of 
Ireland and the United Kingdom illustrates the essence of path-dependency. But Ireland`s weakness 
between 1642 and 1650 was political rather than naval. In 1647, the English parliamentary fleet was 
so weakened that Irish Sea power could have given the English fleet a serious blow. According to 
Lloyd, the “ships available to the confederation of Kilkenny were sufficient to control Irish waters 
and put such pressure on English trade as might have brought any English government to terms”.606 
But the lack of unity and coordination of the Irish fleets presented England with the sufficient 
opportunity of eventually gaining control of the island. Thus, the limitations of putting efficient sea 
power at work sealed the political history of Ireland for centuries to come. Yet, England was a rather 
modest sea power early in the 17th century, a fact that is also mirrored in Irish-English relations.  
 
Perhaps even more important was the rapid rise of the Dutch. Dutch penetration of the North 
European maritime economy was evident already at the end of the 14th century, when the Dutchman 
Benkelszohn brought new methods of salting to the Bothnian gulf, thus making Tornea (Torino) a 
great international fish-market,607 not controlled by the Hansa. About 1425, the herring left the 
Baltic waters off Skåne and Pomerania, and took to spawning in the North Sea, off the coast of 
Holland. This removed a great deal of trade from the Baltic, where the Hansa were masters, and led 
to a marked increase in the wealth and power of Holland. The first step of the Dutch was to 
endeavour to make themselves of use to the ruling powers, thus undermining the League.608 On the 
accession to the throne of Germany of Charles V, King of Spain and the Netherlands, their 
opportunity arrived.  
The Dutch Republic was an economic power of such a scale that it prevented the Hansetic League 
from penetrating the Dutch polity, however federalist it was by nature. But there is no mechanical 
economic relationship to explain this. Rather, Dutch entrepeneurship and abilities to use force 
whenever necessary consisted of deliberate actions that made the merchant machinery work, even in 
times of crises. More than anything else, this capital-intensive logic was to ensure the Dutch main 
                                                 
605 As Lloyd, 1996: 15 states, the bitterness of these conflicts was deepened by the fact that Ireland had remained 
Roman Catholic, while England had become Protestant in the 16th Century 
606 Rodger, 1997: 424 
607 Christiansen, 1997: 178-180 
608 Writing on the Dutch, Postan, 1973: 221 states that ”It was largely because their economy grew so gradually that 
their appearance in the Baltic passed almost unnoticed by their contemporaries” 
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principle of mare liberum. However, there is a basic truth in Wallerstein`s assurance that a territory 
in the core needs a strong state. Thus, the Dutch Republic, and predominantly Holland, was able to 
project power overseas to ensure the smoothest possible functioning of its trade. In Tilly`s 
explanatory scheme, the Dutch Republic should be seen as a capitalised-coercion state. Although the 
Dutch republic was not a dominant land power, it clearly was a seapower of first rank from early in 
the 17th Century. We will return to the question why mare liberum ideology survived in the Dutch 
republic. 
 
Denmark and the Hanseatic League 
Emigration from the German towns was even greater to Denmark than to Sweden.609 The 
geographical proximity (particularly Lübeck) made for numerous clashes between the League and 
the Danish monarch. After the christening of the Danes in the tenth and eleventh centuries by the 
German Knights, the ruling powers in Germany had exercised a certain authority over the Danish 
king, so it had been easy for the German merchants to obtain special privileges in the trading-posts 
and towns round the Baltic. As the power of Germany declined, it only required a strong king in the 
person of Valdemar (1157-1182) to stir the Danish people into revolt against these German 
merchants. It was the trade between Lübeck and Skåne that provoked attack by Valdemar the Great, 
who, after seizing many of the German trading ships, invaded Holstein and captured Hamburg. 
Lübeck remained in the hands of Denmark from 1203 to 1215. Once rid of the Danes the League 
Cities banded themselves together and attacked the Danish forces, winning their first victory at the 
battle of Bornhöved, in 1227. Thereafter, Emperor Frederick II declared Lübeck as a free city 
forever, owing allegiance to none but the emperor.610 But the Danes, unsuccessfully, continued to 
challenge Lübeck. It was with the accession to the Danish throne, in 1326, of Valdemar III, that the 
Danes entered into a new and uneasy phase of their history. His aim was to rid Denmark of the 
German trade monopolists with their privileges, and to secure the Baltic trade for the Danes. As 
mentioned, he won back Skåne in 1360, and took Visby at Gotland. This was way too much for the 
League, which obtained the promise of alliance from Sweden and Norway. War was formally 
declared on Valdemar, and fleets from the Baltic and the North Sea attacked in 1362, the Norwegian 
and Swedish Kings backing out in the last moment, however, not sending any forces to help the 
Hansa towns.611 After the disastrous leadership of the Hansa fleet612, the League was reduced to 
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make another treaty with Valdemar (this was an important lesson for the League; they were less apt 
at organising and leading their own fleet for war than for commerce). Valdemar then laid the 
foundation, by bethroing his daughter Margaret to Hakon, the next in succession to the thrones of 
Norway and Sweden, for a united Scandinavia. In the short run, the Danes lost, however. The 
League pillaged and burnt the towns on the Baltic. In 1369 Denmark sued for peace. The treaty of 
Stralsund that was drawn up by The Hansa and signed by Valdemar in 1370, and the terms were 
probably the most humiliating ever accepted by Royalty, especially when one realises that they were 
not dictated by another sovereign, but by the burghers of a League of Cities. The League claimed the 
freedom of the Peninsula of Skåne, and two-thirds of all its revenues613. What is more; a free 
passage on all the Baltic Sea for a period of fifteen years, and lastly, that during the whole of that 
time the League of Cities should have a final say in any choices of a ruler for Denmark. The treaty 
established The Hansa as a great and powerful body in Europe.614 The daughter of Valdemar was 
proclaimed queen in Denmark in 1387, and allegedly, Margaret’s chief desire was to see a united 
Scandinavia. Quite clearly, the kingdoms of Scandinavia had clear motivations to reduce the 
German influence at Skåne. Postan,615 for example, claims that as late as in 1537, more than 90.000 
tons of herring were still salted annually at Skåne. 
With one enemy on the throne of Germany and the Netherlands, the League was faced with another 
bitter opponent when Christian II came to the throne of Denmark-Norway. As King of Norway, 
Christian had seen the Hansa tactics in Bergen, and like Charles V, he had no sympathy for the 
League. In seeking to counterbalance, The Hansa supported Gustav Vasa as King of Sweden.616  
Norway, now united with Denmark under the Oldenburg monarchy, faced a more even struggle with 
the Hansa. In the autumn of 1519, the relationship between the Hansa Kontor in Bergen and 
Christian II worsened. The King demanded the “10th penning” (a tax) of the Kontor to finance his 
war in Sweden.617 Although this conflict ended in a settlement, it damaged the Hanseatic trade with 
Bergen critically from 1518-1522.618  Clearly, the League was uncomfortable with Christian II. In 
1523, conveniently enough for the League, Frederick I of Holstein was placed on the throne of 
Denmark. Thus the League was instrumental in setting Gustav Vasa on the throne of Sweden 
(1523), and Frederick I on that of Denmark, and in return for their assistance they were given a 
                                                                                                                                                             
612 The fleet was led by Johann Wittemborg, burgomaster of Lübeck, who was later beheaded by the Hansa. 
613 The sovereignty of this enormously rich fishing district was indeed unclear, according to Christiansen, 1997: 12-
13 
614 Reynolds, 1974: 98 
615 Postan, 1973: 95, 
616 Gustav Vasa had been taken prison by the Danes in the war between Sweden and Denmark, escaped and was 
taken care of by the Hansa, which then assisted him in gaining the Crown in Sweden. 
617 Hanserecesse: 3 Abt. Vii nr 246, 14 
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renewal of their old privileges, and a fifty years lease of the island of Bornholm. When Gustav Vasa 
took over the Swedish throne, this was also accepted by the Danes as being the final dissolution of 
the Kalmar Union.619 But the success of the Hansa was short-lived. The arrogance of the English 
merchants was increasing, the Herring had left the Baltic, and the Dutch were seizing a larger and 
larger share of the carrying trade. The Scandinavian Kings then showed clear talents at realpolitik. 
King Frederick refused the League to continue its monopoly. In 1533, the Danes, encouraged by the 
example of Gustav Vasa, joined with Sweden in an anti-Hanseatic alliance (Gustav Vasa by now 
had openly challenged the Hansa).620 Through a series of expensive wars, the unity of the Hansa was 
destroyed. Gustav Vasa began to build a navy, including purchases of ships from the Dutch and later 
the French, all under Admiral Mans Svensson Some, but the major part of the Scandinavian fleet 
was provided by Denmark under Admiral Peter Skram. The alliance took back Copenhagen in 1536, 
and the next three decades both Sweden and Denmark-Norway kept naval squadrons active in the 
Baltic.621  During wars with the Dutch also, the League suffered the above-mentioned crucial blow 
to its trade in Russia. At this time, also Livonia had defied the Hansa and started independent trade 
with Russia.622 Then Ivan the Terrible took Livonia, and, by 1560, Livonia was divided up between 
Poland, Sweden and Denmark. The Hanseatic League was no longer a significant maritime power in 
Northern Europe. The military power triangle in the Baltic now clearly consisted of Russia, Sweden 
and Denmark, with the Dutch cities becoming much more influential in the economic sphere. The 
war between Russia and the Teutonic Order was an intensification of the more or less permanent 
state of war that had existed on the European Eastern front since the Establishment of the Order in 
the 13th Century.623 One might argue that the order was outmanoeuvred already in the 15th century, 
since Lithuania in union with Poland meant that “the Turk had replaced the Lithuanian as the 
leading non-Catholic power confronting Eastern Europe”624. The Scandinavian Seven years War 
(1563-1570) began with the Swedes under their new King Eric XIV, fighting the Danes, under 
Frederick II, and Lübeck for mastery of the Baltic. Gustav Vasas successor, Erik XIV, forbade the 
league to cross the Gulf of Finland. This incensed Lübeck, which formed an alliance with Frederick 
II of Denmark, and declared war on Sweden, but Lübeck had to give in, lacking funds and support 
of the rest of the League.625 The war aligned Denmark, Poland and Lübeck against Sweden, but 
                                                                                                                                                             
618 Nedkvitne, 1984: 69 and 72 
619 Bjørgo et al 1995: 100 
620 Reynolds, 1974: 154 
621 Reynolds, 1974: 154 
622 Christiansen, 1997: 248-249 
623 ibid: 497 
624 Christiansen, 1997: 261 
625 Nash, 1929: 200 
  
States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology 
 
 
            
 
 
 
151
Lübeck was by now a totally “subservient Danish ally”, according to one author.626 The result of the 
war between Sweden and Denmark was a stalemate in 1570. The more enduring aspect of this 
warfare was increased efforts to state building, both states hastening the production of new warships, 
the Danes turning to Dutch shipwrights to direct their work. 627  The outcome of the war was thus 
twofold. It reinforced the Danish dominum maris baltici and Danish possession of Ösel. On the 
Swedish side, Erik XIV had no alternative “but to levy the peasants for military service and the first 
Swedish army ordinance was enacted in the 1560ies…in the absence of cash with which to pay for 
mercenaries the Swedish King had no alternative”628 Even Poland tried to establish sea power. In 
1620 Zygmunt III had 20 warships built and in 1627 the Polish Navy fought its only sea-battle when 
it defeated the Swedish off Oliwa.629  
 
The fall of the Hanseatic League as a major regional Power 
With the loss of the privileges in Russia, Scandinavia and the Baltic, it was only natural that the 
prestige of the League should suffer throughout its jurisdiction. To this, one can add the heavy 
import duties put on all Hanseatic merchandise by both Philip of Spain and the Prince of Orange. 
With the incremental Dutch and English rise to masters of the sea, their merchants extended their 
activities. The League forbade participating in this trade. This is why Hamburg finally broke loose 
from the Hansa, taking several other cities with it. It is remarkable; however, that in a large period of 
medieval Northern Europe, a league of cities had been a central challenger to successful 
Scandinavian state building. In contrast, there seems to have been no special Hansa Kontor building 
in Bruges like the ones in Bergen, Novgorod and London, although the Hansa enjoyed prosperous 
trade in Bruges.630 There simply was no possibility for the Hansa to establish a monopoly here.631 
But the decline and fall of the Hansa cannot be explained without reference to the growing power of 
the Dutch, English, Russian, Swedish and Danish states. The League had made war on all these 
states, and ultimately failed. The Hansa combined economic and military power, but could not fend 
off attacks in an area covering the larger part of Northern Europe, including the Baltic. Moreover, it 
was simply not accepted as a “proper” unit by contemporary monarchs that had highly mixed 
experiences with the intricate organisation of a city-league with extensive maritime interests. After 
                                                 
626 Bakka, 1998: 497 
627 Reynolds, 1974: 155 
628 Bakka, 1998: 498 
629 Zamoyski, 1994: 156. Dodge, 1998 assures that the ”Polish fleet” was patched up by Gdansk, a free city owing 
mer nominal allegiance to poland. The losses on the Polish side were considerable in this only Polish Naval victory. 
630 Nash, 1929: 132 
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the fall of the Hansa, it was primarily states, and secondly Merchant companies connected to the 
states, that were the crucial actors. Mercantilism was to be dominant in strengthening the sovereigns. 
The League was of importance in undermining the efforts of Norwegian state-building. Thus, 
Norway remained in union with Denmark also after the dissolution of the Kalmar Union, and 
became a province of Denmark from 1536, totally losing its sovereignty.632  Denmark kept the 
dominium maris Baltici, and to break its grip on Swedish trade Karl IX founded Göteborg as the first 
port on the Swedish West Coast.633 In the following war Denmark captured the fortress of Älfsborg 
built to cover the approaches to Göteborg, thus closing the Swedish “window to the west”. In the 
following peace agreement, it was pledged to the Danes against a ransom of 1 million thaler.634 
Thus, an almost permanent state of belligerency was created between the two Scandinavian mare 
clausum polities with their geographical proximity and conflicting interests in the Baltic Sea and the 
Sounds. The Baltic trade entered a period of regression (partly because of the flux in grain prices).635 
A transnational market had existed in Northern Europe prior to the fifteenth century.636 The 
observations summed up by Postan are important clues here. He argues that the role of the trade in 
Northern Europe has been ignored because it “bear little resemblance to the conventional image of 
medieval economy…(it) evokes in the modern reader none of the romance which clings to trade in 
southern Europe”637. The trade here was “cruder, bulkier, and altogether more indispensable than 
the luxuries and the fineries of the text book convention. This convention is not altogether true even 
of the south, for foodstuffs and raw materials also entered into the trade of the Mediterranean 
region…The trade of Northern Europe was almost exclusively devoted to the necessities of life”.638 
Since the trade was so important, it is not difficult to see why maritime conflicts were given such 
priority and became such a chronic concern for the monarchs of Northern Europe. Moreover, the 
fight against the German Cities was a major incentive to build more powerful Navies in Denmark 
and Sweden, for the English to improve their vessels to be able to perform long-distance sea travels 
and the protection of sea lines of communication (opening up trade at Iceland and the route to 
Archangel), and for Russia to adopt knowledge of trade and warfare from western countries. We 
have mentioned that the German grip on Denmark was very firm at times, documented in the 1370 
                                                                                                                                                             
631 Reynolds, 1974: 135 
632 Of course Norway had been in unions, of different constellations, since 1319, but had kept its national council 
until 1536, when Christian III abolished it. Norway was to be a ”ledemodth aff Danmarks riige och under Danmarks 
krone til ewiige tiidt”. See Bjørgo et al 1995: 98 
633 Bakka, 1998: 498 
634 ibid: 499 
635 Davies, 1984: 300 
636 For a similar conclusion largely based on other sources of evidence, see Abu-Lughod, 1989: 1-24 
637 Postan, 1973: 92 
638 Postan, 1973: 93 
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treaty of Stralsund. Had the German influence in Sweden been less significant, thus making state 
building in this country easier than in the other? This seems to be negated by several scholars. 
Wallerstein asserts that “in the later Middle Ages Stockholm was listed as a Hanseatic town”639 
Roberts states that up to the 16th century, Sweden “occupied the position almost of a German 
colony”.640 On the other hand, there is little doubt that the Swedish State experienced a growth and 
strengthening of its structures relative to the other Nordic countries once the German monopoly641 
was broken in the 16th century.  
Stein Rokkan has captured the starting point of these processes in broad terms. In his conceptual 
map of Europe, he labelled Iceland and Norway as “seaward peripheries”, Finland as a “landward 
buffer”, Sweden as a “landward nation-state” and Denmark as a “seaward nation-state”.642 And yet, 
the examination of the interplay between The Hanseatic League and the Nordic kingdoms in 
particular demonstrates how a non-state actor played an essential part in North European economy 
and coastal societies from the 12th to the 16th century. Moreover, we have claimed that the intense 
competition between these monarchies and the League in this period created a habitus in these 
territories where mare clausum was a central part. The port cities of what became the Dutch 
Republic was a notable exception to this pattern, since they lay in the northernmost part of what 
Rokkan called the “city-belt”, characterised by a certain resistance against centralized political 
authority. In all the other territories analysed here, the outcome was a maritime policy that leaned 
heavily towards mare clausum principles. Naturally, applying later notions of liberalism to the early 
modern period is risky in the sense that it involves conceptual stretching. On the other hand, in the 
anarchic period covered thus far, the League and the cities of the later Dutch republic were 
economic liberalists by contemporary standards. Moreover, the fact is that the League in some vital 
aspects of maritime rules and praxis gradually contributed to temper lawlessness on the sea. The 
chief motivation was economic utility, to be sure, since a transnational city-league could not run 
overseas business without a minimalist degree of order. Thus, the City-League sought cooperation 
and reciprocal understandments with sovereigns in one field: to limit piracy and plunder.643 For the 
merchants, the most efficient way to secure their ships and crews was to encourage as much of a 
functioning monopoly of violence as possible where private violence threatened commerce. 
Ironically, then, the League also bargained with monarchs whenever possible and whenever a total 
absence of order threatened sea-faring and markets. The outcomes were national laws forbidding 
                                                 
639 TMWS II: 203 
640 Roberts, 1958: 20, see also Postan, 1973, Miskimin, 1975 
641 Roberts, 1958: 139-142 
642 Rokkan, 1999: 355 
643 Lorentzen, 1959: 82-84 exemplifies this 
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piracy unless sanctioned by the monarch and a gradual abandonment of the ancient right to plunder 
shipwrecks (the latter privilege had been very liberally interpreted until the 14th century and in some 
areas until the 16th. The Treaty of Westphalia from 1648 did not recognise the Hanseatic League as a 
sovereign body. The Hanseatic League, functionally but not territorially integrated for mutual 
defence, did not fit the territorial principles embodied in the treaty of Westphalia. Increasingly, 
sovereigns commanded organisations for violence that non-state actors could no longer beat in 
battles. With the exception of the soon declining Scotland, all the mentioned states belonged to the 
states of the world that had major navies of sailing-ships (see appendix I). The numbers show how 
England eventually gained the upper hand in naval power compared to the Dutch republic. But it is 
also important to note that this did not occur until the 1670s; before this decade, the extraterritorial 
power was distributed more evenly. In the Baltic, Denmark-Norway gained momentum compared to 
Sweden. Glete explains that this was not a result of Swedish sluggishness on ship construction, but 
that Denmark capured 21 ships of around 13000 tons between 1675 and 1679. At the same time 
Sweden lost another 9000 tons of warships in total in the same years. France had to apply pressure 
on Denmark-Norway in order to restore the provinces Sweden had lost. 
But to explain the denial of the League as an entity at the conference of Wesphalia with the fact that 
the league was not a sovereign state, is a tautologic statement. The decline of the Hanseatic League 
begun much earlier, and from 1570, it was actually powerless at sea.644 How come the league was 
that much weakened compared to the early states from the latter part of the 16th century? 
The comparative efficiency of early modern states is aptly illustrated by a comparison with the 
German League. Firstly, while states could afford to build, maintain and operate a standing army as 
well as a more or less permanent navy, this was much more difficult for the League, since it was 
much less territorial. This meant a diversified infrastructure, and an increasingly cumbersome 
decision-making process where it became impossible to handle unexpected crises for the League and 
such events were easy to exploit for its adverseries. The permanent state structures, however 
primitive, were ultimately superior at resource-extraction and warmaking compared to the multiple, 
diverse and spread actors of the Hanseatic League. Thus, Exit-opportunities were far easier within 
the League than within the state. Standardisation was much easier in the state than in the League 
(consider for example how the League never managed to standardise a system of measurements, a 
fact that contributed to comparatively high transaction costs. The institutionalism as elaborated by 
North, 1990, contributes to this kind of explanation). Thus, cheating (with) in the League also was 
an enduring feature of the Hansa. Naturally, the Diet tried to get rid of these problems by its issuing 
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of commandments, but enforcement of these decisions rested with municipal councils dominated by 
the merchants responsible for cheating. The League did not have the supreme and ultimate authority 
of the sovereign state to interpret and enforce regulations. I do not claim that the state structures of 
the states in Northern Europe in early modern time corresponded to the bureaucratic weberian ideal-
typical creed of “sine ira et studio”, but they nevertheless were superior to the decision-making and 
enforcement process of the Hanseatic League. However, a further explanation lies in the dual 
process of state formation and the establishment of a minimum level of international norms. The 
monarchs were political entrepreneurs that wanted to get rid of strong, independent cities. They truly 
wanted to monopolise both use of violence and taxation.  
Secondly, the lack of military capacity on behalf of the League should also be seen as connected to 
the second problem of raising capital (on this point, Tilly`s model certainly has explanatory power). 
The league in the long run could not solve the free-riding problems that successful state formations 
eventually managed rather smoothly. Thus, the problems of the League were to a large extent 
institutional and political, not merely economic or military. Opposed to the League, with its 
cumbersome way of coordinating policy, the absolutist states had a final decision-making authority. 
These institutions were more able to “overcome the feudal remnants of economic and legal 
particularism”.645A confederation of towns spread over Entire Northern Europe could not rely on a 
centralised government ruled by dynasties or monarchs.  
Thirdly, the Hanseatic cities were quite diverse and stretched throughout Northern Europe. Over 
time, therefore, many local Hanse tradesmen became more and more assimilated in the social 
environment in which they lived. The League did simply not offer a sufficiently strong common 
identity to counter this incremental process. In a time where wars between sovereigns often made 
lines of communication precarious, this made any attempt at controlling the local offices more 
difficult. As a result of this and the gradual process of centralising power under monarchs, the 
position of many of the local Hanse kontors beyond Germany also made strong attempts at 
upholding a distinct Hanse society on foreign territory unattainable. 
The fall of the Hanseatic League and early state formation in Northern Europe also sheds light on an 
argument in favour of the multi-dimensional concept of power. Military and political power was 
what made the early states of Northern Europe superior to the City League. In turn, the principle of 
the territorial, sovereign state created incentives for mutual empowerment of sovereigns. A 
principle, one might say an ideology, of the state was created with highly substantial significance for 
both states and the international system. Thus, the “Hansa was not acceptable as a player in 
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international politics”.646 Wallerstein`s general economic model, or the neorealist model of Waltz, 
are not readily applicable to Northern Europe in the 15th and 16th Centuries. Apart from the fact that 
long-distance trade in essentials existed prior to the 16th Century, the political history of Northern 
Europe seems to indicate that it was state-builders, not economic forces per se that shaped the 
political geography of the Baltic and North Sea seaboards. Against this, world-systems scholars 
would argue that this is only the superstructure of the development. But this argument does not seem 
very reasonable when one considers that the economic power of the League during the 14th and 15th 
Centuries was not sufficient to outsmart the early states in the long run. This enabled monarchs to 
enforce their laws and regulations in own territories and adjacent waters. Thus, the Hanseatic league 
simply had to adjust to national laws, a fact that made their transaction costs within the League rise 
even more. And yet, this chapter illustrates that the European international “system” was less 
“systemic” than the neorealist model allows. It also demonstrates that neorealism is not universal; 
units were indeed functionally differentiated in Northern Europe of the early modern period. 
Paradoxically, this resistance to the League also helped foster mercantilism, including, strong 
incentives towards mare clausum. This is evidenced in the continued fight for dominium in Northern 
waters after the fall of the League. All states in this area that had experienced considerable 
incursions into their sovereignty by the League, developed into mare clausum polities. Thus, 
permanent navies became instruments to pursue sovereignty also at sea, in a logic that involved 
repeated clashes and the institution of the balance of power, with its secret diplomacy and temporary 
alliances. But at least this balance of power-logic contained rules of conduct; what was acceptable 
and unacceptable behaviour did not correspond to a truly “Hobbesian culture of anarchy”. Inherent 
in this institution of balance of power is a minimal claim to mutual respect among states in an 
international society. Not that struggles over territories and income from taxation did not occur, far 
from it, but in the case of extraterritorial sovereignty, a state praxis emerged in which states 
recognised each other’s right to sovereignty over narrow strips of coastal waters, although the exact 
demarcation of these waters remained contested. The ordering principle in the international 
community of sea-powers thus was built upon mare clausum, but also a mutual consent that piracy 
at sea should be somewhat regulated. Although prize-taking was to flourish in times of crisis, 
monarchs in Europe were increasingly prone to judge this praxis differently than piracy by “The 
other”; the Islamic communities of Northern Africa.647 
                                                                                                                                                             
645 Spruyt, 1994: 155 
646 ibid; 170 
647 But the myth of the Hanse returned in German political history. Already in 1846, the German writer J.G. Kohl 
emphasised the “Germanness” of the coast of Scleswig-Holstein. Prussia should be seen as a successor of the 
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Compared to other regions of the 17th Century, at least according to traditional opinion, one defining 
feature of the political landscape of North-western Europe was the absence of “formal” empires that 
had direct648 rule in neighbouring territories. As we have seen, this verdict must be qualified. Firstly, 
England certainly was well on the way to establish an Empire of the British Isles from the late 17th 
century. Sweden created a maritime empire in the Baltic from the early 17th century, and Denmark 
was in firm control of Iceland and Norway from the 16th century. However, these were maritime 
empires where the motherland out of weakness established indirect rule in its colonies and 
dependencies. Northern Europe AD 1600 was a security complex where conduct between these 
fragile polities was institutionalised only to a small extent. Although the treaty of Westphalia should 
perhaps not be seen as The dividing juncture of the European state system, but rather a codification 
of evolving principles, it is quite clear that the most dominant international institution in Northern 
Europe was the principle of balance of power between sovereign monarchs by mid 17th Century.649 
This included a growing concern about alliances that included diplomacy and signing of bilateral 
treatries. Multilateralism only had a fragile take-off from 1648. But above all, the balance of power 
rested on the assumption that a state only existed when the monarch and his or hers state apparatus 
could execute sovereignty-that is, the functions of the state within a more or less defined territory, as 
well as the adjacent “territorial sea” in the case of coastal states. Although states certainly could 
compensate unilateral weakness by entering into alliances with each other, evident military 
weakness was dangerous, since any militarily weak state was a tempting target and an unattractive 
ally. Apart from the ideological power that could be mobilised along religious lines, economic 
power was an asset largely to the degree that it could be translated into military or political power. 
One of the most efficient ways of producing political power in Northern Europe, I argue, was the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hanseatic League. A decade later, Anton von Etzel thus could claim that “the Baltic is essentially a Germanic 
Mediterrenean”, and that the other powers of the region have “always been passive, it has always been their historic 
fate to be outstripped by others” Cited in Kirby & Hinkkanen, 2000: 56 
648 This opinion certainly contains substantial truths. The dominant states of Northern Europe in the 17th century 
were not strong enough to impose direct rule over longer periods in conquered territories in Europe. The Swedish 
maritime empire is thus judged by Peter Englund, 2000 as a type of indirect rule, where especially rich merchants in 
the cities along the Baltic Seaboard kept a very substantial degree of autonomy. Riste, 2001 shows how Denmark let 
Norway keep a national council. Lloyd, 1996: 3 sums up the nature of the English colonies by stating that “it was 
accepted by the 1630s that English colonies could take most decisions for themselves” 
649 There is an enormous literature on the balance of power. Theoretically, I find, the major dividing line in the 
realist literature at this point is between scholars that see the institution as intentionally maintained by states, and 
those who see it as unintentionally maintained by states. Hobson, 2000: 27, in my view accurately, states that “while 
for Bull the system is intentionally maintained by states in part through the balance of power, for Waltz the system 
is unwittingly maintained as states balance, because its subversion into a hierarchy through the creation of a world 
empire is ultimately prevented”.  On this question, I am prone to support Hedley Bull, not necessarily because it is a 
better assumption in macro theory, but because it closes the gap at least a bit, between micro and macro levels of 
analysis. Thus, interaction between units becomes might be better described than in waltzian neorealism. In the 
latter theory, analysis built on game theory or transaction costs analysis only belongs to the analysis of foreign 
policy of single states. 
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establishment, maintenance and use of permanent navies. Those organisations could, to simplify, be 
applied for three main purposes. 
Firstly, navies could protect territorial waters, harbours and cities, thus ensuring that enemy forces 
were not able to penetrate the territorial state from the sea, and ensure that the extraction of coastal 
resources (e.g. fishing) could be used for the native inhabitants of the coastal state. 
Secondly, navies could be used for the protection of sea lines of communications. This meant that 
sovereigns could sell protection to the merchants and merchant companies of his or hers own states. 
Alternatively, the sovereign body could grant the merchant company the rights to provide this 
protection themselves. What is more, navies could be used to sell protection for vessels of other 
states. In the case of Denmark, for example, the Sound toll existed well into the 19th Century. 
Protecting sea lines of communications also could be a means to ensure that goods and personnel 
could travel safely between the motherland and its colonial processions or dependencies when the 
two were separated by salt water. 
Thirdly, naval force could be applied for pressure of and outright conflict with opponents. But it 
could also be a means to suppress non-state actors as pirates and looters at sea. And finally, both 
military and merchant navies was by far the most efficient, and often only sensible, means of 
transporting armies to distant theatres of war or colonial possessions. 
In sum, this indicates that a comparative analysis of the size and nature of navies and maritime 
power seems to be an interesting and potentially substantive aspect of state formation processes in 
Northern Europe. In short, the main questions that I will seek to address in this chapter are; 
1. What kind of Navies did the states of Northern Europe create, and how were these state 
organisations influenced by their society? 
2. What was the logic of this aspect of state formation compared to the institutionalisation of 
territorial armies? 
3. In what way did states with maritime power influence international institutions regulating 
extraterritorial sovereignty and use of violence? 
 
Each of these three questions is demanding. However, recent contributions by historians in these 
fields of study make it possible to draw an empirical map that makes comparison feasible. 
Furthermore, if we once more stress that the aim here is to contribute to theorising and broad 
comparative perspectives, we will hopefully be able to avoid being swamped in historical details. 
The focus will especially be on navies, their organisation and extent, and how these were embedded 
in society. This may seem like a narrow approach, but when considering both the nature of the 
international anarchy and the percentage of state resources that were used to build navies in this 
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period, a different picture appears. Above all, we must grasp how navies gradually became 
practitioners of state policy, and expressions of the preferences and principles state leaders had.  
 
3.1 Naval Technology, Personnel and Organisation 
In order to understand the trajectories of state formation in the naval and maritime realms, we need 
some basic understanding of what nature naval organisations had from ca 1600 till the 1850s.  
The introduction of guns and gun-carrying ships, made for more complex naval technology, ship-
designs and organisation. In turn, this demanded increased co-ordination and exchange of 
information.650 Seen in perspective, it is worth noting that in Europe at large, the Italian maritime 
cities of Genoa and Venice still were the leaders in maritime technology by the early 16th century. 
Thus, it was not uncommon that both France and England bought or hired Mediterranean armed 
merchantmen. One century later, the balance had tilted in favour of Northern Europe. In the early 
17th century, Dutch and English shipbuilding were the best in Europe. Warship technology at this 
point developed fastest in the new economic centre around the North Sea. While few reliable 
sources exist on this early technological development, Jan Glete stress that “the development of 
technology for warfare at sea is often best analysed as an interaction process between the users.., the 
producers and the political rulers of the state or the private investors in maritime armed force”.651 In 
order to achieve this, different groups in state and society had to find compromises that were 
efficient and mutually profitable. Thus, maritime technological development fostered coalitions 
among actors within the polity. 652The fields of co-operation were vast, and can only be properly 
comprehended by the contemporary reader by briefly examining how different aspects of 
shipbuilding, operation of ships and –maintenance demanded such efforts at collaboration among in 
other respects different actors in society.  
 
The first aspect of maritime technology involved the technology of guns. The guns applied at sea in 
the early 15th century were small and primarily used as infantry weapons against the crews of the 
adversaries. Stone shots were only replaced by iron during the 16th century. The composition of the 
guns themselves underwent drastic improvements, from wrought-iron guns to copper guns, although 
the latter only gradually was deployed at sea.653 The next step was the introduction of the cast-iron 
                                                 
650 Glete, 2000: 19 
651 Glete, 2000: 19-20 
652 See Rodger, 2004: 581 
653 When this was widely applied is uncertain. What seems clear is that Portuguese ships relied on gunpowder rather 
than boarding from the end of the 15th Century. 
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gun; a weapon built with a cheaper material than the copper gun, but much more difficult to 
produce. Initially an English monopoly, the Dutch were able to produce cast-iron guns by 1600. 
Before 1650, however, the English navy generally preferred the copper guns to cast-iron ones, due 
to the technical problems experienced when firing cast-iron guns, while Sweden relied on copper 
guns primarily because of their rich domestic supply of copper. This definitely changed after 1650. 
The main reason mainly was that the increased demand for cheap guns stimulated technical progress 
in building iron guns. The variations in abilities in fostering and applying new technologies stand 
out as the most challenging question. In fact, realism and the other major schools of thought in 
international relations are silent on such questions of domestic factors. World systems theory gives 
economic factors a priori predominance. What these research programmes have in common is a 
minimalist theoretical assumption of the state. I believe that Michael Mann654, belonging to what 
John M. Hobson655 has coined the “second state debate” in sociology and comparative politics 
where state power is seen as derived from the extent to which states are embedded in society, is a 
more interesting and fruitful approach to this question. The building of extraterritorial power 
demanded a material basis for sure, but the social constitution of the state and its society mattered as 
well. At the same time, half the story is missed if we do not pay due attention to international 
factors. Competition between states gave incentives as well as limitations in financing increased 
fire-power. 
 
Even more demanding than the introduction of ever better cannons and artillery, was the 
competition in designing, building and manning gun-carrying warships. Indeed, it is hardly 
exaggerating to claim that it was one of the most demanding organisational tasks in European states 
prior to the industrial revolution. Several scholars, amongst them Immanuel Wallerstein, have seen 
17th century shipbuilding in Holland and England as the second (next to textile industries) industry 
of early modern times. Shipbuilding was highly mechanised, used many labour-saving devices and 
required an “industrial-commercial complex”.656 It is true that shipbuilding from the 17th century 
involved the construction of wind-powered sawmills, great cranes, ropeyards, biscuit bakeries, ship 
chandlering, construction of nautical instruments and sea charts. One single medium-sized ship 
required perhaps as much as 2000 mature oak trees. Much of this wood for Western navies in the 
period came from the Baltic area. In order to achieve the necessary raw materials, the best prospects 
were in the hands of those states able to export other goods to the Baltic cities, and here the Dutch 
                                                 
654 Mann, 1993 
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republic was in a favourable position throughout the 17th century. Again, the Baltic was very central 
in the balance of power. 
By 1650, improvements in ship design had made battles with guns carried in sailing ships a more 
common form of warfare at sea. Fleeting platforms of artillery gradually replaced infantry fighting 
at sea. Not only was the firepower of these ships superior at open sea, and during sieges and 
bombardments; the ships were generally safer and had better sailing capabilities, making them much 
better instruments of power-projection. This also provided commercial shipping with far better 
protection against attacks by pirates. This provided state leaders and merchants in coastal states 
incentives for investing in sea-going navies. Thus, guns also made it possible to substitute 
manpower with capital to some degree. Moreover, guns, projectiles and gunpowder could be stored 
for long periods of time without losing quality. This meant that fighting efficiency could be 
maintained at sea for much longer intervals than earlier. In this way, warfare at sea became truly 
inter-regional, and in some respects gradually globalized. Time-space was reduced in an important 
sector that affected international relations. The ability to project power through extra-territorial 
means of violence meant that distant powers could operate in waters with great strategic and 
economic importance to a degree unparalleled in earlier epochs. The implications were drastic, and 
to a large degree in favour of the strongest maritime powers; the significance of power based on 
local resources was reduced while the potential for using sea power to defend national interests at 
long distances was increased. Furthermore, the coastal state with an inferior army could defend itself 
by meeting the enemy at sea and try to defeat his adversary before he could land his army. This 
meant that even a rather small navy could have a considerable deterrent effect, and that armies and 
navies had become functionally different organisations. Thus, a large army could not entirely 
compensate for a weak navy.  
The development of the gun-armed ship also gave new opportunities for combinations of cargo 
carrying and firepower. This made the application of Naval vessels as well as long-distance 
transport of goods more cost-effective. In this way, fewer men-of-war were required for escort, thus 
making their use more flexible. At the same time, armed merchantmen could serve as a reserve fleet 
that could supplement the regular navy in time of war.657 
If we compare the major maritime powers in Northern Europe by the size of their regular, sailing-
ship navies, we achieve an impression the significance this “maritime revolution” had on the use of 
state resources and resource extraction from society at large. 
                                                 
657 Glete, 2000: 31 
            
 States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology
 
 
 
           
 
 
162 
Speaking from quantitative measures, the figures in appendix I show the enormous comparative 
strength of the Netherlands, but especially of England in the period. Furthermore, there is little 
evidence that those two states had navies that were of a poorer quality than their competitors. On the 
other hand, also several British naval historians (including Peter Padfield658) acknowledge that the 
Navy of the Dutch republic was perhaps even more efficient than the English. The overall 
impression is also a marked increase in the sailing-ship navies of Northern Europe combined, 
although the rising English proportion of the increase is most spectacular.  
 
Building or supporting a regular navy became a dominant strategy to two main groups in the 
societies of 17th century Europe. Firstly, it benefited the state builders that wanted to increase 
centralized power. By building and maintaining a navy, state leaders sought to deny possible and 
actual opponents the ability to penetrate their sovereignty by ways of bombardments, landings of 
armies and blockade. In a weakly institutionalised international environment, the state not able or 
willing to set up this defence during the 16th and 17th century were the “suckers” in a prisoner`s 
dilemma with many players. Navies could also increase the legitimacy of the monarch, if the 
populace actually could witness that navies could protect fisheries and transport routes at sea that 
were vital for supplies of commodities. Thus, although regular navies imposed protection costs by 
their very existence, these costs were tolerable whenever transactions otherwise were threatened by 
unregulated use of violence. Therefore, naval protection of commerce can be seen as a transaction, 
or rather a series of transactions, between taxpayers and monarchs with their state officials.  
The second group to benefit from a standing navy were the maritime groups (merchants, merchant 
companies, sea captains) that had interests in trade protection or plunder over long distances. Indeed, 
many of the same platforms could be applied to both protection of own ships, while praying on the 
vessels of the belligerent by prize-taking or even piracy. The exchange hypothesis on protection and 
tax is just as appropriate when used to this relationship between state and private maritime 
entrepreneurs as it is on the relationship between state and civil society in general. Naturally, the 
state had to protect property rights in the domestic realm. Without such secure rights, the economy 
would suffer, and thereby the state lost revenue. Simultaneously, of course, merchants would deem 
it rational to support such efforts of protection to maintain their business. This is a very obvious 
view today, but when we consider that enforcement of property rights and protection of transactions 
required efficient state bureaucracies and that the distinction between domestic and international 
realms was highly diffuse for coastal societies, it is also clear that building navies were paramount 
                                                 
658 See especially Padfield, 1999 
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tasks for every sovereign coastal state with a vibrant maritime economy. Whereas a landlocked state 
in the critical phases of state formation in theory could do with a territorial army to protect its 
sovereignty, sovereignty for coastal states also included protecting what they saw as extraterritorial, 
sovereign rights. These rights included access to markets, and the use of sea lines of communication 
and important fishing grounds.  
The losers in this process were, as Glete659 points out, those who had a vested interest in naval 
warfare “with easily convertible cargo carriers and in regional commercial supremacy based on 
control of trade routes where long-distance trade was kept out by armed force or geographical 
distance”. 
 
Technological and tactical developments not only opened up new strategic opportunities, but 
affected sailors and their societies as well (this is a wide, and unfortunately neglected theme in 
scholarship, especially in the Scandinavian countries).660 Considering the quantitative increase in 
navies described in Appendix I, these effects must have been pronounced, and the fitting of 
professional expertise to political ends and technical opportunities certainly was one of trial and 
error.661 The major European export product from the 16th to the 18th centuries was violence - 
violence that had to be projected from the sea, since landwards communication predominantly was 
much more time-consuming than transport by sea. This ability, a result mainly of the fierce 
competition in the North Sea and the Baltic together with the competition between the Iberian 
monarchs over sea routes and colonies, was basically the only field in which Europeans were 
superior to peoples of other continents. The first encounter that the native peoples of the “new 
world” had with Europeans was heavily influenced by European firepower and the military 
organisation of soldiers, guns and warships. To the maritime states of Europe, the seagoing navies 
and merchant companies with firepower gave opportunities for increased social mobility, profit and 
spoils of plunder, whether “legally” sanctioned or not. Naval force in early modern Europe was 
increasingly applied to gain profit through overseas ventures, be it in trade, colonisation, piracy or 
                                                 
659 Glete, 1993: 123 
660 In my humble opinion, the best sociological analysis of the early naval profession in Europe, is the seminal 1950 
article by Norbert Elias (Elias, 1950). There is no need to reinvent the wheel on the topic of the genesis of the naval 
profession, since Elias has covered this ground, and Rodger (2004) has gone in even greater detail on the topic. It is 
suffice to say that the article by Elias convincingly demonstrates how maritime know-how was a primary 
determinant of naval success, but that the merging of the professional mariner (a permanent position) and the 
gentlemanly military officer (appointed temporarily) was a cumbersome, incremental process. See esp. Elias, 1950: 
296-299. As Elias (ibid: 299) notes "It was only in the early eighteenth century that a post and station in the career 
of young mariners, the post of a midshipman, developed finally into a regular training station reserved for young 
gentlemen". Prior to this institutionalisation, crisis always led the Crown to commission civilian captains as "naval 
officers", i.e. in the King`s service. 
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slave trade, in addition to protecting home waters. The state and private initiatives were not easily 
separable in this respect. State organisations had great difficulties, despite their increased degree of 
centralization, to control their coasts and maritime societies at the fringe of the territory they sought 
to penetrate. Thus, state authorities often supported private use of violence until the 1850s. We will 
have more to say on this matter in a later chapter, but it is sufficient to say that privateering and 
piracy were not fully separated in early modern Europe. Indeed, as Ferguson has pointed out, state-
sanctioned piracy was the genesis of the process that founded the British Empire.662 To poorer 
sections of the populace, at least in coastal communities, the prospects for profit from such ventures 
could be much more attractive than what life ashore or in coastal fishing vessels could provide. Most 
importantly, the close connection between private entrepeneurship and state navies became 
institutionalised in the way personnel were recruited. As Christopher Dandeker has demonstrated, 
salaries for naval officers even in Britain well into the 19th century, were very modest so that "Prize 
was a vital element in officers`material existence and was generally seen (particularly by the state) 
as a most important incentive for men to join the service".663 Needless to say, such a system gave 
incentives for captains to seek prizes and pray on civilian shipping. Even in dressing, the navies of 
the 17th and 18th centuries were very different from armies; sailors hardly wore uniforms.664  
Furthermore, the “civilising process” that Norbert Elias has written so much about, did certainly not 
limit behaviour in distant waters, in foreign villages or against the crews with different outlooks and 
languages from other territories that could be pillaged, to the same degree as at “home”. The 
distance involved in the use of violence at sea thus involved praxis that would have been seen as 
illegal, upsetting and morally condemnable in the local communities of the seamen. Overseas was 
“another place”. In distant regions, other norms came to apply, since neither the populace nor the 
legal bodies of the state to which the European sailors belonged could, or necessarily were interested 
in, overlooking the everyday conduct of extraterritorial "business". Not until early 19th century did 
the slave trade become an issue in the British polity, and at large, it was only with the appalling 
horror of King Leopold’s Congo that the majority of nations in the western world for the first time 
seemed united in viewing the previous western “civilizing” of colonies as potentially barbaric.  
If we look at the relationship between state authorities and state power on the one side, and the 
private sector or society at the other, what is quite clear up till the early 18th century is that a private 
maritime trade was a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing military power at sea. 
                                                                                                                                                             
661 Elias, 1950: 292. Elias also reminds us that there was no sharp distinction between "armies" and "navies", in our 
sense of these concepts, in the early modern period 
662 Ferguson, 2002, see chapter 1. 
663 Dandeker, 1978: 307 
664 See Ula, 1946 for a colourful but most entertaining portrait of life in the Danish-Norwegian Navy until 1807. 
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States that contained such societies seldom had great difficulties in expanding a minor navy at rather 
short notice. These societies already had the able sailor, the experienced captain, the navigator and 
the maritime entrepeneur that could man and supply ships. One interesting case is of course the 
Dutch republic, where the northern, coastal communities and cities were superiorly equipped for the 
task.665 A vibrant maritime community could thus be translated into the most efficient agent of state 
power in Europe – the Dutch Navy. Private ship owners had the networks necessary to find skilled 
masters, navigators, boatswains and quartermasters who in turn could pick an efficient crew of 
sailors.666 Even when recruiting captains for their warships, navies often preferred men from the 
coastal communities with already existing local and regional networks rather than noblemen. In turn, 
this segment of the populace was relatively easy to incorporate in state structures: unlike soldiers for 
standing armies, the sailors and the pilots already existed. Unlike more landlocked polities, coastal 
states already had an infrastructure to build upon. What were required were a mechanism and an 
apparatus to convert these sailors and specialists to man a state navy. Arguably, this was an 
organisational and bureaucratic requirement that also was a necessary condition in order to create 
sea power in its direct military meaning. But the interplay between a private, maritime trade also 
created incentives for converting navy personnel back to civil society once the state could not afford 
their services or did not need them. This created the paradox that the size of regular navies was 
relatively small in times of “peace”, but it also facilitated a rather smooth relationship between 
navies and maritime enterprises. Unlike the professional infantry soldier, the sailor’s special skills 
could very easily be re-incorporated and presumably made to good use in the civilian sector after 
wars (note that there were some variations in this respect. This nature of navies as organisations and 
their embeddedness in civil society should make for a qualification in the hypothesis that states 
made war, and war made states. Maritime communities made navies, and navies made states as well 
as commerce. Indeed, maritime violence could be seen as more cost-effective; small organisations of 
armed vessels could play one-shot games through plundering without being permanently tied up in 
costly operations in the army manner of occupying territory. Somewhat unlike the army officer 
corpses, sea officers employed by the state also became a highly distinct group. Unlike army 
officers, who dominantly came from the nobility, by 1650 the main principle that a sea officer 
should be a specialist generally had been established.667 Such officers to an increasing degree began 
their careers as young men and received basic training in ship handling, gunnery and navigation 
before they could obtain commission as sea officers. It will forever be denied by army officers and 
                                                 
665 See Padfield, 1999 for a discussion 
666 Glete, 2000: 42-44 
667 Glete, 2000: 49 
            
 States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology
 
 
 
           
 
 
166 
historians of territorial armies, but the craft of leading naval forces simply was a much more solitaire 
task of leadership, and certainly more complex, technically speaking, than leading companies, 
battalions or even regiments on land. While the field commander to an increasing degree could rely 
on specialised officers of lower rank during and after the military revolution, the Navy captain had 
to have intimate knowledge and experience in a vast set of technical matters while simultaneously 
being able to act with great autonomy during battle.668  
But how this institutionalisation of a permanent Naval officer corps actually took place is a complex 
process that actually only is partly understood even by the foremost of naval historians at the time of 
writing. According to Jan Glete669, this happened “gradually during the 16th Century” in Denmark-
Norway, and in the “early seventeenth century” in Sweden. In England, the permanent corps of sea 
officers was actually not fully institutionalised until the late 17th century. The Dutch republic had a 
corps of captains with full-time employment from 1626, but the practise of hiring junior officers 
from the open market continued. The practise that social and political considerations played a large 
part in state employment continued longer when it came to the commander-in-chiefs of major fleets 
and the permanent heads of navies (Lord High Admiral in England, Riksamiral/Rigsadmiral in the 
Scandinavian countries, Amiral-Generaal and his deputies in the Dutch republic). The Dutch 
Republic was the first European state to employ a commander-in-chief of a major navy from humble 
social origin when Piet Hein was appointed in 1629. The situation was different in England, to be 
sure. But by the early 18th century, admirals usually were chosen among able captains with long 
experience at sea.  
The political economy of recruiting the common sailor turned out to be more different among the 
maritime powers of Northern Europe. In both Denmark-Norway and Sweden, sailors were 
conscripts from coastal towns and maritime communities. It seems that discipline was not a problem 
in these navies, although the conscripts served for years under often harsh conditions. Only in 
Denmark do we know of a smaller cadre of professional sailors employed to supplement the 
conscript sailors. In England, impressments were used in periods for recruiting sailors.670 Mutinies 
among these men, however, seem primarily to have occurred in the first half of the seventeenth 
century. The Dutch example again is a case standing out from the others. This navy seems to have 
been the only one that was able to rely on the open market for mass recruitments of sailors. In its 
                                                 
668 After the industrial revolution, one might speculate, the difference between land power and sea power in this 
respect was actually sought reversed, especially in the Royal Navy. These efforts were fuelled by the mechanisation 
of fleets, communication and tactics underpinned by a belief in naval warfare as an exact science that perhaps have 
survived in many developed countries even today. I am grateful to Captain Inge Tjøstheim for his very clear 
suggestion that this indeed is the case (Sea Power seminar, Ulvik, Norway, August 30 2002) 
669 Glete, 2000: 50-51 
670 Rodger, 2004 
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merchant companies, merchant marine and navy, vast opportunities were opened for sailors, 
including many foreigners, especially Germans and Scandinavians. 
 
The role of navies in state formation is much less understood than the role armies played in the same 
process. Considering the 17th century “hegemony” of the Dutch republic and the later English one, 
however, the notion often held by historians and sociologists that the Dutch and English states were 
“weak” and very limited, must be qualified. Both the Dutch Republic and England were able to 
project often-overwhelming power through their state navies. What is striking is that states like 
Sweden, the Netherlands and England during the 17th century were able to gain political influence in 
Europe that was out of proportion to their bases in population and economic resources. The answer 
to this is that organisation and resource utilisation mattered. These medium-sized states were 
ultimately superior in projecting power by sea. Only efficient state machinery could be able to 
convert the scarce resources of these countries into military and thereby political power. How this 
happened can only be understood by comparing findings of different specialists on naval 
administration and organisation and the processes of financing these organisations, a task that will 
be attempted in the following sections. 
 
3.2  The Balance of Sea Power and extraterritorial Sovereignty 
The principle embodied in the balance of power between polities was the dominant international 
institution of in Europe from AD 1600. Largely, these polities were states, understood as hierarchies 
where the ability to use large-scale violence and tax the people of the territory to a substantial degree 
had been monopolised, although this monopoly was frequently challenged. The principles embodied 
in the logic of balance of power included the institutionalisation of agents of violence; the 
institutionalisation of armies and navies under varying degrees of political control, intelligence 
aimed at reading the capabilities and intentions of adversaries by ways of intelligence, the military, 
political and ideological measures taken to counter the power of competitors, the exchange of 
information between states through the medium of diplomacy to be able to take such actions, 
signalling of policy intentions, war making and the negotiation and agreements over peace 
settlements and alliances. Navies both constituted a major element of the monopoly of violence and 
a possible means to increase incomes by protecting own trade, praying on trade of others, black 
mailing and selling protection.  
At the international level, the navies played an important part in forming and changing the balance 
of power. Domestic factors (remembering that the demarcation between national and international 
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was almost as blurred as the distinction between private and state enterprise in naval matters up till 
the early 19th century), to a high degree meant that states had varying abilities to participate in the 
balance of power. Protection of territory and extraterritorial valuables, in this case through navies, 
should be seen as transaction costs.671 Douglas C. North672 defined the costs of transacting as “the 
costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting 
rights and policing and enforcing agreements”.  More effective and/or cheaper naval protection 
meant that transaction costs were lowered. In turn, lower transaction costs consisted of lower 
insurance rates, decreased transportation costs (Increasing carrying capacity and decreasing the size 
of crews since merchant ships to a larger degree were freed from protecting themselves), lower 
prices, a widening of markets for goods and raw materials, and a smoother exchange of goods and 
information in commercial centres, especially those of a maritime character.  This also meant that 
states were different when we compare their ability to resist penetration of their own sovereignty 
from the means of extraterritorial violence applied by adversaries in the international system. In the 
following sections, we will try to look into the main trends of the domestic factors that influenced 
state behaviour and to what degree these were manifested into sea power. 
 
The Dutch Republic - An International Liberalist? 
In chapter two, we depicted the Dutch Republic as one of the few cases that we can call an 
international liberalist. As we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, both the domestic 
sector and Dutch maritime policy in the realm of foreign policy were heavily influenced by the vast 
and highly international maritime sectors of the Republic. We have indicated that this dynamic 
maritime sector was the basis for the military and political power of the Netherlands in the 17th 
century.673 We have not looked into the decline of this power, but will do so in the last half of this 
section. 
Profits from sea-borne trade and the financial means to wage war were intertwined phenomena in 
the Dutch republic.674 It thus moulded its strategy to suit the interests of the maritime groups in the 
northern part of the republic. This was perhaps the key to the Dutch success for much of the 17th 
                                                 
671 A view also held by Glete, 2000 
672 North, 1990: 27 
673 See for example, Israel, 1995: 241-242 
674 The international configuration of power struggle also gave the Dutch a favourable starting point; “it cannot be 
denied that the spectacular military achievement of the Republic between 1590 and 1597 were possible only because 
Spain was distracted by the struggle in France” (Israel, 1995: 253). The reopening of the waterways and rivers 
linking Holland and Germany, the influx of capital and skills from Antwerp after 1585 and the internal stabilisation 
of the Republic after 1588 all contributed to the “Dutch miracle” of the 1590s.  
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century.675 The commercial maritime interests then also certainly influenced foreign policy. Mare 
liberum as elaborated by Grotius certainly reflected the economic interests of both commerce and 
state. In this way, the civil society and market agents of the Republic, especially Holland, to a large 
degree influenced the international discourse on sovereignty at sea. The doctrine of mare liberum 
was a natural one to adopt in northern waters where Dutch ships were the universal carriers.676 
Dutch policy was much more bent when it came to areas where Dutch companies tried to gain a 
foothold in trade and transport of goods. Thus, along the West African coast, in eastern seas and off 
Brazil, the Dutch companies protected their monopolies forcibly. In addition, as Anglo - Saxon 
historians remind us, they closed the river Schelde to trade for foreigners to secure the position of 
Amsterdam. However, I believe that it is an exaggeration to see the mare liberum position as mere 
hypocrisy. The Dutch society was liberal in a comparative perspective, which also meant that the 
Calvinist creed did not question Man’s role as master and lord of the universe. Thus, both meat, fish 
and whale meat was consumed in large quantities. Working in the comparatively speaking liberal 
atmosphere oh the Republic, René Descartes held that since animals lacked immortal souls. Man’s 
soul, on the other hand, was implanted by God; thus mankind was free to harvest and use natural 
resources in any way deemed necessary.677 Beyond this, there is no reason to doubt that Dutch 
citizens were proud of their success, consistent in their faith in the blessings of free trade and excited 
by the comparatively wide freedoms granted them by the Dutch republic. 
 
In this respect, the contribution of Dutch society and enterprise was ideologically different from the 
corresponding ones in Denmark-Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, France and England, and 
institutionally different from the Hanseatic League. The Netherlands in fact replaced the Hanse as 
the dominant carrier of maritime trade. Lübeck and Antwerp were replaced by Amsterdam. But it is 
also interesting to note how the Dutch Republic rose without a national, seagoing navy.678 It could 
rise to a large part because of the strong merchant navies in northern Netherlands and the locally 
organised navies in the same regions. How did these interests affect international maritime 
institutions? In the first half of the 17th century, the Dutch republic was able to shape such 
institutions in Northern Europe. As a protest against the Danish king raising the sound tolls in 1611, 
                                                 
675 And Protestantism was not a barrier to local autonomy; “”Nowhere else...did Calvinism become so closely linked 
to civic autonomy and the defence of local privileges against princely authority as in East Friesland. Indeed, the 
political ideology, and church politics, of the Emden revolution of 1595 neatly complemented the larger ideological 
framework of the Dutch revolt itself” (Israel, 1995: 251 
676 Padfield, 1999: 83 
677 Padfield, 1999: 84-85. Note the similarity in implications with the views in the Reagan administrations on 
environmental politics. In other respects, needless to say, there are huge differences. Padfield (ibid: 85) shows how 
the view of animals as mechanical devices were reassuring for Descartes and his contemporaries. 
678 Glete, 1993: 153 
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the republic forged an armed alliance with Sweden. Thus, with the treaties of 1613-1614, the 
principle was established in the Baltic that no state could be allowed to obstruct the trade or shipping 
by others. The states should all guarantee the freedom of the Sound. When the English Crown in 
1614 sought to prevent that unfinished English cloth was exported for processing in the Republic, 
Holland’s retaliation (ban on imports of English finished cloth) forced the English monarch to 
abandon his initial regulation.679 
At the same time, the Dutch Navy, divided into five admiralties, became a “local” undertaking as 
well. The five admiralties, or admiralty colleges as Jonathan Israel coins them, resided in 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Enkhuixen (collectively), Zeeland and Friesland. The 
admiralties had a wide range of responsibilities; “administering the navy, collecting customs, 
maintaining guard boats on rivers and estuaries, building warships, recruiting naval seamen, and 
enforcing (and advising on) the states general’s regulation of shipping and fisheries”.680  
Seen from the point of the Dutch polity, this regional domestic organisation had obvious 
disadvantages (e.g. lack of unified military command, lower degree of standardisation and political 
convergence). But initially, it had advantages as well, perhaps being both an object of considerable 
local legitimacy since it suited the trade interests (and by implication employment possibilities) for 
people in those five units of the Dutch federation. Again, the Dutch republic as the later USA and 
the former City league, were relatively decentralised, federative polities, and they all belong to the 
main category of international liberals. While the Dutch navy (navies) can be seen as a means 
primarily created to protect trade and enforce liberal property rights, this was also visible in its 
financing. Again, the financing as well as the organisation, of the navy was a reflection of the 
composition and political economy of the state itself. “It has been estimated that four-fifths of total 
Dutch revenue was raised in the provinces by means of the separate provincial tax systems”.681 More 
than any other income, the revenues used for the navy came from customs paid by ships going in 
and out of ports. Each admiralty had a substantial administrative staff both for financing the navy 
and running it.682 But in addition to this income, the navy was also founded by the state in a direct 
manner, through stats subsidien. This was granted by the central authority (the Staten Generaal), 
and paid by the units of the federation as a whole. Thus, it would certainly be erroneous to see the 
Dutch Navy as merely a locally financed and organised institution. It was the Generality which fixed 
the tariffs and naval policy and supervised the work of the colleges.683 The navy also became a truly 
                                                 
679 Israel, 1995: 406 
680 Israel, 1995: 295 
681 Israel, 1995: 285 
682 Details can be found in Israel, 1995 
683 Israel, 1995: 296 
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state instrument, however decentralized. The navy was used as the vital mean in a grand strategy by 
power projection as well as protection from blockade and invasion. However, one should note the 
very peculiar (for the observer in the 21st century) dualism of state and market in the Dutch naval 
forces. Jan Glete684 thus speaks of two Dutch navies; one owned by the admiralties, financed by tax 
on shipping and used primarily for the protection of trade, the other a state navy in the (modern) 
sense, paid by the federal state and administered by the admiralties. However, this administrative 
and financial arrangement did not result in two different organisations altogether. Policy clearly was 
co-ordinated. Rather, the “two fleets” were used for sea control and as battle fleet respectively, 
where the battle fleets were composed of vessels from all admiralties. At the international level, the 
Dutch Republic further contributed significantly to the discourses on extraterritorial sovereignty by 
its foundation of two rather distinct bodies that were delegated authority of using organised 
violence. These were the United East India Company of 1602 and the West India Company of 1621. 
Again, power was deliberately granted in a decentralised manner that was thought to be an efficient 
institutional arrangement. In order to colonise the Indies, each company were given responsibilities 
to make war, trade and colonise in their respective areas. However, especially the East India 
Company acted in a manner that it would be inaccurate to see as just another example of the blue-
water Lockeanism found amongst the more purely paternalist powers.685 Furthermore, as the 
existence of a maritime community with skilled organisers and labourers created an infrastructure on 
which to build sea power, the vastness and extension of Dutch maritime enterprise also created a 
structural problem for the state navy, and thereby for the Dutch polity. Thus, privately owned ships 
with their entire crews to a large degree were available for hire on an open, international market. 
This was liberalism with a vengeance. Indeed, some of the most famous Dutch admirals sailed in 
foreign and private service for long periods of their careers. The problem arose when the Dutch 
republic lost in the competition for personnel. The navy simply became very reliant on foreign 
sailors. Jonathan Israeal, for example, cites the English ambassador to Denmark-Norway, who in 
1664 claimed that “all their Norway mariners are run in to the Hollanders`service, for want of 
employment at home, and if (the Danish King) should command them back, the States would not be 
able to put their fleet to sea”.686 Unlike England, the Dutch admiralties could not apply press-gangs 
to man their ships. A liberal republic could not employ such means if its ideological creed should 
have any legitimacy. This meant that capital was even more important in order for the Dutch to man 
a fleet when deemed necessary.  
                                                 
684 Glete, 1993: 154-155 
685 See ibid: chapter 4 
686 Israel, 1995: 623 
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The maritime entrepreneurs also demonstrated a lack of interest for a Dutch Navy with ambitions 
outside of Europe. Such roles were only given the Companies, in which private capital and citizens 
at large mainly contributed as stock-buyers. Indeed, even in the Baltic, Dutch merchants were 
primarily protected by the efforts by Dutch authorities to keep friendly relations with the kingdoms 
of Scandinavia, rather than costly patrolling by the Dutch navy in the period till 1654.687 The very 
vastness of Dutch maritime activity meant that upholding a navy used both in local and distant 
waters would have been enormously expensive. Thus, it was a pareto-efficient strategy to 
concentrate on protection in more local waters. At least it seems to have suited the Dutch well in the 
final phase of the Thirty Years War. The transaction costs decreased for the Dutch in these years; 
Spanish embargoes were lifted in 1647, the Flemish privateering campaign against Dutch shipping 
ceased in 1646, Dutch-Spanish hostilities in the New World came to an end (1647) and the freight 
charges and marine insurance rates dropped. However, Dutch policy rested on the ability to keep the 
international institutions of maritime sovereignty as liberal as was possible for the Dutch to compete 
in. This meant that the political economy of the Dutch trade and foreign policy sooner or later would 
collide with the mare clausum politics of England. While England had been able to compensate their 
loss of commercial advantages in Northern Europe to the Dutch by gaining in the Levant, “by 1651 
the slump in England, and disgruntlement of the merchants, shippers and clothiers, had brought 
Anglo-Dutch relations under severe strain”.688 In august 1651, the English parliament passed the 
Navigation Act. From now on, the struggle was intensified. The first Navigation acts of England 
banned the import and export of goods except on English ships or on ships of the place of origin or 
port of final shipment of the goods. Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to see the English navigation 
act as an attempt to strengthen the English Merchant navy, and thereby creating both revenue and a 
maritime infrastructure that could be translated into sea power if necessary. The extension of the 
navigation acts to include the English colonies resulted in the arrest of Dutch ships689, the direct 
cause of the war from 1652 till 1654 that was concluded by an empty English victory. The main 
battles were fought in the Channel, the choke point between the North Sea and the Atlantic and 
southern colonies, where both navies sought to control sea lines of communication.690 Since this war 
has been richly described elsewhere, it is sufficient to say that the balance of power was in the 
favour of England. The Dutch had never prepared for such direct confrontations with battle-fleets, 
while the English were superior in large warships. But the English “victory” was more than empty; 
                                                 
687 Of course there are exceptions to this rule; one famous example being the batlle in the Sound between the Dutch 
and Swedish fleets in 1658. However, it was precisely the prospects of an utterly weakened Denmark that forced the 
Dutch navy to intervene. 
688 Israel, 1995: 714 
689 Glete, 1993, Israel, 1995: 715 believes that 30 Dutch vessels were brought in in January 1652 alone. 
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it demonstrated the comparative Dutch advantage in maritime power conceived as a broader set of 
capabilities than military power projected from the sea. Apart from fighting successfully in the 
Channel, the English forces were not sufficient to break the Dutch hold on the main sea-lanes further 
away from their homeland. Thus, England’s commercial shipping was damaged more than was the 
Dutch. The latter, allied to Denmark, and maintaining a significant force at the Sound, closed down 
the English trade with the Baltic completely. The Dutch were even successful in the 
Mediterranean.691  
The war created a naval arms race between the two states of unprecedented proportions.692 It also 
meant that both English and Dutch fleets began to operate on a larger scale both in the Baltic, the 
western Mediterranean as well as in American waters. Thus, the English Navy projected power in 
the Mediterranean such that the North African corsair states were forced to sign treaties, the 
Tunisian fleet was destroyed and Portugal signed a treaty where the British undertook to protect its 
possessions in exchange for trade concessions. In order to protect its interests in the Baltic, the 
Dutch Navy clashed with Sweden`s remarkable and actually final serious effort to gain dominium 
maris Baltici in 1655-1660. The prospect that the balance of power in the Baltic would tilt in the 
favour of a strong Sweden could have such disastrous consequences (such as a Sweden-dominated 
naval alliance in order to control east-west trade in Northern Europe) that both England and the 
Dutch republic sent strong fleets to the Baltic in 1659 (actually, the Dutch Navy was sent to support 
the Danes, while the English fleet was deployed to support the Swedes). It was this effort by two 
strong, permanent navies of the great powers of Northern Europe that recreated the balance of power 
in the Baltic, and made Sweden bow and sign a peace treaty with Denmark in 1660.693 The Anglo-
Dutch struggle for hegemony had definitely penetrated the Baltic Area and the North European 
security complex at large.  
But the violent dispute between the Liberalist and the Paternalist was not settled. They clashed yet 
again in the second Anglo- Dutch war of 1664-67. Again, the issues on extraterritorial sovereignty 
and rights were the direct causes of a war that influenced the international configurations of power 
and influence. The more successful Dutch war efforts in this war were direct results of a more 
centralised Dutch naval policy including a programme for building of battleships never seen before 
in Europe. In 1652, the total displacement of the Dutch state navy had been ca. 30000 tons; by 1672 
it had passed 100000 tons.694 This strength certainly was required when the kings of mercantile 
                                                                                                                                                             
690 Described in Glete, 1993, Rodger, 2004 
691 Israel, 1995: 721 
692 See table earlier in this chapter 
693 Glete, 1993, Israel, 1995: 738 
694 Glete, 1993: 189-190 
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England and France allied and unsuccessfully sought to end the Dutch commercial superiority 
through a series of naval battles in 1672 and 1673. Indeed, our label of the Dutch republic as an 
international liberalist seems justifiable when we look at the contents of diplomacy carried out by 
the Dutch in the mid 17th century. The treaty of friendship that Amsterdam hoped that Charles would 
accept in 1651 contained the principles of unrestricted trade (thus abolishing the Navigation Act) 
and the principle of free ship, free goods whenever one of the two powers was engaged in hostilities 
with other powers.695 Although the treaty was actually signed in 1662, the atmosphere - partly due to 
the mare clausum policy of England prohibiting foreign fishing vessels to fish nearer the British 
shore than ten miles –was so tense “that it failed to provide the stable basis of friendship which the 
Orangist camp needed”.696 The Republic also secured a treaty with France in 1662, guaranteeing the 
Dutch fisheries in the North Sea. However, warmaking continued. The series of battles fought 
between France and the Dutch Republic ultimately took its toll. From 1671 till 1680, the republic 
was not able to replace losses at sea. By 1680, the Dutch navy was only about half the size of the 
French and English. This certainly also was as much a result of the continued war on the continent 
as the costs of protecting trade and fighting battles at sea. As a matter of fact, the war between 
France and The republic was not a direct result of maritime questions, and even forced the more 
maritime conflict with England into the background. Indeed, the Dutch invasion of England led by 
William of Orange in 1688, had the immediate effect that the two maritime powers formed an anti-
French coalition, the naval implications of which will be described further in the next section of this 
chapter. The strategic interests of both England and the Dutch Republic allowed for such an alliance 
to endure. These interests were primarily the specific counter-balancing of France and protection of 
sea lines of communication in general. In other words, the logic of balance-of-power between 
sovereign states had become the prime international institution that also penetrated national policies. 
Thus, the liberal and commercial idealism that we can find in Dutch attitudes concerning interstate 
relations among European states did not fully reach a breakthrough because the Dutch navy 
ultimately was not strong enough to impose these principles of mare liberum after 1670. Thus, I 
believe it is not feasible to see the Dutch republic as a hegemon after this decade. Furthermore, it 
seems to me to be quite wrong to label, as some scholars have done, international maritime 
institutions prior to the 20th century as reflections of mare liberum principles alone. The mare 
liberum predominance de facto disappeared with the demise of the short-lived Dutch naval 
predominance. Mercantilism and mare clausum were the dominant principles included in the 
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institution of the maritime balance of power.  
 
But did the title as an international liberalist fit the Dutch republic? This upon the ideological 
position of the reader and what standards of empirical comparison we apply: those of the late 17th 
century or the 20th? However, it seems that some defining features of Dutch state policy on 
maritime matters are clearly liberalist in a comparative, 17th century perspective. The maritime 
policy of the Republic was initially defined out of local needs and the demand for protection of 
fisheries and long-distance trade. While local entrepreneurs under the direction of the five 
admiralties gave the former protection to a large degree, the latter was only gradually sought through 
a permanent navy projecting power overseas. Before the Dutch-Anglo wars, the Republic primarily 
worked in favour of mare liberum and tried to protect overseas sea travel through good relations 
with other coastal states. This policy was gradually eroded through the strained relationships and 
wars with England and France. The logic of balance-of-power became the dominant international 
institution in Western Europe in the 18th Century.697 This logic forced the Dutch republic to enter an 
alliance with England in order to fend off France. In many ways, it is also tempting to interpret the 
naval battles in Northern Europe during the 18th century as a result of this equilibrium. From 1690 
till 1815, the only clear-cut examples of battle between Battle fleets fought on the explicit orders of 
political leaders in this area occurred in the channel in 1690 and 1692.698 From 1692, naval 
deterrence seems to have worked. However, competing in the continuing naval armaments race was 
immensely expensive. Thus, the decline of Dutch sea power was pronounced by 1740. In the 1740s, 
as one leading historian has stated, “the Republic abstained from taking part in the new naval race 
over hegemony in the Atlantic hemisphere…the queen of the seas was of course now the British 
Navy”.699 During the 18th century, the European power struggle (if seen primarily as a balance of 
power between larger powers) can be interpreted as gradually being divided into one continental and 
one maritime sphere. From the traditional battlefields of Western Europe, the maritime sphere 
contained the struggles over colonies and sea lines of communication in America and Asia. The 
Dutch Republic did not have the financial resources or the motivation to outpace England in its 
trajectory towards becoming a global power. The two main protestant powers of Northern Europe 
during the 18th century thus were often allied or at least friendly neutrals whenever a conflict arose 
between one of them and another power. This relationship, however, became more and more 
asymmetric as the Dutch navy declined in a comparative perspective. By 1760, for example, the 
                                                 
697 See Clark, 1989 for a very acute observation as to how statesmen prior to the 19th century and the Napoleonic 
wars saw the balance of power as a principle beyond dispute, and even almost beyond human control. 
698 The battles of Beachy Head and Barfleur/La Hogue 
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Dutch only had a dozen vessels that could be called real battleships by European standards. The 
conventional view is that this development in the Dutch navy paralleled the general stagnation of 
Dutch society in general.700 However, it seems to be inaccurate to portray this decline as a dramatic 
weakening of the Dutch republic and its society. It is tempting to support Immanuel Wallerstein in 
that economic decline in the case of the Republic ultimately should be interpreted in a comparative 
perspective.701 However, it is also striking to note how the Dutch became technologically inferior in 
naval armaments and shipbuilding. The economic weakening cannot be ignored as the chief variable 
in explaining Dutch decline. The economic centralisation to Amsterdam meant loss of income to the 
admiralties of Zealand, Noorderqwartier and Friesland. Naturally these units of the federation had to 
cut down their peacetime navies, while the maritime infrastructure to man vessels for naval purposes 
in times of crisis also must have been weakened. The Dutch navy in practise became the Amsterdam 
Navy. The economic centralization did not harmonise with the principles of administrative and 
military decentralisation that the Dutch continued to rely on.  The international competition had 
passed a threshold that made decentralisation in the monopoly of violence and taxation into a 
disadvantage rather than an advantage. How come the international incentives for change did not 
punctuate the institutional logic of the Republic?  This is a highly demanding question, but one 
major reason seems to be the vested interests that embedded state structures and organisations. The 
admiralties were parts of the political structures. The declining provinces did not want to lose these 
bodies, since the admiralties were formal power positions. At the same time, the units of the 
federation did never really agree on federal founding for a permanent navy during the 18th century, 
not until Great Britain declared war in 1780, that is. Although the Dutch Republic managed to 
launch a large number of warships between 1781 and 1785, structural weaknesses in state structures 
and maritime infrastructure soon became evident. A main problem probably also was the lack of 
stores.  
The vested interests that blocked reforms in state structures eventually resulted in their destruction 
following the French invasion of 1795. One result was that the “new” Batavian republic abolished 
the admiralties and created a unified, national navy. The Dutch navy in effect was recreated from 
1813 after its earlier incorporation in Napoleon’s Empire. The new state (till 1830/31 including 
Belgium) returned to the traditional Dutch Naval policy where the avoidance of blockade of Dutch 
ports was given priority. What definitely had changed was the administration of the Navy. The 
French period from 1795 till 1813 gave as its lasting impact the existence of a centralised naval 
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administration and a permanent corps of naval officers. In many ways, Dutch state-building can 
accurately be described as being re-started during the French period.702  By this time, the republic 
had become a bandwagoning liberalist. What was beneficial to the Netherlands also certainly was 
the fact that after 1815, Great Britain saw good relations with the Low Countries as vital to its 
national interests. Thus, Great Britain actually restored most of the Dutch colonial possessions! 
Anglo-Dutch relations within the security complex of Northern Europe seemed to have changed for 
eternity. As the Dutch did not see Britain as a security threat, they had no reason to use scarce 
resources for building a battle fleet either. Anglo-Dutch relations to some degree had become 
embedded in a tit-for –tat strategy. The Netherlands thus concentrated on protecting their vast 
maritime empire, while simultaneously trying to keep a low profile in European power politics. The 
only exception to this pattern was the creation of Belgium in 1830-33, where France and Great 
Britain intervened with a naval blockade to force the Dutch to accept the new state. Armed conflict 
was avoided, and the new territory (the northern part of the earlier state) kept all its naval vessels, 
Belgium serving as a buffer state with only a token Navy of coastal gunboats and patrol boats.703 
The Netherlands, however, modernised its fleet through the gradual converting to steam beginning 
already in the 1820s. Although the Netherlands have remained a maritime nation till this day, it 
never again came even close to being a core state, or to challenge other hegemonies. The 
extraterritorial dimension of Dutch politics nevertheless is an enduring trait in its foreign policy 
habitus, as will be seen later. However, the trajectory of Dutch sea power is a prime example of how 
the international competition in 18th century Europe quickly made older political and administrative 
arrangements obsolete. Although building, manning and maintaining navies could be cost-effective, 
it certainly was costly if it was a means to enforce its own national preferences on other powerful 
states. Above all, the consistent and long-term commitment required in order to produce a credible 
naval force from the 18th century was at odds with the highly decentralised way to organise the 
monopolies of extraterritorial violence and taxation in the Dutch republic.  
 
England as a naval hegemon 
If some of the empirical issues we try to cover in this thesis are hampered by lack of historical 
sources, this certainly does not apply to English maritime policies and sea power. More than in any 
other nation in Europe the Navy seems to be a true institution of the English. To recreate yet another 
narrative of the development and nature of English sea power thus seems entirely unnecessary. Ever 
                                                 
702 Glete, 1993: 438 
703 Glete, 1993: 438. It was a de jure Navy, for sure, thereby trying to exercise the functions of a state. 
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since A.T. Mahan wrote his influential treatise on the Influence of Sea Power upon History in 
1890704, the dominant theme has been that of the rise of English and later British power by means of 
Naval force. Accounts of battles and detailed overviews of technological innovations will not be 
given in the following. Only during the past two decades, however, have historians analysed in 
detail how the limited state and societal structures of England could produce this expansion through 
force. To simplify, is not the dominant sociological explanations of the English “political 
development” somewhat narrow in focusing on the relationships between classes, agriculture, modes 
of production and the raising of armies? Without pertaining to argue that these variables have not 
been important in explaining English state building, I will claim here that what makes England 
special in a comparative perspective is the efficiency of extraterritorial violence created by this 
country that was rather insignificant by early 16th century standards. It was this capability that in 
time would ensure that British ideology coloured 19th century international maritime institutions to a 
very large degree. 
Indeed, this growing ability has been underrated as a factor in studies of state formation in political 
science. The military revolution in land warfare supposedly created the absolutist state in Europe, 
where the representative institutions of the medieval period were abandoned. England only, so the 
traditional geopolitical explanation goes, escaped this path because it was “invasion-proof”705, or 
because other powers were occupied in continental warfare. The weakness in this line of argument is 
obvious, according to N.A. M. Rodger.706 A navy of 20000 men was more expensive than an army 
of 100000 men by 1600. In 1588, it was proven that the resources of the greatest military and 
financial power in Europe, Spain, were not sufficient to supply a navy equal to the English. Realism 
cannot explain this, since the military resources of Spain were superior all in all. Materialists should 
also note that Spain had ten times more money than had the English state had at the time.  
What mattered was skill, commitment but above all cooperation between state institutions and 
private interest groups. It was the ability of creating sea power that fostered an Empire and changed 
international institutions of maritime questions that was an important part of the 18th and 19th 
century world orders. The ability to raise an efficient navy was more dependent upon raising money 
                                                 
704 A reader of this thesis will perhaps question why not more emphasis has been laid on analysing Mahan. The 
answer is that Mahan’s work is deterministic. Moreover, his argument about the “national character” is both unclear 
and quasi-racialist (Kennedy, 1976: 7). Taken together, Mahan’s “principles” of Sea Power is not a theory that can 
be tested, but rather an all-embracing listing of main variables that can explain all successful as well as all failed 
attempts at creating sea power. The role model used by Mahan in his inductive research strategy clearly was 
England. According to Mahan, this state and its society clearly matched all principles that made up the successful 
recipe for sea power. 
705 As we have seen from the previous chapter, this is an absurd argument. 
706 Rodger, 1997: 430-432 
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than manpower. Thus, the absolutist state was not a viable option for the English monarchy, since 
compromises between interest groups and state bureaucracy was a necessary condition for creating 
naval power.  
There is no denying that England had advantageous natural dispositions on which to build maritime 
power. But geography also was part of what constituted necessity in foreign policy. Separated from 
continental Europe by salt water, fending off possible invasions by naval force was the most obvious 
strategy chosen in times of crisis. Furthermore, England – especially in the south- had many good 
harbours, rich fishing grounds that also laid the basis for sea-faring and rich coastal communities, 
large sources of iron ore in the Weald, which gave good and comparatively speaking cheap guns. 
England’s position in the Northwest of Europe was an ideal position both on the east-west axis of 
trade in northern Europe, as well as in the later race for colonies and control of sea lines of 
communication.707 Economic development and an increasingly nationalist policy went hand in hand. 
Thus, the English state early sold protection to civilian commerce, instituted navigation acts and 
permitted private agents the use of extraterritorial violence for commercial purposes. In the latter 
respect, England’s de facto policy had far more a character of blue-water Lockeanism than that of 
the international liberalist of the Dutch Republic. The expansionist impulse in England gave rise to a 
series of chartered companies; the Turkey Company, the Venice Company, the Levant Company, 
the revived Eastland Company, the Muscovy Company, the Cathay Company and the East India 
Company.708 Thus, state-supported companies not only gave the state increased income, they also 
laid the infrastructure on which a stronger navy could be built upon later. Moreover, these early 
ventures and organisational innovations included alliances between the Monarchy, the Gentry as 
well as a new and dynamic middle class, all interested in the potential profit of extraterritorial 
commerce. The religious creed, be it conversion of Pagans or later the policy against Catholicism709, 
naturally gave these adventures an ideological and idealistic dressing. However, it is important to 
note England as less ideologically constrained than for example Holland. There was a certain 
element of pragmatism included in the conduct of the Paternalist English polity that was not found 
in the Dutch republic of the 17th and 18th centuries. This pragmatism, a somewhat surprising feature 
in the eyes of the 20th century observer perhaps, had some important advantages that also were 
                                                 
707 Kennedy, 1976: 23-25 
708 Kennedy, 1976: 25 
709 It is not an exaggeration that the split between Protestantism and Catholicism had to be overcome in order for the 
“Three Kingdoms” to become a first class sea power. “Charles I was divided from many of his protestant subjects by 
his Arminian principles, widely perceived as no more than diluted or disguised popery. The hatred and fear which 
English and Scots Protestants felt for Catholics was beyond any other motive in guiding their political consciousness 
(and it is a motive which modern historians find especially difficult to understand). It not only made them suspicious 
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commented upon by contemporaries.710 The English maritime entrepreneurs and specialists were apt 
at picking up new methods, technology and organisational innovations. Pragmatism was also an 
advantage when encountering native peoples of distant colonies. Thus, English imperialism, 
although at times brutal and racist, was not as horrendous as the atrocities committed by some 
imperialists from other countries. But paternalist, it certainly was. Thus, the genesis of the British 
Empire was laid already in the late 16th century by the policy of blockading adversaries, protecting 
“English” fishing grounds and selling protection against pirates.711  However, we should be cautious 
against a tendency to picture this as a uni-linear development. Naval policy in England during the 
17th century depended, like naval policies in the Dutch Republic, upon constellations of elites within 
the domestic realm, and in the English case, the parliamentary regime mattered indeed. Parliament 
gained control of the King’s Fleet in 1642.712 Parliament supported only a coastal naval fleet of 
smaller vessels in order to protect trade, ports and fisheries. This was a contrast to the foreign policy 
Navy of big ships earlier emphasised by Charles I. Thus, extraterritorial ambitions among private 
domestic elites reflected their more moderate ambitions at the time. The biggest ships of the navy 
(Sovereign and Prince) were laid up. In many ways, this policy in the latter period of the Civil war 
and in its aftermath in several ways was a return to an increased degree of private control over naval 
affairs. Rather than being controlled by pure state organs like the Lord Admiral and the Navy Board, 
the English Navy actually was controlled by a web of Parliamentary committees. Among these were 
the Navy and Customs Committee, established in 1641 to control and allocate revenues. 
Furthermore, the Navy Board in 1642 was replaced by a Navy Commission, combining professional 
members with parliamentary representatives in control of the Navy rather than the Lord Admiral. 
Thus, the political system of the English polity already at this stage shows its distinctive influence on 
the Navy when compared to the administrative and political control of extraterritorial violence in 
Spain, France, Portugal and Denmark-Norway. The degree of “democratic” control of English naval 
matters should not be overstated, though. N.A.M Rodger thus shows how the “active members of 
the Navy and Customs Committee, the distinct Commission of 1643, the two Admiralty Commissions 
of 1642 and 1645, the Prize Commission of 1644, and the parliamentary representatives on the 
Navy Commission, were virtually the same”713 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
of their own sovereign, it divided his kingdoms, for in most of Ireland and parts of Wales the common people 
remained largely, and the nobility and gentry partly, catholic” (Rodger, 1997: 411) 
710 See Kennedy, 1976: 28-30 for examples and discussion. 
711 Armitage, 2000, Kennedy, 1976: 40.  
712 Rodger, 1997: 421 
713 Rodger, 1997: 422. See also appendix V in the same volume 
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However, this was a costly arrangement for the English society. The army occupied London in 1647 
and ejected most of the Presbyterians from naval administration. The Navy itself was indeed purged 
of Presbyterian officers, and the “Army rule” of the fleet caused mutinies in much of England. 
Indeed, the Navy played a vital role in favour of the parliamentary side during the Civil war, and so 
“earned the gratitude of its new paymasters”.714 Thus, from the maritime point of view the outcome 
of interest here is that the war re-established English Sea Power as a major factor in the European 
balance of power. Domestically, this was facilitated by the fact that the Navy from this time on was 
regarded as a national force, or to be more sociologically precise, a part of the state monopoly of 
violence. Thus, the Rokkanian view of early state building in England should be complemented by 
this nuance: the English monopoly of violence was not secured until the 1650s. At this point in time, 
the English navy and naval administration thus had become more akin to Weber’s notion of the 
modern bureaucracy. Wages in the Navy were raised to attract personnel, pensions became more 
common, corruption in the administration was reduced drastically, capable officers replaced Royal 
favourites and logistical support improved drastically. And the revolution certainly brought into 
power and political position those groups in society who favoured an improved and stronger Navy 
that could be applied for both overseas colonisation and defence of sea-lines of communication that 
could provide for safe ocean-faring and trade. This melted together in a gospel of national interests 
that also converged around the religious and commercial well-being and profit of the upper and 
middle classes. 
The most serious and immediate obstacle to maritime predominance nevertheless lay in Dutch 
maritime primacy. This struggle and the background for the first navigation Act of 1651 have 
already been mentioned in the previous section. Although trade wars, these wars were also were a 
matter of survival for the Dutch empire, and once concluded in favour of England, the Republic had 
to reduce its ambitions. The trajectory of the Republic was one from a state aspiring for hegemony 
to one subdued by another hegemon in an asymmetric, informal alliance. For English admirals and 
state leaders, the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century opened their eyes to the potential value of 
“command of the sea”, that is neutralisation of enemy fleets and control of maritime 
communications. Command of the sea did not only mean protection of the territorial polity, but also 
the ability to subdue colonies and to control and protect trade. Extraterritorial means of violence 
created extraterritorial sovereign “rights” as claimed by the power-projecting sea power. This 
introduced a new logic to the balance of power in Europe, and a dilemma for policy makers in ALL 
EUROPEAN states. They had to maintain a close surveillance of the continental balance of power, 
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to be sure. But the maritime sphere was global, and success in this vast field of competition in turn 
had the potential to finance both enterprises in the new world as well as defence of territorial 
national interests for protection and for contributions to the continental balance of power.  
             By 1660, The Royal Navy had become the power and the glory of a State that increasingly 
ruled the waves. The protestant myth of 1588 had produced a very concrete naval force. From now 
on, extraterritorial violence was used to keep the balance of military, political and economic power 
in equilibrium. Above all, the navy was an instrument for the protection of national interests, not 
primarily tied up to the defence of the territory of the motherland, but also of sea-lines of 
communication within the European security complex and a global network of sea-lanes. Thus, in 
the Scandinavian wars of 1658-1660, England was both eager to check the Danes and the Dutch in 
the Baltic, but simultaneously warned Sweden off from any attempt to achieve control of Norway, 
due to the possible monopolisation of Naval stores that this could imply. But this balance of power 
view of international relations should not be seen as unlimited cynicism and power politics for the 
sake of power itself. Rather, the international balance shifted since international relations always are 
in flux. The Triple Alliance of England, France and the republic in 1717715 should be seen as an 
example of how national ideologies at times are penetrated by the balance of power as an 
international institution. But even here, the domestic ideological nature of England was not clear-
cut. On the contrary, domestic interests resulted in a split during the 1670s, where the English were 
divided between a protestant, pro-parliament, pro-Dutch policy, and those favouring a pro-French 
policy led by a strengthened English Monarch. Indeed, the interplay between domestic and 
international politics is obvious in this case. The pro-French policy lost after a series of unsuccessful 
naval battles between England/France and the United Provinces, with the Treaty of Westminster of 
1674 restoring the status quo ante.716 Although the domestic effects of the Anglo-Dutch wars were 
diverse, enhanced sea power and a higher volume and diversity in English commerce reinforced the 
mercantilist inclination in the English polity. To an increasing degree, therefore, violence and 
revenues from the sea were monopolised by the English state. After the Glorious revolution, all the 
older monopoly trading companies with the exception of the East India Company lost their 
privileges. In the diplomatic role, ambassadors and consuls took over the functions previously 
exercised by companies, and the navy took over the tasks of protection. 
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The war of 1689-1697 was the first major war between states where a maritime coalition (England 
and the Dutch republic) fought the large navy of a continental power (France).717 This war was to 
have important implications both for the increased willingness in the English parliament to support 
the Navy, as well as for tactical, technical and strategic concepts for modern navies. In addition to 
protection, the Royal Navy had to be used as an offensive weapon if the war was to be won. This 
meant disturbing and destroying French trade by controlling sea-lines of communication. Again the 
east-west axis of Northern Europe was of high importance. French supplies of grain and naval stores 
from the Baltic could be severed since they passed close to the Anglo-Dutch coasts. 
The real wonder of the almost constant state of war between Britain and France in the period from 
1689 till 1713, was that there was no significant decline in British sea power or financial strength. 
The creation of financial institutions such as the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange and the 
introduction of the National debt contributed to the latter and gave the necessary credit for overseas 
expansion. In addition, British shipping could carry on despite losses to privateers, traders could find 
alternatives to closed markets and the arms industry was stimulated by the demands of war. By 
1714, for example, the Royal navy alone employed more workers than any other industry in the 
country718, in addition to a general rise of employed in all services required for building and 
maintaining a Navy that was in use constantly. Many of the new territories that came under British 
control were the direct results of this use of the Navy. At the 1713 Peace of Utrecht, for instance, 
Britain acquired Gibraltar, Minorca, Hudson’s Bay, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.719 After the 
Seven Years War, the empire was extended to include Canada, Cape Breton Island, Florida, St 
Vincent, Tobago, Dominica and Grenada, plus effective political control of India.720 Such gains of 
extraterritorial sovereignty naturally gave wind in the sails of the proponents of a British blue-water 
national strategy. There is no denying, though, that ever from the time of Elizabeth, the English 
polity at times was split between advocates of this blue-water lockeanism and the supporters of 
active English participation to support allies on the continent in times of war. The balance between 
the two groups has varied with the tides of the European balance of power, but the fact remains that 
this heritage also weaves a fabric between past and present in English politics. The colonies and the 
later Commonwealth were legacies of the Blue-water strategy that made the British Empire hard to 
reconcile with integration of England in Western Europe. In order not to run ahead of our narrative, 
we should note that the policy of pursuing extraterritorial maritime fortunes gained leverage after the 
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720 For a complete overview of territories under the British Empire, see Lloyd, 1996 (The British Empire), table VII 
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Glorious Revolution. The fruits of colonialism also meant that the chief 18th century opponent of 
Britain - France - sought to interrupt the sea-lines of communication, to a large degree by the use of 
privateering. In turn, this put increased demands upon the Royal Navy. Thus, a circular logic was 
involved in which the increased protection of merchant shipping demanded increased revenue to 
strengthen the Navy, which stimulated increased efficiency in transactions and protection and an 
increased volume of long-distance trade. An improved escort system was introduced, but 
simultaneously the overall use of the sealines of communication was increased to a degree that the 
Royal Navy could not provide protection to all. However, the National Naval strategy of Britain to 
some degree developed into a pincer strategy in which the Mediterranean Fleet diverted French 
Forces to its southern coast, thus relieving the commercial warfare in Northern waters.721 Thus, the 
seizing of Gibraltar in 1704 as well as the 1703 Methuen Treaty with Portugal, altered the strategic 
complexity facing France to a significant degree. Britain was the true victor of the War of the 
Spanish succession. We have already mentioned the extraterritorial gains outside of Europe for 
Britain. In addition, the Treaty meant that there would never again be a merging of Spanish and 
French power under the same crown, and thus that France could not gain hegemony in Western 
Europe. In addition,  
 
“The allocation of the Spanish Netherlands, Naples and Sardinia to Austria, a non-maritime power, 
was a classic example of divide et impera on Britain’s part, since it tied the emperor to the defence 
of those key strategical points which London wished, in any case, to be kept out of Bourbon 
hands”722 
 
Although the configuration of military and political power on the continent itself was an important 
aim of Britain, there is no doubt that British sea power played a major role and that she ended up as 
the superior sea power on the globe after the Treaty of Utrecht. The fact is that Britain was to hold 
this position for a very long time. As historians have demonstrated in a reliable manner elsewhere, 
Britain in the 18th century was a status quo power in Western Europe, and a steady investor in 
colonies and trade on an almost global scale. Britain can thus be said to have found a stable 
equilibrium strategy in its foreign policy. This policy both consisted in keeping an eye on all aspects 
of European politics, as well as reinforcing the paternalist disposition in regard to less developed 
territories under British auspices in its various forms. In the words of Palmerston; Britain had no 
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eternal allies, only eternal interests.723 As constellations of power and alliances in the realm of 
international relations were in flux, the extraterritorial interests of Britain were rather fixed. These 
two facts also ensured, however, that “Imperial Britain” was influenced and in turn influenced 
developments on a worldwide scale. Thus, the rise of Russian Sea Power meant that depots of naval 
stores were built in America to compensate for losses in trade from the Baltic, while British and 
Spanish vessels fought in the Caribbean, etc.  
The British equilibrium strategy of the 18th century was costly, as any strategy would be given the 
level of ambitions held by the British polity. But it was possible; at war with France, for example, 
the same Western Squadron of the Royal Navy that kept the French fleet in port and destroyed her 
merchant marine also blocked any reinforcements to America and Asia, while simultaneously 
allowing British trade to the same regions. The synergy of this was British dominance in all theatres 
of struggle for extraterritorial sovereignty and –rights. Thus, apart from her losses in the West 
Indies, Britain appeared as the victor again at the peace of Paris in 1763, “with the greatest 
collection of spoils in her history”724. That Britain did not gain the desired results during the 
American War of Independence must partly be explained by a lack of national unity, many 
prominent flag officers being among the notables of the British society that opposed British attempts 
at suppressing the American revolt by force. Lacking a coherent national doctrine for this scenario, 
British naval and army forces were used in disperse operations where British efforts hardly were 
decisive in any one theatre. The peacetime administration of George III in effect had also resulted in 
a Royal Navy of poorer quality than the victorious force from the Seven years War.725 In addition, 
the balance of power in Europe had changed to the effect that France, for the first time in a war with 
Britain, did not have to run a continental campaign in parallel with the maritime one (thus, the 
“elephant” for the first time could try to compete seriously and on an “equal” footing with the 
“Whale”, to use Potter’s and Nimitz’s phrases). In addition, maintaining large and numerous 
garrisons in America was quite another enterprise than upholding the relatively cost-effective 
outposts in the outskirts of the traditional British Empire. I will suggest one further variable at the 
level of international institutions, however. The British paternalist policy of mare clausum had 
reached a limit in North European and North Atlantic waters. Thus, the attempts by Britain to gain a 
monopoly of the effective use of maritime violence in 1778 provoked the “Armed Neutrality” of 
                                                                                                                                                             
722 ibid: 102 
723 Often quoted differently, though. What Lord Palmerston said as British Foreign Secretary in 1848, was that “We 
have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are perpetual and eternal and those interests it 
is our duty to follow" 
724 Kennedy, 1976: 124 “She had virtually total control of the valuable North American continent; Minorca was 
restored to preserve her dominance in the Mediterranean; Senegal taken to increase her position in West Africa...and 
French political influence was eradicated in India” 
            
 States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology
 
 
 
           
 
 
186 
1780. There were limits to the intensity of mare clausum that the neutral states of Europe could bear. 
By 1783, Britain was isolated, since both Portugal and the two Sicilies had joined the Dutch 
republic, Russia, Sweden, Prussia, Austria and Denmark-Norway in the pact.726 Furthermore, the 
North American colonies could simply not be controlled by sea power as the bonds of loyalty to the 
British Isles were weakened, and as the populace in this particular colony became more or less self-
sufficient. Thus, when a mare clausum policy had reached a point where it had to be followed up by 
large and lasting efforts at land warfare supported by logistics from distant sea lines of 
communications, it had to be adjusted. The alternative was overstretching.727 The peace treaty of 
1784 meant in effect that Britain avoided such a situation, and instead entered a remarkable period 
of increase in productivity and in volume of sales.  According to Paul Kennedy, the value of British 
exports thus rose from 12.5 to 40.8 million pounds from 1780 till 1800.728 Even in areas where 
Britain had lost her political control, as in North America, the losses in extraterritorial sovereignty in 
this case had no devastating negative economic consequences.729 And the vital economy in turn 
made the British able to develop their fleet further. Few historians will deny that in this respect, 
Britain was ideally equipped for the challenges during the struggle with France from 1793 till 1815, 
and that these years increased further the British power in Europe, also making it into a true 
maritime hegemon on a global scale. The period is perhaps best known for its famous sea battles (as 
Trafalgar, 1805) that proved to be decisive for the European balance of power.730 The British policy 
of blockade, in addition to lead to starvation in enemy and neutral countries, made it more difficult 
for its enemies to achieve the naval stores so crucial for warship building and reparations. Thus, the 
British mare clausum policy in the form of sea denial was strategically effective in times of war, 
although in no way without a price even for its executioner, which an overview of British losses as 
well as the incredible war expenditure figures amply testifies.731 Moreover, if one looks at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
725 Moore, 1979: 23-25 
726 Kennedy, 1976: 132 
727 Moore, 1979: 26-27 
728 Kennedy, 1976: 138 
729 The exercise involved in the counter-factual speculation what the profit would have been in the same area had the 
British political control been upheld, is one I do not wish to engage in.  
730 Such a statement is open to criticisms from all theorists in international relations that downplay the role of sea 
power as a factor in the balance of power. I cannot find any good reason for the latter practise. In the case of the 
Napoleon wars and the European balance of power, British Sea Power played a large part in the outcomes in the 
decisive, Eastern Theatre. Kennedy (ibid: 160), for example, writes that “it can reasonably be argued that the British 
support for Russia, Austria and Prussia in the form of almost unlimited subsidies and munitions in the years 1812-14 
had played a large part in the victories in eastern Europe; and that it was the Royal Navy’s protection of commerce 
which had permitted Britain to afford assistance of such dimensions to her continental allies” 
731 The system of public borrowing found in England made Britain able to spend money on war far beyond the 
potential found in tax revenue. Thus, financial variables indeed should not be discredited in explaining the British 
success. However, if we compare the overall economic resources of Britain with the total resources of her 
adversaries, it seems rather clear that economy is not a sufficient explanation. 
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overall balance of power measured by numbers of warships, total tonnage etc.,732 it is pretty clear 
that Britain was quantitatively speaking outnumbered in naval forces. However, the century of rising 
and extending British maritime power had made The Royal Navy into a professional and coherent 
fighting machine unmatched by any of its adversaries. In this respect, the comparative advantage of 
the British captains and sailors around 1800733 bears similarities to the advantages in skills that 
favoured the Dutch Navy from around 1650 till 1680.734 In addition to contributing to victory in the 
European war, a lasting consequence (naturally not independent of the outcome of the war in 
Europe) of this superiority was that Britain in 1815 emerged as the totally dominant colonial power 
in Europe. In retrospect, however, we have due reason to pose the question as to how the British 
were able to gain these results. When we consider the official, contemporary lists showing that 
11000 British merchant vessels were captured in the period 1793-1815, 735it is clear that the British 
achievement certainly was a result of more than tactical skills, leadership and “bravery”.  
Indeed, the tremendous British losses could easily have brought the Isles to its knees.736 In addition 
to the hardships suffered among ordinary people, marine insurance rates rose dramatically due to 
losses, and communication between the motherland and its overseas colonies were threatened. 
Transaction costs within the empire rose. The answer to this dramatic development had to be found 
in increased protection and a lowering of information costs. The Admiralty held the key to both 
questions because Naval Power could provide protection, and protection in turn would lead to a 
lowering of information costs as well, since secure sea lines of communication provided both assets. 
The efforts to reach these results were formidable. Patrols were deployed to focal areas in European 
waters. Frigates were dispatched to watch enemy ports, thus disturbing enemy shipping and 
providing the Admiralty with crucial intelligence. In order to quell privateering, armed ships 
                                                 
732 See for example, Glete, 1993, Modelski and Thompson, 1988, Knutsen, 1999 
733 At this point, one should naturally be aware of myths that hail these captains and their men out of proportion. 
However, I believe it is fair to judge British TACTICS as superior during the Napoleonic wars, and such tactical 
superiority is never enjoyed without a technical and organisational skill fostered by experience and minimum 
requirements of leadership among the key officers. However, it is perhaps more accurate to stress the differences in 
skills between British commanders on one hand and their Spanish and French on the other. To generalise, the latter 
may seem to have been rather inefficient and at times almost totally insulated from their crews. The praise of British 
naval leadership nevertheless can be wildly exaggerated. 
734 We will return to the notion of generations of warfare in chapter 8. The theorists behind so-called 4th generation 
warfare argue that the Dutch and british way of naval warfare prior to 1815 was very advanced in philosophy, 
planning, trust between commanders, autonomy and leadership, and that those modes of tactical and strategic 
warfare were later lost. 
735 Kennedy, 1976: 154, Moore, 1979: 31-32 
736 But Britain had the power to form the international institutions of the 19th century to a large degree. As a 
hegemon, Britain did not lose the game either through defeat in war manifested by harsh peace conditions or 
domestically by social revolutions. Both the flexibility of the political system of Britain, as well at the unique 
robustness of the financial institutions of its society must be considered when this is to be explained. Thus, the 
financial system gave insurance for the ship-owner (thus, business as usual, but with a re-directing of routes and 
markets if necessary), capital for industry (keeping the wheels in motion, producing supplies for own use and export, 
and maintaining employment) loans for the state to support the Navy (which in turn protected shipping) 
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disguised as merchantmen (“Q-ships”) patrolled along the English coasts, thus launching surprise 
attacks. Expeditionary forces were sent out to destroy the enemy naval bases and ports that were 
used to interfere with colonial trade. But the grandest and most successful design ofem all was the 
institutionalisation of a worldwide convoy system. Worked out by the Admiralty and Lloyd’s; “by 
reference to the Convoy Acts of 1793, 1798 and 1803, imposed upon the mass of reluctant ship 
owners. In doing so, the navy and the insurers gave protection to the important overseas trade routes 
and undoubtedly reduced the rate of shipping losses”.737 Thus protection- as well as information 
costs, were kept as low as possible through a unique co-operation between state authorities, large 
insurance companies and ship owners. The sheer size and the organisational requirements of this 
enterprise seem impressing even at the time of writing.738 Indeed, when one adds that even the 
United States, the third international liberalist in our typology, united with France in declaring war 
on Paternalist Britain, the achievement of the latter is underlined.  While this conflict again reflected 
the enormous difficulty any attempt at invading America would have, the peace terms in effect only 
postponed the questions over maritime rights. This was to become no insignificant source of future 
conflicts between the two otherwise similar Anglo-Saxon countries. This testifies to the effect that 
maritime principles in the ideal types of mare clausum and –liberum really do constitute a major 
cleavage in world politics as it does within many polities. I believe few, if any, can denounce the 
conclusion that the Napoleonic wars ended in a world order where British views of how the 
international maritime world order should look like, prevailed. In short, Britain had used its power to 
form the international instititution into one predominantly resting on a mare clausum prerogative of 
Britain, and otherwise mare liberum to the degree that it did not threaten the empire. The sixty years 
following Napoleons`s final defeat was dubbed Pax Britannica. In retrospect, it is clear that the 
power of Britain also made their inhabitants overestimate the degree to which this international 
hierarchy was “natural” and “inevitable”. Yet, one can hardly be surprised that the Britons also came 
to see it that way; the largest colonial empire in world history was ruled “at a cost to the nation of 
one pound or less per annum per head of population in defence expenditure – equivalent to 
somewhere between 2 and 3 per cent of the national income”.739 Following the utter defeat of her 
enemies in 1815, Britain had a much more solid base of military power than any other potential 
challenger. This military power, which was repeatedly translated into political power, was also 
based on a strong financial sector, a maritime empire of trade and the fruits of the industrial 
                                                 
737 Ibid: 155 
738 As many as 500 merchantmen could assemble at Portsmouth , be escorted out of the danger zone by ships of the 
line and frigates. Escorting merchantmen going through the Belt from Danish attacks in 1808, ships of the line were 
placed in intervals along the sea-lane. 
739 Kennedy, 1976: 176 
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revolution (that the surplus from this activity was indeed unevenly distributed within Britain is 
another matter).  The industrial revolution was said to have changed the Britons from a nation of 
shopkeepers into a community that was the workshop of the world. Thus, the hegemony of Britain 
was only to be challenged by the USA and Germany from the late 1880s.740 But by then, British 
mare clausum traits in foreign policy had left an imprint on international institutions. 
 
But what was the content of the international maritime institution she created during the 19th 
century? I believe, and at this point I differ somewhat from the most traditional pro-British 
historians, that this international institution was marked ideologically by Britain as a paternalist 
power. This did not mean that she preferred to settle disputes by violence, although she certainly did 
at times (“Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim Gun, and they have not”, a later slogan 
reflecting this sentiment). On the contrary, soft power, economic power and the political power 
backed up by the ever-present naval power were used in cost-effective ways to keep business 
running and hold the empire together. Neither does it mean that Britain created a maritime world 
order in which no other territories could thrive. Indeed, "semi-peripheries" and peripheries were not 
“exploited” by the core state in a crude sense. Neither does the paternalism inherent in Pax 
Britannica mean that Britons behaved in a more cruel fashion than other paternalist powers and 
imperialists. Britain was the driving force behind the abolishing of slavery, for example, establishing 
Freetown in today’s Sierra Leone for freed slaves and using large resources in order to stop shipping 
of slaves from West Africa after 1815. 
What paternalism does mean in the case of Great Britain, is a shared sense of superiority in the 
hierarchy of states and nations. Thus, it was “natural” and “good” for humankind if the “reasonable” 
and generally able British civilisation could be exported elsewhere. In the 19th century, it was Britain 
that was “bound to lead”, and this to the better for the “common good of all”. Thus Cecil Rhodes 
could claim that “the British are the finest race in the world, and the more of the world they inhabit, 
the better it will be for mankind”.741  As Peter Marshall has observed, Empire strengthened a view of 
the world as a hierarchy, “in which the British occupied a pre-eminent place among the colonial 
                                                 
740 Scholars disagree on when the decline of the British Hegemony set in. I believe Immanuel Wallerstein is right in 
stressing that decline is a very gradual process. Thus, if we give prominence to economic variables, he is right in 
stating that the late 1870s witnessed the start of this British decline. At this point, German and North American 
shares of world trade rise sharply. Politically and militarily, however, Britain remained a first-rate power until 1940. 
ideologically speaking, the ghost of empire survived until the 1980s, witness the Falklands war. 
741 Quoted in Cannadine 2001: 5. Cannadine argues that social class actually was more important than the racial 
hierarchy within the British Empire. Thus, in his mind, indirect rule was fostered also by a particular political 
ideology that had its roots in the English and later British society even before the Enlightenment. This ideology 
maintained a very deep-felt sense of distance between social classes. Thus, local elites in the colonies were in some 
ways seen as the colonial equivalents to the British upper classes.  
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powers, while those subjected to colonial rule were ranged below them, in varying degrees of 
supposed inferiority”.742  The international institutions dominant for all states was not primarily an 
anarchical balance of power, it was a hierarchy of states and peoples, in which the hegemon, and 
then the other great powers, were the players forming international praxis. This hegemony in turn 
was of economic, political, military and ideological substance and impact.  
But British paternalism was also restrained by the very notion of “civilising” that the British creed 
maintained. Thus, the practises involved in the colonial adventures were, on the whole, less brutal 
than those of the other European colonial powers, although we certainly can find examples of British 
conduct that was both inhumane and counter-productive. On the whole, however, the British Empire 
also meant an export of Aristotelian ideals743 and political and administrative arrangements that we 
must admit bore special British traits. Of these, the political implications are the only ones deserving 
mentioning here.  
Even from the time of the Tudors, those with the highest social prestige dominantly undertook 
English government at local levels. “This meant that it was in the hands of traditional 
authorities…that it was relatively inexpensive, and that it was amateur”.744 This tradition continued 
as Wales, Ireland and Scotland became parts of Britain; local elites were used to control their 
communities. Thus, indirect rule had traditions in Britain, and this tradition was to a large degree 
exported to the colonies, especially to the great dominions of settlement, but also to India and the 
crown colonies of conquest.745  One could perhaps portrait British imperialism as a benign form of 
imperialism, but imperialism and colonialism it was. Although present-day Marxists readily see the 
asymmetries of wealth between North and South too easily as a direct result of imperialism, there is 
no denying that Britain extracted huge resources from their colonies.  To portray this as a policy of 
“free trade”, including a maritime regime of mare liberum, is thus utterly misleading (but 
nevertheless so common a mistake in political science, that it has almost become an axiom of 
thought). Adam Smith was quite right at this point; imperialism was a fundamental breach of the 
principles of free trade. Elements of free trade rhetoric and to some extent free trade principles 
nevertheless became parts of British policy during the 19th century. The idea among advocates of 
free trade in Britain was that Britain would gain more than any other community would if the 
                                                 
742 Marshall, 1995: 385 
743 The ideal of the gentleman was fostered in British Universities and Military Academies. Although this will not be 
elaborated further here, I believe it to have had political consequences. Thus, in the latter part of the 20th centuries, 
numerous anecdotes exist on how British negotiators (all educated in Latin and Greek) appeared rather lax and 
perhaps not overly prepared in international negotiations concerning maritime boundaries in the North Sea. 
744 Cannadine, 2001: 11 
745 We should admit that the question of variances in British colonial rule is complex in time and space, and this 
certainly is reflected in scholarly debate. An overview can be found in the extensive five-volume edition of “The 
Oxford History of the British Empire” 
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principles of free trade were followed. With the large number of markets and sources of extracting 
resources and the largest merchant fleet in the world, Britain would only strengthen its position in a 
more cost-effective manner than mercantilist policies would. The abolition of the Corn Law and the 
repeal of the Navigation Acts could be seen as examples of such free trade principles. Although 
several of the other European powers followed suit, at least partly, as did France, most non-British 
contemporaries nevertheless saw it as a pick-and choose-policy by the British, intended to kick away 
the ladder once the summit of greatness was achieved. Indeed, the relative gains were in favour of 
Britain, although the boom in overall world trade from the 1850s gave all states in Northern Europe 
absolute gains. Inherent in this British status-quo policy, was a belief in indirect rule of the 
peripheral territories of the Empire. The free-traders in particular criticised alternative modes of 
colonial administration as overly costly, as “millstones around the necks of the British taxpayers”, to 
use the words of Disraeli. Thus, a more “humanistic” spirit also seemed to fit the subtle changes in 
British policies towards their extra-territorial claims to sovereign rights; all would gain on free trade, 
and in the process, Britain would not break liberal principles. But if we are to study the actual policy 
carried out by Britain regarding their Empire – the significance of this rhetoric (that also has inspired 
much scholarship) - should be seriously questioned. It is a matter of undisputable fact that although 
formal, or colonial empire was not the favourite words for describing the British Empire, “there are 
remarkably few examples in the nineteenth century of the British government withdrawing from 
colonial territories”.746 Naturally, when it came to “white” colonies or “dominions”, to use the stick 
on a regular basis was senseless and unnecessary. But in the south, gunboat diplomacy was indeed 
frequently applied. Although the present thesis does not support Marxist theories of imperialism, the 
story of the 19th century British Empire demonstrates that to talk of international relations as always 
having contained elements of multilateralism,747 is seeing world politics as too benign. Likewise, to 
call the period up till 1914 a period where international institutions were characterised by free trade 
and mare liberum748 is inaccurate. For local rulers and ruled alike in West Africa, Latin America and 
in the Orient, the Royal Navy cruiser or gunboat was a highly concrete reminder with regards to the 
alleged content of “free” trade. Furthermore, Britain kept its chain of strategic bases on which its 
Sea Power also rested upon. These were truly extraterritorial units under direct British political 
control. They were the best strategic ports along the sea-lanes of the world, the “keys” that locked 
up the globe, to use Admiral Fisher’s words749. Thus, the Royal Navy was the international 
institution asserting freedom of the seas for British vessels, and for the vessels of other nations 
                                                 
746 Kennedy, 1976: 180-181 
747 Ruggie, 1993, has made this claim 
748 Nye, 1983 
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whenever it suited British interests. Considered that the political leaderships in all coastal states 
were aware of this fact, the evolutionary stable strategy was to bow to the British mastery of the 
Seas. But in order to make this commitment credible, Britain took in possession territory far away 
from the motherland. Apart, perhaps, from the Pacific, Britain thus ended up with bases in every 
ocean of the world. It is enough to mention just some examples of such bases acquired by deliberate 
political strategy in the “anti-imperial age”. Heligoland, Malta and the Ionian islands strengthened 
its grip on both the Mediterranean and the North Sea. Singapore, at the main entrance to the China 
Sea from the west was acquired in 1819, in 1833 the Falkland Islands (overlooking the route around 
Cape Horn), Aden in 1839 (entrance into the Red sea), in 1841 Hong Kong, and later bases as 
Lagos, Cyprus, Fiji, Mombasa, Alexandria and Zanzibar. To coastal states in the western world, this 
does not deny the argument that aspects of the Pax Britannica naval policy was for the benefit of 
“all”. In particular, the abandonment of protectionist tariffs and the suppression of piracy were 
positive developments for most European states. Indeed, the label world order might be an accurate 
label in describing the norms that governed international interaction in the post 1815-era. The 
existence of the Royal Navy gave the British principles of extraterritorial sovereignty a credible 
apparatus of applying sanctions to those units that broke the rules of the international game. Even 
the ideologically different US saw the profit in this world order, since the credibility of the Royal 
Navy made the Monroe doctrine a political reality. The latter is a major reason why the US chose to 
bandwagon behind Britain for decades following 1815. Although bowing to Britain was not without 
costs for the other European powers, it was cheaper than providing the protection themselves. 
Britain thus kept transaction costs at an acceptable level to its European neighbours. Moreover, 
internal processes of state- and nation-building were vital in order for several of these states to 
survive at all. The period from 1815 till 1856 witnessed many challenges to European states, the 
year of 1848 standing out as a particular manifestation of this.  
There were elements of the freedom of the seas in British foreign policy after 1815, and increasingly 
so. Although we have argued that Britain remained a dominantly mare clausum-agent, let us look at 
the arguments of the supporters of the view that mare liberum was the dominant British doctrine in 
the 19th century. Firstly, Britain did abandon the claim to the channel salute in 1805. I believe this is 
not much to write home about. It largely was a symbolic gesture that was most important in British 
propaganda, but one that was duly noted by British historians. Another factor often used in favour of 
the view that Britain became a mare liberum-state is secondly, that Britain took upon itself the huge 
responsibility of charting the oceans after 1815. Again, the political scientist and sociologist must 
                                                                                                                                                             
749 Kennedy, 1976: 181 
  
States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology 
 
 
            
 
 
 
193
free himself of the ideologically coloured presentations by some Anglo-Saxon historians. Naturally, 
the British government proclaimed this as a benefit for all humankind. And to some extent, it did 
help for foreign companies or captains to which these charts were made available. It is true that this 
was a breach with the earlier policy of keeping cartographic information a national secret, but to 
interpret this as a result of a mare liberum doctrine is too strong a claim. Thirdly, suppressing piracy 
outside of Northern waters has also been taken in favour of the view that Britain had become a mare 
liberum agent. The theory of benign hegemony contains elements of truth here, in the sense that 
Britain actually did apply vast resources to curb piracy. But the intention of this activity was not to 
provide a common good to mankind, although rhetoric at times would include such claims. There 
can be no doubting who benefited most from this activity. Being the chief beneficiary of non-
interference in overseas transports, Britain also was the actor most interested in lowering this aspect 
of transaction costs.  This is not a priori a reason to dismiss the suppressing of piracy as a mare 
liberum policy, however. Unlike the two factors listed above, getting rid of piracy did not 
necessarily imply a relative gain for Britain, since she was the one sea power with the best 
protection apparatus amongst all Western states. Thus, weaker sea powers should share a 
disproportionate part of the common good produced by suppressing piracy. On the other hand, 
smaller sea powers in Northern Europe did not have much of a ocean transport outside of Europe 
when compared to Britain. However, I believe this is the best example of an international institution 
where the hegemon, a la Hegemonic stability Theory, provided a common good (more akin to the 
freedom of the seas-ideology than the opposite) to be enjoyed by all states. The campaign began 
soon after the Peace Treaty, with the bombardment “of that lair of the Barbary corsairs, Algiers”750 
in 1816. Gradually, European waters were cleansed of piracy,751 but non-state extraterritorial 
plunder remained a problem in the Indies and in the China Sea,752 and has indeed remained a 
problem till this very day (as we will see in chapter 6). Although not a direct result of maritime 
policy, but rather a general turn in political values in Britain that was to affect the Navy, is the 
British suppression of the African slave trade. It is very hard, if not entirely futile, to find self-
interest or hypocrisy in this British policy, that came of being with the forbidding of slave trade in 
1807 and the ban on slavery as such in most British dominions in 1833. The evidence for this, 
generally accepted, conclusion rests in the formidable costs this enterprise had for the British state in 
general, and especially for the Royal Navy. Although the Congress of Vienna had decided to make 
                                                 
750 Kennedy, 1976: 194 
751 See Rodger, 2004. Ibid: 21, the author stresses that the “Barbary corsairs” of North Africa did not practise piracy, 
but the corso, a traditional way of warfare to these peoples.  
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the trade illegal, there was no agreed-upon way of implementing the decision by the great powers. 
Partly due to the evangelical movement, the burden of implementing it fell upon the Royal Navy for 
a period of fifty years. Thus, aspirations for an "ethical foreign policy" can also be found among 
major powers of the 19th century. The burdens were heavy and long lasting; in the feared Bight of 
Benin, for example, disease led to the death of over one quarter of the West African squadron in 
1829.753 It is remarkable that the British efforts continued, in spite of resistance from Spain, 
Portugal, Brazil and France, and in spite of growing reluctance in the Admiralty. Without the efforts 
of the Royal Navy, later international agreements would not have had any means of sanctioning the 
agreed-upon bans. It might even be suggested, though, that this anti-slavery policy increased the 
ideological power of Britain in the eyes of contemporaries.  
However, the suppressing of piracy and the anti-slavery naval campaign, stand out as exceptions to 
the rule that Britain was a 19th century paternalist mare clausum power. Thus, the case of Britain in 
that century also reminds us of the fact that our idealtypes are theoretical constructs to guide our 
interpretation of historical evidence. There were traces of mare liberum in British foreign policy in 
the 19th century, but even the anti-slavery campaign added new bases to the British Empire, and 
raised the soft power of the hegemon among African coastal communities. Humanitarian 
interventions demand military power to a degree largely found among hegemons. There indeed was 
a Pax Britannica. A defining feature of the hegemon is its ability to give extraterritorial protection 
for its citizens and their property. Thus, Palmerston could compare he British empire with the 
Roman; “As the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis 
Romanus sum, so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the 
watchful eye and strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong”.754 
 
Without the strongest navy in the world, such confidence will be built on false hopes. In the last 
years of the period analysed in this chapter, though, we see signs that testify that a hegemon always 
will be challenged, and will view it that way itself. From 1852 on, the growth in the French navy 
produced an invasion scare in Britain. The French decision to build warships with steam power 
seemed to make the British naval hegemony threatened by technological superiority, thus making 
the British government pour money into defence industry and fortifications. Furthermore, the French 
                                                                                                                                                             
752 Indeed, the polymorphous mixture of private and “state” maritime violence lasted longer outside of Europe and 
North America. Thus, some of the really violent sea battles fought by fleets from the Royal Navy were fought 
against fleets of pirates, for example in the China sea in 1849. 
753 Kennedy, 1976: 195 
754 Kennedy, 1976: 198 
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navy commissioned its first ironclad warship in 1858, producing the perception that France had 
taken the decisive lead in naval construction. The scare in Britain to these developments was rather 
unjustified, when viewed in retrospect. However, it stands as a reminder of how prophets of 
hegemonic decline can easily be supported by technological and organisational developments in 
other military organisations.  
The Crimean war, not to say its conclusion in the Peace treaty of 1856, should perhaps be seen as 
more important in the development of the British Empire and international institutions regulating 
maritime affairs.  In the Declaration of Paris in 1856, Britain more or less voluntarily gave away one 
of the keys to her undisputed naval hegemony: the right to prevent the carriage of contraband goods 
in neutral bottoms in times of war. Thus, the weapon of blockade in war was at least in theory 
abolished. How come Britain gave the game away? I believe that this is an important event in world 
history, and a clear sign that ideological factors matter in international relations as well as in the 
organisation of the use of the monopoly of violence. The British government seems to have claimed 
that the international opinion was in its disfavour. Not that this opinion, a phenomenon in flux to be 
sure, had the “force” to do something about it, but a normative consensus in disfavour of earlier 
British principles mattered. What mattered most in this international opinion was perhaps the 
growing concern over the rise of a new naval giant with a somewhat different ideological 
composition; the USA.  
In this section of the chapter, we have tried to demonstrate that British sea power was decisive in 
creating a state practise that achieved the force and more or less informal status as positive 
international law. We have also shown that this policy, seen from a global perspective, is more 
similar to the ideology of mare clausum than mare liberum, although British Policy during the 19th 
century to an increasing degree abandoned earlier mercantilist practises. Thus, the British polity 
optimised its efficiency through lowering transaction costs. This had the benefit, especially by 
suppressing piracy after 1815, for all states in North Europe and North America, that protection 
costs were lowered.  
However, we have not been able to give a thorough explanation of the domestic qualities and 
political trajectory and its interplay with international factors that gave the British polity this ability. 
In fact, I believe this question has only been partly answered in spite of a huge body of scholarship 
on the subject matter. The question naturally should be approached with a portion of humility, and I 
will claim that no mono-causal explanation holds. Rather, like neo-weberian historical sociologists, I 
would prefer to underline the complexity of the question (of a singular causal explanation). We have 
already mentioned several factors. England was geographically located in a convenient way (a 
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tautological fact, but a fact anyway). Once in possession of credible sea power, England controlled 
the Channel and the Irish Sea, the first being a strategic funnel in the east-west sea-line of 
communication both within Europe as well as between Europe and the Atlantic. The salt water 
dividing Britain and Europe also had the advantage that attempts at invasion could be stopped before 
foreign armies were landed on English soil, provided that the Royal Navy was effective as deterrent, 
another fact noted in scholarship on Britain. However, these geographical explanations are 
inadequate in themselves. Relying too heavily on these independent variables has brought scholars 
into teleological explanations of English state formation. One particularly flawed explanation is that 
the sea freed England from the burden of maintaining a standing military force, or to put it bluntly; 
Britain did not need a large standing army in order to protect its borders. Allegedly, this made 
British political development essentially different from the continental powers of Europe, since 
resources did not have to be extracted from society to the same degree, whereby England by and 
large avoided absolutism.755 Thus, the trajectory of England supposedly was set in the direction of 
liberal democracy at an early point. But this ignores the whole dimension of sea power, and this is 
what makes the explanation above incomplete and insufficient. The first we need to note is that 
building the Royal Navy was more demanding than raising large armies. This is particularly well 
proven by Brewer756 and Glete757. It is true, of course that the burdens of building navies as well as 
raising armies that faced the Dutch republic and France were enormously demanding. However, it is 
entirely wrong to see the military demands upon England as less incredible! Thus, geo-strategic 
explanations in themselves are not sufficient to explain the successful English state formation 
process and Empire-building.758 To geographical factors should be added some of the assets of sea 
power that we dealt with at some length earlier in this chapter. Sea power was cost-effective in two 
ways. Firstly, when successfully integrating extraterritorial areas that largely could be maintained by 
Naval force into the empire, new areas of resource-extraction and even markets were provided. 
Secondly, shipbuilding industry involved an economic synergy that benefited the domestic 
economy. This is a necessary part of the explanation, but it is clearly not entirely sufficient, since it 
cannot answer why exactly Britain succeeded better at this from the 18th century than other 
European powers. Indeed, the balance of power often was in disfavour of Britain, a fact that should 
                                                 
755 According to Perry Anderson (1974b:18) “absolutism was…this; a redeployed and changed apparatus of feudal 
domination…in other words, the Absolutist state was never an arbiter between the Aristocracy and the bourgeois”.  
Nevertheless, I believe Anderson goes far in admitting that England was an anomaly in his overall theoretical 
scheme. Thus, in the case of England, “the strongest medieval monarchy in the West eventually produced the 
weakest and shortest absolutism…a particularly constructed variant of absolutist rule” (ibid: 113). If England was an 
absolutist state, its absolutism certainly was weak and short-lived. 
756 Brewer, 1988 
757 Glete, 1993 
758 Rodger, 1997 and Brewer, 1988: 10 share my view at this point.  
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warn us of linear explanations of the Rise of British power and liberal democracy. Thus, we are 
forced into considering the central assumption in what Hobson759 dubs the second-wave theories of 
the modern state; how the embeddedness of the state in society itself can amount for state power, 
rather than viewing the power of the state over society. However, it is not easy to extract an 
explanation of the particular British trajectory directly from the meta-theory of Michael Mann nor 
the general guidelines found in historical institutionalism. But at the other hand, they provide us 
with the general approach that we can apply. Specifically, we argued in chapter 2 that ideational and 
material factors combined should be considered in addressing empirical complexity. In essence, 
domestic factors explain the ideational variable. I believe it useful to look particularly into the 
British case, since it influenced international institutions of maritime principles to such a degree.  
What was it with the British and English society that made its state strong? By strong, we do not 
refer to the sense of dominating and controlling society, but rather politically and militarily strong 
enough to shape international practise and norms? One general explanation is found in scholarship 
based on what James Coleman760 named social capital. The Norwegian political scientist Torbjørn 
Knutsen761 has used this as one variable in explaining hegemonic power. In his view, social capital 
fostered liberties and, in general, modernisation. The hegemonic powers thus were the chief 
moderniseres of their contemporary world orders. I believe that in the British case, the existence of 
such social capital in the 19th century might make some sense. The internal social cohesion of these 
polities, Knutsen holds, made them into effective fighting machines, thus enabling them to influence 
the international arena, and the very social cohesion of these polities made them look arrogant and 
paternalist to many contemporary observers. However, as Knutsen762 readily admits, social capital at 
best is only part of the explanation. Moreover, I find the concept ambiguous and in the case of 
Britain, not sufficiently tied to material factors as administration, finance and industry. Was post-
1707 Britain really that much of a cohesive unit? As far as I can see, one could indeed make a case 
that the class cleavage in the British polity to be of such a character that “social capital” sounds odd 
as an explanation. On the other side of the ideational-material spectrum of analysis, Marxist 
explanations certainly do not fare better. I simply cannot see that World-systems theory can explain 
the rise of British power without introducing ad-hoc voluntarist explanations. I believe that strategic 
state policy is part of the answer, but John Brewer is close to the point when he explains that the 
peculiar British version of the fiscal-military state chiefly was the result of “the unintended 
consequence of the political crisis which racked the British state after the Glorious Revolution of 
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760 Coleman, 1990 
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1688”.763 Under the later Stuarts and Hanoverians, the features of modern British politics began, that 
turned Britain into a strong state with low transaction costs compared to any other large unit in the 
world. The strong treasury, a centralised financial system, a standing parliament that largely 
supported the Navy, heavy taxation to found the organisations of violence, and government officials 
with a strong public ethos were all traits of an efficient state. The system of government deficits also 
contributed to a community with particular affinity and opportunities for profit making. The role of 
the City was controversial, but what mattered were the opportunities for wealthy individuals and 
companies to invest, and for self-made men to raise capital for new enterprise. That representatives 
of this state and its citizens at various times were conceived as arrogant and snobbish should not 
surprise us in a comparative perspective. The English had the power to enforce their will, and the 
financial means and techniques to uphold a strong naval force for centuries. Moreover, the synergies 
involved in naval warfare were elements of what I, somewhat awkwardly, will call a loop of positive 
reinforcement of incentives. This is no magic formula, but something I believe Britons in private 
ventures as well as state administration gradually came to recognize from the late 17th century. 
Maritime commerce created the skills, the know-how, the infrastructure and financial basis to create 
a Navy. Building a navy also enhanced the maritime infrastructure and -interests, since Naval yards 
became the largest industry in Britain. In turn, the instrument thus created produced two things: state 
deficits and a mean to lower transaction costs by providing protection for overseas commerce. Both 
created very concrete incentives for the twin process of market and state expansion through the 
acquisition of extraterritorial possessions. In turn, these gains paid the bills of the state, and gave 
British capital new possibilities of investments. This clearly was the thinking that informed the 
arguments of the Naval, or maritime, school in Parliament. But the key, the core in our explanation, 
must be that the nature and extension of the British state rested on a delicate balance between 
capital, Parliament, Monarch, state administrators and interest groups. Thus, it was not only the 
relative absence of invasions by foreign forces that made the fiscal burden of the state easier to bear 
than it would have been with a different geopolitical context, but just as much the interest in the 
coalition to keep the state apparatus efficient and lean; or in one word; small. This strikes me as 
typically British among the larger powers of Europe. Thus, it has been estimated that already in the 
Elizabethan England, there were only 1200 crown officers, or one officer per 4000 inhabitants. The 
corresponding numbers for France were 40000 officiers, or one for every 400 French inhabitant!764 
The similar practise of selling public offices could also be found in Spain, thus fostering large, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
762 See Knutsen, 1999: 142-145 
763 Brewer, 1988: 250 
764 See Brewer, 1988: 15 
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at times most unproductive administrations with vested interests. In Britain, on the other hand, titles 
and honours remained more separate forms of reward. In addition, although the Royal Navy was 
expensive, navies were also less personnel-intensive than were armies, and the skills of naval 
personnel were easier to reroute into productive enterprise in civilian life than the skills of infantry, 
cavalry and field artillery, the bulk of the traditional army. Add to this the cost-effectiveness of sea 
power as opposed to land power, and the lack of institutionalised regionalism in the English polity, 
and the most important explanations to the successful British state building is given. It was this 
success at internal reform that gave Britain its influence at the international stage. The point for the 
development of the maritime world order was not that it was formed by a British hegemony, but that 
the hegemony was British.765 Indeed, the extraterritorial sovereignty exercised by the British in 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia, to name some of the largest dominions, are examples of a 
lasting influence on other units in the international system that is unparalleled in international 
relations. Thus, apart from the large role played by Britain in forming international institutions as 
treaties, norms and state praxis, the Pax Britannica shaped many of the units that were to be parts of 
the international system. Thus, worldviews, political ideology and the British class system were 
exported overseas.766 The British hegemony can be said to have given a double impact on 
international relations; both in directly shaping units in the system, and by giving international 
institutions a content that was British in origin.  
 
The USA-an emerging Naval Power 
Although the US was not to influence international relations to the same degree as Britain had for 
yet another century, a closer look at the development of US maritime interests and the US Navy will 
give us valuable insights into the nature of the USA as a maritime world power and late 20th century 
hegemon. Moreover, the trajectory of US maritime policies is a very crucial test of our typology of 
idealtypes, and the entire theoretical ambition in this thesis. As we shall see, the United States would 
increasingly try to expand its trade in a world of mercantilist states, without jeopardising its 
predominant liberal maritime ideology, and without building a strong navy. Perhaps the genesis of 
the particular US extraterritorial ideology is to be found in this period. Rather than imitating the 
European paternalist, it seems, the US government chose the more costly route of furthering its 
claim to mare liberum without strong state-controlled extraterritorial means of violence.767 In other 
                                                 
765 I have borrowed the phrasing from the comment upon American hegemony by Ruggie, 1993 
766 For examples, see Cannadine, 2001,  Cain & Hopkins, 2002 
767 See Bukovansky, 1997, particularly, ibid:216 
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words, neither Marxist nor rationalist theories seem to have much explanatory power when applied 
to US ideology and maritime foreign policy. 
I believe the very peculiar history of the American federation shaped the formal and informal 
constrains affecting US transaction costs and its diverse ideological principles that at times would 
guide its foreign policy regarding the maritime world order. In other words, the line of argument 
should be consistent with the analytical model developed in chapter 2: state and nation-building 
created domestic institutions and a political culture that also came to shape the ideologies and 
dispositions to act in foreign policy. 
In 1775, the thirteen colonies were still legally attached to Britain. The fear that Britain would use 
force to keep them in this position, made Congress pass the Rhode Island resolution on August 26 
1775, urging each colony to fit out armed vessels for its individual defence.768 It is thus possible to 
date the first seed planted that was to become the US Navy accurately. In retrospect, the very 
humble and modest nature of the first North American steps to create sea power should not blur the 
fact that these efforts were deliberate attempts at gaining sovereignty. Herein lies a key to an 
understanding of the nature of how North Americans have viewed sea power as an ideology; an 
effort to curb imperialism and enhance “freedom”, conceived as the right to exercise national 
independence.  
The first ship of the continental navy, a converted merchantman, was bought in November 1775, but 
the policy of building ships, finding the crews and capturing prizes was rather amateurish when 
compared to the administrative sophistication of contemporary European sea powers. Of course it 
had to be that way; hundreds, if not thousands, of practical problems had to be solved, testifying to 
the huge public effort required to create naval power when lacking a solid maritime infrastructure. 
North America certainly had the capacity to build ships, but to arm these ships was an enormous 
challenge. Since British law had banned the casting of cannon in the colonies, the skill of how to 
cast cannon was one of the worst obstacles that had to be overcome. Trial and error was expensive. 
The navy actually went to war “with only a very rough idea of how to make its main armament”.769 
It is typical of the American spirit that when Congress’s efforts at centralised cannon manufacture 
was a failure; contracts were instead given many foundries. Although an improvement, the lack of 
usable cannons had the result that badly needed frigates could not go to sea. Most artillery pieces 
used on American vessels were thus either captured or brought over from France.  Moreover, the 
strains of war made the Americans use unseasoned timber for many of their ships, giving the vessels 
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a short lifetime. The overall policy was to build many and small (relatively fast) ships, a reflection 
of the asymmetrical resources when one compares the Continental navy and the Royal navy. But the 
administrative challenges were not insignificant. In order to control the fleet during the War of 
Independence, no fewer than four separate bodies were set up. None of the earlier attempts at 
constructing Naval committees or a board of the admiralty were successful. Characteristically 
enough, the solution during the war was to give the sole responsibility to the wealthy entrepreneur 
Robert Morris. Thus, one single man became agent of marine, with “sole responsibility for and 
authority over the fleet’s organization”.770 This proved to be too late, anyway; the continental navy 
literally ceased to exist by 1781. In addition to the important French support, American sea power at 
this point more or less consisted of a guerrilla tactics including privateers. Issuing letters of marque 
was an apt strategy for the Americans, and since foreign vessels could be seized and sold, the policy 
was also popular with the shipowners and their crews. In fact, privateering was so popular that it 
drained personnel from regular naval service (as in the case of the Dutch republic, a structural 
problem arose when the state had to compete with other organisations for crews). If controlling the 
navy was a challenge, controlling the privateers was even harder. Thus, seen as a public policy, 
privateering certainly was a mixed blessing. Although not optimal, privateering nevertheless brought 
home goods and did harass British shipping, thus disturbing the sea-lines of communication. 
American privateering in this way raised protection costs for the British. As we have seen from the 
previous section on Britain, this meant that the Royal Navy had to use considerable resources over 
the Atlantic under difficult logistical circumstances. The most important legacy from the 
privateering activity under the war proved to be the increased skills among American sailors. As the 
merchant marine in the Dutch republic and Britain had created a maritime infrastructure on which to 
build regular navies, so the trial and error naval enterprises of the federation did the same thing for 
North America. Moreover, although a minor adversary to the powerful Royal Navy, even the naval 
battle of Lake Champlain (navies certainly were used for territorial as well as extra-territorial 
violence), can with some justification be called a strategic victory. Although the fleet was defeated, 
it gave the country breathing space to endure the critical year of 1776 until help could arrive from 
allies from the other side of the Atlantic. As a matter of fact, the war of Independence became a 
global war, since an enemy of Britain became an ally of France. Together with the armed neutrality 
(mentioned above), Britain thus was on the defensive and forced to spread her naval resources. The 
international balance of power worked in favour of North America, enhancing the state building of 
the US. However, the monopoly of violence as conceived by Weber was very fragile in the US 
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polity. When the Constitution went into effect in 1789, there was no US Navy or Navy Department 
for that matter. Naval matters, so far as naval matters were even considered, were the responsibilities 
of the War Department.771 A critical juncture was passed when the US Navy, in the proper sense of 
the word, was created in 1793. The opponents to the bill raised objections that to a peculiar degree 
can be found in later debates on the nature and course of American foreign policy. The objections 
were that a permanent state bureaucracy at the federal level would be created, the Navy involving 
America in wars, raising public debts and increasing the burdens of taxes.772 However, the law came 
into existence in March 1794, the authorisation for six frigates passed by two votes. The actual 
compromise reached, however, was the building of three of these frigates in 1795. The corsair state 
of Morocco, declaring war on America, was the direct reason why any of the frigates were built at 
all. Thus, the isolationist tendency in American politics can be traced from day one in the praxis of 
the US Navy. Although the US and Britain settled their disputes through treaty in 1794, the threats 
from pirates and the fact that France broke diplomatic relations with the US in 1796 made George 
Washington proclaim the need for a regular Navy in his last annual address to Congress;“Therefore, 
so that a future war of Europe may not find our commerce in the same unprotected state in which it 
was found by the present, America has to set about the gradual creation of a navy”773 
                        Providing protection for US commerce was the chief motivation. A society like the 
American could not do without the lowest possible transaction costs. In this case, the hegemonic 
Britain supported this policy. Keeping transaction costs at the optimal level nevertheless also meant 
that the Navy should not be too costly; this theme was to reoccur in Congressional debates ever 
since. Still, a state administration controlling, planning and building a navy was created, a defining 
moment in American state formation. The independent Navy department was created in 1798, freed 
from its earlier control by the Army.774 Furthermore, the Marine Corps was formally established the 
same year. The modest bureaucratic improvements of institution building (until 1815, the Navy 
Department consisted of a civilian Secretary and some clerks. It is characteristic that the Anglo-
Saxon countries almost exclusively had civilians as heads of the fighting services) were followed up 
by a far more rigorous building of warships than ever seen before in America, the building of 30 
warships were authorised in the same year. The new strength of US sea power was demonstrated in 
the “quasi-war” with France 1798-1801; American strategy was by now more coherent, captains and 
                                                 
771 Albion, 1945: 294 
772 Howarth, 1991: 57 
773 Howarth, 1991: 59 
774 Albion, 1945: 294 
  
States and Navies 1600-1856; Institutionalisation and Ideology 
 
 
            
 
 
 
203
crews much more skilled than during the War of Independence.775 American protection was by now 
not only effective; it was cost-effective when viewed in the light of transaction costs for the society 
at large. Naval costs during the war with France totalled 6 million dollars. When we compare this to 
the total import tariffs for the same period, we see that it amounted to 22 millions. Simultaneously, it 
is probably no exaggeration to claim that without the navy, little of the exports totalling 200 million 
dollars would have come outside of the country.776 In 1799, for example, marine insurance rates 
were reduced at a scale that amounted to eight and a half million dollars. Economic profit coincided 
with a growing national pride, reflected both in the speeches of President Adams and the cheerful 
gatherings of people welcoming warships home after “glorious victories”. But the spirit supporting a 
strong navy was to compete with the very concrete and ever-present spirit of national debts and 
taxes on companies and citizens alike. Under the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, secretary of state 
Gallatin found that the expenses on the Navy were among the posts most easily reducible. The 
contemporary Republican “Party” at the time was agrarian and anti-naval. However, Jefferson had 
to struggle between party loyalty and his role as President. The choice was acute simply because the 
pasha of Tripoli demanded a substantial increase in American tribute. In effect, the declaration of 
war on the US by Tripoli in May 1801 should be seen as a turning point of even higher importance 
than the bill of 1798. The decision made implied that the young American Navy should fight Tripoli 
and decline from paying tribute to the North African states. In effect, the decision also meant that 
the US intended to maintain a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean in order to secure the 
freedom of the seas and sea-lines of communications.777 A squadron of the US Navy was to cruise 
along the North African coasts as a force deterring “piracy”. This policy was openly, but softly (“to 
superintend the safety of our commerce there, and to exercise the seamen in nautical duties”), 
declared by President Jefferson in a letter to the pasha of Tripoli dated May 21, 1801.778  
Once the dice was tossed, a half-hearted attempt at blockade of Tripoli proved insufficient to 
safeguard merchantmen, thus threatening the credibility of Jefferson. In this situation Congress gave 
the President full discretion to apply the Navy for measures of offensive operations in February 
1802. Precisely one year later, funds were given to build four vessels suited for inshore work and 
shore bombardment. In this way, the US Navy in effect had a blue-water as well as a brown-water 
capacity suited to protect overseas interests. The Americans had come to the same conclusion as had 
the British; money paid in tribute to Algeria would be to throw money out of the window since the 
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other piratical states in the Magreb; Tripoli, Tunis and the emperor of Morocco, would demand 
equal or larger tributes. After all, there was a limit to  British willingness to provide the common 
good of sea-lines of communication unfettered by piracy. The US had to contribute for the sake of 
their economic interests, and one dares perhaps say, their own international reputation. Furthermore, 
the USA risked no quarrels with the West European states if it were to crack down on the corsair 
states; the international norms among modern states were on their side. Thus it was that the US 
Navy showed force at Tangiers and instituted a blockade of Tripoli. However, losing one frigate and 
providing the pasha with 307 more American prisoners gave the campaign a less than ideal start. 
Indeed, although the Barbary wars were fairly popular back home (“From the shores of Tripoli...”), 
and commerce was restored, the peace treaty in practise ended by the US paying for the release of 
American prisoners. Furthermore, apart from a minimum protection cost in maintaining a small 
Navy for the protection of commerce after 1806, no American Naval strategy had emerged. Even as 
a large state with growing incomes from exports, the US could only afford a total of 1169 serving 
naval personnel from 1806.779 This testifies to the absence of mare clausum-incentives in the 
American political culture. The principles favouring low public debts, a minimal state bureaucracy 
and low taxes overruled any attempts at grand strategy that could involve active use of Naval force. 
The US in practise ended up with a gun-boat navy, a reflection of the isolationist tendency in the 
contemporary American polity, where local and agrarian interests dominated. While this small navy 
could, and should, be seen as a manifestation of exercising sovereignty in American waters, it also is 
proof that America in the beginning of the 19th century had no serious preferences for further 
expansion and claims to extraterritorial sovereignty. Republican representatives deemed even this 
minor naval force unnecessary. In this aspect of American beliefs we find the assumption that as 
long as the US stayed out of balance of power politics entirely, then the USA would be left entirely 
to itself, which was deemed as positive. As we claimed in chapter two, the real significance of these 
principles on foreign policy was the lack of imperial ambitions. In retrospect, the isolationist mood 
is striking, and can only be explained by the political ideology that prevailed. The central state 
should be small and inexpensive. Thus, there were few supporters of grander ambitions.  
However, the growing US economy, and the nature of international relations made a policy of pure 
isolationism unfeasible in the long run. During the Napoleonic wars, as the Scandinavian supply of 
grain to Britain was cut off, its trade boycotted by European powers, Britain declared that direct 
trade between the United States and Europe simply was prohibited. All American vessels carrying 
cargo were to clear their goods through England, another example of classic British mare clausum 
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policies. Responding to this, Napoleon issued a statement that said that American vessels were free 
to do so, but that they by implication would lose their rights as neutral ships and thus would be 
regarded as lawful targets. The American answer was an Embargo act of 1807 forbidding the sailing 
of any American vessel carrying goods for foreign ports! Again, the US President sought to keep his 
country out of war. This hurt the US more than anyone else. The evidence that sea power is about 
upholding sea lines of communications, not about controlling territory, was proved on this occasion 
as well, but it was a lesson that Americans had seemed unwilling to learn. The result was that British 
vessels scooped the vacant sea lanes, and France seized all American merchantmen, after all, they 
violated the Embargo act! It all ended in exchange of fire between the US Navy and Royal Navy in 
1811. The cleavage in the Federation regarding naval expansion and whether to enter in a war 
against Britain was peculiar, at first sight. With strong maritime traditions, New York and the New 
England states voted in favour of an expansion of the Navy and against war. The other states voted 
diametrically in favour of the opposite; against naval expansion and for war.780 The coastal states 
voted for expansion partly out of principle, partly out of the fact that if the war developed without a 
US Navy, then their trade as well as homes would suffer. The assumption of the other states also had 
some logic; a war with Britain could be waged without a Navy, since US war efforts should be 
channelled through an invasion of British-held Canada. In the hardships of the winter of 1812, 
pressure was growing in Britain in favour of lifting the sanctions on the US trade. This was done in 
June 1812, but due to lack of communications; the US was ignorant of this fact when it declared war 
on Britain two days later. Thus, the British had a war that it did not want, the US a war for which it 
was not prepared. However, a clash between the mare clausum sea power and the liberalist US does 
not seem entirely coincidental in retrospect. The war of 1812 was a war over maritime principles. In 
spite of the cultural similarities and common heritage of the British Isles and the US, the vital 
importance of maritime principles was important enough for them to drift into armed conflict. The 
effect of the 1812 war on the future of US foreign policy should not be underestimated. The result of 
the war was that the principle of non-entanglement was elevated “into a matter of principle”.781 The 
outcome was a disposition to act that we in chapter two labelled bandwagoning liberalism. That this 
label was not contradictory with US isolationism lies in the origins of the kind of liberalism to which 
the US polity subscribed. More than perhaps any other nation in the world, North Americans shared 
the belief Adam Smith had elaborated in the Wealth of Nations; that international trade more than 
international political relations created peace. Indeed, the two, state-politics and economy- were 
seen as separate realms of human activity. In this respect, mercantilist and paternalist policies of the 
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European major powers were different to those of the US.782 It meant that the US was anti-
imperialist, but at the same time anti-interventionist. America “goes not in search of monsters to 
destroy”, as John Quincy Adams quipped when he turned down a request for help from Greek 
insurgents fighting for independence from Turkey in the 1820s. However, prior to the 1890s, the US 
did relatively little to actually shape the international institutions to its liking. It was not a hegemon, 
and after 1815, the US did not challenge Britain to any particular degree. Rather, it chose to 
bandwagon behind Britain as a bandwagoning liberalist under a paternalist, but increasingly liberal, 
paternalist hegemon. However, the 1812 war does much to demonstrate the difference in ideological 
terms between the US and Britain. 
Against all odds, 1812 was a relatively successful year for the US navy through a single-ship 
strategy that gave some victories and prizes of high symbolic value. The esteem of the US Navy rose 
in public and in congress, and control of the big Lakes became paramount in order to subdue the 
British forces in Canada, a venture that were to turn out successfully for the US. But the balance of 
power in Europe affected the course of events; with Napoleon`s abdication in 1814, experienced 
British soldiers were available for action in Canada and on the East coast of the US. Thus, 1814 was 
to increase the American awareness of the importance of military power in general and naval force 
in particular. The British burning of Washington that year was a short-term tactical success, but 
would eventually become a central facet of the American identity, as were the US national anthem, 
written during the bombardment of Baltimore. These are apt illustrations that naval conflicts were 
part of the American nation-building process. The peace signed on Christmas Eve 1814 in fact was 
                                                 
782 The spirit of American exceptionalism and isolationism was perfectly illustrated by the 1796 Farewell 
address of George Washington (italics added):”Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure 
you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history 
and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But 
that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be 
avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of 
another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second 
the arts of influence on the other…The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in 
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we 
have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has 
a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in 
frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it 
must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or 
the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation 
invites and enables us to pursue a different course...when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, 
guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to 
stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our 
peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true 
policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world…I repeat, therefore, let 
those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be 
unwise to extend them”. Quoted in http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/49.htm 
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the foundations of two realisations - on the part of the US that Canada would not be integrated as 
American territory - and for the British that the US was a sovereign polity. The US Navy came out 
of the war with increased prestige, which secured its institutions as permanent features of the federal 
state. The three decades of peace that followed for the US included reforms of the naval 
administration. With a Naval academy, a professional corps of regular officers, and with a Board of 
Navy Commissioners, also experienced Captains got a say in naval affairs.783 To call the slow-paced 
shipbuilding programme of the US Navy innovative would nevertheless be to exaggerate. Even 
consideration of steam engines was rejected. Thus, many of the new ships of the US Navy were 
actually outdated when they were commissioned for use. The somewhat insular position of the US 
when compared to the European powers in part explains this; the US admirals and policymakers did 
not fear the French innovations of steam warships that in turn accelerated British constructions. 
Rather, the nostalgia of 1812 was allowed to govern US naval policies. 
At the principal level, however, the US navy became busy; the overseas trade of the bandwagoning 
liberalist boomed after 1815. This meant that the Navy to an increasing degree were used to provide 
protection from piracy for private merchantmen, not only along the coasts of the US. From 1817, 
ships from the US Navy patrolled the east coast of South America, ships headed for the seas of 
China, the first vessel reaching the Philippines in 1820. The concept applied to the Mediterranean 
squadron784 was applied to form more solid and robust lines of command within the navy. Thus, the 
ships off Chile and Peru in 1821 were organised into the Pacific Squadron. The following year, the 
West Indies squadron was established. This is not to deny that peacetime meant a downsizing of the 
Navy. The number of personnel was reduced by almost 20% from 1816 till 1822.785 The US actually 
spent more on its army than its Navy, the 1823 Monroe doctrine was more guarded by the Royal 
Navy than the by the bandwagoning US. From 1798 till 1947 when the Navy Department existed as 
a separate body, there were only 27 years when there was allocated more money to the Navy than to 
the Army. Moreover, while many US presidents have been generals, and some, like J.F. Kennedy, 
Jimmy Carter and George Bush have served in the Navy, no American President have been career 
Naval officers. In retrospect, the officer corps of the US Navy seemed somewhat insulated from 
technological as well as political developments during the 19th century. When Congress in 1839 at 
last passed a bill authorising the building of two steam frigates, there were over 700 commercial 
steamships in America.786 The potential for American innovation was there, to be sure. The civilian 
                                                 
783 Albion, 1945: 294 
784 Howarth, 1991: 130 stress that by squadron, contemporaries did not mean the fixed, regular forces as we see 
today. Rather, the squadron commander in the US Navy of the 19ty century was some sort of an area commander. 
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sector was technologically well developed, and occasionally this benefited the Navy, as in 1841, 
when the US was the first in the world to permit the construction of a warship with an underwater 
propeller instead of paddle wheels. However, the problem lay, in addition to the somewhat 
conservative officer corps, in the shifting support the Navy had in various administrations. Between 
1841 and 1853, for example, there were seven different presidents and ten different secretaries of the 
Navy. With the Congress controlled by the Democrats, to large degree a party of the farming 
community at this time, the Navy was not given high priority. That the Navy board was a consensus 
institution without personal responsibility for any of the commissioners did not improve the state of 
affairs. The US simply did not have effective state machinery for running the Navy. A reflection 
perhaps of the distrust in federal bureaus inherent in the US, the US simply lagged far behind the 
European sea powers. This should also serve as a reminder that a vibrant civil society and a private 
overseas commercial sector are not sufficient factors to make a sea power. In the terms of second-
wave weberian historical sociology, the state apparatus, and in particular the navy, was not 
sufficiently embedded in civil society for it to become a truly national instrument of considerable 
power. Perhaps this is not so strange when we consider the relationship between land and population 
in North America. When the war in California came to an end in 1848, the USA had gained its 
present-day extent (apart from the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867). This meant that 
“between one shining sea and the other there were an awful lot of land and not many people”.787 The 
potential for expansion was to be found on US territory itself. Given the ample opportunities this 
vast continent provided for a relatively small population, it was no wonder that the Americans 
turned their back to the sea. When one adds the facts that the US after 1815 faced no serious external 
threats from other sea powers, and the multi-ethnic composition of the US populace, the particular 
version of American exceptionalism is comprehendible. Up till the 1890s, however, the US was not 
internationalist on the political level, and bandwagoned behind Britain as far as its ideological 
foundation allowed and to the extent that power politics demanded. 
  
Sweden 
Early Swedish state building certainly was influenced by the Hanseatic League, but we should also 
stress the struggles of the 17th and 18th centuries with Denmark and Russia as an enduring feature of 
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the geopolitical context. Thus, already early in the 16th century, Sweden at times allied with the 
league in order to balance the Danish monarchy.788 
The formation of the Swedish state as an organised monopoly of violence under the Vasas started 
with the rebellion against the Danish occupation force in 1521. Gustav Vasa hired mercenaries in 
order to gain better control of Sweden. With the support of the League, Sweden began to assert 
control of the Baltic Sea.789 Vasa soon turned against the League, however, and by 1536, the city of 
Lübeck had lost its role as a serious competitor in terms of military power compared to the 
increasingly centralised states of Sweden and Denmark-Norway. From 1540, Sweden built a galley 
fleet, a fleet that was used in attempts at invasion in Russia in 1555. The main competitor in the 
Eastern Baltic nevertheless was Denmark-Norway, and from 1563 till 1566, the two sovereigns 
fought seven major battles.790 These wars had major significance on statebuilding through the 
organisational and logistical innovations they fostered. This more lasting sort of naval operations 
required planning and preparation of stores through the winters. Losses had to be continually 
replaced during battle, and ships damaged had to be repaired on short notice. The use of guns as the 
decisive element of naval warfare required more copper, more guns and more gunpowder. In order 
to break blockades, Sweden built special-purpose warships rather than relying on armed 
merchantmen. By the 1580s, the Baltic was pacified. The Dutch, as we have seen, used this 
opportunity to develop shipping and trade in the Baltic.  
Nowhere in Europe was the influence of Dutch technology and know-how more felt than in Sweden. 
The lack of capital and native commercial organisation here gave the Dutch premium opportunities. 
The ambitions of the Swedish monarchy as well as the availability of extensive mineral resources as 
copper and iron brought many Dutchmen to Sweden as well, facilitating increased efficiency in 
industry as well as in business. The Calvinist Louis de Geer, for example, settled in Stockholm and 
built up the largest business empire in the country, “comprising iron mines and works, brass 
foundries, shipbuilding, rope-making...(and) also became the largest producer of cannon and 
cannon-balls not only in Scandinavia but possibly the whole of Europe”.791 All this was possible 
because the Baltic had been relatively secured from piracy, a rare quality in European waters at the 
end of the 16th century. Furthermore, the influence of the Dutch was not a hindrance for Swedish 
imperialist expeditions directed against other targets. Thus, under Gustav II Adolf, Sweden started to 
apply their efficient armed forces for ambitious offensives in the Eastern Baltic. Moreover, since a 
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Habsburg fleet in the Baltic threatened Dutch trade there, Swedish naval power was sold as 
protection to the Dutch. The Habsburg power, reaching the Baltic coast where the emperor aspired 
to create a navy, was in fact supported by Spain, hoping to break Dutch Trade in the Baltic Sea. 
Thus, the religious wars of Europe certainly affected Northern Europe. This was a major reason why 
the German Baltic coast was taken by Sweden, and this is part of the background for why Sweden 
got heavily involved in the thirty years war. The North European security complex involved shifting 
alliances, so that whenever the Swedes seemed to gain control in the eastern Baltic, the major 
powers intervened, as did the Dutch republic on behalf of Denmark-Norway in 1652-54. Sweden 
and Denmark-Norway in fact shifted in the roles of selling protection to Dutch shipping. The peace 
of Westphalia settled the balance of power in the region in favour of Sweden. However, this only 
meant that the Dutch republic again sought to check Swedish influence by supporting Denmark. 
From the 1650s, therefore, the Baltic Sea security complex was penetrated by the balance of power 
in Europe at large. However, these developments at the international arena should not blind us to the 
fact that Sweden to a high degree continued to shape security in the Baltic for decades to come. In 
order to do this, Sweden relied on a Navy that both could secure lines of communications, transport 
soldiers, artillery and munitions, land soldiers, and least, but certainly not last, to provide supply to 
extraterritorial bridgeheads and depots. In other words, a limited imperialist ideology was reflected 
in naval praxis. To manage such a task demanded vast resources. There were limits to what the, after 
all, small state and population of Swedish society could provide of these resources. Part of the 
answer was to let the armies feed themselves through confiscation, buying and plundering the 
regions in which they were deployed. However, the use of mercenaries and specialists in state 
bureaucracy also demanded money. This was partly raised by taxes the Swedes could extract from 
the ports they controlled on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea. Thus, controlling parts of the 
seaboard in the Baltic paid off. But the ambitious policies of Gustav Adolph and Karl X Gustav 
were also followed by periods of a modest foreign policy, which immediately were reflected in the 
(lack of) priorities for the Navy.792  As soon as the Navy was weakened, the Swedish Baltic Empire 
was immediately threatened as well. The crisis was acute since the military prestige of Sweden was 
shaken by the defeat in Brandenburg in 1675. The relationship between the Swedish Navy and army 
was utterly important because of two simple reasons. Unlike Empires that included weak political 
structures overseas, the Swedish Empire faced highly competent and efficient armies on continental 
Europe. Secondly, the fact that the Swedish possessions nevertheless were overseas meant that the 
empire would be lost if sea-lines of communications between the motherland (and particularly the 
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possessions in Germany) were broken. Above all, this was true of Pommerania, Wismar, Bremen 
and Verden.793 Joint operations between naval and land forces was the rule, not the exception in the 
Baltic area at large, partly due to the limited resources and weak systems of land communications of 
the era. Glete thus states that in this area “any army which was to operate successfully had to be 
placed at one end of a maritime line of communication controlled by the navy…even defensive 
warfare had strong amphibious elements”.794 Especially after the rise of Russian sea power in the 
early 18th century, all parts of the Baltic Sea were probable theatres for acts of war. This made the 
Baltic an area where battle fleets, archipelago fleets and army forces had to be coordinated.  
Surviving the wars in the 1670s, Karl XI thus took advantage of the peaceful years from 1679 till 
1700 by a significant strengthening of the Swedish Navy. The monarch decided already in 1679 to 
found his new naval base in Karlskrona, much closer to the overseas possessions in the southern 
Baltic than Stockholm. Karlskrona was the main base in effect from 1689, at a time when a rise of 
Russian sea power seemed unlikely. Although the professionalisation of the Swedish officer corps 
came later than in the Dutch republic and in England (Swedish admirals were regularly chosen 
among army officers with scarce naval skills, and no Naval academy was instituted during the 17th 
century), the naval infrastructure built in this period was an important part of Swedish state building. 
Gothenburg became a permanent naval station in 1699. From 1680 till 1700, thirteen ships of the 
line795 were built, a formidable effort by a Nordic power. By 1700, the Swedish Navy thus included 
no less than 39 ships of the line and nine frigates. However, even the Swedish administrational skills 
did not suffice to create an efficient system of educating the sailors. The system of conscription 
worked poorly, and the efforts at employing professional sailors were costly and did not create the 
quantity required.  
The Great Northern war from 1700 was to change the scope of the tasks for the Swedish Navy. In 
1721, Sweden lost most of the eastern Baltic to Russia, the battle of Poltava raising the influence of 
Peter I in Europe, and similarly reducing the reputation of Karl XII. Sweden also lost parts of her 
possessions in Prussia to Germany. The land, population, revenues; all were lost (although Sweden 
was given the right to import grain from her former provinces in Livonia duty-free up to a maximum 
of 50000 rubles per year).796 
The loss of the Swedish-controlled provinces in North Germany and in the eastern Baltic meant that 
the tasks of the Swedish navy became much more conventional for a small state. With no trans-
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Baltic empire to defend, ambitions were reduced in Stockholm. But it is too easily forgotten that 
many of the traditional extraterritorial tasks nevertheless had to be carried out in the much smaller 
empire. Communications between Finland and Sweden had to be kept intact, army operations along 
the coasts needed naval support and blockades had to be broken.797 Apart from Denmark-Norway, 
Sweden now also had a powerful Russian Navy to look out for in the east. The geopolitical position 
of Sweden dictated its policy for the century after the Great Northern war; a mix of fear, and 
simultaneously hopes of revenge for, Russia, and the desire to annex Norway. This does not deny 
the fact that the geopolitical ambitions of Sweden forever were reduced after the Great Nordic war. 
The war should, frankly speaking, be seen as a turning point in the social constitution of the Swedish 
state and Swedish society.  After all, the wish to incorporate Norway was a smaller ambition than 
being the dominant power of the Baltic security complex. We should also note that Sweden’s role on 
the continent of Europe utterly diminished. Thus, Sweden’s extraterritorial aspirations were 
strikingly reduced. Although officers and monarchs could dream of restoring the lost empire, 
geopolitical alterations had made Sweden much more inward looking.  
This did not mean, however, that Sweden was reduced to the negligible after 1721. The ambitions 
aimed at Norway and the sizable navy reminds us that Sweden still was a territory with paternalist 
traits, although the application of paternalism was limited. The ingenious system of militia sailors 
living along the coast in fact made rapid mobilisations of the Swedish Navy possible798, a cost-
effective arrangement on part of the Swedes, as so often has been the case. The system proved to 
function smoothly during the wars with Russia in 1741 and 1788. While a good system for defensive 
purposes, the personnel policy of the Swedish state nevertheless made the Navy unsuited for 
offensive operations. Swedish sailors were unskilled, by the standards of 18th and 19th century 
Europe. This was evidenced in the attempts at attacking Russian base areas in the Gulf of Finland in 
1790. The Swedish state did not have the resources to pay for professional soldiers, and there was no 
political will to conscript or press sailors in the merchant navy into service in the state navy. In the 
end of the 17th century,  
 
“the non –noble estates had been able to trade taxes for the support of a volunteer system in 
exchange for guarantees that conscription would be abolished. This was a reaction against the 
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conscription system which had supported Swedish 17th century continental warfare, a system where 
many young men were sent out and few came home.”799 
 
Again, as Michael Mann and John Hobson point out, states are, in the long run, not stronger than 
their embeddedness in society permits. The Swedish attack against Russia ended as a total fiasco in 
1742. It is tempting to judge the 18th century Swedish foreign policy in general, and especially naval 
policy, as overly ambitious compared to the abilities to actually achieve the results desired by the 
state leadership. The ambitious program of shipbuilding from 1781 till 1785 was part of Gustav III`s 
scheme for an operation against Copenhagen and Norway to annex and occupy Norway. But since 
Russia was involved in a Turkish war, the Swedish monarch instead decided to strike at Russia in 
1788. The results were again disappointing, with severe Swedish losses of personnel and vessels. 
Indeed, the criticism of the Swedish Navy around 1800 was based on quite unrealistic beliefs in 
what Sweden could achieve given the European balance of power. It was not only the main Swedish 
Naval base that had moved to Karlskrona, but also the central naval administration, the 
Admiralitetskollegium. Thus, the senior naval officers and planners were isolated from the politico-
administrative center of the state, and senior politicians and bureaucrats grew increasingly ignorant 
of naval affairs. In this respect, the difference to Britain is striking. Distrust and lack of 
communication between officials and various interest groups severely hampered the always-
important connection between political decisions and strategic and tactical possibilities as worked 
out by naval officers. In fact, the Kollegium was formally abolished in 1791. The admirals were not 
at all interested in galley warfare in the Eastern Baltic; to them, a battle fleet was what a Navy ought 
to be, and Denmark was the lasting enemy. Thus, there was a cleavage among the most powerful 
groups regulating the use of extraterritorial violence, a cleavage founded on different conceptions of 
Swedish strategic and national interests. In fact, it was Swedish politicians and army officers that 
created the archipelago tactic of warfare, since the Kollegium could not provide tactical guidelines 
for such manoeuvres.800 Thus, the admirals lost administrative control of the galley fleets in 1756. 
These fleets were organised as a separate organisation, a sort of forerunner for the 20th century 
mobile forces of the Swedish coastal artillery. It was only in 1788, when the same person was 
appointed commander-in –chief of both fleets that Gustav III had full control of his battle fleet. 
Although the naval administration had been a modern bureaucracy, this shows how naval 
institutions could be much more conservative than their political superiors and younger officers, 
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how slow Admirals could be at grasping the new realities of sea power as part of national strategy, 
and how a monarch in a strong state as Sweden had to manoeuvre and wrestle with the apparatus of 
his own state. The dynastic union with Norway from 1814 must have been something of a, militarily 
speaking at least, disappointment to the Swedish leadership. The rise of Germany (see below) made 
Sweden formulate a new naval policy in 1850-51 with support for the battle fleet. Improving 
materiel, training and building steam frigates made the rather poor state Norway build two steam 
frigates and three corvettes.801 Even this periphery and modest mare clausum state was influenced 
by the European-wide impulses of a more activist foreign policy. For some years during the 1850s 
and early 1860s, scandinavism, the aspirations for a new union of the Scandinavian states, had a 
hold on the elites in the three countries. These aspirations came to nothing. 
But the Nordic countries were divided further in more than the ideological realm. On February 21 
1808, Russia launched a surprise attack on Finland, which for centuries had been part of Sweden. 
Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I had made a secret agreement, where the latter was to make Sweden 
break with Britain and join the continental system by the use of military force. In compensation, 
Russia was to gain Finland.802 The position of the Swedes had been to avoid this, since Britain 
controlled the sea-lines of communications, thus denying France the ability to project power to the 
Scandinavian Peninsula. The attack was a strategic surprise in the most literal sense of the word, 
since the tsar was a cousin of the Swedish monarch and had been an ally of Sweden. Thus, the 
weakly defended territory of Finland was overrun by the Russian army in a campaign where naval 
forces played a secondary role at the tactical level (a winter campaign during the critical phase of the 
war), while the European contest for the blockade against Britain was the decisive struggle at the 
strategic level. The outcome was that Finland became a Grand Duchy under Russia from 1809. 
However, Sweden was not de facto further subdued by Russia, thanks primarily by the true ruler of 
the Baltic in 1809; the Royal Navy. The fleet-in-being of Britain hindered the Russian Navy from 
entering deeper into the west. Thus, Britain also broke the sea-lines of communications that were so 
vital for the allies of Napoleon in Eastern Europe. The Swedes were forced to sign peace with 
France in 1810, thereby joining the continental system of blockade of Britain, but in reality, Sweden 
continued its trade with Britain. Neither Russia nor France could do much to prevent this, since there 
was one truly sovereign of the seas. Thus, the Royal Navy ensured that Anglo-Swedish trade could 
carry on.803 In sum Sweden remained a regional player, but the Swedish political territory had 
changed; she lost Finland and "won" Norway, even if the latter was a hollow victory when one 
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considers the political autonomy of the Norwegians and the meagre economic outcome Norway was 
to yield to Sweden. 
 
Denmark-Norway and Germany 
The capital of Denmark remained the main naval base in Denmark until after WWII, with the 
incorporation of Nyhamn in the base in 1680s. Although the Baltic Sea had been thoroughly 
penetrated by the balance of power in Europe by the 1720s, Denmark-Norway continued to be a 
considerable naval power, the naval yards at Holmen building 15 ships of the line from 1680 till 
1700.804 In 1700, the Danish-Norwegian combined Fleet consisted of 33 ships of the line and nine 
frigates. A further strength was the coastal fleet of smaller vessels. All in all, the combined fleet 
consisted of 2800 cannons and 17500 sailors by 1700. In one crucial aspect, Denmark-Norway went 
further in developing a modern Navy than its main competitor Sweden805. The union started regular 
training of midshipmen already in 1679. These midshipmen became the core of regular units in 1701 
(A school educating navigators both for the Navy and Merchant Navy was instituted in 1685). As in 
Sweden, the recruitment of sailors nevertheless was a considerable problem. Thus, the Danish-
Norwegian fleet relied heavily on conscription, but a substantial number of professional sailors were 
employed by the state in addition. The most important threat to Denmark-Norway was that Sweden 
could break the sea-lines of communications between Denmark and Norway. Norway was the chief 
aim of Swedish ambitions in the 18th century, but Norwegian territory was difficult to operate in for 
any intruding force. Thus, the main threat to the union was a Swedish blockade of Copenhagen.806 
This made for a defensive security policy of the union, but it also meant that the combined fleet of 
Denmark-Norway had to be numerically superior to the Swedish. The fact that Swedish influence in 
the European balance of power diminished after the Great Northern war did not alter this basic fact 
of the Nordic security complex. Divided by salt water, Denmark and Norway were forced to uphold 
a vital Navy. The Atlantic islands under Danish rule and the colonies in the West Indies made this 
policy even more sensible. It is also worth stressing some similarities between Sweden and 
Denmark-Norway, particularly for the reader who will question to what degree extraterritorial rights 
and violence mattered for the total course of history in these countries. Both kingdoms were 
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maritime powers with very significant interests in trade carrying by ship in Europe. As the volume 
of overseas transport along the east-west axis in Europe represented by the Dutch republic fell, 
Denmark-Norway and Sweden in many respects occupied the roles previously held by Holland. The 
protection of merchantmen from the raids by vessels from the corsair states were important for both 
countries, but this task was a secondary one, mainly carried out by cruisers. Perhaps more important 
than anything else, although this might sound strange to a reader less inclined to see the value of a 
regular navy, was to keep fleets in being. This worked as a deterrent. First of all in the region of the 
Baltic Sea, but also in Europe at large; having a substantial sea-going navy meant that both countries 
could be important assets in an alliance as part of the European balance of power. This provided 
protection of overseas transport by itself, since hostilities could turn the relationship with the Nordic 
countries into an enmity that could be disadvantageous in a later conflict. Concerning the balance 
between Sweden and Denmark-Norway, none were really able to exploit the weaknesses of the 
other. While the Swedish Navy could be mobilised rapidly and with great security, its personnel 
were not very skilled. Thus, the Swedish navy was good at defensive undertakings, but poor on 
offensive operations. In Denmark, on the other hand, the core of professional soldiers and a rather 
well trained officer corps made her fleet comparatively better at offensive operations than the 
Swedish, but the Achilles heel of Denmark-Norway was geographical. The very distance between 
Denmark and Norway, not to say the Atlantic islands, increased transaction costs within the union. 
Besides, Copenhagen, the main naval base, was situated on an island. This meant that an enemy 
surprise attack, or surprise blockade (this actually was what the Swedes planned to do in case of 
hostilities with Denmark) actually could hinder the mobilisation of the fleet. The sailors, in a 
blockade, would simply not be able to get out to their ships.807 The Royal Navy took advantage of 
this weakness of the Danish mobilisation system on three crucial occasions; in 1800, 1801 and 1807. 
The combined fleet was never ready on either of these strikes. The Norwegian-made guns aboard the 
combined fleet were also inferior to the high-quality Swedish guns. Thus, the men-of-war in the 
Danish-Norwegian Navy were given larger dimensions in order to be able to carry the same 
firepower. However, Danish ship design could not keep pace with the progress in France and 
particularly Britain. There is some truth in the “myth” that the small gunboats applied for coastal 
operations in Norway were rather effective, however. Such smaller vessels in large numbers were 
efficient in archipelago operations, a fact that was also evidenced in the Swedish victory in sea battle 
with the Russian navy in 1790. The days of oared warfare continued into the early 19th century. One 
should also note the obvious fact that such smaller vessels with crews of limited size also were 
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beneficial to a weak state for defensive purposes. The central dilemma for small coastal states has 
always been that scarce resources make for a Navy with a small number of advanced, sea-going 
ships, or a Navy with a higher number of smaller, simpler ships. Both choices have their 
weaknesses, to be sure. During the Great Northern War, the combined Danish Norwegian fleet to a 
large degree was based on building smaller ships, with no ships of the line being commissioned after 
1711.808 Norway got a particular profile for coastal combat, a naval monopoly of violence that suited 
the maritime policies of a sovereignty-seeking coastal state. In 1807, the combined Danish-
Norwegian fleet suffered a catastrophe after Admiral Nelson’s successful raid at Copenhagen. Up 
till that day, the combined fleet had been one of the larger battle fleets in Europe. That was precisely 
the reason why Britain chose to seize it, of course. The Royal Navy had to ensure that the Danish-
Norwegian fleet did not fall in the hands of Napoleon. To the British, that scenario would mean that 
the naval balance of power in the Baltic would be utterly changed, which could threaten the trade 
with states like Sweden. The destruction of the combined fleet was a purely strategic move to ensure 
British superiority in European waters. The losses suffered by the combined fleet in 1807, and the 
dynastic union with Sweden that Norway was forced into in 1814, meant that the economic and 
infrastructure investment that Norway had contributed to the battle fleet was lost. What Norway 
inherited was a naval force of gunboats and brigs. At this point, the difference between Denmark 
and Norway is illuminated. While Sweden, given the skills and huge maritime infrastructure of 
Norway, wanted Norway to build a new battle fleet, the Norwegian parliament consistently refused 
to do so. Given, furthermore, that Norwegian sailors had made up a large proportion of the 
personnel of the combined fleet, the almost total lack of enthusiasm for building a new fleet seems 
to suggest that the support for the combined fleet in reality had been modest in Norway. The 
defensive, restricted mare clausum inclination in Norway was now fully revealed. A battle fleet 
seemed to have been viewed as entwined with a more offensive foreign policy and the use of 
extraterritorial violence in distant waters. There was little support for such a policy in Norway after 
1814. Furthermore, while the Danish-Norwegian fleet had been a combined venture with the 
powerful Denmark, the Norwegian army had been a relative autonomous branch of the nation since 
the early 17th century. In the increasing efforts at nation-building during the 19th century, therefore, 
the army had a much larger support among the elites. The army was increasingly embedded in 
society as a part of the nation, while the battle fleet Navy was seen as more Danish than Norwegian. 
While highly distorted, this view of history came to stick in the Norwegian identity.809 Another 
peculiar, but rational and totally transparent, view among Norwegians was that although the 
                                                 
808 Jungersen, 1945: 268-269 
809 See the entire book by Ulriksen, 2002, for a line of argument in favour of this interpretation. 
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Norwegian sea-lines of communications clearly existed on the mercy of Britain, it would be 
beneficial to Britain to safeguard these sea lanes in the event of crisis. Upholding the commodity 
chains between Norway and Britain would be in the British self-interest. This belief was part of 
Norwegian foreign policy until the German attack on April 9th, 1940. Apart from the movement in 
favour of supporting Denmark against Prussia in 1848 and 1864, Norway was an utterly isolationist 
polity, a sovereignty-seeking periphery until 1905 that gradually tried to loosen its bands to its 
stronger neighbours. The use of the Norwegian army outside of Norway had to be given the support 
of the Parliament, an institutional barrier preventing the Swedish leadership in applying Norwegian 
units to create a stronger union with a more activist foreign policy. In fact, Russia repeatedly warned 
the Swedish monarch whenever he tempted to force the Norwegian parliament to abide his word in 
these matters.810 To Russia, it was paramount to counterbalance any attempt on the behalf of 
Sweden to create a strong military power in Northern Europe. This led to the ironic result that by 
1836, Tsar Nicolas warned Sweden that they better stick to the constitution Sweden had granted the 
Norwegians. The sympathy for Denmark’s cause was not entirely a result of the close cultural ties 
that existed between Norway and Denmark; it was quite clear that both politicians in Sweden and 
Norway saw Denmark as an important buffer to the south against Prussian ambitions.  
The post-1814 development in Denmark was very different than the Norwegian trajectory. It 
actually rebuilt a battle fleet. Although this fleet was small, and the men-of –war themselves not 
large or equipped with impressive fire-power compared to for example the Royal navy, the Danish 
battle fleet was suitable for exercising sovereignty in its empire of Atlantic and West Indies islands. 
Moreover, the German states had not had a Navy since the German mini-fleet abolished in 1701. 
This was an advantage to Denmark, but was perceived as a disadvantage in Sweden, since it meant 
that Russia after 1721 was the dominant naval power in the Baltic.811 When Prussia set out to create 
a navy from 1850, Denmark (which had moved from absolutism to constitutional rule in 1849), was 
convinced that naval force was essential in any confrontation with Germany. Thus, Denmark 
modernised its navy in the 1850s with seven screw frigates and corvettes and converting one 
battleship to steam.  
It is striking to look at the well-known fact that in spite of the rise of Prussia to great power rank, 
despite its Baltic seaboard after 1814 and despite Germany’s large merchant fleet, German military 
naval forces consisted of a few gunboats.812 The revolutions of 1848 resulted in an attempt to 
recreate a German Navy. In fact, although the federal German state planned by the Frankfurter 
                                                 
810 See Riste 2001: 56-58 
811 Hornborg, 1945: 302 
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parliament did not materialise, a Federal German navy was instituted. Its main opponent was the 
Danish navy. At this time, the German Duchy Holstein was part of a dynastic union with the Danish 
monarchy.813 Holstein and the German population in Schleswig revolted in 1848. A local fleet and 
the German federal navy were both means in the support for the cause of Schleswig-Holstein and 
against Denmark. However, both forces were abolished with the peace of 1850. Prussia experienced 
a Danish blockade in the conflict of 1848-50. This led to the recognition that it was absurd for a 
great power to be at the mercy of a small Scandinavian state at sea. Even the small Danish fleet had 
been able to block the busiest ports in Germany, and thereby in effect produced a stalemate in the 
war for Schleswig-Holstein. It is indeed poignant to ask why the German states in effect had no navy 
at all. The main reason was historical; the peace of Westphalia had made much of the "German" 
coasts belong to the Kings of Denmark-Norway and particularly Sweden.814  
Prussia actually started building a navy, and as always when a largely continental state was to 
embark on such an effort, the relative lack of naval infrastructure was a drawback. However, the 
flexibility of naval forces made it possible to build the first frigates designed by a Swedish naval 
architect, and to man the first steam vessels of the German navy with Swedish officers.815 In 1864, 
this Prussian state, joined with Austria in a joint attack on Denmark. The Danes, without support 
from other powers, managed to fight the Germans at sea with some success, a testimony to the 
limited capacity of the German sstates to project power over sea. By 1870, however, the direction of 
German sea power had taken another route than the other Baltic powers. While Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and Russia created coastal defence navies, Germany soon would create a navy where the 
core was a battle fleet of armoured battleships.  
 
3.3 Monopolies of violence? The practises of piracy and Prize-taking and 
Northern Europe until 1856 
We have already noted that the formation of states in Northern Europe was heavily influenced by 
competition with a strong non-state actor (or should we say set of actors) through the Hanseatic 
League. Thus, theories of international politics too narrowly focusing on an international system of 
states miss central facets of 16th and 17th century international affairs. Moreover, we have also seen 
that fighting the Corsair states was a formative phase for the emerging US Navy.  
                                                                                                                                                             
812 This was the Royal Prussian Navy, in existence since the Napoleonic wars. See Sondhaus, 1997: ch. 1 for an 
interesting overview.  
813 Riste, 2001: 56-57 
814 Sondhaus, 1997:1 
815 According to Glete, 1993: 435, this was a result of Prussian conservatism. Rather than let the liberals who had 
run the federal navy of 1848 lead the building, they preferred to hire foreign competence.  
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Medieval jurists had echoed classical Roman law in labelling pirates hostis humani generis: "enemy 
to all mankind."   The piracy these sea-robbers practiced was seen as different from selective 
maritime theft, conducted with the approval and support of a sovereign against merchant shipping 
flying the standard of that monarch or civic republic's rivals.  This practice was alternately termed 
“ire ad pirraticamã; to sail or go as a pirateã, and ire in cursumã going "in cursum"; i.e. 
corsairs”.816 Later distinctions were variations of the same division between piracy and state-
sanctioned violence at sea. Janice Thomson has demonstrated the importance of the fight against 
piracy in international relations. However, her study does not analyse how and to what extent piracy 
influenced Northern Europe. This reflects the tendency to see piracy as the adventurous activities in 
southern waters conducted from exotic bases in distant islands. In the following, I will seek to 
construct another, often neglected, story of how piracy influenced states and their conceptions of 
maritime sovereignty in Northern Europe. So neglected is this part of European history, however, 
that we must use whatever scattered comments that actually exist in naval history in order to analyse 
the subject. Pirates were a large and diverse set of actors, and did thus not make for a coherent 
picture of “the other” in nation building. In this way, the phenomenon is often seen as unimportant 
in traditional contributions in historiography. If we are to evaluate whether piracy (the concept is 
ambiguous, but defined in international law. At present, the distinction between piracy and terrorism 
at sea should be seen as a distinction primarily in the goals of the two activities, see chapter 6), we 
should ask whether piracy affected the core of the modern state, conceived as a monopoly of 
violence. In more precise terms, to what degree did states in Northern Europe (apart from hegemons 
like the Dutch republic and the British Empire, which by its almost global reach inevitably came in 
contact with piracy) apply their navies to suppress piracy? Another side of the coin is to what degree 
the states themselves approved of methods that were similar to piracy? It was primarily “piracy” in 
the Mediterranean that affected modern states in Northern Europe. After the dissolution of the power 
of the Western Roman Empire, the corsairs, or “Berberians”, in the Magreb region to a large degree 
gained control of the Western Mediterranean. Around AD 935, the Arabian prince Zeiri founded 
Algeria on the foundations of the old Roman colony Icosiums.817 According to Danish historian 
Jungersen,818 this marks the beginning of the long period in which piracy, or the corse to be more 
precise, became an important source of income for the power-holders along the coast in Northern 
Africa. Such was the intensity of violence committed by these units that all major European states 
with seafaring in the region, including Britain, had to pay large sums of money in tribute to the 
                                                 
816 Tai, 2003:1 
817 Jungersen, 1945: 280 
818 Jungeren, 1945: 280 
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regional rulers of the Magreb. It is tempting to use the analogy of blackmail. However, we should 
also note that the corsairs at times ventured as far away as to Iceland, where they set ashore in 1627. 
They pillaged local villages, slaughtering people and livestock, and captured over 300 persons as 
slaves, according to Icelandic historian Gunnar Karlsson.819 It is interesting to note that such 
practises seem to have been universally condemned as uncivilised by all North European states at 
the time.820 The indignation against the corsairs did nevertheless not produce a permanent 
weakening of piracy at sea, or rather the corso. When the cargo carrying of the Scandinavian 
countries rose significantly in the Mediterranean from the 1730s, for example, Sweden, Denmark 
and Norway were all forced into signing “Treaties of friendship” with the corsair “states”. It was a 
costly peace. Thus, states from Northern Europe occasionally sent naval forces to the Magreb in 
order to gain better terms. Already in 1746, Denmark sent 3 ships of the line and one frigate to 
Algeria in order to negotiate with the Pasha. Backed up by visible force, Denmark-Norway thus 
managed to reach agreements with Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli and Morocco through rather substantial 
gifts to the regional leadership.821 The biggest problem with establishing stable conditions with such 
non-state actors in an anarchic environment was the question of verifying and enforcing that the 
parties stuck to the agreements. Given the resources and time required to project power from 
Northern Europe to the Magreb, this was an opportunity the corsair leaders often took advantage of. 
Thus, the Algerian pasha set forth new demands in 1769, and when these were not met, he simply 
declared war on Denmark and started preying upon Danish-Norwegian traffic in the Western 
Mediterranean. In this situation, Denmark-Norway sent a force of 4 ships of the line, 2 frigates and 2 
artillery ships to Algeria in 1770. The patrimonial traditions in these areas meant that the problem 
was never solved once and for all. When a new pasha came to power in Tripoli in 1796, he 
immediately made new demands and broke the treaty. The only way to seek effective (although 
temporary) settlements was through violent confrontations. Thus, a Danish fleet actually combated a 
fleet from Tripoli in May 1797. Still, one should note that until the war in 1801, Denmark-Norway 
maintained a fleet of 7-8 frigates in the Mediterranean continually. Thus, a not insignificant part of 
the armed forces of the Union was more or less permanently deployed to prevent piracy and prize-
taking (the activities of the corsair states increasingly shifted from piracy to prize-taking, since the 
latter could mean both the capture of cargo and ransom money for imprisoned crews). The only 
means to stop this activity was occupation and complete pacification of the territories from which 
prize taking and piracy were conducted. Thus, France conquered Algeria in 1830. The paying of 
                                                 
819 Karlsson, 2000: 144 
820 Karlsson, 2000: 145 
821 Jungersen, 1945: 280 
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tribute to Magreb territories does not seem to have stopped for the Nordic countries until France 
defeated Morocco in 1844. The latter operation in fact was a multinational endeavour. Swedish, 
Norwegian, Spanish and Danish war ships supported the French operation that more or less ended 
the tribute and prize-taking in the region for a long period.  The significance of the fight against the 
corsair “states” is also a sign of the norms that came to be recognised by an increasing number of 
western states. After 1815, this was reflected in exactly multinational operations other than war that 
were meant to uphold these norms. In 1828, two Norwegian and three Swedish warships operated 
together for nine months. In 1844-45, apart from the mentioned states participating against Morocco, 
small states like Norway (1 frigate, 1 corvette) and Sweden (1 frigate and two corvettes) gave 
substantial contributions to international operations of this sort. Scandinavian navies co-operated in 
1847-48 to support Norwegian, Danish and Swedish merchant ships in the Mediterranean (the 
Nordic co-operation also included combined operations during the Crimean War). There is no 
reason to lay the guilt of piracy solely on muslims. Many European outlaws participated alongside 
the pirates of the Magreb countries. In addition, the often-told stories of piracy in exotic waters more 
or less rest on the myths of actions by people of West-European origin. What is even more striking, 
however, is the state-approved policies of prize-taking with global reach, as they were practised by 
states in the “civilized” western world. Nowhere, perhaps, is the contrast between territorial and 
extra-territorial laws and modes of violence more striking than in the question of prize-taking. The 
property rights on the seas were strikingly different from those on land, and the use of violence was 
granted private entrepreneurs to a far larger degree than what was conceivable for territorial 
organisations other than the sovereign state itself. Captured vessels in the 18th and19th centuries 
often (at least in western countries) were taken to “prize courts, whose decisions were avidly 
followed by the press and public. They played a vital role in the port cities that were the major 
population centres of maritime nations. The laws controlling prize taking were as familiar to the 
American populace as the rules of baseball are today”.822Thus, the historian cited above, with some 
justification, argues that prize-taking in practise was a sort of lawful booting on the seas. In contrast 
to piracy, prize-taking was considered as lawful acts. How come this anomaly in the constitution of 
states and international relations came into being? In fact, the practise that ALL ships were entitled 
to carry arms seems to be as old as seafaring itself. Ship crews did not need government 
authorisation to use their weapons for self-defence. Included in this principle was the right to seize 
prizes, that is, to capture and hold “enemy” ships that attacked, or might attack them. The captor’s 
sovereign in turn became the property-holder of the captured vessel, cargo and the ransom of 
                                                 
822 Petrie, 1999:1-2. This publication is the only comprehensive study of prize-taking that, to my knowledge, has 
been made public since 1861. 
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prisoners.823 However, the outcome of prize-taking was entirely different, financially speaking, if the 
Captain of the ship prior to the voyage received a written licence824 from his sovereign, authorising 
attack on enemy vessels on behalf of the nation. If the ship was a warship, such a Royal letter was a 
commission as a vessel of the national navy, a straightforward certificate that the ship and its crew 
were parts of the monopoly of violence. However, if the ship was privately owned, the letter was 
called a “letter of marque and reprisal”, and de facto made the vessel a privateer. Privateers were 
ships with a state license to seize property belonging to owners from other countries. Thus, private 
use of violence became part of foreign policy, since the sovereign at least tried to regulate the 
practise of privateering against adversaries rather than allies. However, the word reprisal indicates a 
condition between sovereigns and private parties that lies between peace and war. In the first 
centuries after the renaissance, privateering was a form of debt collecting. In this period, letters of 
marque and reprisals authorised “a wronged private party to secure redress by seizing vessels of the 
offending nation” 825. As such, private vessels were not necessarily part of warfare, perceived as 
armed conflict between nations. By the 18th Century, if not earlier, the practise was reversed. By the 
1850s, letters of marque and reprisal were issued only in time of war. Thus, these private vessels 
were supplements to the state navies. The main reason why states ceased to apply privateering too 
generously was that it created a mess of unpredictable clashes with unintended consequences. In 
Britain, this realisation came gradually, as the extension of government control over extraterritorial 
forces grew.826 As the total volume and striking power of the world`s navies rose, and as the British 
Empire became so vast as to threaten overstretch of the Royal Navy if tensions were not controlled, 
admirals could not be allowed to behave like leaders of organized crime with private interests. 
Slowly then, a norm was consolidated on this issue, a norm that was respected by all western powers 
after the 1850s, with some minor and unintended exceptions. Thus, it is no surprise that these 
western powers eventually joined forces to root out the last uncontrollable non-state actors and 
rogue states that did not respect the sea lanes for peaceful transportation.   
 
3.4 States and Navies - A comparative overview 
Quantifying the extraterritorial power of the European states and North America in the 19th century 
is not as straightforward as one might assume.  The measurements and records by themselves are 
unreliable, and do not suggest much about the differences in efficiency among the states. However, 
                                                 
823 Petrie, 1999: 2 
824 In French, “lettres de Marque”, in Norwegian and Danish often “kaperbrev” 
825 Petrie, 1999: 3 
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they do suggest major variations and similarities of ambitions and foreign policy thinking in the 
state leaderships in the period (a more detailed view than found in Appendix I is warranted for this 
period).  
         Table 3.4 Combined size of sail- and steamship navies 1820-1860827 
 
                       1820       1825        1830        1835        1840         1845        1850        1855          1860 
Great Britain 504 448 442 448 447 508 550 646 825 
Denmark 
 
  14   18   22   27   28   31   30   31   34 
Sweden 
 
  34   25   26   28    28   32    31   29   36 
Norway 
 
- -     2     2       2     3      3     7   11 
 Prussia 
 
- - - - - -      1     8   12 
German Fed. - - - - - -      7 - - 
Netherlands     4   47   53   53    55   59    60   65   69 
US   52   57   60   60   70   77    92 108 150 
 
The table illustrates that all the “paternalists” in our typology maintained a substantial naval force 
during most of the 19th century. The regional differences are nevertheless profound. Thus, the Baltic 
states including Sweden, Denmark and Germany are numerically much weaker than the states that at 
one time or the other have been included as hegemons by Wallerstein. Of these states, the paternalist 
power of Britain had a far stronger base of power-projection than the international liberalists the 
USA and the Netherlands. Germany is a special case, since the German ambitions to create sea 
power only gradually surfaced after 1850. The periphery Iceland never had a navy, and Norway was 
a minimalist naval power after the dissolution of Denmark-Norway (although the latter half of the 
19th century saw a strengthening of the Navy). While the above numbers evidences British sea 
power in an apt manner, one should also note that any notion of Britain as a minimalist state is 
highly inaccurate. It is also clear that Britain was in a unique position to provide protection for its 
worldwide transactions through this naval strength. However, such a military protection in itself 
involved high costs. Thus, a drop in income could quickly make the cost-effectiveness of the Empire 
precarious. The rise and long-lasting vitality of the British Empire cannot be explained by theories 
of the international system alone. A unique ability to utilise naval skills and entrepeneurship was 
mixed with a strong civil society and stable political institutions to produce a lean but lethal ability 
                                                                                                                                                             
826 See Bukovansky, 1997: 221 for a similar conclusion 
827 Elementary Statistics of European States, 1859, Glete, 1993: 465. Displacement in 1000 tons. British and 
American ships on the Great lakes are included. The numbers for Norway are calculated independently of the 
dynastic union with Sweden. 
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to project power overseas. After 1815, the Concert of Europe was a deliberate attempt to regulate the 
balance of power in Europe, but the content and form of this peace was characteristically marked by 
British preferences. The domestic political and social development of Britain thus influenced the 
international system to an unprecedented degree. In this period, Britain also gradually became a 
chief engineer of instituting the navy under political control, even though the use of non-state 
violence on a large scale continued for much longer in the naval realm. The smaller states could no 
longer hope to compete with Britain in the maritime realm after the 18th century. Not even allying, 
for example with the aim of remaining neutral during crises, made these states into powerful actors 
on the international scene. Moreover, no European power seemed a significant threat against Britain 
in naval terms prior to the late 19th century, while the US remained isolationist throughout the 
period. The fact that the American Civil war produced new weapons and vessels for naval warfare 
did not make the US attempt major incursions into the sovereign European states. In the Western 
hemisphere, a different pattern was observed, as witnessed in this chapter and the following one. 
Nevertheless, with the single exception of the Civil war, the North American navies were 
insignificant when compared to the major navies of Britian and France. Nevertheless, all states 
covered in this chapter gained political control of arms at sea originating from their territory in this 
period, although this process was cumbersome. If we compare extraterritorial force with the 
territorial equivalent, it is clear that navies were institutionalized much later than were armies. 
Moreover, elements of private violence continued toi exist side by side with state agencies at sea. 
All in all, the analysis so far lends support to the hypotheses of chapter 2: a relatively liberal Dutch 
Republic lost its naval hegemony to paternalist Britain, with the US joining as an uneasy 
bandwagoning liberal state after 1815. Interestingly, both Sweden and Denmark behaved according 
to the paternalist category throughout the period analysed above. 
 
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945 
“The supreme geopolitical fact of the modern era, Prince Bismarck is alleged to have remarked, is 
that the Americans speak English” 
                                                                 David M. Kennedy828 
 
This chapter will seek to analyse to what extent and in which ways extraterritorial violence and 
regulation of sovereignty at sea changed principally at the international level during the age of 
industrialisation, and how ideology influenced world order. In other words, the aim here is not 
                                                 
828 David Kennedy, 1999: 465 
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primarily to explain different modes of imperialism, but to highlight the purpose, organisation and 
use of naval force, itself an indicator of the scope and ambitions inherent in foreign policy for any 
coastal state. Secondly, the chapter seeks to compare the significance of naval factors on outcomes 
of state building in the major powers; how naval policies influenced domestic and foreign policies. I 
will lay particular emphasis on Britain, Imperial Germany and the US in this respect. While the 
extraterritorial policies of Britain were “locked” in a particular direction829 at the conclusion of the 
Napoleonic wars, the other two powers were latecomers as states and hence as naval powers. Fact is 
that navalism as a modern phenomenon in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy came only 
after A.T. Mahan`s "The Influence of Sea power upon History" (ISPUH), reached world-wide fame 
in 1890. Crucial matters that will be addressed cover new and more efficient means of 
extraterritorial violence. Without pertaining to analyse all facets of those changes, I will seek to shed 
light on how this maritime revolution changed time-space dimensions between and within states. In 
other words, we ask the question whether and in what way the praxis of power at sea changed the 
international system and the states covered in this thesis. Again, the approach is comparative in 
design and methodology, with emphasis on the major powers in Northern Europe and the USA. For 
reasons explained in chapter four, the Netherlands and Germany after WWI are not included in this 
chapter. Needless to say, in the age of industrialisation, these states were pioneering both 
organisational and technological innovations with important bearings for the society of states at 
large. Thus, a major proposition is that smaller polities had to adapt as best they could to the balance 
of power and new technology, and that these efforts influenced small states as major powers shaped 
international relations.830 Again, state principles as well as preferences are seen here as the main 
engines in international change, and simultaneously, international change affected the constitutions 
of domestic societies and state structures. A major challenge to the presentation is the degree of 
interconnected impulses between the major powers that affected their foreign policies. Thus, a 
comparative design that proceeds by covering one territory after the other might obscure the degree 
to which policies in one territory were affected by the policies of the other. Nevertheless, I have 
chosen to stick to a traditional comparative design in order not to complicate the empirical 
presentation unnecessarily. In order to show the interconnectedness between states in this era, 
                                                 
829 The history of British seapower was path-dependent. After Trafalger, the majority of Britons saw their empire as 
intimately linked to the Royal Navy. There is little doubt that the Navy had played a major role in creating the 
empire and protecting it against the challenge from France. However, historians recently have come to doubt the 
cost-efficiency of the Empire and such a strong navy during Pax Britannica (see Ferguson, 2002; introduction and 
chapter one for a discussion). The major proposition here is that British politicians and politicians came to see any 
threat to British naval predominance as a threat against the empire and even the Isles themselves.  
830 As Rolf Hobson (2002: 12-13) reminds us, the rapid technological development of the 20th century not only 
imposed increased financial burdens on states. These burdens in themselves gave incentives for innovations that 
could produce ”a bigger bang for the buck”. 
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comment is made on perceptions of other powers in each of the major states, where clear ideologic 
and institutional differences are highlighted. While this in itself is endlessly complicated, the main 
focus will be on the perceptions of threat and security in each country. Again, the national 
experiences of state- and nation building varied between societies so that these perceptions of other 
powers were coloured by different historical experiences. I believe this to be the main advantage of 
the comparative method in studies of foreign policy, and I believe that it is able to explain as well as 
interpret international change. That Japan, Russia and from 1917 the Soviet Union, France and 
Austria-Hungary also were important in the international and regional balance of power is 
indisputable.  Thus, comments on the effects these entities had on the countries in this study will be 
made. However, I believe it is not too much to claim that the domestic formation of naval 
preferences and relationships between the states covered in this thesis had the most profound effects 
on European and world politics in this era. I believe this chapter to be the most challenging part of 
the thesis so far, as it deals with a period of incredible economic and technological changes and 
political upheavals. These changes, and the controversies that enmesh historical scholarship on the 
era, to some degree parallel the huge number of efforts and different approaches in the social 
sciences at theorising the dominant phenomena of the age; the rise of social and economic classes, 
the nation-state and the developments in international relations. To address all these contested and 
often conceptually ambiguous themes is impossible considering the scope of this thesis. However, 
few scholars –be it on the left or right of politics- will protest against the claim that ideological 
views on imperialism, extraterritorial violence, the naval arms race and “military-industrial 
complexes” in the industrial age were vital aspects of the changes that occurred. Thus, I believe that 
the connection between my hypothesis of chapter two and the empirical data discussed here will 
form a basis on which to pursue further analytical questions concerning the interplay between 
domestic and international politics. 
Narratives of warfare will not be constructed here, since it is an understatement to claim that the 
wars of the era presented here have been extensively researched. However, there is little doubt that 
the outcome of wars continued to shape international and domestic societies also in this period. 
Thus, codification of state praxis in form of treaties will be of interest in this and the following 
chapter. Second, even if war itself is not analysed here, it is clear that the effects that technologies 
for violence at sea had on western states in this period were astonishing. Efficiency in 
administration, higher levels of taxation and engineering competence were all vital for strategic 
reasons in this period. Furthermore, the strains upon states to achieve the required modernisation 
fostered various changes in domestic politics. As historical sociologists, amongst whom Barrington 
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Moore stands out, have pointed out, which industrial, land-owning and state elites formed alliances, 
had profound effects on the political regimes of the 20th century. But so did the international 
political developments beyond full control of any single state. Industrialisation meant increased 
productivity, but it also meant that the means for organised violence were industrialised.831 This 
happened for all arms of land warfare, at sea, and –ultimately- in the air. At sea, ship construction 
alone in fifty years “turned the ship of the line which Nelson and even Blake would have recognised 
into something akin to the ironclad of modern times”.832 New designs, new propulsion and better 
guns made production costs immensely much higher than in the wooden world. This was a major 
alteration of the dynamics of international relations. Likewise, how (and to what degree) states 
adapted to these changes was to change their societies at large.833 
We will begin this chapter by analysing British Naval power, Britain still being a prime maritime 
state at the end of this epoch. Next, we will look into the particular course of German ambitions for 
maritime influence, before we examine the rise of the US into becoming the major global naval 
power. Finally, the smaller states in our typology from chapter 2 will be analysed.  
 
4.1 From Pax Britannica to a weakened maritime Empire: Britain and the 
International Hierarchy 1856-1945 
After Trafalgar, the majority of the British social and political elite saw the Royal Navy as the 
backbone of the Empire. This meant primarily two things.  
Firstly, the means of extraterritorial power were prioritised beyond dispute.834 It was as if it were 
impossible to question the wisdom of allocating the Navy with the chief task of protecting the 
empire and the Isles, and this in effect meant that British naval policies was set on one single path 
after Nelson’s historic victory; the Royal navy had to be the strongest navy in the world. Thus, even 
well into the 20th century, naval priorities were of chief concern in nearly all matters of British 
foreign policy; in this respect, British nation building was path-dependent with a clear influence on 
British foreign policy. Whatever historians writing in the 21st century will have to say about the 
cost-efficiency of such a mental predisposition, the point is that to the politicians in the Empire, it 
                                                 
831 Reynolds, 1974: 400-402 
832 Kennedy, 1976: 228 
833 Howard, 2001: 124-126 gives an elegant summary. Our ambition here is not to tell the history ofn these changes, 
but highlight both the reasons and consequences of the change in praxis of extraterritorial violence. However, such 
an explanation cannot be given without describing some details of what changes actually took place within state 
navies.  
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was evident that it rested on naval power. Winston Churchill, for example, in “The World 
Crisis”characteristically wrote; 
 
“For consider these ships…All our long history built up century after century, all our great affairs 
in every part of the globe, all the means of livelihood and safety of our faithful, industrious, active 
population depended upon them…The British Empire would dissolve like a dream; each isolated 
community struggling forward by itself; the central power of the union broken; mighty provinces, 
whole empires in themselves, drifting hopelessly out of control, and falling a prey to strangers; and 
Europe after one sudden convulsion passing into the iron grip and rule of the Teuton”.835 
 
While pompous, such rhetoric indeed captured a central facet of that unshakable faith that leading 
politicians had in the role of the navy for the Empire at large.  
Even entering WWI was largely a question put in naval terms for British politicians. While Britain 
had no formal treaty requiring the protection of France in the advent of a German attack, Belgium 
was different. Ever since the 17th Century, Britain would not permit a great power to seize control of 
the Low Countries. In order to keep the Channel coasts out of the hands of a potential opponent, 
Britain had fought Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte! Britain had guaranteed 
Belgian neutrality, and during the war in 1870, Gladstone sought to verify if Bismarck had 
understood British commitment to Belgium, which Bismarck indeed had.836 
Secondly, any -even modest- shortcomings of the Royal Navy were perceived as shocking; often 
provoking public outcry and even war scares.837   
                                                                                                                                                             
834 Naturally, there were heated debates on naval allocations at times. But by the standards of the European balance 
of power, Britain during these one hundred years upheld a strong navy independent of which party formed the 
cabinet. 
835 Cited in Massie, 1991: 788-9 
836 Thus, the army of Moltke the elder did not enter Belgian territory. The general staff of Moltke the younger in 
adopting the Schlieffen plan, however, based the entire attack on France on a march through Belgium. That this 
might provoke an English entry in the war did not worry the chief German generals, since the British expeditionary 
force consisted of only six divisions. This line of reasoning was the basis of Moltke the younger’s words to Tirpitz 
that ”The more English the better”, meaning that if Britain applied her land forces in Belgium, at least it would not 
appear elsewhere. See Massie, 1991: 896. Naturally, a strategic mind so bound up in land warfare ignored the effects 
of extraterritorial power in the advent that the war would be longer than envisaged by the Schlieffen plan (exactly 42 
days to conquer France). 
837 These war scares occurred from time to time after 1856. One of the most dramatic was the one in 1909, when the 
British media helped shape the perception that the Germans were outbuilding the Royal Navy. Thus, a heated debate 
took place in the Balfour cabinet and in Westminster on how many new dreadnoughts Britain could afford to build 
in one year. Churchill later described the result as ”The Admiralty had demanded six ships, the economists offered 
four; and we finally compromised on eight” (Cited in Massie, 1991: 618).  
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This was evident already at the outset of the period covered here. Contrary to common views of 
Britain and the British Empire as the almighty sea power till WWII, the fact is that the Crimean war 
left the British somewhat surprised as of the limitations of the Royal Navy.838 Perhaps this should 
not be seen as a surprise given the long period of absence of major wars after the Napoleonic wars, 
but for a proud maritime power with glorious memories of naval supremacy, the Crimean war was a 
reminder to the British that there are no free lunches in international politics. John Moore reflects 
the same sentiment, claiming that "The Royal navy`s showing at the bombardment of Alexandria in 
July 1882 was woefully incompetent".839 While such operations undoubtedly gave some incentives 
for innovations, Kennedy interprets the course of British sea power until 1900 as one of slow but 
steady relative decline. However, this by now traditional account (notice the similarity to 
Wallerstein) should not make us project the present into the past. One might indeed question to what 
degree British military and political power diminished in the period.840 After all, up till the 1890s 
there seemed to be no probable challengers to British supremacy. Americans were occupied by civil 
war and the demands of the following reconstruction. The German Navy was still negligible, and the 
French navy unimpressive after the defeat to Germany in 1867. The perceptions in Britain changed 
in the 1880s, due to the ambitious Russian and French, but especially the latter’s, fleet programmes, 
and the prospect of a French-Russian entente. The perceived weakness of the Mediterranean fleet, in 
particular, led to the so-called naval defence Act in Parliament in 1889, with its ambitious goal of 
commissioning 10 new battleships and many smaller vessels. In retrospect, it seems rather clear that 
Britain overestimated their potential rivals, witness the outcome of the Russian-Japanese encounter 
in 1904-5, and the weak French performance at Fashoda in 1898.841 The Royal Navy enforced the 
global ambitions of the Empire. Yet, here also lay a problem. Was this a productive or self-defeating 
                                                 
838 Stoll, 1992: 267 interprets the increased British concern with developments in other navies from "around 1860", 
and interprets this as a result of changes in naval technology. 
839 Moore, 1979: 48 
840 In other words, Wallerstein (2000) and historians Cain and Hopkins (2002) lay such stress on the economic 
factors that they are perhaps in danger of neglecting the considerable military power of the Empire. Cain and 
Hopkins, however, see the role of the City, insurance companies and investors as the most important sinews of 
British power. This leads them to the conclusion, contrary to Wallerstein, that British power actually made her the 
only global actor as late as the 1930s. It is probably right to criticise Paul Kennedy for laying too much weight on 
the gradual weakening of British home industry. However, it seems obvious that this had major impact on British 
society as well as the balance of power in the first half of the 20th Century. Lloyd (1993: 38), for example, is quite 
straightforward when emphasising the lack of innovations in British industry as a major drawback in the 
international competition; “From the 1870s…trade in England had been dull… New development was hindered by 
the way that English industrialists turned their backs on the new areas of enterprise and stuck to well-tried old 
favourites, such as railways and textiles, at a time when Germans and Americans were taking more interest in steel, 
chemicals, and the uses of electricity”. In ibid: 58-59, Lloyd buttress his argument with some statistical evidence. 
Besides, as will be demonstrated here, Britain’s share of world trade DID gradually diminish. Partly perhaps, as 
changing the Empire became a necessity out of domestic and international factors. Thus, in Abernethy’s words, 
colonialism could be seen as a self-defeating strategy. 
841 See Lloyd, 1996: 204-206, and in particular 250-251. A colourful account is given in Massie, 1991 
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strategy in the long run? The sum of extraterritorial use of power was expensive and diverging the 
focus of both the army and the Royal Navy. However, the British seemed resolved in their ambitions 
of extending the Empire; “between 1871 and 1900 Britain added four and a quarter million square 
miles and sixty-six million people to her Empire”.842 Thus, even during the scramble for colonies, 
Britain came out on top.843 At the end of the century, Britain still was the “carrier of the world”, and 
London held a firm grip upon the global financial market through the insurance and banking firms in 
the City.844 Mahan’s work inspired navalists in Britain, as elsewhere in the major powers, and in 
Britain to the degree that the perceived connection between sea power and Empire was consolidated.  
However, the geopolitical warnings on future competition sounded by Mackinder, did not produce 
the incentives for a modernisation of British home industry that could have delayed the decline of 
British hegemony. Thus, Wallerstein indicates that the end of British world hegemony should be 
dated to the 1870s.845 Britain partly compensated the German and American commercial 
competition by utilising the lead it had through its Empire, but in the long run, this was hardly a 
substitute for innovation and development. Furthermore, the limits of empire seemed to become 
more pronounced. The efforts at creating a federation out of the empire met with fierce resistance, 
particularly from Canada. In a short perspective, however, the Foreign Office, by giving way in the 
peripheries, managed to focus naval tasks to vital areas in order to best serve the national interest. 
This amounted to an enormous state activity, both in scope and resources, but it was not "war-
making" in the sense that Tilly uses the term. Wallerstein perhaps goes too far in interpreting the 
decline of the British hegemony as an “inevitable” process to a large degree caused by a diminishing 
share of world industrial output. British shipbuilding industries were not hit by recession, and then 
again; sunk costs were immensely valuable to the position of both the Royal navy and the British 
merchant marine. As Paul Kennedy reminds us, “The Royal navy naturally still benefited from its 
control of the many overseas bases, of the superb cable communications system, of the near-
monopoly of good steaming coals, and from the ultimate support which it and the giant merchant 
marine gave to each other”.846  
 
The decline of hegemony, according to both Kennedy and Wallerstein, was an incremental, gradual 
process. Not only the incremental nature of decline, but also the fact that it was a relative 
                                                 
842 Kennedy, 1976: 213. Note that the size of the populace seems uncertain. See also Ferguson, 2002: introduction 
843 Lloyd, 1996: chapter 9 discusses the impulses, controversies and inconsistencies in the ”Victorian Imperial 
Enthusiasm”, which he dates from 1883 till 1899 
844 Lloyd, 1996: 225-6 
845 Wallerstein, 2000: 253-260 
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phenomenon, seemed to form the perception that British maritime power was as strong as ever by 
1914. But the fact is that the period from 1890 till 1914 indeed was an era of “new navalism”; after 
publication of Mahan’s Magnus opus in 1889, ALL the major powers (including Russia and the US) 
built major navies in this period. What is more, efforts to remain a hegemon during a revolution in 
military affairs require that the hegemon spends money, enormous amounts of money, in order to 
keep its position. Building "Castles of Steel" became an organisational and economic challenge to 
the states at this stage with some equivalence to the building of fortresses that could stand more 
advanced artillery centuries earlier. The great revolutions in naval technology in the mid-nineteenth 
century must be said to have been the introductions of steam, the screw propeller, shell guns, rifled 
ordnance and armour.847 This development made for "races" in arms and technology, although the 
scientific studies of such an arms race have yielded divergent results.848 Steam and screw propellers, 
once introduced, rendered traditional ships obsolete. The shell gun of a potential enemy had to be 
met with similar weapons as well as protection of hulls and improved designs. The latter 
development had an especially profound effect upon the production and utilisation of naval 
vessels.849 By 1863, Britain had stopped using wood for ship building entirely.850 The building of 
ironclad ships had been a transitory phase, and the introduction of iron hulls changed ship 
construction to a very significant degree. From now on, naval engineering could produce designs of 
highly diverse types and functions that had previously been impossible. Considering the solid 
industrial base of England in the latter part of the 19th century, the industrialisation of extraterritorial 
violence strengthened British power in the short run, especially compared to France and most other 
second-rate naval powers.  One should also note the advantage of Britain vs. France in the 
technological breakthrough. Britain was in the position to adopt French innovations in naval 
engineering (note the dissimilarity here between the British Empire and the US at present. The latter 
bears the immense costs of research and development on new weapons and –systems to a degree 
unparalleled in modern history). But one should also be cautious to interpret industrial strength as 
the sole basis for extraterritorial power. As we will see later in this chapter, the US would soon beat 
the industrial output of Britain and Germany without fostering the same degree of naval ambitions. 
In steel production, Germany had bypassed Britain by 1910. 
The strategic consequences to a large degree rested upon the new logistical requirements. 
Extraterritorial bases became of vital interest not only as a means to safeguard imperial 
                                                                                                                                                             
846 Kennedy, 1976: 226 
847 See Hobson, 2002: 26-28 
848 See Stoll, 1992: 263-267 for a discussion 
849 See also Brodie, 1940 and van Creveld, 1991 
850 Hobson, 2002: 28 
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administration and trade, but also in order to supply (fuel) and maintain the machined ships. In naval 
tactics, the steam ship had enormous advantages to the sail. Paradoxically, the need to supply fuel 
meant that the steamships gave further incentives for the major powers to possess overseas naval 
bases.851 While expenditure on these bases was high, the introduction of an industrialised navy also 
meant that costs increased in replacement of materiel that all too rapidly became obsolete due to the 
technological race. This trend was obvious during the 1860s, although the developments in the two 
decades prior to WWI were to dwarf this level of expenses. The development of guns and shells was 
an especially important factor in this regard, and as a naval historian has pointed out, navies then 
had to live with “…one of the primary laws of the industrial age – that obsolescence begins at the 
time a design is made, not at the time the equipment is completed for use”852. This was a change that 
affected the state with the pretension of remaining the most powerful naval power in the world. At 
Trafalgar in 1805, for example, Nelson`s flagship had been 40 years old, without being inferior to 
the vessels of the opponent.853 At the end of the 19th century, a 40-year old naval ship would be 
hopelessly outdated.  
Rolf Hobson thus has called the British standing of the latter part of the 19th century as one of 
“relative disadvantage”.854 As technology spread, Hobson argues, Britain repeatedly had to topple its 
competitors. Whether it was an advantage or the opposite to be the leader in the race of 
technological innovations is a controversial theme, more so since the cases of international 
“hegemony” are so few. Richard Stoll, for example, argues contrary to Rolf Hobson on this point, 
stressing that there was a clear advantage for Britian in "…preferring to let other navies innovate, 
and then to use its greatly superior resources (including the ability to build ships more quickly than 
other navies) when other experiments were shown to be successful".855 This corresponds to my 
tentative conclusion above. The fact is, that if we compare the ratio of resources spent on research 
and development to the ability to project sea power at the turn of the century and the following 
decades, Britain was unrivalled in producing efficient ships in a quantity that no one else could 
match. However, a brief look at the effects of the competition gives us a clear picture of what the 
arms- and technology race meant for the British state, in a narrow definition of the state as a 
monopoly of violence and taxation. 
Even this vast empire faced severe challenges in order to finance its extraterritorial means of 
violence. In 1883, Naval expenditure of the British crown totalled 11 million pounds. Twenty-seven 
                                                 
851 Hobson, 2002; 28-30 
852 Ropp, 1987: 58 
853 Lavery, 1983: 101 
854 Hobson, 2002: 32 
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years later, expenditure for the same purposes had risen to an astonishing 40.4 millions!856 To a 
hegemon, even such challenges might seem inevitable; the price for NOT keeping up is the loss of 
an old and familiar world, national pride as well as standards of living, material interests as much as 
the feeling of cultural and political supremacy.857 Technologic development fuelled the rise in 
expenditure, the Dreadnought introduced in 1906 rendering all other first-class battleships in the 
world obsolete.858  
However, the increasingly democratic state had barriers for unlimited militarism, including infinite 
levels of spending. In a modern mass democracy of a society with distinct class-cleavages, attempts 
at genuine domestic economic and social improvements were prerequisites for public support. 
Moreover, the informal empire that Britain had enjoyed in Africa and Asia more or less disappeared 
in the European scramble for colonies. Either the parts of the “informal empire” had to be 
abandoned, or made formal. The Empire “won” more territory than its competitors, but the point is 
that the price was high; forms of direct rule (in various modalities to be sure) became more 
dominant. Ultimately, the perceived need of outbuilding Germany thus made the British government 
seek alternative solutions in two previously vital theatres; A Japanese naval alliance and a Caribbean 
agreement with the United States.859 Clearly, such scaling down of ambitions was a reflection of 
rational calculus. But it also lends evidence to the decline-thesis of British hegemony; that it was a 
process reflecting the increased military and economic competition. One further attempt at 
maintaining British Naval hegemony was to engineer leaps in the technological developments. Thus, 
the Invincible class of battle cruisers was meant to outsmart both cruisers and battleships through 
speed and gunnery. However, the development of effective torpedoes and submarines made 
deployments of large naval vessels increasingly more risky, especially in the littorals and in the 
narrow seas. Alas, the hegemon could not simply escape the geopolitical realities of the 20th century 
by means of naval engineering alone. At the same time, Britain could not escape the logic of a 
competitive international arena where several paternalist states developed into first-class sea powers. 
Each new generation of naval vessels were far better than their predecessors. The result of future 
war to a larger degree than previously was determined by peacetime construction programmes.860 
The gap in naval contruction speed between Britain and Germany seemed to be closing, or so was 
                                                                                                                                                             
855 Stoll, 1992: 268 
856 Kennedy, 1976: 228 
857 Stoll, 1992: 271 
858 Modelski and Thompson, 1988: 76 
859 Hobson, 2002: 35 
860 See van Creveld, 1991 
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the British perception.861 Neither should we be totally blinded by the democratic influence on 
Imperial policy. As always, geographical, but above all cultural, distance mattered a lot in 
determining the modes of control over the various parts of empire. According to British historians 
Cain and Hopkins, British paternalism was given new justification in the last decades of the 19th 
Century by notions of hierarchies of racial classes. Thus, India as a prominent example belonged to 
a type of country  
“…whose spiritual and material improvement were to be entrusted to the paternal direction of 
gentlemanly rulers”.862 
These sentiments, the propaganda in favour of colonialism (from for example A.T. Mahan) and the 
enormous resources devoted to the arms race in the period from 1880 till 1914 shows us that the 
international environment had not changed in the direction of a “democratic peace” or a “culture of 
Kantian anarchy”, as has been described by contemporary philosophers on the post-cold war world-
system. On the contrary, although nationalism had had positive influence in abolishing old regimes 
and fostering a development towards democracy in many Western European countries, the 
international arena was filled with mutual suspicions, fear of preventive wars, a lack of international 
cooperation and information-sharing. Clark Reynolds has described this state of affairs in a way 
worth reiteration; 
 
                                                 
861 Stoll, 1992: 271-272. There have been numerous attempts at quantifying the naval arms race prior to the Great 
War. Many of these have followed in the footsteps of Richardson, whose work was made famous by Antaol 
Rapoport some 50 years later. 
862 Cain and Hopkins, 2002: 285. The same authors (ibid: 293) also note that India attracted an increasing flow of 
investment from London, which lead them to conclude that India was vital for British investments. This is of course 
not the same as portraying British imperialism as wholly damaging to the colony. More substantial, perhaps, is that 
Cain and Hopkins (ibid: 402) sees the traditional explanation of declining British power at the international scene as 
a result of weakening British industrial vitality as unsatisfactory. The two historians see the other major powers 
ambitions as reactions to the dominant position held by the Empire, and notes that none of the competitors managed 
to topple British influence. This undoubtedly adds a nuance to Kennedy and Wallerstein, but it does not refute the 
central argument here; that British POLITICAL ambitions and windows of opportunities were reduced after the 
1880s. Furthermore, and as a comment on the situation after 1914, while Cain and Hopkins (ibid: 405-406) certainly 
are right in warning against the tendency to read the present into the past, even they must admit that a) Britain had to 
compete in a much more hostile international environment after 1900, and b) that the US was a much stronger 
competitor after 1918. This is not to say that British imperialism died after 1914. However, I believe that Cain and 
Hopkins are perhaps a bit too willing to see British imperialism as TOO long-lasted and vital. What is of interest in a 
comparative perspective is the changing nature of the British Empire. Cain and Hopkins seem to agree with my 
central argument; that British paternalism survived well into the 20th century, but on an increasingly fragile material 
basis. Our assessments of British power nevertheless are different. I cannot but disagree when Cain and Hopkins 
(ibid: 407) asserts that “Britain was the only true world power of consequence in the 1930s”. The fragility of their 
assumption is evidenced in the changing balance of extraterritorial power. This is a result of their reliance on an 
almost exclusive emphasis on the economic aspects of power in international relations (“although there were tense 
moments of rivalry, the central battle was between economies” (ibid: 449)) 
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“The days of Pax Britannica came to be numbered as rival powers –no longer content to adhere 
willingly to British rule upon the seas- imitated Britain with their own merchant fleets, colonies and 
navies. These powers made feeble attempts to perpetuate the old international legalism of the 
enlightenment with disarmament conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907 
and with the Declaration of London in 1909, which aimed at protecting neutral shippers in time of 
war. But opposition within Britain itself and elsewhere left the Declaration unratified by any 
nation”.863 
 
In the Eurasian landmass, railway made territorial modes of violence more effective. By railway, 
commerce flourished in new nodes, and most importantly for war making; huge numbers of troops, 
artillery and logistical support could be transported fast and in relatively secure ways to the 
battlefields. To some degree, this changed the challenges to extraterritorial violence applied to the 
European continent. The much-applied British strategy of sending expeditionary forces by sea to 
project power from (often) peripheral positions at the continent was made a lot more risky. The 
continental power could counter such expeditions by rapidly transporting and deploying troops by 
trains. Furthermore, this development meant that it was not only Britain that could send 250000 
soldiers 6000 miles from the motherland (over the ocean), as they did to fight the Boers in 1900. By 
1904, Russia, by means of railway, could fight the Japanese with the same number of troops in 
Manchuria. Industrialisation also meant that mass armies could be equipped and sustained in a more 
efficient way. Thus, the earlier relevance of sea power in the international balance of power was by 
now modified through improved communications by land.864 However, this did not significantly 
reduce the perceived value of sea power and overseas stations. The transition from sail to coal made 
overseas bases and stations to support fleets ever more important to the great powers.  Overseas 
garrisons seemed to grow, due to the increased mobility of most of the major great powers (i.e. 
Russia, Germany, Japan, the US, France). Extraterritorial possessions became ever more costly in 
terms of numbers of troops. With a small professional army engaged largely overseas in the Empire, 
Britain now had few possibilities to influence continental politics by force. Thus the famous remark 
by Bismarck when answering what he would do if the British were to land their army on the German 
coast; “Call out the local police force and have it arrested”.  
                                                 
863 Reynolds, 1974: 401. We will discuss the role of Germany in particular below. 
864 However, we should naturally note that railway had its limitations, too. Moreover, some military historians have 
emphasised that the technologivcal development of navies made them even more decisive in future wars. See 
Hobson, 2002: ch. I for a discussion. 
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Indeed, the historian T. Lloyd argues that the Boer War ended the era of territorial expansion of the 
British Empire.865 The fact that Britain had to send 250000 troops, and was still not able to cash in 
an easy victory, gave second thoughts even to ardent imperialists. The early British setback in the 
war was something of a shock to a nation used to “splendid little wars” in the colonies. Besides, J.A 
Hobson wrote “Imperialism” based on his experiences in South Africa, from which he formed a 
general theory on imperialism that in the words of Lloyd “shaped all subsequent thinking about 
empire”.866 It is an understatement to claim that Hobson’s thesis has been debated, embraced and 
refuted respectively, but it did cause an increased level of uneasiness in Britain as to the logic of 
overseas possessions. It also inspired anti-imperialists in America and a certain character known to 
the world as Lenin. German perceptions were different; in the eyes of the Kaiser, the war 
demonstrated that Germany had to build a substantial ocean-going navy.867 In the short run, the Boer 
war led to some critical British self-examination, and indirectly to social reforms. The performances 
of British soldiers convinced some politicians that “an unhealthy and poverty-afflicted nation was a 
weak nation”.868 However, welfare had to be balanced with warfare. In Britain this meant that 
expenses on pensions and unemployment partly competed with the building and manning of naval 
ships. From 1909 onwards, when the Admiralty claimed that Britain required more battleships in 
order to be able to retain command of the sea, the Cabinets repeatedly found themselves in a 
difficult position. Increased taxation was inevitable when social reform at home and participation in 
a naval arms race at the international level were pursued simultaneously. To some degree, the 
Government found it self squeezed between labour and capital as well, witness the rather bitter 
strikes from 1912 till 1914.869 The two-level game was an increasingly complex one for British 
governments in the 20th century.  
 
Blockade, as a weapon in crises and war, became a somewhat less effective strategy due to the 
railway. For Britain, the prospect that her own sea-lines of communications could be vulnerable to 
an adversary with suitable naval capability, had seemed less credible during the Pax Britannica. Yet, 
the coming age of submarines and the development of airplanes armed with torpedoes would expose 
the inherent weakness of even the state with considerable sea power. These innovations, when added 
                                                 
865 Lloyd, 1996: 253-255 
866 Lloyd, 1996: 257 
867 Moore, 1979: 54 
868 Lloyd, 1993: 15 
869 Lloyd, 1993: 47-50 
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to the industrialisation of British society and its huge increase in population,870 made Britain much 
more vulnerable. One should nevertheless avoid the conclusion that British decline was inevitable; 
Britain and its Empire indeed was the most powerful military and political unit in the world. In some 
respects, it was also highly technologically advanced and held the lead in communications. An 
enormous reduction of time-space was made possible through her imperial cable communications 
network. By this asset, Britain was able to reduce transaction costs by exchanging information faster 
and more reliably than anyone else. This had obvious economic, strategic and military advantages. 
Nor was the quantitative strength of the Royal Navy an inaccurate measure of her strength; it was 
paralleled by quality of men and materiel, compared to her competitors. The French learned this in 
1898, when Britain was willing to wage war over the Upper Nile, making Kaiser Wilhelm comment, 
“The poor French...They have not read their Mahan!”871 In retrospect, it may seem tempting to see 
a clear (relative) decline of British maritime strength from 1883 till 1900, as Paul Kennedy has 
argued strongly. However, the observation given above, that only an enemy alliance of major sea 
powers (thereby creating a possible equilibrium of forces) could threaten Britain, seems sound.872 
The difference by 1900 was that Britain certainly could not fight alone against an alliance of major 
powers; while the number of British battleships in 1883 almost equalled the total of all the other sea 
powers; by 1897 the numbers were 62 (GBR) against 96 (others).873 This alteration of material 
extraterritorial power contributed to the end of the foreign policy of “splendid isolation”. Indeed, 
judged by political influence, it even ended Pax Britannica. Already in 1901, the First Lord, 
Selborne, in practise argued that Britain simply had to accept that it no longer could go alone in 
international relations. At this point, Germany, Russia and Japan, and an international liberalist, the 
US; all were major sea powers. The era of an international order (although weakly institutionalized) 
to a large degree upheld by a single maritime hegemon, was about to end. The end of Pax Britannica 
was a result, more than any of the other contributing forces, of an increase in maritime incentives 
and power on behalf of states that sought extraterritorial possessions, expanded markets and 
prestige.  
The afterthought that the shifts in balance of power brought to British decision-makers, were vital 
for the coming pattern of alliances. A fascinating question, for example, is why the relationship 
                                                 
870 Less and less of the food consumed in Britain was produced domestically. Likewise, raw materials naturally had 
to be imported to a very substantial degree from other countries and from other parts of the Empire. To an island 
nation, this had especially drastic consequences. By 1913, denmark was Britain`s food supplier. One should also 
note how important this was for the exporting countries (Argentine, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, to mention a 
few). By 1900, 60% of all Danish exports went to Britain. This is but one indicator how smaller Nordic states were 
dependent upon the crumbling hegemon. See Cain and Hopkina, 2002: 206 
871 Kennedy, 1976: 245 
872 See Kennedy, 1976: 245-249 for a discussion and comparative data, confer also Reynolds, 1974: ch. 13 
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between Britain and the USA (paternalism-liberalism) did not turn into open enmity, while Germany 
became the enemy of both. We will return to the German and US positions, but in the case of Britain, 
it seems clear that a number of considerations pointed towards the evolution of a relatively benign 
relationship with the US.  
Strategically, Canada would be difficult, not to say impossible to defend. In addition, the US war 
against Spain created enthusiasm for naval power to a degree not paralleled in the previous history 
of the republic. By 1905, the US had twelve modern battleships and was building another twelve.  
For Britain, given her interests in its adjacent waters, in Europe and in parts of the Empire in the 
southern hemisphere, projecting power against North America by now seemed impossible and 
undesired.874  
Financially, a major conflict between the US and Britain would be a disaster for both sides. British 
Admiral Philip Colomb indeed had argued this already in 1880. The trade competition had made 
Britain immensely dependent upon imports not only of raw materials, but on food supplies as well. 
Colomb concluded in 1881 that war with the USA had become a “practical impossibility”.875  
Politically, British decision-makers increasingly began to see the USA as a potential ally once they 
acknowledged the limits of British global power. And finally, culturally (if not exactly 
ideologically), the two Anglo-Saxon powers had more in common than they had with any of the 
other major powers. Thus, for the differences at the ideological level, the potential for painting 
reciprocal pictures of the other Anglo-Saxon power as an enemy, was limited. The outcome was an 
effort at graceful withdrawal, avoidance of a (so it was thought) war it probably would not win, and 
in the process, hopefully, winning the lasting friendship of a new major power.876  
This policy of "appeasement", evidenced over the canal question and the Alaskan boundary, faced 
with American expansion, was in fact not resented in Britain. Both the Foreign Office and the 
Admiralty were pro-American and eager to get rid of a political and strategic inheritance that to 
some degree was seen as somewhat embarrassing or improper applied to the northern hemisphere.  
British perceptions of Germany were different. Increasingly, perceptions among the British elite of 
paternalist Germany changed for the worse. While the Admiralty did not produce war plans for a 
potential outbreak of hostilities with the US, such courses of action seemed more likely in the Far 
East, where the commercial interests of the Empire were perceived to be threatened by France, 
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Germany and Russia. To preserve the “independence” of China seemed futile faced with landwards 
expansion from Russia via Siberia, and from France via Indo-China. Even more disturbing to the 
British identity was that the balance of naval power in this region had swung decisively in favour of 
the Franco-Russian alliance. Again, the Admiralty actually contemplated alliance with a major sea 
power in the region, resulting in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, signed 30 January 1902.877 However, 
the British Government saw the applicability of the alliance as strictly limited to the East. In other 
words, it was not designed in order to counter Germany and be able to give support to the French in 
Europe, a development that came later. Also in contrast to later wars of propaganda, the scaling 
down of British ambitions was not made into major domestic issues. Nevertheless, it was evident to 
British decision-makers that German naval ambitions would accentuate the imperative to pay closer 
attention to European waters if Germany would become a "threat" to the national security of the 
isles.  
In particular, as we will see later, the Tirpitz idea from 1897 that Germany only could achieve her 
genuine political freedom by creating a force of battleships stationed in the North Sea, was deemed 
with some anxiety in the British Admiralty. The Admiralty raised the first warning in the Cabinet of 
the possibility that German naval ambitions could be aimed at Britain, in 1902.878 To uphold global, 
imperial ambitions, to counter US and Franco-Russian influence and an arms-race with Germany 
simultaneously was too much; the time had come for prioritising, witness the British military 
transformation from 1907.879 The new naval base in the Firth of Forth and the increase of the Home 
Fleet were generally perceived as responses to the German naval build-up. Under Fisher, 
furthermore, the Royal Navy was drastically transformed. It was a naval revision based on one sole 
strategic imperative; strength in home waters. The Japanese 1905 victory only made the withdrawal 
of five battleships from the Far East to the Channel Fleet seem even more sensible. The general 
argument in favour of a new disposition was given already in the so-called Cawdor memorandum 
from 1905;“…The kaleidoscopic nature of international relations, as well as the variations or new 
developments in Sea power, not only forbids any permanent allocation of numbers, but in fact points 
the necessity for periodic redistribution of ships between our fleets to meet the political 
requirements of the moment”880 
The re-organisation simply reflected a new perception of the balance of power, much to the 
dissatisfaction of local naval officers and the dominions. This criticism eventually led to the 
                                                 
877 Kennedy, 1976: 253. See also Moore, 1979: 72-75 for the impact this alliance had in the US. 
878 Kennedy, 1976: 255 
879 Moore, 1979: 59-61 
880 Cited in Kennedy, 1976: 260 
  
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945 
 
 
            
 
 
 
241
Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, followed by “national” navies of territories like Australia. 
More spectacular still was that the abandonment of less useful ships made the new Dreadnought 
class possible. With its strength, firepower and speed, it more or less made all other battleships 
obsolete.881 In addition, the Anglo-French entente was improved in the years following the first 
Moroccan crisis. Eventually, this (together with Tirpitz`s supplementary Naval Law of 1912) would 
allow for an even more concentrated naval defence of British “home waters”. Not only German, but 
also Italian naval ambitions and the creation of an Austro-Hungarian navy of Dreadnought 
battleships were used to justify this policy. This also led to the naval agreement between Britain and 
France, which facilitated British interests in the Mediterranean. Thus, the Admiralty ultimately 
withdrew all but a few battleships stationed at Malta from the Mediterranean to the home fleet. Part 
of the agreement was that the Royal Navy should protect both sides of the Channel. Although 
British politicians later could claim that this was not a legal obligation to protect France, it 
nevertheless was seen as a moral duty to help protect her northern coastline by 1914. Indeed, Grey 
warned already in 1906 that British opinion could make it impossible for Britain to stay neutral in 
the case of a Franco-German war. Still, one should not underestimate the delicate balance facing 
British cabinets trying to make ends meet in budgetary terms, gain domestic support for policy, and 
simultaneously assessing and acting on the international scene. The Naval Arms race and the 
perceived costs due to technological improvements gravely influenced British politics. The belief 
that the Empire rested on the Royal Navy seemed ingrained in the British national character to a 
degree that made even slight naval improvements in other countries seem threatening. From 1909 
and onwards, the Liberals saw no other alternatives than introducing higher taxation. The 
constitutional crisis of 1909-11 was a result of this.882 What naval priorities really mattered in 
British domestic politics by 1912, however, was the reduced presence in the Mediterranean. Yet the 
withdrawal of vessels from the Mediterranean was also facilitated by another move in the 
relationship between France and Britain. Although no formal treaty was signed, France in effect 
transferred its fleet to the Mediterranean the same year (see above). Had it not been for German 
ambitions, Britain could have prioritised differently. But, alas, this remains a counterfactual 
hypothesis. Facts were that the Royal Navy and the means to secure extraterritorial sovereignty 
ended up where they had emerged centuries earlier, as a result of German ambitions. Churchill 
stated it flatly to the English Parliament that Britain was building ships against one power alone; 
Germany.883 Thus, in spite of a Royal navy unprecedented in strength, all –or practically all- efforts 
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were centred on the, in Paul Kennedy’s words, expected Armageddon in the North Sea.884 The 
Nemesis of Tirpitz was that he had never expected that Britain would temporarily “abandon” her 
overseas interests in such a way. Thus, the British isolation from the continent was also abandoned. 
To see another European power threaten the maritime hegemony would ensure that Britain would 
live at the mercy of a not necessarily benign competitor. Being an open economy and an island 
territory, this could imply a threat to the survival of the isles, or so at least Britons perceived it.885 
Perceptions both on international relations and individual states mattered. As we will see in 5.2, 
German leaders in no way wanted a war with Britain. What they underestimate was the way in 
which Britons evaluated extraterritorial power. Britain reacted decisively and perhaps in an 
exaggerated manner against any attempts by a major European power to create another formidable 
seapower in Europe, but sher acted true to her foreign policy habitus. 
In sum, the period from 1856 till 1914 did not only signal vast organisational and technological 
changes in extraterritorial violence. In this respect, the most significant changes of them all occurred 
between 1897/98 and 1914, but the main change at the international level was that Pax Britannica 
had ceased to exist by 1914. This was a result of the steady relative decline of the British maritime 
and economic hegemony at the international arena.  
Indeed, the dominant picture of WW I is that of trench warfare, where new machines and modes of 
violence, increased strategic mobility and efficient munitions were the crucial factors in the 
destruction of millions of young lives.886 The conscription of a generation of men and the economic 
strain on the British state in order to wage war was a dramatic shift from the 19th century British 
foreign policy. Britain perceived a German domination of North-western Europe as unbearable. The 
Royal Navy made dispositions in order to fight an enormous “New Trafalgar”, presumably in the 
North Sea, where it was confident that it would defeat the German main fleet. In addition, the Navy 
was convinced that it would apply blockade and commercial warfare against Germany in order to 
cripple Germany’s will and ability to fight. Again, history was applied to conjure up how a future 
war should be fought. Except from some success at blockade, the other two calculations simply did 
not materialise. Geographical factors greatly contributed to the only partly successful blockade 
strategy. For Britain, the war could only be won at the battlefield, but it had to be secured on the 
oceans. Germany was never able to break British dominance in the crucial sea lines of 
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communications in Western Europe (although it was close in 1917, but ironically by means of the 
U-boat, a weapon that traditionalist European naval officers a few years earlier had dismissed 
entirely). Germany could never gain superiority neither numerically nor in firepower against the 
strategy applied by the Admiralty. The balance tilted even more in favour of the Royal navy during 
the war. Thus, Britain could apply a defensive position and apply the old weapon of (at this stage 
distant) blockade against Germany while simultaneously protecting her trade with the dominions. 
Germany would lose either she chose an offensive (which she by all calculations was likely to lose), 
or a defensive (in which her fleet could be preserved, while her economy was badly damaged). Both 
actors played according to the mini-max strategy envisaged in game theory; a stalemate was the 
conclusion. For British naval officers and opinion, this defensive position was hard to swallow, but 
the new technologies of submarines and improved mines made the calculations seem right (causing 
indignation by conservative Britons, to whom this invention seemed a total breach with Nelsonian 
tactics). On the u-boat, Admiral Wilson declared that it was “underhand, unfair, and damned 
unEnglish”887. In fact, the perceived threat from German u-boats made the Royal navy even more 
careful during the war. The Battle of Jutland thus was the only full-scale fleet encounter of the war, 
which only outcome (in strategic terms) was to confirm the naval stalemate in northern waters.  
The really significant change in the logic of extraterritorial means of violence during WW I was the 
use of submarines aimed at the sea lines of communications, deeply threatening supplies from 
overseas. One should note, however, that both the fear of making the US enter the war as well as 
moral qualms made the German leadership hesitate for years before conducting “unrestricted”888 
submarine warfare. The British response ultimately was the old defensive weapon of convoying. But 
an astonishing eight millions tons of merchant shipping had been lost due to u-boats at the end of the 
war.889 This primarily had two intimately interconnected consequences. 
Firstly, the British merchant navy was dealt a severe blow, from which it would take immense 
resources to recover, which in itself meant a weakening of British maritime power. Included in the 
equation one should add the severe financial and industrial losses to the Empire. The modern war of 
attrition did simply not produce a boost in the economy, as had the Napoleonic wars. Indeed, the 
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loss of a young generation hurt Britain as it hurt the other major European powers. But in terms of 
assessing candidates for maritime hegemony, the most apt comparison is that between Britain and 
the US. The USA appeared in a much more healthy condition after the war than any of the European 
major states. In this respect, the difference between 1914 and 1918 is astonishing. 
Secondly, it became clear that British naval mastery would NEVER regain strength similar to earlier 
times. Since the required number of merchant ships and convoys was so high, Britain would never 
again be able to protect overseas transports alone at a sufficient level; she could simply not produce 
the required number of destroyers. Only the new industrial giant, the US, could replace destroyers 
and merchantmen fast enough to do so. The industrial and financial strain on Britain resulting from 
the war effort was unprecedented. We have previously mentioned that even after the naval arms race 
had begun, allocations for the Royal Navy amounted to less than 40 million pounds per year by 
1910. In the two last years of WWI, however, Britain spent the same sum of money continually in 
less than six days throughout the rest of the war. By 1917, the total British expenditure on the war 
was seven million pounds PER DAY! Naturally, an increase in taxes (and an increase there certainly 
was) could never sustain this effort alone. The result was that the British National Debt increased 
from 650 million pounds in 1914 to 7435 million pounds by 1920!890  Simultaneously, replacing lost 
u-boats was comparatively speaking much easier, as indeed demonstrated by Germany during the 
war. To some extent, then, both Germany and her main adversary had underestimated the role of the 
u-boats. On the other hand, the surrender of the German High Sea Fleet in November 1918 did not 
feel like a clear victory to the Royal Navy.891 For patriotic Britons, the naval war of 1914-1918 
seemed something of an anticlimax. Sinking the German U-boats at Scapa Flow could not hinder 
that the Royal Navy had lost prestige (in particular the large battleships), and that prospects for a 
war in the future would have to include new modalities for protecting sea-lines of communication.  
On the other hand, the weapon of blockade against German supplies had proven less efficient than 
British staff officers had assumed prior to the war. Germany was not an island. Only 20 per cent of 
her exports were extra-European. The loss of 6-8 per cent of her national income was not a total 
disaster, especially when the central powers could take in possession vast resources in Central and 
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Eastern Europe (For example Rumanian wheat and oil).892 Here, again, the vitality of railway 
transportation had changed the strategic environment somewhat since the Napoleonic wars.893 
Furthermore, one German lesson was that the breakdown in Russia made Ukrainian goods available 
in Central Europe, thus relieving Austria and Germany. Controlling the “heartland”, as described by 
Mackinder, was just as vital as controlling the sea-lanes to the continental powers. Only in the 
Mediterranean did the Royal Navy apply the offensive with success. This strengthened the British 
hold on Egypt and the Suez Canal, but it also tied up as many as 750000 Empire troops.894 
Furthermore, it did not alter the gloomy psychological effects of the war, perhaps one of the main 
lasting effects of WW I, and one that would influence British foreign policy for decades. What is 
more, by 1918 the US had taken over several of the traditional British markets, and had replaced 
Britain as the most significant creditor nation on the globe. In addition, the strategic position of the 
Empire had been drastically altered in 20 years: Britain came out of the war much more dependent 
upon her allies, mainly the US, and for a period, Japan. Thus, Britain’s position partly rested on the 
attitudes of the political leadership in these allied countries. In the short run (to which we will 
return), there were definite limits as to the US sympathy for the Empire. Thus, the incredible US 
naval build-up came at the worst possible time for Britain; when her debt was enormous and her 
fleet had already come to be seen as technically outdated. In the words of Liddell Hart, victory in the 
true sense means that one emerges from the war in a better position than one held at the outset. By 
this definition, Britain had no true victory in 1918. In the longer run, this naturally had implications 
for the Empire; if Britain no longer was superior at extraterritorial power-projection, how could 
London assume the chief responsibility for Imperial foreign policy? Indeed, the very concept of the 
Empire was changed by the international equilibrium following WW I. While the victorious 
determined that Germany was to lose all her colonies after the war, it did not seem “proper” that 
these were to be annexed by the Allies. Thus followed the principle that these areas were to be held 
“under mandates from the League of Nations, and that countries administering them should be 
responsible to the League”.895 Formal imperialism was not compatible with the ideology of the 
liberalist US. While historians Cain and Hopkins argue that the mandates held by Britain were 
“colonies in camouflage”896, thus circumventing US principles, this nevertheless does not refute the 
argument of a changing nature of imperialism. Indirect rule became the preferred mode of control, 
India serving as an experience. Furthermore, what remained of the British Empire (which was by 
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now increasingly called the Commonwealth) also changed on the crucial centre-periphery dimension 
within the Empire. The Dominions gained increased leverage in their relationship to London. One 
example of this was the fact that mandates given the Empire were to be administered by 
dominions.897 Thus, Australia was given parts of New Guinea, New Zealand was handed Samoa, 
and South Africa German South-West Africa. Secondly, there had been an upsurge of nationalism in 
the dominions, accompanied by the lessened economic and industrial dependency on England. The 
international institution of the League of Nations, however fragile, gave legitimacy to the claim that 
dominions were entities -  polities, on their own. Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and 
India (though not a self-governed territorial state) all became members of the League of Nations. 
Ultimately, domestic changes in Britain itself accounted for the more wary approach to outright 
imperialism. Almost complete adult suffrage raised barriers to imperial policies. Democracy was not 
compatible with formal imperialism. The twin processes of domestic democratic development and 
attempts at civilising the relations between states at the international level made compromise a 
necessity in the British Empire; witness the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921. The 
paternalist sentiment in British foreign policy nevertheless survived through the notion of 
trusteeship. As Cain and Hopkins observe; 
 
“…By claiming to promote both progress and conservation, Britain’s version of trusteeship offered 
a vision of an international system which could compete with the appeal of Bolshevism and fascism. 
Although the world order envisaged by the British was neither democratic nor populist, the script 
for the civilising mission emphasised the merits of a multi-ethnic enterprise united in its diversity by 
long chains of loyalty which led ultimately to the imperial monarch”.898 
 
In the immediate perspective, the Empire was extended; witness the mandates for Palestine, Iraq and 
Transjordan. With this extension, however, seeds of trouble were planted within the empire that was 
to become troublesome to cope with for London later in the century.899 
Nevertheless, the economic situation following the war, the defeat of Germany and the absence of 
enemies meant that the Royal Navy was scaled down in the 1920s. Furthermore, the economy was 
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not really recovering to pre-war standards in the interwar years. Britain’s share of world trade fell 
from 14.15 per cent in 1914 to 9.8 per cent in 1937.900 The downward trend was somewhat masked 
by increased domestic consumption and preference for trade within the still existing Empire, as well 
as exports to smaller countries dependent on British manufacture. Alas, this only postponed the 
industrial and financial re-structuring that Britain needed badly. The actual naval allocations shrunk 
from 356 million pounds in 1918-19 till 52 million pounds in 1923.901 This meant that the British 
version of a paternalist policy of mare clausum, often dressed in the rhetoric of free-trade liberalism, 
did not influence the world scene to anything resembling the degree Pax Britannica had.902 The US 
did little to conceal its demands for the freedom of the seas in the negotiations after the war. Thus, 
changes in the balance of power meant that the international institutions of maritime sovereignty 
were also altered since the dominant maritime nation simply had other principles and preferences. 
This was evidenced in the Washington Conference for naval disarmament, whose main architect was 
President Harding, under pressure from his domestic economy-minded circles. The outcome of the 
Conference initiated by the international liberalist was a 10-year stop in all naval building programs, 
and definite limits to the total size of state navies. The main target for the Americans (Germany’s 
Navy already having been crippled), was the alliance between paternalist Britons and Japan. In 
practise, the outcome was a Treaty between The US, Britain, France and Japan to respect the 
possessions of each state in the pacific and the Far East, plus some provisions on the forbidding of 
fortifications in these theatres. This treaty demonstrated the degree to which Britain was dethroned 
from the role of being the maritime hegemon. The US more or less imposed its will.903 In spite of 
fierce protests from the British Admiralty, the British government simply accepted the terms. Paul 
Kennedy904 ascribes this new British flexibility to several factors. Partly it was a matter of domestic 
reluctance to navalism, in part it resulted from the pressure on the economy, and partly the 
dominions (Canada and South Africa in particular) pressed for as smooth relations with the US as 
possible. Above all, Britain could no longer compete for Naval superiority. Neither materially nor 
ideologically did the US make for a suitable rival in an arms race. One thing, or so argued British 
politicians, had been to extract tremendous resources from the Isles and the Empire in order to 
defeat Germany. To extract even more resources from society in order to compete with the US 
would be quite another matter. In a period of relative tranquillity, the main naval disputes at the 
international scene were the disagreements between the international liberalist and the major 
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paternalist. And US policy was consistent towards Britain; at the 1930 London Naval Conference, 
the British Labour Government accepted the American demand that Britain build no more than a 
total of fifty cruisers.905  
                                 In the field of military technology, the most spectacular novelty was perceived 
to be air power. How, and to what extent, the use of airplanes as platforms would affect strategy 
remained a controversial issue throughout the interwar period. For navalists, it also meant another 
service to compete with for resources in peacetime (The Royal Air Force came into being as an 
independent service by 1918), and a competing means in the pursuit of strategic ends. Firstly, the 
advent of airplanes armed with bombs and torpedoes could be seen as rendering battleships highly 
vulnerable, if not useless (an extreme stance, of course). Secondly, air power was advocated as a 
strategic deterrent. In this respect, air power came to be seen as the new extraterritorial means of 
violence. Instead of costly amphibious operations and expeditionary corpses to the continent, Britain 
through air power, or so it was thought, could strike at the heart of enemy motherlands. This would 
save British soldiers from dying in trench warfare, it would save money, and it had the potential of 
swift action – a characteristic that would also increase the value of it as a deterrent. At the very least, 
one must admit that the prospects for breakthroughs in military technology made politicians 
postpone decisions on modernisation out of fear that progress might render new platforms obsolete 
before they could be put to use. Only in 1932 was a process of reassessment under way. By then the 
Empire “had lost its muscle”.906 The Royal Navy was a latecomer when it came to one of the novel 
machines of extraterritorial power-projection; the aircraft carrier. The British policy of appeasement 
in foreign policy was thus not only a result of wishful thinking and horror at the prospect of war 
with Germany; it was also a bid for time. The Japanese seizure of Manchuria and the Italian war in 
Abyssinia only worsened Britain’s strategic position.907 The difference from the policies of 1902-7 
was that the adversaries this time was even less prone at signing treaties or agreements acceptable to 
Britain. Besides, as Paul Kennedy has pointed out; “At the same time, Britain’s only potential allies 
remained a decaying France, together with New Zealand and possibly Australia; even Canada and 
South Africa were uncertain friends by the time of Munich”.908  
The Royal Navy was overstretched even in European and Atlantic waters. Worse still, even the 
maritime threat posed by Germany and Italy in these regions seemed no graver than the threat posed 
by the enormous Japanese build-up. The entire Royal navy, if concentrated, would in fact have an 
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enormous challenge in encountering the fleet of Japan in battle.909  Moreover, sea and air power at 
this point had become interconnected.  
 
And the rest is history. So many libraries are crammed with books on WW II and the naval struggles 
involved, that an attempt at repeating or synthesising these dramatic processes seems unnecessary. 
Constitutionally, it was a fight over which regimes modern states ought to have. Materially, it 
weakened the states of Western Europe, and made the US comparatively much stronger. As for the 
former, Philip Bobbitt to some degree is right that the question remained unsettled till the break-up 
of the USSR in 1990.910 Concerning the latter, however, an unintended consequence of WWII 
undoubtedly was US hegemony in the non-communist world, laying the foundations for a post-1990 
Pax Americana. We will return to this in the next chapter, but we should summarise quite briefly the 
main implications of WW II for Britain.  
Firstly, although the extraterritorial power and pride of Britain emerged as, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively speaking, magnificent in 1945, the enormous machinery of the new western hegemon 
dwarfed the military power of Britain. By 1945, it was an understatement to conclude that the 
British Empire never again would become equal to the US, unless the latter in some mysterious way 
should disintegrate or be defeated in a total war. The fact is that British sea power helped the allied 
win the war by keeping the sea lines of communication open, yet this very contribution was a 
defensive one. The days were gone when the Royal Navy could claim command of the sea.911 
Moreover, any use of fleets overseas in crisis and war now would require substantial aerial support, 
evidenced by the operations in Crete and Norway. During the invasion in 1944 -operation Overlord- 
air superiority was vital, tactical support to the ground was decisive, and the destruction of 
communication facilities by bombers much more significant than what the Navy could contribute. 
What is more, aircraft could, through the use of torpedoes and bombs, be a cost-effective weapon 
against both convoys and regular battleships. The aircraft carrier was a new platform, but it was a 
platform designed for air power. On the other hand, scholars of sea power will not hesitate in 
arguing that such platforms, and even any amphibious landing, are doomed unless one has sea 
control. It thus follows that the almost invisible role of sea power is as vital as ever. Thus, a kind of 
hybrid form of warfare had developed that changed the outlook of extraterritorial violence. Britain 
                                                                                                                                                             
908 Kennedy, 1976: 345 
909 Kennedy, 1976: 347 
910 Bobbitt, 2002. His insight that the Thirty years War only in retrospect seems like ONE war, is of course to the 
point. There is some inclination towards teleology and determinism in his general account, however insightful his 
tour de force of world history undoubtedly is.  
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was not the leader in this kind of warfare, and the costs associated with large carrier groups would 
ensure that even major powers would have limited possibilities to build and man such large 
platforms with all their required material and manpower.  
Secondly, the material basis of the Empire as the dominant power in the world was shattered. Thus, 
according to Paul Kennedy;“In the second quarter of 1942 American military output caught up with 
the British; by the end of 1943, her production of aircraft was double, her launchings of merchant 
vessels six times, that of Britain; and by 1944 her overall armaments production was six times as 
large912” 
Only the US had the industrial and scientific capacity to develop the ultimate weapon that came out 
of WWII. Even more impressive; the US war efforts never strained her finances as was the case with 
Britain and Germany. By 1943, 63 per cent of the German GNP was military expenditure, the 
British figures corresponded to this, while US figures never rose above 43 per cent. It is true that the 
US had to fight a bitter war in the Pacific. But it is also true that the US motherland came out with 
an undamaged (in many ways improved) infrastructure, a superior economic position in the world-
system, and the ability to utilise the “fire of the gods” to use Kissinger`s words; The Bomb. On the 
financial side, the war struck Britain decisively. Already by the end of 1940, munitions orders to the 
US totalled 10.000 million dollars. The terrible financial situation made the Congress pass the Lend-
Lease act in 1941. This was seen as a grandiose act when it came, but some sixty years later it is 
open to a more critical assessment, to be sure. Firstly, the act was seen as an effort to secure 
America. Economically and strategically, the fall of Britain would have been a catastrophe for the 
US. Secondly, the USA set the conditions for the help. This primarily meant that Washington 
controlled the gold and dollar reserves of Britain. It also meant that the US practically did not import 
any British-made products. In the words of historian A.J.P Taylor, Britain sacrificed her post-war 
future for the sake of the world913. This is a benign interpretation of the sacrifice of Britain. The 
governments of both states had few viable alternatives, given their position. There is no reason to 
doubt that the relative strength of both polities was highly affected by the agreement. But that a 
favourable outcome for the US was not the primary intended consequence of the Roosevelt 
administration. Rather, it was a compromise between the “internationalist” and “isolationist” camps 
in the US at the time. To contemporary critics of “imperial USA”, it might be useful to remind of the 
fierce resistance the Lend lease agreement met among isolationist Americans. David Kennedy has 
done much to illuminate this resistance; “Roosevelt’s onetime progressive ally Montana senator 
                                                                                                                                                             
911 Reynolds, 1974: 542, 545-547 aptly illustrates this. 
912 Kennedy, 1976: 369 
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Burton Wheeler, now the implacable adversary in foreign policy, charged that the Lend-Lease 
legislation was the New Deals “Triple-A foreign policy: it will plough under every fourth American 
boy”.914 
To counter the criticism from the isolationist camp, Roosevelt sought a design that would lead to the 
perceived conclusion that Britain had expanded all its dollar reserves before receiving American 
aid.915 Even so, the isolationists had the strength to attach a series of amendments to the Lend-Lease 
bill. 
Thirdly, and intimately linked to the argument directly above, the US in effect undid the logic of the 
British Empire that had prevailed until WW II. In spite of all other portraits of F.D. Roosevelt and 
his administration, this is the brute fact. This was evidenced in the long-term policies that were 
being planned in Washington (see below). The US simply wished to break up the trading blocs that 
had hampered her exports. She wanted to gain access to raw materials around the globe; in one 
single phrase – she wanted international liberalism. And fundamentally, this sort of liberalism was 
American. But hegemony must be secured and codified through agreements. In practise, this meant 
terminating the Sterling Bloc and the systems of imperial preference established in 1932. Most 
significant of all to US policymakers, the entire system of European colonies should be demolished. 
This was in line, of course, with the ideology of international liberalism. It was also expedient for 
American economic hegemony. In the words of Paul Kennedy, this meant that the US demanded 
 
“a full freedom for their own firms to secure the oil of the Middle East, the rubber and tin of 
Malaya, and the markets of India and the colonies – at the same time ensuring that American raw 
materials, tariffs and spheres of influence (especially Latin America) would not be tampered with by 
the allies from whom she was demanding so much. Hence the constant insistence, in the Atlantic 
Charter, the 1942 Lend Lease agreement and elsewhere, upon “access to the trade and raw 
materials of the world”, the frequent collisions with London over control of the oilfields of the Gulf 
                                                                                                                                                             
913 Taylor, 1965: 513-514 
914 David Kennedy, 1999: 472-473.  
915 As David Kennedy (ibid: 466) notes, ”It was no easy thing for Americans accustomed to thinking of Britain as 
the saggering master of a global empire now to believe the assertions of British bankruptcy”. FDR in a meeting with 
American journalists on December 17 1940 applied a simplistic metaphor to convince the public opinion of the 
moral obligation to help Britain ”If a neighbor`s house was on fire and he needed your garden hose to put it out, you 
would`nt haggle about the prize; you would loan him the hose, and he would return it when the blaze was 
extinguished” (ibid: 468). At this point, FDR was also explicit in stating that the US expected a refund from britain 
after the war. 
            
 4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945
 
 
 
           
 
 
252 
states, Saudi Arabia and Iran; the efforts to control the size of the sterling balances by reducing 
lend-lease supplies; and the plan for an American-dominated International Banking Fund”916 
 
In turn, the weakened economic position of paternalist Britain would make her less able to resist the 
new rules of the game imposed by the new hegemon after the war. All these principles were to have 
specific bearings on ocean politics and international institutions concerning maritime matters. For 
Britain, these norms and the loosening of bonds between territories of the Empire as a result of the 
war, in effect meant that it was assumed to behave differently.917 By 1945, the traditional Imperial 
Idea was definitely dead. This was a remarkable alteration of international politics that to some 
degree has been downplayed in IR literature.918 Involved in the process of changing the relationship 
between big powers and small states in the world-system obviously were the ideas envisaged in the 
League of Nations and later, the United Nations (we will return to the latter). It is also quite clear 
that these ideas primarily came from, and was defended by the US. To claim that the USA had an 
interest in forging these institutions is not denying that American Idealism actually changed 
international relations and the constitution of polities. But this also had profound consequences for 
nearly all other polities. Indeed, new polities were created out of the dismantling of the empires in 
the wake of WWI. Although Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire are not examined here, it is 
almost impossible to over-estimate the domestic and international effects of the altering of ideational 
principles in the western world. These changes have been described and explained in detail 
elsewhere, so that only a brief summary is sufficient to underline the argument above. The Balfour 
declaration of 1926 formally established the “equality of the members of the Commonwealth”.919 
But this was not primarily a result of Britain wanting to tie the dominions as close as possible to the 
Commonwealth. On the contrary, it seems fair to claim, as historian T.O. Lloyd does, that it was a 
result of the desires of the dominions to define their positions in constitutional terms, to codify their 
new international status. This process was carried further by the revised Statue of Westminster in 
1931 where, for all practical purposes, Dominion parliaments were given as much control “over 
                                                 
916 Kennedy, 1976: 374. 
917 This is not to claim that nationalism in the colonies and dominions was a novel feature in 1945. Lloyd, 1996: 
230-236, for example, shows how Indian nationalism gained momentum from the 1880s.  
918 Again, this might due to the way established IR theories have narrowed the empirical study of state relations. To 
neorealists, the system was and remains to be anarchic, to neoliberal institutionalists, international relations more or 
less continued to be seen as structured through international regimes. See Wæver, 1999: 47-88 and Wæver, 1992 
919 Lloyd, 1996:293. The United Kingdom and the Dominions were ”autonomous communities within the British 
Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, 
though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations” (Quoted in Lloyd, 1996: 299 
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their own constitutions as they wanted to take”.920 Until 1945, however, large parts of the Empire, as 
India, were still under tight British control. By 1950, these territories too, were well on the path to 
national independence; exit extraterritorial possessions of a distant motherland. WW II had 
accelerated the tendencies already evident in the 1920s and 30 towards a loosening of imperial ties. 
We do not need to go into detail about the developments in India, the Pacific or the Far East. It is 
sufficient to point out that Britain emerged as a much more limited power after the establishment of 
the UN and the Bretton-Woods system. Furthermore, although the UN was not formally more 
committed to ending imperialism than had been the League, overseas empire as a predominantly 
western endeavour, was deemed as improper by 1945.921 This primarily applied to the relations 
between territories divided by salt water. Any wide-ranging claims to paternalism overseas from 
Northern Europe were to face severe resistance at the international level. In the final analysis, 
however, the paternalist and mare clausum inclination of Britain was to prevail for decades to come. 
 
4.2 The rise and fall of a continental sea power; Germany 
As covered in a previous chapter, “Germany” exhibited few naval ambitions until the 1850s.922 The 
crucial dimension to be studied in this section is the genesis of such ambitions, to what degree they 
were connected to German foreign policy habitus, and how the outcome in the form of a maritime 
policy influenced international relations; all deemed by most scholars to be highly significant923 for 
the history of the 20th Century. Emphasis will be put on the history of the German Empire until the 
defeat in 1918, since we in our typology have not included the Wimar Republic or the third Reich. 
The fact that Germany was a young state, and in particular a young naval power, also necessitates a 
somewhat different approach to the German case than to that followed above on England. In 
chapters two and three, the ideological genesis and sinews of British sea power have already been 
highlighted. Thus, a rather materialist analysis might be deemed as sufficient to explain the 
dominant domestic impetus for sea power in England in the industrial age, since the culture of 
British national security changed little during the 19th century. The German case is different, and 
one might argue, more similar to the US, in some respects. Germany had no such naval traditions 
and –experiences, as did Britain. In terms of quantity, the German trajectory of sea power in the 19th 
and 20th century started near zero. This makes Germany all the more fascinating; what shaped the 
                                                 
920 Lloyd, 1996: 293 
921 Colonies in 1918 were ”out of fashion”, in the words of Lloyd, 1993: 94 
922 For an overview, see Sondhaus, 1997: ch.1 
923 For a brief overview of the historiography of wilhelmine navalism in particular, see Hobson, 2002: 1-7, Kaiser, 
1983: 442-474. For an assessment of the influence German naval priorities had in Britain: Stoll, 1992: 263-283. 
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particular content and form of German imperialism, and particularly sea power? Was this a 
development fostered by imitating the Empire, or did the German Sea Power take its own peculiar 
direction? In order to address these questions, I believe it is imperative to look much deeper into the 
ideological impetus in Germany that helped it develop into a considerable sea power. The question 
is not so much that these ideas originated in Germany than how ideologies of extraterritorial power 
were interpreted in this continental power. Therefore, I will seek to address the development of 
naval thought in Germany from the latter half of the 19th century in a more detailed fashion than for 
England during the same period, we will therefore look much more into the innen side of the 
equation in the following. 
 
4.2.1 Early developments in German naval thought 
In structural terms, German and North American sea power shared some fascinating common 
ground. While Britain had, and relied upon, long naval traditions, the newer large power had no such 
reservoir of experience, and the war with Denmark in 1848 had all too clearly demonstrated this in 
the case of Germany. In the case of Germany is illustrative, the historian Lawrence Sondhaus points 
out that; "And because the Danish blockade became a symbol of the impotence of a divided 
Germany the creation of a German navy went hand in hand with the Frankfurt Parliament`s quest 
for national unity".924  Both Germany and the US developed a “scientific”, i.e. theoretical and rather 
abstract, approach to what sea power was, and how it should serve national strategies. Thus, both 
drew heavily on their military academies, indeed they were the first navies to found such 
institutions. Compared to Britain, the study of sea power in Germany and, especially, the US was an 
academic discipline. In Britain, it has been argued; strategic debate was very much a public affair.925 
The Royal navy had no doctrine, although the “navy scares”926, the impossibility of war with the US 
and the fear of Germany fostered debates in newspapers. The Germans proceeded much more 
systematically through the Marine-Akademie from 1872, but at the same time, naval policies were 
much more an insular process of developing and formulating concepts and strategies. The US 
created the Naval War college and fostered Alfred T. Mahan, whose influence was to become the 
point of departure for most attempts at formulating sea power doctrines as part of foreign policy. As 
a matter of fact, the influence of exactly Mahan was to become a crucial conceptual and ideological 
basis for the development of German sea power. 
                                                 
924 Sondhaus, 1997: 19. Italics added by me. 
925 Hobson, 2002: 80 
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However, advents prior to the 1890s laid the seeds of German overseas imperialism. Historian Fritz 
Stern has argued that the ambitions of Belgium’s King Leopold II were the signal for the “partition 
of Sub-Saharan Africa.927 Neutral Belgium, according to Leopold, was blessed by its access to the 
sea. One could argue that Germany ought to take advantage of this asset as well. By 1884, according 
to Stern, the prospect of a “German India” in Africa began to gain support. Although there was a 
certain degree of scepticism both among German merchants and in Bismarck, the latter in particular 
reasoned that a free-trade area in central Africa (ruled by Leopold) would be more favourable to 
Germany than French or Portuguese rule. When the US and Germany granted Leopold (virtual at 
least) sovereignty over Congo by 1885, the scramble for Africa in effect had begun. By March the 
same year, the German state created the subsidies needed for a regular German steamship line to the 
Far East. Bismarck created an empire five times the size of the Reich. The temporary conversion of 
Bismarck to imperialist, and his following loss of interest in the same project from 1886, has indeed 
puzzled historians (as it did the contemporaries of Bismarck) ever since. Stern concludes that 
domestic reasons by far were the most important, 1884 being an election year.928 Colonies made for 
pawns on the international chessboard. It also seemed to be an element in Bismarck’s effort s to 
create a German-French entente. German business interests perceived colonialism as beneficial. A 
German Colonial league was created in 1882, claiming that overseas colonies would produce new 
markets. Once Bismarck gave the starting signal, businessmen and adventurers in German society 
plunged into efforts at creating a German overseas empire. However, German imperialism never had 
the same significance to Germany under Bismarck than as it had to Britain under Gladstone or 
Disraeli. In some respects, Germany was the “reluctant colonialist”929 during the era of Bismarck. 
At the same time, Germany’s increased interest in sea power and her more solid self-esteem prior to 
WWI demands an explanation. Again, efforts at creating sea power were a state priority that 
changed foreign policy, and this change in the German case was to have profound effect on 
international relations. However sketchy as the portrait comparative scholars are able to construct, 
we nevertheless have to look deeper into the configurations of thoughts on strategy and foreign 
policy that developed in Germany after 1871.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
926 Occasional fear among officers, politicians and the upper strata of the population that Britain was losing in the 
technological and quantitative competition in sea power 
927 Stern, 1979: 402 
928 Stern, 1979: 410. In addition, Bismarck became an ”imperialist” out of short-time tactical considerations of the 
domestic political game. I have not found any serious scholar who has argued to the contrary. 
929 Stern, 1979 
            
 4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945
 
 
 
           
 
 
256 
Germany was a latecomer in the European state system, and in naval affairs it was a novice 
following the German unification. The Navy thus was an entirely new national institution with very 
modest experience by the standards of the 1870s. Earlier attempts at establishing a navy had been 
Prussian both in geneis and personnel.930 By 1861, however, Prussia was the only major power not 
in possession of at least one ironclad.931 The more ambitious plans for a fleet were introduced 
following the war with Denmark, and these proposals effectively were the basis for the Fleet that 
came into being in 1867. We are in a safe position, however, if we conclude that prior to 1888, the 
Navy was a rather negligible institution compared to the German army.932 In the words of Rolf 
Hobson; “…the navy was completely subordinated to the army – institutionally, strategically, and 
financially. It played only a minor role during the wars of unification”.933 In this period, the German 
Navy had no prominent role in national strategy. Furthermore, Germany prior to the 1890s was not 
crucially dependent upon overseas supplies. Another side of the same coin was that she had no 
significant colonial history compared to Britain. The result was a navy role of coastal defence. The 
interest in the navy was negligible compared to other institutions.934 It was this initial isolation from 
the public arena that gave German naval strategy its peculiar institutional outlook and content. As a 
matter of fact, German naval strategy and doctrine increasingly aimed at reducing its dependency on 
army doctrines. Herein lies a fundamental reason behind the particular German path towards 
imperialism and sea power ambitions. In the words of historian Hobson, the fact that the German 
navy wanted to transcend the bonds to the Army, “laid German naval thought wide open to the 
unlimited ambitions of the age of imperialism”.935 The aspirations and the eagerness of the German 
naval officers to enhance the influence of their own service made them into advocates of imperialist 
policies. In this picture Mahan became immensely important, since his theory allegedly linked naval 
strategy and the perceived benefits of overseas possessions. Moreover, the German merchant marine 
had grown to be the third largest in the world by 1869 (see appendix II), thus providing both an 
illustration and a rationale for the argument that Germany indeed had overseas interests.936 In the 
case of Germany, however, the Mahanian doctrine developed into naval expansion without clear, 
well-defined strategic objectives. Let us try to outline the anatomy of this development. 
                                                 
930 Sondhaus, 1997: 57-58 
931 Sondhaus, 1997: 46-47 
932 ”When the Kaiser appointed Tirpitz state secretary in 1897, ”the German navy”, the admiral wrote later, ”was a 
collection of experiments in shipbuilding surpassed in exoticism only by the Russian navy””, Massie, 2003: 9 
933 Hobson, 2002: 111 
934 Sondhaus, 1997: 78-80 
935 Hobson, 2002: 112 
936 Sondhaus, 1997: 56 
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The Prussian war minister tried unsuccessfully to persuade the 1865 Landtag to favour a long-term 
naval construction program. His main arguments for such a scheme was to “protect the overseas 
trade of Prussia and Germany and defend the Baltic and North Sea coasts, and second, in order to 
maintain for the future its European influence against such lands which may only be reached by 
sea”.937 In 1867, the first naval minister of the North German Confederation eventually managed to 
pass a 10-year naval armaments program for the North German Bundesmarine.938 Compared to the 
1865 proposal, Admiral Jachmann had laid greater emphasis on a fleet of cruisers for overseas 
service. General (!) von Stosch939 served as chief of the Imperial Admiralty from 1872 till 1883 and 
he in effect laid the foundation for the Imperial Navy. Article 53 of the constitution of April 1871 
made the Bundesmarine into the Kaiserliche Marine.940 The alleged ambition for the fleet also 
included possible service overseas to “protect German interests”. The latter is interesting. Stosch 
principally argued along the same lines as Tirpitz did some 25 years later. By being able to protect 
the German Merchant fleet, the Imperial navy in effect would foster overseas trade. Thus, a synergy 
similar to the one perceived in the British Empire was possible also for Germany. Rolf Hobson also 
notes that Stosch thus defended German annexation of overseas colonies, especially on the 
assumption that this would absorb “German emigration by providing land for agricultural 
settlement, but also to provide markets and sources of raw materials for industry”941. But the 
influence of Stosch was marked by the trivial fact that he was in high office prior to Mahan. Thus, 
Stosch advocated cruisers and frigates for direct protection overseas. The actual result was that one 
major German warship was continually stationed in the Far East from 1869 till 1914, and German 
vessels made sporadic cruises in the Caribbean.942 The difference with the Mahanian age can be 
illustrated by comparing Stosch to Tirpitz. According to Tirpitz, political influence through sea 
power was best assured through the presence of a strong German fleet in European waters. This 
conformed with the view of the chief of the General Staff, Moltke. At the same time, always 
preoccupied with the balance of power, Bismarck added that Germany should be a respectable 
second-rate Navy. His reason clearly was that a German navy could be an asset in the balance of 
power.943 The result was that Germany had the third largest navy by 1883; only behind France and 
                                                 
937 Roon`s speech April 5th 1865, quoted in Hobson, 2002: 113 and Sondhaus, 1997: 81 
938 Sondhaus, 1997: 85-86 
939 It was typical of the first period of building the German navy that army officers, largely of Prussian origin, 
became naval officers, since there did not exist naval officers with any seniority in the first place. Von Stosch was 
promoted to both General and Admiral in 1875, but was most often referred to as General von Stosch. See 
Sondhaus, 1997: 102 
940 Sondhaus, 1997. 101 
941 Quoted in Hobson, 2002: 114 
942 Sondhaus, 1997: 97 
943 Sondhaus, 1997: 123 
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Britain. Thus Bismarck’s purpose with the Navy was fulfilled; it became a second-rate naval power 
that could serve as a potential ally of one of the western sea powers. After a brief reduction of 
ambitions from 1883 till 1890, the initial goal of the fleet set by Stosch in 1873 was reintroduced by 
admiral Hollmann, state secretary of the new Reichsmarineamt from 1890 till 1897. The rationale 
was that the German navy should have the potential of defeating either the Russian Baltic or the 
French North Sea fleets. Thus, the actual size of the Imperial fleet varied with the estimated 
strengths of the fleets of the potential adversaries (in effect between fifteen and twenty ships). It 
might be concluded that the German fleet from 1883 till 1898 to some degree was designed 
according to German grand strategy, since it enhanced Germany’s ability to participate in the 
conscious efforts at balancing power at the international arena (efforts were also made to make the 
German maritime power visible for this purpose. From 1872, both the German navy and merchant 
marine became more active in the Mediterranean, Latin America, East Asia and the Pacific). In the 
internal realm, the naval strategy also necessitated institutional reforms. Symbioses between naval 
doctrine, shipbuilding and naval weapons also started to materialise.944  Gradually, the navy also 
indeed freed itself from its subordination to the army.945 Furthermore, the balance of power 
diplomacy of the Bismarckian era seemed more and more constraining the German range of action 
in foreign policy, the new Chancellor became sceptic as to the possibility that Germany might avoid 
a two-front war with both Russia and France.946 The nightmare of such a war seemed even worse if 
a naval blockade could be imposed upon Germany: Caprivi was the first in high office in Germany 
to demand a study of the consequences if such a scenario was to materialise.947 His main defence for 
liberal trade policies was his conviction that “in a future war the feeding of the army and the country 
may come to play a decisive role”.948 Traditional German strategists could perhaps point out that the 
navy would not be able to decide the outcome of the war, but this nevertheless bordered to the 
irrelevant, since a naval blockade of Germany in a major European war would cripple its industry 
and starve its population. In the mind of Caprivi, Germany had to adjust its naval strategy so that it 
became compatible with German vulnerabilities, and to Caprivi, the main vulnerability was being 
the victim of naval blockades.949 This ran contrary to the organisation and tasks of the fleet that 
Tirpitz had in mind. Although France, and not the UK, figured as the main antagonist in German 
                                                 
944 The decline in major German warships in the latter part of the 1880s in part was a result of the influence of the 
Jeune Ecole in France. This school of thought was popular in the years before ”The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History” was published in 1889.  Commerce raiding and coastal defence were central ingredients in the Jeune Ecole 
camp. This led to an emphasis on smaller torpedo boats, also in Germany. 
945 Sondhaus, 1997: 144-158 
946 In this respect, he shared the gloomy view of von Moltke the elder. 
947 See Hobson, 2002: 121-124 and Sondhaus, 1997: ch 7 for an interesting overviews of Caprivi`s thinking. 
948 Speech in the Reichstag December 10th 1891, quoted in Hobson, 2002: 123 
949 Sondhaus, 1997: 168 
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strategic thought, the weapon of blockade naturally would be even more crippling to Germany in the 
case of war with the British Empire. In that case, the Royal Navy in effect could close the Atlantic 
sea-lanes to Germany (The Channel and the Gap between the Shetlands and Norway). The 
difference in strategic thought in Germany also reflected different ideas about the role that Germany 
should play in international politics and economy. Caprivi thought that Germany as a continental 
power was more or less bound to dominate Europe without expansion; he even envisaged that 
Germany would be the leader of a united Europe. Tirpitz, on the other hand, argued that it was 
“necessary” for Germany to develop overseas colonies and become a prime European overseas 
“empire”. The logic of Tirpitz implied that a strong German battle fleet would serve as a fleet-in-
being that in peacetime would ensure the functioning of this overseas trade and protect German 
colonies.950 To Tirpitz, the mere existence of a potent German fleet would deter even the British 
Empire from waging war with her.951 To Caprivi, as to Bismarck, the prime assumption was that it 
was the general balance of power –not a strong fleet per se- that would ensure German 
extraterritorial sovereignty, especially through the possibility of an alliance with England. 
Furthermore, in the event that no alliance with Britain was to materialise, the window of opportunity 
open to France would be restricted if England were to choose a strict policy of neutrality as the one 
she had chosen in 1870. By the early 1890s, such an outcome, in addition to the assumption that the 
US would remain neutral in the case of a German-French war did not seem wholly dubious. If 
events were to point to the contrary, there was not really much Germany could do about it.952  
The Tirpitz notion of a German Naval strategy prevailed. As the new state secretary at the 
Reichsmarineamt in 1897, Tirpitz “convinced the Kaiser and Foreign Secretary Bülow that his 
projected first navy Law would improve Germany’s position vis-à-vis Britain and lay the foundation 
for its rise to world power”.953 The real jump in ambitions came two years later with the second 
Navy Law, doubling the size of the German fleet. This can with authority be said to have marked a 
real turning point, from a continental to a world grand strategy. Militarism was no longer confined to 
the national defence, but included imperialism. In other words, domestic changes, chiefly the 
abandonment of the navy as an institution subordinated to the army in the name of national defence, 
was tossed aboard in the German polity. How sharp a demarcation was this turn? Rolf Hobson 
                                                 
950 As Hobson, 2002: 126, notes, Tirpitz had recognised enemy blockade as a possibility, but only as a worst-case 
scenario. Sondhaus, 1997: 176-177 argues that Tirpitz was instrumental in convincing the Kaiser , since the latter 
waverd between the French jeune Ecole and Mahan for some time early in the 1890s. 
951 As noted in the previous section, there was some tactical sense in this configuration of thought, since the enemies 
were careful in not risking their fleets in an all-out naval battle. This was a meagre comfort however, since in 
strategic terms, the German navy in itself could not deter a total European war. 
952 Hobson, 2002: 127 
953 Hobson, 2002: 130 
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interprets it as profound.954 He points to the fact that for the years 1875 to 1890 the Marine-
Verordnungsblatt only published “two or three articles that are even remotely connected with a 
theoretical discussion of strategy, or even tactics. Surprisingly, not even the more important 
contemporary British or French debates were referred to at any length”.955 
The German case is similar to the USA in this respect, witness the US Naval Institute’s Proceedings 
until 1886. And as in the US, the German navy until the 1890`s figured only marginally compared to 
the army in national security. In both countries, there must have been both personal and institutional 
motivations to develop theories of sea power that could enhance the prestige and resources of a 
modern blue-water navy.956  
The seeds to German navalism (the US is to be elaborated below) can be found in the Marine-
Akademie at Kiel. A pattern of professional and prestigious education of officers for the army had 
already been established in Prussia. In particular, the Berlin war Academy proved an exemplary role 
model. The German naval academy was, contrary to popular belief, the first of its kind in the world. 
The academy (established 1872) focused on strategy, not on techniques and seamanship as at the 
Marine-schule. The Marine-Akademie was to foster a “German Mahan” in one of its first teachers 
(assigned to the Academy in the periods 1875-1881 and 1894-96), Alfred Stenzel, who wrote 
(published posthumous) two volumes on the history of naval warfare.957 In his books, however 
(based on his notes for his weekly lectures), we find the same problem that Mahan faced some years 
later; how to articulate a theory of naval warfare in a service lacking experience and traditions of 
naval service and in particular -warfare. Stenzel partly built on Clausewitz, whom he believed had 
grasped the nature of war better than any other military theoretician.958 Thus, Stenzel lacked the 
subtle analysis of the late Clausewitz applied to war at sea, so skilfully developed at a later time by 
Corbett. A central assumption of Stenzel, and the main reason why he borrowed freely from 
Clausewitz, was that for all their peculiarities, land and naval warfare essentially had something in 
common. The conclusion Stenzel could draw from this was that also naval forces were to be 
concentrated, particularly at decisive points in time and space. However, Stenzel was firm in his 
belief that the Declaration of Paris would be followed, since this would be in the interest of all 
                                                 
954 See Hobson, 2002: 133 
955 Hobson, 2002: 132 
956 See Sondhaus, 1997: 186-190 
957 Hobson, 2002: 137 
958 In the words of Hobson, 2002: 139:”Stenzel in Kriegführung zur See” was trying to baptize Clausewitz with salt 
water”. One should note however, that the main influence of Clausewitz upon Stenzel was the military application 
of principles rather than the general, philosphical parts of Clausewitz`s works. It has been debated however, whether 
the ”philosophical” Clausewitz ever existed, or whether he has been invented in the 20th century by military 
historians. 
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neutral sea-faring states (including the US). Thus, Germany would not be totally dependent on its 
own merchant fleet if the German Navy could manage to break a naval blockade. Implicit in this 
argument, however, was the belief that the neutral powers actually would have the capacity and the 
will to defend their own interests.  
But a far more self-conscious ambition of German naval strength was to develop with Tirpitz. The 
incentive for increased ambitions took a course that is interesting also in a theoretical perspective. 
The Tirpitz school of thought in part is an example of diffusion of strategic thought (From Mahan in 
the US),959 but also to a significant degree an example of defining the national interest "from 
below", Tirpitz always promoting "the interests of whatever department he happened to be 
serving".960 
The role of Tirpitz initially (and instrumental for his further career) primarily was as leader of the 
Torpedo section, where the tactical focus prevailed. This work culminated in a long memorandum 
by Tirpitz in 1889, containing not only conclusions on the use of torpedoes and platforms for this 
weapon, but also far more general observations on naval tactics.961 Indeed, one military historian has 
argued that “the 1889 document strongly suggests that the torpedo department was the original 
workshop for future German naval development as guided by Tirpitz, first as Chief of Staff in the 
Naval High Command and later as Secretary of State at the Imperial Office”.962 
As Chief of Staff at the High Command, he elaborated his doctrine of the strategic offensive, 
formulated in the famous Dienstschrift IX from 1894. Other scholars have analysed the intellectual 
development of Tirpitz.963 Suffice to say in this work is that Tirpitz was influenced by Clausewitz 
and probably also to a large degree by Stenzel.964 Already in 1877 he claimed that  “It is 
characteristic of war on the open seas that its sole goal is the destruction of the enemy…At sea 
success lies only in destruction”.965 It was this firm (and I dare say single-minded) conception of war 
at sea, that made Tirpitz, the foremost developer of the practical use of torpedoes, resist the 
temptation of devising a torpedo-boat, littoral German Navy. The operational conviction of Tirpitz, 
together with his ambitions for a significant German battle fleet, made him less prone to support the 
Jeune Ecole after the publication of ISPUH.966 As Chief of Staff at the High Command from 1892, 
                                                 
959 Sondhaus, 1997: 193 
960 Sondhaus, 1997: 199 
961 Hobson, 2002: 147 
962 Lambi, 1984: 109 
963 See Sondhaus, 1997, Hobson, 2002, Lambi, 1984 
964 Tirpitz spent the years 1892-1894 developing the Linearteknik, in practise revising the traditional battle 
formations of the days of sail for a modern era of naval warfare. 
965 Quoted in Hobson, 2002: 150 
966 See Sondhaus, 1997: 192-194 for a discussion 
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Dienstschrift IX in practise was the work of Tirpitz, and gave the German Navy an operational 
doctrine.967 More than anyone else, Alfred Mahan of the US Navy was the source of inspiration. But 
how come Imperial Germany turned out a paternalist naval power, in sharp contrast to the US? 
 
4.2.2 The Influence of Mahan upon German History  
One might question why American naval officer Alfred Mahan fits into the section on German 
navalism. Yet, such was the influence of Mahan’s teachings and publications that any study of 
extraterritorial violence and sovereignty in Northern Europe without due reference to the imprint his 
works had is incomplete. Nowhere in Europe did he gain more attention than in Germany, the young 
state, the young naval power, with its desire for a “platz in der sonne”. Is this the main source for the 
paternalism of maritime politics in Imperial Germany at the ideational level? 
Inherent in Mahan`s project was the desire to build a theory of sea power on a „scientific“ basis and 
to publish his results extensively. Concerning the former, he applied the French Baron Jomini`s 
principles of war on sea power. Regarding the second objective, Mahan was wildly successful in 
“The Influence of Sea Power upon History“ (ISPUH), published and read literally all over the globe. 
Social scientists have in general not been very eager to analyse or apply his theory. Firstly, the 
“theory“ as developed by Mahan is not particularly “scientific“, although it contains concepts for the 
study of sea power. Secondly, the normative appeal towards expansionism and imperialism in his 
writings does to a large degree overshadow significant insights. However, this cannot preclude a 
proper understanding of the extent and content of Mahan’s influence on naval thinking from 1890 
till 1914. Whether he was “correctly“ interpreted by political and naval leaders, is irrelevant in this 
respect. In ISPUH, Mahan stands out (and this was his desired appearance) as an interpretor of the 
workings of Sea Power in history, primarily applied to the period 1660-1783. But he is also the clear 
advocate of rebuilding US strength at sea and expansion. It is no exaggeration to claim that this 
motivation coloured his empirical and theoretical analysis. In particular, Mahan sought to link naval 
strategy with imperialism, making him the chief theorist of extraterritorial policies at the turn of the 
century. First and foremost, it was his famous six "principles“ of sea power that introduces ISPUH 
(“the book of the age“ in Gladstone`s words), that made him famous.968 What is important 
concerning strategy in these principles for his influence on Germany (and world history in general, it 
                                                 
967 Hobson, 2002: 153, Sondhaus, 1997: 198. Note that the Kiel Canal was completed in 1895. The same year, the 
larger fleet exercises almost entirely were high seas operations rather than coastal, a trend that would last. 
968 Mahan, 1987/1894: 29-81 
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is fair to say), was his connecting of colonies and economic interests with a strong navy.969 In short, 
Mahan concluded that sea power (a term he never defined precisely) had two positive objectives and 
two corresponding negative ones. In ISPUH he writes that sea power gives the state both the ability 
to transport troops overseas and to control commerce through overseas transportation. 
Correspondingly, these positive objectives correlate to the ability to deny a competitor these 
assets.970 But his six principles of sea power also made up a body of a very much broader definition 
of sea power; a truly navalist stand where sea power for the state depended upon three factors; 
production, shipping and colonies. Shipping and commerce made for overseas stations that turned 
into colonies. Colonies, in turn, provided security for business in general and shipping particularly. 
But without a navy strong enough to project power overseas to these stations and to protect the sea 
lanes, no empire could be had. Furthermore, since wars according to Mahan sprang from economic 
competition, and since the US was fast becoming a prime industrial and economic power, the USA 
had to build a strong navy in order to protect her national interests. That this interpretation was 
ideologically coloured and one-sided is rather clear,971 but it is also more important that Mahan`s 
argument gained attention. For navalists, in particular, the celebrated six principles as elaborated by 
Mahan made for a checklist with which to assess the naval policy of their respective countries 
(needless to say, the use of the principles more often than not produced arguments in favour of 
stronger navies). What is more, Mahan does not draw a sharp distinction between sea power in war 
and in peace. In peace, rivalry between sea powers was a test of financial strength and “willpower”, 
with sea power the ultimate mean to gain credibility. Extraterritorial means of power is more or less 
synonymous with what Mahan labelled sea power; the total maritime resources of a society. In war, 
contests were determined by the rival`s capacity to gain command of the sea. Again, the close 
connection between economic strength and naval capacities is stressed. 
The most important argument in naval propaganda became the axiom that "The size of the battle 
fleet had to be "commensurate“ with the size of the Reich`s overseas economic and colonial 
interests.“972 The one, according to this logic, could not be had without the other.973 A strong 
                                                 
969 Hobson, 2002: 157 
970 Mahan, 1987: 8, 26 
971 His six principles of sea power are easy to criticize as necessary but not sufficient conditions for any one coastal 
state to be a sea power in Mahan’s sense. To a large degree, the different principles seem to have been construed 
from historical cases that are particularly apt in illustrating the points Mahan seeks to make, rather than principles 
that can be deduced from a general axiom on power. It is quite intriguing, for example, to follow Mahan’s argument 
that a strong merchant fleet gives the basis for a strong navy. The Dutch republic seems to be the prime model here, 
where Britain serves as the main ideal of a colonial empire. According to Mahan, the US and France did not produce 
strong navies and a vast overseas empire due to their rich soils, making the populations more motivated to turn 
inwards for resource extraction rather than become expansionist. The historical evidence for these propositions is 
rather scarce in Mahan’s works. 
972 Hobson, 2002: 163 
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German navy was a requisite not only in case of war, but also as an instrument in the required 
expansion of German economic activity. Inherent in this position was a central tenet of navalism; 
that the international scene was an arena for the survival of the fittest. Moreover, such arguments 
could thrive without particular objectives of contest; the belief in international competition was so 
strong as to form the perceptions of the entire field of international relations, and in the case of 
Mahan, social Darwinism was an all too obvious assumption.974 In particular, this view was turned 
into arguments in favor of strong navies. There was a domestic side of the coin also. Mahan was not 
particularly fond of socialism, to put it mildly, and he believed that a great navy also would arouse 
national pride and cohesion. This theme also seems quite visible in the ideological justification of 
Tirpitz in fostering a strong German navy. But for the purpose of our analysis, the foreign policy 
direction from 1895 is the most remarkable one. More than anything, German naval thought helped 
develop, and merged with, ambitions of a German Weltpolitik. Announced by Wilhelm II, these sea 
power ambitions found a potent fertilizer in Mahan`s ISPUH. The domestic source of German 
navalism did not only come from the Navy, but it is beyond debate that it was instrumental in 
navalist propaganda. From 1894, the High command increasingly supplied the press with articles 
stressing the need for a stronger German Navy. Appointed state secretary of the Reichsmarineamt 
(RMA) in 1897, Tirpitz helped intensify this tendency. One might be wise to stress that Mahan was 
but one of the ingredients in the broader nationalist German sentiment that turned it into a 
competitor for the core in the hierarchy of states. Historians indeed have been divided on the issue of 
to what extent and in what form Mahan influenced German naval priorities and, in a broader sense, 
extraterritorial ambitions.  
One school of historians has argued that Mahan did not influence German navalism to a significant 
degree.975 The central argument among these scholars is that Mahan was misunderstood in a 
profound way in Germany, both by the Kaiser, Tirpitz and in the public opinion. Thus, Germans 
picked and choosed among Mahan`s publications, missing his real insights. In other words, German 
navalis would have followed the same path if Mahan had never gained attention in Germany. This 
explanation has some virtue, stressing as it does that German ambitions existed without ISPUH, for 
sure. Indeed, there was a certain sense of urgency in the German naval service itself; it was a young 
navy of young officers eager to justify the institution itself: "More than 60 per cent of the sea 
officers of 1888 had entered the corps since the Franco-Prussian war, and thus never served under a 
                                                                                                                                                             
973 Sondhaus, 1997: 202-207 
974 Hobson, 2002: 168. This, in my view, does not remove the value of Mahan’s work as interesting contributions to 
the study of sea power or geopolitics. It does, however, explain the limited normative appeal today and the 
limitations of his theoretical publications. 
975 See Baecker, 1976:10-19, Herwig, 1988: 68-105 
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chief of the admiralty who was not a Prussian general".976 It should not surprise us that the sea 
power gospel of Mahan thus was used for what it was worth by German naval officers. Much in the 
same vein, German navalists could very well support the claim that increased defence spendings in 
Germany should primarily benefit the navy because a broader recruitment to the army could pollute 
the aristocratic purity of the army officer corps. 
The popularity of Mahan`s thinking influenced German development in a particular direction. 
Partly, ISPUH and interpretations of it influenced the German public directly. But above all, Mahan 
influenced the German polity indirectly through the navy itself. Mahan produced a scholarly 
justification for extra-territorial aspirations. One school of historians agrees with this interpretation, 
Volker Berghahn977 being a prominent scholar in this group. He argues that ISPUH served to 
intensify tendencies that existed in Germany.978 Mahan and the chief navalist spokesmen in 
Germany converged in three areas; a social Darwinist interpretation of sea power, a common 
understanding of strategy and notion of "the rise and fall" of maritime powers. In particular, it was 
the broader political implications of sea power as imperialist policy that proved to be especially 
influential on Tirpitz. There is no doubt that Mahan was read by the senior officers, and that most of 
them deemed Mahan as an essential contributor to plans for naval power. More than anything, 
Mahan gave German navalists an increased belief in a naval purpose beyond coastal warfare.979 It 
was the imperialist, rather than the tactical, message that received attention. Admirals Maltzahn and 
Tirpitz both conceptualised the role of the navy in a European great power conflict prior to 1894, 
while both „at some point during early 1894...expanded their horizons to take in the rest of the 
world“.980 Now, the way Mahan was interpreted in the leading naval circles in Germany by 1895 
invites a crucial question of its implications for the larger course of extraterritorial violence. If, as 
Tirpitz believed, great power conflicts almost inevitably rose out of maritime competition; if, 
furthermore, Germany needed a strong battle fleet in order to take part in the economic competition 
including colonies, was it not so that a future war with Britain also was inevitable?981 Historians 
now seem to suggest that in the eyes of Tirpitz, at least, some sort of conflict with Britain would 
occur to determine who would have command of the sea. How Germany eventually could turn itself 
                                                 
976 Sondhaus, 1997: 209 
977 Berghahn, 1971 
978 See also Hobson, 2002: 180-181 
979 See Massie, 2003:9-10 for a vivid description 
980 Hobson, 2002: 189, and further (ibid same page) “The most likely cause of the change of emphasis was that 
sometime in 1893 or 1894 both Tirpitz and Maltzahn had been convinced by Mahan’s theories about the role 
navies had to play in overseas expansion and altered their justifications accordingly”. 
981 See Sondhaus, 1997: 213-214 on the roles of the heads of the naval agencies in the debacle of the Kruger 
telegramme. 
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into a great sea power, however, was a far more complicated matter than to be decided by theoretical 
debates alone. 
 
         4.2.3 German navalism 1895- 1918 
Intra-service rivalry and limited state budgets served to modify German naval ambitions until the 
late 1890s. The absence of a clear operational doctrine and bureaucratic infighting meant that the 
plan for the fleet was inconsistent until 1899. By 1899, Tirpitz managed to pass the second Navy 
Law with its stated goal to double the German fleet. His presentation of views on German naval 
armaments to Kaiser Wilhelm in 1891 had not damaged his career, to say the least. In his 
memoranda during the early 1890s, the political significance of sea power was the central argument 
in favour of a large fleet, and at the strategic level Tirpitz remained confident that the status of 
Germany as an extraterritorial power would be determined in a future battle in European waters. His 
appointment to higher office, faced with the material realities of the German navy, did much to 
mature his strategic analysis. The chief problem for the navy was to define ist exact purpose. Tirpitz 
also fully realised the chief operational difference between land and naval warfare in the 
industrialised world; the room for maneouver for the inferior fleet would be very limited. These 
insights were incorporated in Dienstschrift IX in 1894 with its emphasis on line-of-battle tactics and 
the squadron organisation. The doctrine of this work was the need for superiority as a precondition 
for the strategic offensive. A superior fleet could bring the war through extraterritorial means to the 
coast of the enemy, forcing the inferior fleet to do battle. In the advent that the inferior fleet was not 
used for this purpose, the offensive part would exercise command of the sea through blockade, trade 
interdiction and bombardments. The purpose of the German fleet was clear: to fight for command of 
the sea (a term much applied by Mahan). This was conceived of as a zero-sum game; the outcome 
would be that the future battle at sea would be fought by the coast of the inferior naval state. Thus, 
Tirpitz concluded that at sea, the strategic offensive was a superior naval strategy, with all its 
requirements of ships, technology and training of crews. If the inferior fleet did not engage the 
enemy, but rather stayed “at home“ in order to avoid wholesale destruction, then the stronger power 
would exercise command of the sea. The vital thing therefore was numerical superiority (given 
similar levels of quality) at the outset of war. This thinking in naval affairs was not only remarkably 
similar to Mahan, but also seems to us in retrospect as something of a self-fulfilling prophesy. In 
peacetime, the state had to prioritise its navy so that it was stronger than its potential enemy. If it 
failed to do so, the war would be lost. In this way, the Tirpitz doctrine also blurred the line between 
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peace and war, since an arms race was the assured outcome between states if they shared the 
ambition to fight for command of the sea. And to ensure that Germany really would be superior, 
Tirpitz in the 1890s determined that the German fleet should be superior to a potential enemy fleet 
with the ratio of five to three.982 At the time Tirpitz wrote the Dienstschrift, such a size was not 
inconceivable when the Dual Alliance was the potential main adversary. The principal, ideological 
point of departure delivered by Tirpitz was at the political level. His German readers did not see 
Mahan as theoretical; he was seen as describing the realities of great-power politics. Thus, when the 
operational doctrine of Tirpitz was widened to be applied beyond the threat of the Dual alliance, the 
Rubicon was crossed. The Dienstschrift plainly stated that Germany’s position as a great power 
depended on developing overseas interests. And a strong fleet in European waters, Tirpitz claimed, 
could protect these interests. This fleet was not only there to protect established trade that had 
already developed, it would be the precondition for further overseas trade to develop. We should 
also note that Tirpitz, in buttressing his arguments, used the history of northern Europe to show this. 
The trade of the Hansa and the Dutch republic were undermined when they did not provide sea 
power to back it up. Like Mahan, Tirpitz now believed that sea power would foster the ability of the 
state to compete in economic terms in peacetime. To Germany, sea power ensured the Lebensraum 
of its economy.983   Tirpitz did not favour a German naval armaments program as some sort of 
Keynesianism by rising domestic spending; his prime (public) argument was that the vital benefits 
of extra-European trade mattered most. Appointed state secretary of the Reichsmarineamt in 1897, 
Tirpitz focused German naval priorities from the perceived threats of the Dual alliance "to the need 
for sea power as a means of exerting political pressure on Britain“.984 Few historians will argue 
anything to the contrary. In the aftermath of WWI, Tirpitz and other leading German officials 
pointed to the Transvaal crisis of 1896 as the first occasion where Germany saw Britain as a possible 
antagonist in a future war, and that from this moment on, Germany had to prepare for the worst-case 
scenario. The arguments of leading German naval officers, in favour of more battle ships prior to 
1895, were primarily that France and Russia were building faster than Germany. As a matter of fact, 
it is not wholly unreasonable to conclude that Tirpitz picked and chose between whatever arguments 
would serve his goal of strengthening the navy. In a much-quoted letter to Stosch dated December 
21st 1895, for example, Tirpitz argued that there were both international and domestic benefits to 
create s sea power out of Germany; 
                                                 
982 Hobson, 2002: 207. This was exactly the recommendation of Mahan in his first ISPUH book. Tirpitz studied this 
publication with great energy at the time. 
983 It is perhaps needless to say that the difference between Wilhelmine Germany`s strategy and ideology to that of 
the Third Reich is obvious. As mentioned in chapter four, this is also the chief reason why the Third Reich is not 
part of the analysis. 
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"I believe that Germany will rapidly decline from its position as a great power in the next century 
unless the growth of these general sea interests is taken in hand energetically, immediately and 
systematically. Not least because in the great national task and the economic benefits it will 
engender there lies a strong palliative against educated and uneducated Social Democrats“985 
In January 1896, Tirpitz in writing for the first time identified Britain as the chief adversary in the 
sea power race. By this time, opinion was growing throughout Germany that the nation ought to 
make itself increasingly heard at the international scene. By tailoring his arguments for these ends, 
he managed to gain broader sympathy for his strategic plans than purely military claims could do at 
that moment. In the thinking of Tirpitz, it was not so much that he at this point saw war with 
England as inevitable or desirable, far from it. To the contrary, he based his judgements on a risk 
theory.986 What would be the case if Germany became a major sea power? In that case, the dual 
alliance could hardly threaten German naval interests in an existential way. Furthermore, England 
would do its outmost to avoid war with the future German fleet. In order to actually prepare for war 
with Germany at sea, England in such a case would have to seriously weaken its Mediterranean 
fleet. But even if it did so, the destruction of the German fleet would require an effort that would 
inflict grave losses to the extraterritorial means of violence of the Empire. These would be losses 
that England simply could not afford. This, in effect, was the core of what has been labelled 
Tirpitz`s risk theory. In hindsight, its logical consistency was not impeccable, however. If, at the 
tactical level, a 30 per cent superiority was needed against the navies of the dual alliance, why 
would a German fleet that was bound to be, numerically at least, an underdog compared to the Royal 
Navy, mean that Britain would not enter a war against Germany? In retrospect, it seems all too clear 
that Tirpitz promised more than even his strong German fleet could possibly be able to keep. 
However, he seemed convinced that his planned navy would ensure that Germany be treated with 
more respect in both peace and war. Partly, this would result from the reluctance to engage a strong 
German fleet out of economic reasons, factors that he believed would be paramount to “the City on 
the Thames”. As with Tirpitz, or perhaps even more, the Kaiser had no intention of seeking war with 
Britain, but rather to enhance German foreign policy. In any event, a German effort at strengthening 
the navy also seemed to make perfect sense in less horrifying scenarios than those involving total 
war. Neither do I see in German naval policy a particular “Germanic” misreading of Mahan. The 
tragedy rather rested in the fact that Mahan did not formulate, and the German leadership did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
984 Hobson, 2002: 214 
985 Quoted in Hobson, 2002: 222 
986 It has become famous in scholarship on Imperial Germany. That various scholars have interpreted his hypothesis 
differently is not so curious given the fact that its author applied somewhat different justifications and arguments for 
it during and after his professional career.  
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fully exploit, the vital importance of connecting sea power to diplomacy and the nature of the 
international system. In fact, even a German navy inferior to the Royal Navy in the North Sea 
seemed consistent with the risk theory. With sufficient firepower and armour, a modern, fast and 
well-trained German fleet -or so it was argued by Tirpitz- could deter England from risking its grand 
fleet in one single stroke, since the navy was the backbone not only of the Empire, but the entire 
defence of The Isles themselves. In such an interpretation, it becomes clear that the German navy 
had no offensive purpose aimed at Britain whatsoever. The deterrent effect was the ability the 
German navy would have to make Britain avoid war with Imperial Germany out of a rational 
calculus that seemed obvious to Tirpitz, Bülow and the Kaiser. To my mind, scholarship that has 
focused on what the German leadership actually said and wrote on naval matters overwhelmingly 
seem to  support such a conclusion.987 German policymakers did not seem to comprehend that by 
building an outstanding navy in addition to the strongest army in the world, they helped create a 
doomsday machine. Furthermore, both the foreign policy and statements made by Germany often 
stirred consternation in England. It seems obvious however, that without the sea power arguments, 
the more consistent and systematic planning of fleet-programs from 1897 could hardly have gained 
the required support within the German polity. The command of the Sea in the Baltic and the North 
Sea would be of outmost importance to Germany whatever coalition of forces would materialise in a 
war in the industrialised age. Without command of the sea in home waters, it was believed, both the 
army and the civilian population would starve in the advent of war. It would also cripple German 
industry and even strangle the German economy permanently. The German fleet programme was 
built on the assumption that the Anglo-Saxon powers would remain neutral in such a conflict, and 
that the same powers would follow the dominant international treaty regulating transport at sea.  
But as an extra assurance of such an outcome, a strong German fleet was a prerequisite. In his 
memorandum to the Kaiser of July 1897, “a defining moment in the history of the Wilhelmine 
empire”988, the long-term objective was redirected by Tirpitz to deter England through naval policy. 
It is significant that Tirpitz was not at all precise on how an eventual naval war between Britain and 
Germany should be directed or conducted. He merely stated that the German fleet should be 
concentrated in the waters between Helgoland and the Thames, and that this required as many ships 
                                                 
987 Bernhard von Bülow, chancellor of Germany for nine years under the reign of William, and with intimate 
knowledge of both the Kaiser and Tirpitz, once wrote, ”It never even occurred to William II to go to war against 
England. What William II most desired and imagined for the future was to see himself, at the head of a glorious 
German fleet, starting out on a peaceful visit to England. The English sovereign, with his fleet, would meet the 
German Kaiser in Portsmouth. The two fleets would file past each other; the two monarchs, each wearing the naval 
uniform of the other’s country, would then stand on the bridges of their flagships. Then, after they had embraced in 
the prescribed manner, a gala dinner with lovely speeches would be held in Cowes” (Cited in Massie, 2003: 10) 
William was the grandson of Queen Victoria of England.  
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as possible. The central puzzle was to convince interest groups and the Reichstag of this necessity. 
In fact, Tirpitz not only devised a political doctrine of German sea power, but he was also 
instrumental in hiring an imminent spin-doctor to spread its message. He set up an Information 
Bureau at the Reichsmarineamt in June 1887. The office immediately set out to influence the press 
and the political parties as to the need of a consistent fleet policy, without exposing the Tirpitz 
doctrine that overseas interests should be served by a strong fleet concentrated in the Baltic or the 
North Sea. Instead, Mahan’s arguments on the connections between economic vitality and sea power 
were used for all they were worth. Next, merchants and shipowners also were convinced of their 
need for protection. Thus, the campaign for the Navy law of 1898 culminated in a grand conference 
in Berlin with approximately 1000 dignitaries from commerce, academia and industry proclaiming 
the need for a stronger navy.  As Rolf Hobson has stated  
 
“The spread of the idea that a navy must be “commensurate with our sea interests” was without 
doubt the most important distinguishing trait of German navalism. It was a stroke of genius on 
Tirpitz`s part to recognize early on the enormous propaganda value of this linkage. It could be used 
to justify any form of fleet expansion without tying the navy down to explaining how the military 
instrument was supposed to function”989 
 
It is my modest conclusion that the development of German naval thought in the years from 1897 till 
1900 led to an alteration of the geostrategic thinking in Germany, and that it in time turned Germany 
into a different player at the international arena. How was this possible? It should be all too clear 
that the gifts of Tirpitz, the systematic workings of the Reichsmarineamt and a Kaiser with naval 
ambitions all are important parts of the story. Yet, the change could not have taken place without the 
economic interests of the merchant class, industrialists and shipowners that all became convinced 
that the 20th century would be an era of intense competition between states and national economies. 
The perceived benefits of overseas markets and colonies applied to the maritime sector, and the 
industry that would have immense benefits from an ambitious naval programme, it proved 
instrumental in setting up and financing the Flottenverein (Deutscher Flottenverein, est. 1898), a 
strong institution in the public debate. The british Empire had been the chief ideal-type of a sea 
power in Mahan`s analysis, and Britain also became the chief society for German navalists to 
compare themselves with. Next, the British empire was turned into the most dangerous potential 
                                                                                                                                                             
988 Hobson, 2002: 236 
  
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945 
 
 
            
 
 
 
271
enemy at sea, since –according to the social darwinian worldview- growing British predomince 
through its empire and navy, necessarily had to come at the expense of Germany. In this context of 
national euphoria, incidents in Europe as well as overseas were easily interpreted as confirming 
Mahan`s theory and Tirpitz`s arguments. Thus, disagreement over Samoa in 1899 and British 
seizure of two ships just as the second navy law was on its way in the Reichstag, were incidents that 
were perceived as typical results of the lack of German sea power.990 
The domestic climate also made it possible to plan for an even stronger German fleet than what had 
been thought conceivable before 1897. Even at the time of writing (AD 2005), the proposal for the 
new German navy that Tirpitz suggested for the Kaiser in September 1899 seem incredible. The 
planned fleet should include 42 battlehips, 12 large cruisers, 100 torpedo boats and a number of 
cruisers and gunboats for overseas service. 
How was it possible for such ambitions to pass muster in the Reichstag, and to be accepted by the 
old Prussian generation of aristocrat army officers? Fact is that, as shown by modern historical 
analysis, the Reich leadership favored naval expansion at the expense of the army from 1900. Part of 
the reason for this was that increasing the annual intake to the army was seen as dangerous, since it 
implied that too many socialist recruits and younger officers lacking the "proper“ background would 
become part of the army.991 The Reichsmarineamt in fact gained the support of the Catholic center, 
the largest party in the Reichstag, in its aims for a greater fleet. When the new Reich Chancellor 
Bülow also joined the chorus of German navalism by famously declaring in 1899 that Germany in 
the coming century would be either the "hammer or the anvil“, in effect the entire political elite in 
the polity was in favour of a stronger German fleet. We have no evidence so far that the German 
elite sought a showdown with Britain on the high seas in the form of war. Thus, we should avoid the 
too simplistic analysis that the Great War was inevitable, and a result of German armament. 
However, as we have pointed out above and in chapter two, Wilhelmine Germany was led by a 
political and economic elite and an admiral that truly believed that German sea power would give 
the nation a "platz in der Sonne“. In fact, the Reichsmarineamt sought equilibrium with Britain as a 
long-term goal, seeking to achieve this by a steady construction program of three larger ships each 
year. Historians now believe that the goal of Tirpitz was that Germany should possess between 75 
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990 Writing on WWI, Robert Massie also noted that ”Antagonism between the American and German navies went 
back to June 1898, when an American naval squadron commanded by Commodore George Dewey had a potentially 
dangerous confrontation with a German force…in Manila Bay…In the months preciding this episode, the Kaiser had 
announced, ”I am determined, when the opportunity arises, to purchase or simply to take the Philippines from 
Spain””The US preempted this possibility (Massie, 2003: 754) 
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and 80 battleships by 1930.992 In retrospect it might seem that German navalism had been fuelled by 
overly ambitious goals and pure sectional interests in the German navy, but this does not deny the 
fact that Tirpitz and his followers indeed were serious about reaching the same level of 
extraterritorial power as Britain in European waters. What they failed to see was the potential British 
answer to such German efforts at reaching naval equilibrium or even superiority in the waters that 
Englishmen since the 17th century had perceived as “Mare Britannicum”. Arguments to the contrary 
were answered with the objection that since England had no universal military service, she would 
not be able to man the sufficient number of battleships required to reach parity with the projected 
German fleet993 Germans believed that the costs of the British voluntary system would force it to 
reduce its construction rate. Besides, the mere extent of the British Empire would force it to disperse 
its fleet in different oceans, as a matter of fact of political geography. In this, German policymakers 
failed to anticipate two British adjustments. Firstly, the fleet was more concentrated in Home waters 
in spite of imperial duties, partly facilitated by improved relations with Japan, France and Russia. 
Secondly, First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher constructed the Navy Reserve, a system of nucleus crews 
strengthened by reservists in times of tension. Whereas Tirpitz and other German navalists thought 
they had found the ideal solution in the navy laws, because these stated that the older ships would 
automatically be replaced after a fixed amount of years. As Volker Berghahn has pointed out; "A 
future more left-wing assembly was, constitutionally, no longer in a position to reduce the naval 
establishment by refuting to approve the naval estimates",994 since the navy laws would restrict the 
freedom of political manouver in naval policy; the Doomsday machine was thus created as an 
unintended consequence of an eager, young service and its supporters. 
When British construction became more ambitious (as evidenced earlier in the chapter), German 
ambitions became -comparatively speaking- more modest, markedly so from 1906. From the goal of 
parity, the aim was reduced to a two-thirds fleet, by Tirpitz believed as sufficient to deter an English 
attack. When the Great War eventually began, one possible strategy was to await the all-out effort 
that German naval officers firmly expected the Royal Navy would carry out to engage the German 
fleet. Thus, a defensive application of German naval force in the Heligoland Bight could be hoped to 
decimate the Royal Navy somewhat, so that parity was achievable. But before the war, indeed up to 
the very outset of WWI, Tirpitz`s risk theory suggested that the German battle fleet would deter 
Britain from entering a war against Germany in the first place. In strictly military terms, even 
German naval officers questioned whether the Tirpitz plan had any value at all. Even if Germany 
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produced a 2/3 fleet, the English could cripple overseas supplies to Germany by applying a wide, 
rather than a close, blockade. Tirpitz and his followers simply hoped that a 2/3 fleet would deter 
England from entering the war, since thirty-three per cent superiority was deemed as necessary for 
the strategic offensive. In other words, if you could not be strong enough to go to the offensive, you 
could at least be strong enough to deter your opponent from going to the strategic offensive. It 
represented a shift in the thinking of Tirpitz. Theoretically, he was convinced that only the strategic 
offensive with numerical superiority could give a state command of the sea in war. The risk theory 
simply was a way to give a military rationale for the new German navy besides “enhancing” German 
power and economy.995 After WWI, Tirpitz claimed that he had firmly believed that most maritime 
powers would oppose any efforts by paternalist Britain to limit the freedom of the seas, understood 
as international waters. In contrast to these claims, he did nothing to influence German foreign 
policy in these directions, rather to the contrary.996 However, Tirpitz -like most politicians in 
Germany- felt assured that enmity between Britain and the dual alliance would continue. The 
agreements between England and France in 1904 and between Britain and Russia in 1907 
undermined this assumption, to say the least, but risk theory survived even these blows. When one 
adds that it was evident that Britain could entertain a wide blockade rather than risk an all-out effort 
in the Heligoland Bight to cripple German sea power, one is led to the conclusion that what made 
Tirpitz cling to his risk theory was that he wanted to strengthen his service. It is beyond dispute that 
the weapon of the wide blockade was recognised by Tirpitz, since he initially had argued that a 
strategic offensive would be required in order to undo French attempts at applying such a strategy. 
Underlying the strategic thinking lay the belief found in Mahan that war would occur as a result of 
economic competition. To strangle the rise of Germany, the German admirals argued in their war 
planning, England might risk a pre-emptive naval war against Germany. By closing off German 
supplies by the sea, and possibly striking at the heart of the German fleet with superior forces, 
Britain could deal a deadly blow against its enemy struggling for its place as a first-rank European 
paternalist power. In the words of Robert Massie; “German naval officers had never forgotten that a 
sudden peacetime attack on the German fleet to destroy it before it was fully developed had been 
publicly advocated in England by no less a figure than Admiral Sir John Fisher, the builder of the 
modern British Navy”997 
It is also interesting to note that the wish to build a strong German fleet of ships-of the line strongly 
motivated German policy towards international law of the sea. When US President Theodore 
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Roosevelt suggested that the peace conference of 1904 also deal with the law of the sea, politicians 
in the Reichstag quickly pointed out that it was in Germany`s interest to abolish all forms of prize-
taking. Thus, the navy eventually would be free of the need to protect merchant ships in the case of 
war. In 1899, Tirpitz had realised that Germany was too weak both to defend its own commerce and 
attack that of an enemy. By 1904, however, Tirpitz with great haste and energy reversed the policy 
of the Navy; it was paramount to keep international law open to capture of enemy ships, in order to 
make the war felt in Britain. Again, one is struck with how Tirpitz manoeuvred with one sole 
objective in aim; to preserve his risk fleet. For if international law had banned all forms of prize 
taking, one could with some justification claim that a strong battle fleet was not required to protect 
German sea interests! On the contrary, Tirpitz argued, to Britain it would be risking too much to 
have her sea-lanes interrupted in the case that German sea power prevailed in war. Thus, he could 
claim that it was in the interest of Germany not to abolish the weapon against civilian shipping in 
war. It was a military rationalisation of the political ideology of sea power. One cannot escape the 
conclusion that this circular logic primarily was applied for institutional and personal reasons; that 
the means justified the ends. Prior to the Second Hague Conference, the procedure was repeated, 
with the German navy opposing the abolition of the right of capture. At this juncture, Tirpitz met 
resistance at the highest political level and from virtually all significant economic interest groups 
notable in the German society. In case of war, Germany at least could secure some overseas supplies 
if international law banned prize taking. Tirpitz, on the other side, was convinced that the prospect 
of economic loss through German interruption of merchant ships would be a potent deterrent against 
England. He argued that if it came to war, commerce raiding would be the only means for Germany 
to make Britain seek peace. This was wishful thinking, since Britain received most of its imports 
from its Atlantic ports, not in the ports on its eastern coast (Tirpitz was not in favour of developing a 
German u-boat fleet). The discourses in the international negotiations were eventually to concentrate 
on the definition of private property and contraband, concluded in the Declaration of London in 
1909. The tragedy herein, for Germany at least, is the fact that it never took the opportunity to work 
in favour of an international institution of maritime law that was in the interest of the weaker sea 
powers. International law has always limited the room for action for the strongest sea power; now 
Germany sought to reduce the scope of the law of the sea. Instead of going for the abolition of trade 
warfare, it supported it. Instead of settling for international rules that would limit the policies of the 
strongest sea power, it worked to enhance it. And finally, instead of seeking a policy that could 
defend exposed interests, it sought a policy that favoured a paternalist extraterritorial strategy; 
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“As a result, it never took the shared interests of the secondary maritime powers into consideration. 
Even when the prospect of American support was considered, Washington’s motivation was believed 
to derive solely from the weighing-up of its commercial ties to Britain and Germany”998 
It was the German application of Mahan that made it seek military rationalisations for an 
expansionist ideology. So fateful for the destiny of Europe in the 20th Century, the axiom in the 
thought of Tirpitz was an act of hubris; yet it was also a reflection of the fact that imperial Germany 
was a paternalist power. 
The fact is that most thinkers on German foreign policy in the Wilhelmine era favoured German 
expansion and an increased standing for Germany in world affairs. In this period, Tirpitz was as 
much a tool –an expression- as he was an independent actor. Tirpitz was part of a social structure at 
the core of Imperial Germany. Was this a structure entirely different from those found in other sea 
powers at the turn of the century? Much has been said above on how the ideological foundation of 
sea power influenced Germany, and much more can be said about its implications for the 
international system. But it is also a fact that a maritime revolution took place at the international 
scene from the 1890s till WWI. Again, domestic and international levels of explanation must be 
addressed simultaneously. It is true that the international development was perceived in a particular 
way in Germany, and it is true that Germany in turn influenced the international development in its 
particular way. But the outcomes at this level to a large degree were unintended consequences of a 
multitude of decisions. The study of German sea power is interesting precisely because of this 
particular interaction between the domestic level in Germany and the international level. This case 
also belies economic reductionism as a way of explaining the development in Europe. German 
navalists seem to have vastly overrated the economic significance of colonies, it is safe to say. To be 
somewhat cynical, the prospect of being able to supply the navy in times of war was perhaps their 
best use, but then again; what should the navy be there for? What mattered however, were 
perceptions; perceptions shaped by the ideology of sea power. Explanations of the German-British 
arms race and the rise of German navalism has primarily been addressed by two different 
approaches; one that stresses the particular domestic institutions and motivations of the domestic 
realm, the other belonging in the camp of IR macro theory that apply quantitative analysis of arms 
races (often so-called peace studies). I believe neither is sufficient to understand the increase in 
German extraterritorial power, while elements from both are necessary to comprehend the German 
trajectory. My main argument is that this particular trajectory cannot be explained solely with 
reference to the international system. Clearly, the ideology as articulated by Mahan merged with 
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social power in a different way in Germany than in the US. On the other hand, there is good reason 
to question whether the German ambitions for sea power really made it different than other major 
powers in the period from 1897 till 1914. Nevertheless, most observers will agree that it was an 
astonishing industrial enterprise for a new-comer among the sea-powers to build such a strong fleet. 
It was a feat made possible due to Tirpitz, to a Kaiser determined to build a fleet, and adherents to 
domestic explanations have also stressed the nature of the German political institutions as a 
supposedly vital factor. The Reichstag had limited control over the executive, and the Kaiser kept a 
decisive say over strategy and armaments. On the domestic side, there have been scholars who have 
advocated the argument that the reactionary “elements” of the German society through a forward 
foreign policy would seek to uphold the status quo of the classes of the German society. However, 
one might pose the question whether the domestic preconditions for building sea power was 
principally the same conditions for building sea power in Russia or Austria-Hungary. In other 
words, the German empire was not as different from other, primarily territorial, empires that sought 
sea power that Germany should be labelled as a special case; it belonged to the class of European 
paternalists. Bismarck had argued strongly that Germany did not need one of the largest fleets in the 
world to keep paternalist Britain from abusing its power at sea. As a continental power, the security 
of Germany was primarily enhanced through its strong army. In maritime matters, the most 
conceivable factor to balance British power was the joint interest of the neutral powers in a 
European war to keep international waters open for transportation and security for neutral rights. 
The deterrent to England was exactly the will of the signatory states of the Paris declaration from 
1856 to uphold their rights. This made for a potential coalition of forces in the advent of English 
participation in a major European war. As the economic and indeed military vitality of the US rose 
in the period prior to WWI, Germany might very well have pursued this potential for a coalition 
restricting British power. Moreover, Bismarck in 1885 argued that a search for absolute security for 
Germany’s commercial interests was bound to be futile.999 Furthermore, Caprivi in effect was an 
advocate for only a blockade-breaking fleet in European waters, plus keeping good relations with 
Britain. Bismarck surely was not a naïve idealist, he simply (and as late as in 1897) dismissed the 
Tirpitz argument that a strong German battle fleet in home waters was a prerequisite to become 
“alliance-worthy”. What separated the continental from the maritime schools in Germany was the 
difference in what means were the most suitable to enhance Germany’s position. The navalists were, 
as we have seen, heavily influenced by Mahan, whose ideology came to be seen as both empirically 
“proven” and as providing conceptual tools in debates to strengthen the German navy. But this does 
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not make German naval officers or the German Kaiser more “imperialist” than their colleagues in 
Britain that already had acquired an overseas empire backed up by the strongest fleet in the world. It 
was Germany that imitated the paternalist Britain. In fact, German naval developments should be 
seen as part of the maritime revolution that occurred in the international system in the decades prior 
to WWI. Ironically, as Mahan built his “theory” of sea power on the model of the British Empire, 
other second-rate powers gradually came around to the view that strong navies and preferably 
overseas colonies was something that any great power ought to have. It was not that Kaiser Wilhelm 
or admiral Tirpitz with their fleet plan sought to revolutionise the international system, but that the 
unintended consequence, partly as a result of their efforts, was a contribution to exactly such an 
outcome. As late as July 1914, for example, the Kaiser energetically denounced the idea that 
England would intervene in the European crisis. One should contrast this to the thinking of British 
strategists like Kitchener and Fisher. The latter already in 1911 wrote “Jellicoe to be Admiralissimo 
on October 21, 1914, when the battle of Armageddon comes along”.1000  Of course, Germany was 
not alone in bringing these unhappiest of all consequences about, but it was a major contributor in 
the Mahanian era. Those who believed in Mahan thought that the German navy would deter a 
conflict on such a scale, and in peacetime make the German economy blossom in a larger empire. 
Similar institutions, similar thoughts and similar efforts at building large navies also occurred in 
Russia and Austria-Hungary in the same period. Moreover, the British Empire did all it possibly 
could do to secure its empire through strengthening and modernising its extraterritorial weapons.  
Yet, domestic reasons also were necessary to alter the form of international competition.1001 The 
main impetus came from state- and nation building. For Germany, as a young state in an old system 
of states, the military in particular proved instrumental. In this respect, Germany was not unique, but 
the repercussions of its extraterritorial policies were. This makes the particular configuration of 
German institutions into a significant field of study. Democratic institutions had limited influence on 
military strategy, with foreign policy being the prerogative of the Chancellor, and military matters 
the same for the Kaiser. In many respects, this suited Bismarck, the principal architect behind the 
German constitution. Notwithstanding the democratic weakness of the constitution, such a scheme 
functioned under the Iron Chancellor, since he was able to coordinate foreign policies. The deficit in 
this arrangement was that outcomes of policies to a very significant degree depended upon 
personalities. In this sense, the Prussian heritage in Germany was a double-edged sword.  Kaiser 
William II indeed used the power given to the emperor by appointing the chancellors, secretaries of 
state and military commanders to his taste. The obstacle to building a large navy was to make navy 
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bills pass muster in the Reichstag. Nationalist groups in favour of naval expansion eased this 
process. Thus, nation-building in this continental state had the puzzling effect of raising German 
sea-power. But the interest in sea power as perceived by German industrialists also contributed, 
often financing agitation for a stronger navy.  
However, there is no doubt that the Reichstag, a democratic national assembly by the standards of its 
age, increasingly supported an accelerated naval expenditure.1002 Without support from liberals and 
conservatives in parliament, the colossal naval build-up could simply not have taken place. Even the 
largest moderate party, the Catholic Center, increasingly accepted strengthening the navy to 
unprecedented heights as a “national responsibility”. The ideology of sea power was not restricted to 
an inner circle at the very top of German society; it became an axiom in itself in German foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, to see in this a particularly aggressive or more nationalist political mindset 
than in other European great powers at the turn of the century, is probably distorting history. Both 
Russia and Austria-Hungary sought naval expansion. Japan and the US developed great navies prior 
to WWI, while in Britain; the domestic consensus on a strong Royal navy was at the very heart of 
English national identity. Although it remains a controversial issue, one might argue the case that 
Germany was more democratic than Japan, Russia and Austria-Hungary. What stands out as 
remarkable, perhaps the only truly remarkable, aspect of German navalism was that a country with 
such a strong army devoted the resources it did on building so strong a navy. The only explanation 
for this is the ideology of sea power that travelled around the international system from the early 
1890s. It is beyond doubt that the grandson of Queen Victoria was utterly fascinated by all things 
British. It was the political power given to the German emperor combined with the particular naval 
interests of this Kaiser that made it possible for a Tirpitz to serve as the unchallenged naval expert in 
Germany for twenty years.  
Radical historians, following Eckart Kehr, have interpreted the navalism and militarism of the 
German empire as an attempt by the elite to slow down processes of democratisation. This line of 
thought has also had Marxist undertones, emphasising that the German approach to foreign policy 
was a way for the ruling class to suppress the political ambitions of the labour class. It has even been 
a way to explain a German Sonderweg from Bismarck to Hitler. It was an attempt prior to WWI, 
allegedly, to preserve the status quo by an alliance between conservatives and liberals. It is not 
possible for me to find hard evidence in favour of such a view. Although men like Tirpitz, Bülow 
and William II did not have much positive to say about socialism, their naval policy was not 
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systematically linked with a desire to curb domestic upheavals. Rolf Hobson has argued the opposite 
of the Marxist explanations.1003 
Miquel`s attempt at Sammlung and Tirpitz`s naval policy were contradictory, rather than 
complementary parts of a common political scheme. It is true that Max Weber published 
commentaries in the Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung in 1897 and 1898 where he spoke in favor of 
Weltpolitik and a strong German navy, where one of his arguments was that an expansionist policy 
would improve the “political climate” in the German society. However, we should note that the 
purpose of Weber’s recommendations were to “educate” the bourgeoisie, limit the power of the 
Junkers and channel the energy of a democratised society into overseas policy. His commentaries 
were not arguments in favour of upholding the prerogatives of the Kaiser or the Reichsmarineamt! 
Rather, it seems, these rather short public expressions by Weber were eagerly used to interpret 
German history by Kehr and other radical historians. Indeed, one of the foremost of historians who 
has contributed a major study of the genesis of the Tirpitz plan concludes as follows on the 
sammlung-theory and German navalism: 
 
"In this appraisal of Tirpitz`s motives, many historians have argued that the domestic, anti-socialist, 
anti-parliamentary goals of William II`s Weltpolitik were Tirppitz`s own primary goals. This thesis 
fails to take into account the admiral`s opportunism and attributes to him a depth of ideological 
conviction that simply did not exist, at least in the mid-1890s…he remained, first and formesost, a 
navy man with naval interests. His primary goals was to gain more ships, more money and a secure, 
central place for the navy in the overall strategy of his country"1004 
 
It was the combination of German sea and land power that made it into a competitor for hegemony 
in Europe at large. If Germany controlled continental Europe and threatened the Royal Navy, then 
England’s position would be highly vulnerable. The US would face a volatile constellation of 
powers if Britain were to suffer a severe blow (as seemed not totally unlikely by 1917). The worst 
case was a hegemonic Germany with the Royal Navy defeated. The tragedy behind the 
extraterritorial ambitions of Tirpitz and William II was the extent to which Germany’s search for 
security and recognition lined up the one opponent after the other. However, the gains to the other 
major European powers by the defeat of Germany were limited, indeed. Neither Britain nor France 
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could enjoy a substantial naval spoil after WWI. All allied powers agreed that the entire German 
submarine fleet should be surrendered (to the allies) after the war. The English and, in particular, 
French governments also wanted to take over the majority of the German surface vessels. All the 
German surface ships were thus interned at Scapa Flow in 1918. On June 20 1919, the Allied Naval 
Council authorised seizure of the interned German ships at the moment the armistice was to expire. 
The German Admiral Reuter, unaware of the deadline and without any written or oral orders from 
Germany, nevertheless was determined to pre-empt such an outcome. He therefore ordered the 
entire fleet sunk peacefully in Scapa Flow. Furthermore, the loss of the German colonial empire, 
although covering 1.000.000 square miles, was not as hard a blow as one might perhaps imagine, 
since the German overseas empire never  became an example of a successful imitation of the British 
Empire. By 1914, these extraterritorial possessions had housed less than 21000 Germans, and 
contributed to only 0.5 per cent of Germany’s foreign trade.1005  
Illustrating the relatively weak strategic German interests in its colonies is the fact that the German 
navy never really prioritised defending them during WW I. Furthermore, the foreign policy of the 
Third Reich followed Mackinder rather than Mahan in one crucial sense; to Hitler it was paramount 
to expand eastwards rather than seeking colonies overseas. The pre-war German building program 
illustrated this thinking. Naval construction came out as third priority, behind the army and the 
Luftwaffe. A substantial build-up of the German fleet did not occur until 1938. The ultimate victory, 
according to Haushofer, would come as a result of the occupation of the Soviet Union, which would 
mean that Germany was in full control of the “Heartland”. Ironically, then, Imperial Germany 
became a major sea power in the first years of the 20th century based on a rhetoric partly 
constructed by an American naval officer. To see Germany as more imperialist than the other 
European paternalist powers prior to WWI is nevertheless misleading. In contrast, the case of the US 
certainly displays a different trajectory. 
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4.3 The ascent of a Maritime hegemon; The US 
               “It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs” 
                                                                                                    Woodrow Wilson, 19121006 
 
In the previous section, we also stressed some –at least seeming- similarities between North 
America and Germany in naval terms. Both were relatively young independent states with very 
modest naval institutions and –experience, and somewhat theoretical and abstract approaches to sea 
power developed in both countries. Partly, this allegedly resulted in a curious tendency to separate 
naval planning from politics.1007 A historian of the US Navy thus has written on the service in 1913 
that; 
 
“Naval planning was detached from the political world. Sea-power theorists gave little thought to 
the possibility that governments may try to avoid war, may have allies –or other enemies- that 
constrain them, or may pursue commercial ends by means other than command of the sea”1008 
 
Such a postulate might at least form the basis of an interesting analytical question; to what degree 
did naval policies in the US reflect imperial or liberal tenets of US foreign policy? If naval policies 
were really “detached from the political world”, then we should expect to find evidence that naval 
policies shaped US foreign policy preferences through a “bottom-up” mechanism somewhat similar 
to the case of Imperial Germany. Furthermore, if history is path-dependent, we might also suggest 
an additional approach in line with our hypothesis (chapter two) that the US predominantly has been 
an uneasy liberal bandwagoning state from 1815 until the 1890s, and then to turn into an 
international liberalist; what were the central motives of policymakers to create and maintain a sea-
going navy at all? Inherent in such a question is the central task of showing how naval priorities 
illuminate the paternalism-liberalism dichotomy applied to US foreign policy. 
At the same time, the differences between Germany and the United States are obvious. Whereas 
Imperial Germany quite openly embraced imperialism after 1890, the US perceived itself as an anti-
imperialist polity, whatever other nations would claim to the contrary. In American public opinion 
and among US politicians, policies that contained too evident features of imperialism resembling 
European foreign policies were always highly contested. Several explanations have been given in 
                                                 
1006 Cited in Thompson, 2002: 78 
1007 Potter, 1981,  O`Connell, 1991, Baer, 1993 
1008 Baer, 1993: 50 This statement applies to both War Plan Orange –the contingence plan in case of war with Japan, 
as well as War Plan Black, the same plan for military dispositions in case of war with Germany.  
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previous chapters (esp. ch. two and four) to account for this self-image, and should perhaps be 
shortly repeated here. 
Firstly, in terms of geography, the US was not physically located in the centre of European great 
power politics, a fact so obvious that it is often left unnoticed. In fact, the sheer distance in time and 
space between the two continents made the US equipped to primarily address internal and regional 
concerns in the latter part of the 19th century. The US also had immense natural resources on its own 
territory. Historians, among them Hugh Brogan and David Kennedy, have argued that this made 
overseas expansion seem unnecessary or counterproductive to wealthy citizens and governments 
alike.1009 Exploring and developing US soil was a vast undertaking, a long lasting process, and cost-
effective.  
Secondly, in sociological terms the constitution of the US as a state and society was different to that 
of the continental European great powers. US citizens to some degree considered North America as 
the first new nation, the first colony to break away from the colonial rule of a European great power. 
It was a state based on ideas, and one prominent US social scientist has gone so far as to claim that 
“The American political system of the twentieth century still bears a closer approximation to the 
Tudor polity of the sixteenth century than does the British political system of the twentieth 
century”.1010 Needless to say, North Americans conscious of their European origin had severe 
difficulties in seeing themselves as imperialists, indeed in embracing anything with a resemblance of 
expansionist foreign policies at all.1011 I believe this background helps explain our theoretical 
labelling of the US as a “liberalist” on the international arena.1012  In all questions on foreign trade 
and maritime matters, two views naturally intertwined in American politics, the US consistently 
                                                 
1009 Brogan, 1999, David Kennedy, 1999 
1010 Huntington, 1966: 382 
1011 Thompson, 2002: 98: ” …the policy of non-involvement had an ideological as well as a pragmatic basis. From 
the classical republican and English country Whig traditions of political thought, Americans had inherited a belief 
that standing armies were a threat to domestic liberty as well as a burden on taxpayers; free societies should rely on 
a citizen militia for defence. This idea became incorporated into the broad distinction between the ”New World” and 
the ”Old” that was fundamental to the ideology of American nationalism as it developed after the Revolution. The 
whole business of power politics, including professional diplomacy and espionage as well as war, came to be 
associated with the European social order – the means by which an essentially feudal ruling class justified both its 
privileges and the whole oppressive apparatus of states and empires”. When Secretary of Defence Ronal Rumsfeld 
during the Bush Jr Administration quipped that France and Germany were part of ”Old” Europe, his utterance was 
part of a long North American tradition.  
1012 Thompson, 2002: 97 argues that the US was not a player on the world arena at all. I believe this is an 
exaggeration; witness the US naval possessions in the Pacific and the Far East, plus the Open Door Policy. 
However, the passive form of liberalism in US foreign policy was remarkable on the European arena dominated by 
European paternalists. The US polity followed the advice of Washington not to let commercial relations develop 
into political ones. But that the US economy was an integral part of the world-system is beyond doubt. By 1913, its 
proportion of world manufacturing output was 32 percent, more than double of Germany as the second largest. 
Furthermore, the US had an agricultural surplus and was more or less self-sufficient in all raw materials. Also, while 
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opposed policies of mare clausum in international affairs. Naturally, the United States itself took 
liberties on this principle from time to time (I.e. the Monroe Doctrine, especially 1890-1909), but 
the memories from the war of the Revolution and the British maritime policies during the Napoleon 
wars left a deep imprint on the ideology of US foreign policy.1013 The British burning of Washington 
in 1814 was a short-term tactical success for Britain, but would eventually become a central facet of 
the American identity, as were the US national anthem, written during the bombardment of 
Baltimore. The word blockade, so prominent in British naval policy and –strategy, was a condemned 
word in the US.  
However, if we accept this ideal type of US foreign policy, we must also admit that there are 
anomalies, deviations from the ideal tpe, in the history of US foreign policy. Scholars have often 
pointed out that the US indeed did expand politically and geographically.1014 Especially on the left 
we will face critical remarks to the very concept of the US as an “international liberalist” from the 
1890s. From this camp of scholars, US policy towards Latin America, the Philippines and territories 
in Asia will be pointed out as examples that illustrate the alleged imperialist creed that has been 
found in US foreign policy.  
We will have to discuss the latter part of the 20th century and first years of the 21st in the next 
chapter, but I will emphasis that the one hundred years from 1845 illustrates that the case of US 
extraterritorial power was qualitatively different than that of the paternalist European powers. The 
justifications and ideological basis for expansionist policies on behalf of the US were, in main, 
different than those of Britain and Imperial Germany. One particular difference to the European 
powers was that the latter to a much greater degree applied double standards in foreign policy, 
drawing a sharp distinction between the standards of domestic and foreign policies. This 
demarcation gradually became less sharp among US policymakers. The existence of such an 
ideological component in the constitution of the American society was well illustrated by the 
policies that were exceptions to liberalism. The works of A.T: Mahan and the policies of Theodore 
Roosevelt are particularly interesting to illuminate the battle between paternalism and liberalism in 
the US worldview and apprehensions of its own possibilities and limitations on the international 
arena. In other words, paternalist sentiments among US policymakers and ideologists at times have 
spilled into US foreign policy. However, the very controversy that US interventionist affairs always 
stirred within the USA tends to support the hypotheses that the US was a fundamentally distinct 
                                                                                                                                                             
Germany by 1913 produced more steel than Britain, Russia and France combined, America’s production was nearly 
double that of Germany! 
1013 See Brogan, 1999: 251-5 
1014 Crockatt, 1995, Wallerstein, 2000, Wallerstein and Hopkins, 1993 to mention a few. 
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actor in the international system; it only reluctantly entered into “entangling alliances”, or let 
overseas commercial relations develop into explicit political ones.1015 In this chapter, I will seek to 
illustrate the ideological ambiguity within the US that eventually determined US involvement in 
major wars and international cooperation until 1945. The particular historical trajectory of the US 
will be emphasised in order to be able to interpret how it structured international relations in a 
peculiar way in the first half of the 20th century. Secondly, this American “exceptionalism” will be 
illustrated through the development and use of the US navy. My attempt to show that the “US Navy” 
hardly existed as an integral part of a “monopoly of violence” at all before the 1890s, aptly 
illustrates the difference between the US and the European great power paternalists. Thirdly, I will 
discuss the imperialist element in US foreign policy in the era of Theodore Roosevelt, and show 
how this sentiment was replaced by isolationism, Wilsonian internationalism and ultimately the 
attempt by F.D. Roosevelt (FDR) to impose an international order after WWII that in some respects 
was similar to ideologies that can be traced back to the New Deal (for the impact of the latter, see 
ch. 5). 
 
4.3.1 US state formation and a modest Naval Power: The US NAVY 1845-1890 
State building is a continuous process, as described by the late Stein Rokkan, and a process that 
eventually is carried on to maintain or moderate structures that are results of earlier state formation 
efforts. In the case of the US however, the state formation process from 1845 till the end of the Civil 
war was a discontinuous process of particularly abrupt changes in terms of what the US actually 
should be. This also had an obvious territorial component. By 1845 Texas had enjoyed de facto 
autonomy from Mexico for nine years.1016 In California, an armed uprising had driven out the 
representatives of the Mexican central authorities. On 1 March 1845, President Tyler signed a 
congressional resolution where Texas –“at the request of the Texans”1017- was annexed by the US. 
This led to the armed conflict between Mexico and the United States in 1846, where The US applied 
                                                 
1015See Crockatt 1995 chapter one for a discussion. 
1016 Potter, 1981: 113. Throughout this section I will refer to Potter, 1981, a widely used textbook on sea power that 
has been curriculum on US Naval Academy and numerous other Academies in the services of Western nations since 
its publication. Needless to say, such a reference should be used with caution. One should not expect to find 
particularly critical views of US foreign Policy, for example, in such a book. Indeed, in the chapters on the Cold 
war, such a suspicion is confirmed, Potter being a rather traditionalist US scholar on the history of the Cold War. I 
have therefore been critical in interpreting, and rarely relied on Potter on political conditions in the Cold War era. 
Nevertheless, Potter is in fact far more balanced than expected on the trajectory of US naval policies. His critical 
remarks on US decisions in the period from 1890 till 1941, for example, has stood the test of time. He is also on safe 
grounds in descriptive passages on naval developments. Overall, Potter’s Sea power serves as a useful overview of 
naval developments to this day. 
1017 Potter, 1981: 113 
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naval force to seize San Francisco and other Californian ports, and to transport troops and supplies 
to the campaign on land, a campaign that eventually also resulted in an invasion of New Mexico. 
The war was momentarily brought to a halt through the signing of the Treaty of Cahuenga of 1847, 
ceding California de facto to the US. It is interesting to note that this became a lesson that at least 
temporarily taught the US the value of naval power in North American waters. The land campaign 
inside Mexico proper in 1847 was also the first inland battle in the history of the US Marine Corps. 
The end result of this war of US “manifest destiny” was the fulfilment of the dream that the US 
should stretch from the Atlantic- to the Pacific Ocean. By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexico 
lost 40% of its territory. It ceded California and New Mexico to the US and recognised US 
sovereignty in Texas all the way to the Rio Grande. This territory became the states of California, 
Nevada and Utah, most of Arizona, plus parts of New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming. The United 
States paid Mexico some fifteen million dollars as compensation for her lost territories.  
Apart from this, the question of what the US was to be had to be resolved through war. So much 
scholarship has been devoted to the American Civil war that it seems unnecessary to dwell on its 
origins or conduct. Traditionally, few historians have emphasised the maritime dimension of the 
conflict, a dimension that was to shape North American thinking on the freedom of the seas, mare 
liberum, for a century, perhaps especially in the southern states. 
The Navy’s strategy of blockade, in addition to the capture of confederate ports, and riverine 
warfare in the West, was a precondition for the victories of the Union armies. The American Civil 
War in fact is an apt illustration of how naval warfare with all its requirements was an invaluable 
contributor, not only to strategy, but also to state formation.1018 
Prior to the Civil war, the Union navy was a small and unsophisticated institution. Through the 
requirements of the civil war, sealing off 3500 miles of enemy coastline, the navy grew 
spectacularly between 1861 and 1865; from 42 to 500 ships.1019 The –in the eyes of the Union- 
utterly successful efforts at strangling the commercial life of the south left two lasting impressions 
on the US. Firstly, naval power was a potent political instrument in American waters. If the US were 
to face an overwhelmingly stronger sea power, it would pay a high price. Secondly, it reinforced the 
general belief, especially in the south, that mare clausum-policies could be a mean form of warfare. 
Hence, the use of blockade by Great Britain during WWI could cause indignation among American 
                                                 
1018 See Howarth, 1999: chapters 17 and 18 for a good summary 
1019 Potter, 1981: 124. The number of ships in 1865 naturally includes private ships that were commissioned for the 
use in the navy. Again, the very nature of the Union navy was not akin to our contemporary understanding of a 
navy. The entire organisation was heavily based on private enterprise, even when compared to the Royal Navy 
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politicians, journalists and laymen to a scale that surprised most Europeans. The ultimate success of 
the Union in turning the resources of its industry and maritime sector into a wartime navy was 
nevertheless astounding. The total number of ships in the Union navy rose from 42 to 264 during 
1861.1020 The civil war was important also in another aspect; it was a catalyst in bringing about 
modernisation of arms at sea. The South with its predominantly agrarian economy could not 
compete with the North in producing large numbers of new ships. Thus, energetic efforts at 
technological breakthroughs were attempted in order to produce ships that would make the 
traditional Union ship types inferior. In other words, the Confederacy tried to beat quantity with 
quality. Perhaps the most spectacular effort to do so was the introduction of armoured warships.1021 
The most cost-effective way to do this was to clothe existing ships in steel. By 1861, the South had 
converted its first ship into an ironclad – CSS Virginia. The prospect of such a vessel with increased 
protection was that it could be able to break the blockade of Chesapeake Bay, and cut off supplies at 
sea to the Union land forces. The most promising design was the one of Monitor, a work of John 
Ericsson.1022 Engineers at the time argued that Monitor contained more than 40 patentable 
inventions.1023 At the Battle of Hampton Roads, the efficiency of the ironclads was seemingly 
demonstrated not only to North Americans, but also to the naval world at large.1024 However, the 
Confederation did not manage to exploit their initial lead, and turned to other technological 
innovations. The most successful was the mine, or as it was dubbed by contemporaries, the 
“torpedo”; a stationary underwater charge fired by either contact or electrical impulse directed from 
shore.1025 These weapons by far sunk the largest number of Union ships.1026 The South also 
produced submarines, small vessels with a crew of nine. These had the unfortunate habit of sinking 
itself and its crew to the bottom, so it never became an institutionalised arm in the American 
navyafter the Civil War. However, the introduction of ironclads, mines, torpedoes and submarines 
pointed out the technological direction of sea power for the rest of the century. In another respect, 
the Civil War marked a swan song of an old phenomenon. After the Paris Declaration of 1856, 
privateering had more or less vanished from the repertoire of the use of sea power by states, France 
                                                                                                                                                             
during the Napoleonic wars. Yet, the point is that the Union had the personnel, economy and industrial base that 
made it possible to mobilise the resources of the society into an effective arm of the state. 
1020 Potter, 1881: 124-125 
1021 Howarth, 1999: 183-4 
1022 Howarth, 1999: 185-6 
1023 Potter, 1981: 127 
1024 See Howarth, 1999: 191 
1025 It is a testimony to the lasting effect these devices had on naval warfare, that the Norwegian Navy as late as the 
1990s still constructed such mine fields with advanced fire control from the shore. Mines that fire on contact is still 
in use in most navies, witness the Iraqi laying of mines during the war in 2003. During the cold war, both the US 
and USSR produced mines, torpedoes and depth charges with nuclear charges. 
1026 See Howarth, 1999: 208-9 
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and Great Britain forbidding such practises within their empires. The south nevertheless ventured a 
policy of privateering, and supplied this with commerce raiding by ordinary naval vessels.1027 This 
was felt by the Union through losses of cargo, increased insurance rates and the necessity of 
dispersing naval force to find the needles in the haystack; Confederation vessels. However, such 
policies of extraterritorial violence added to the criticism of the Confederacy from most western 
powers, thereby also ironically resulting in the confiscation of two ironclads that had been ordered 
from England.1028 The very trajectory of the naval developments of the Confederacy does not, 
however, conceal the fact that the naval power of the south was gradually reduced compared to the 
Union.1029 Although new usages of technology were to leave an imprint on warfare at sea ever after, 
the strategy of the South was the strategy of the weak. With the American Civil War, the US had 
gained experience in blockading, naval diplomacy, distant patrols, the use of steam, armour mine 
warfare and submarines. According to Stephen Howarth, the infrastructures and institutional basis of 
the US Navy embedded in the North American society was established; “Gideon Wells, by adding 
three extra bureaus, had refined the Navy’s administration to a form which remained essentially 
unchanged until after the Second World War…It had dry docks, navy yards, foundries and rolling 
mills”1030 
 
By the end of the Civil War, the US navy on paper (i.e. in quantitative terms) was one of the 
strongest naval powers on earth. It counted 700 ships, 5000 guns, 6700 officers and 51000 men on 
duty.1031 This force could easily have been applied as a mean to protect overseas trade, or even to 
project political power regionally or globally. Had the US been a paternalist power, such a 
temptation could hardly have been resisted. But the United States was not a paternalist, and in effect 
scrapped its enormous extraterritorial state apparatus by 1870. By this time, all its ironclad 
monitors had been laid up, its converted merchantmen sold or scrapped and most of its riverine ships 
decommissioned.1032 Thus, E.B Potter has noted that by 1870 “only 52 ships mounting 500 guns 
were in full commission”, 1033 and Robert Albion comments that "The naval officers faced wholesale 
                                                 
1027 Howarth, 1999: 195-6 
1028 See Reynolds, 1974: 384-394 
1029 ”The American carrying trade fell very badly and did not return to its antebellum level for three generations. But 
northern imports and exports continued to be carried in other countries ships, whereas in the South, as the blockade 
grew ever tighter, overseas trade evaporated”, Howarth, 1999: 196 
1030 Howarth, 1999: 215 
1031 Potter, 1981: 155. The exact numbers seem to be hard to determine. Howarth, 1999: 218 claims that by 1865, the 
US navy had 671 ships in commission, 7000 officers and 51500 enlisted men. 
1032 One might even be tempted to draw the analogy to Ming China, a seapower that eventually abandoned its navy 
and overseas objectives.In 1436, an imperial edict banned the construction of seagoing ships.  
1033 Potter, 1981: 155 
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unemployment as the swollen Civil War Navy shrank to a meagre handful of cruisers".1034 The 
downscaling of this effective force following the Civil war indicates how modest roles imperial 
objectives could play in US foreign policy. In domestic politics, focus instead was on the 
reconstruction of the south, settlement of the west and industrialisation of the northeast. To a higher 
degree than in Germany, the US was a polity where citizens and politicians alike perceived its own 
territory as promising an abundance of opportunities for development; developments that also could 
lead to a positive trade balance with any other power. In addition, geopolitical factors were 
perceived as beneficial to the United States. By 1870, the 3000 miles of Atlantic that divided North 
America and Europe was seen as an assurance against any serious threats on the international arena. 
And as long as Britain was a status quo power, the international market would not hinder US 
economic growth. The US was a liberal bandwagoning state at this stage, but it had not become an 
international liberalist yet. It was a bandwagoning liberalist in the sense that its dominant conception 
of an international community was one based on the "freedom of nations", where free trade and the 
freedom of the oceans was a precondition for the other. As long as relations between states could be 
based on such freedoms, the US would scarcely have any incentive for “entangling alliances”.1035 In 
the words of Hugh Brogan; “The world was so large, the oceans so wide and their own continent so 
vast and empty it was impossible for the Americans to be much concerned with foreign affairs”.1036 
Such a worldview did not provide justification for a strong navy. Congress barely appropriated 
enough funds for the US Navy to keep its ships manned and afloat between 1868 and 1883.1037 
Thus, the small allocations devoted to the navy made it a very modest state institution with few ships 
and few officers; 
 
“By 1881 Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt could report that all but thirty-one American 
vessels were unserviceable. Representative John D. Long termed the fleet “an alphabet of floating 
wash tubs”, regarded by the public as a “marine Falstaffian burlesque””1038 
 
In other respects, US maritime power nevertheless was considerable. Throughout the 19th century, 
US overseas trade thrived and developed. This increased the merchant navy, a backbone of any 
maritime community. Furthermore, the modest US navy did preserve the skills needed to apply sea 
                                                 
1034 Albion, 1945: 299 
1035 See Howarth, 1999: 225-6 
1036 Brogan, 1999: 436 
1037 See Howarth, 1999: 221-3 
1038 O`Connell, 1993: 57 
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power as a mean to meet political goals. This is evidenced in the overseas operations of the fleet that 
were aimed at protecting US trade. In 1871, for example, US marines and sailors went ashore in 
Korea and killed some 350 Koreans. US sailors landed in Montevideo to protect American property, 
US marines were sent to Panama to keep open the trans-Isthmian railroad, and the US Navy worked 
closely with the Royal navy in Egyptian and Chinese waters to show force.1039 When one adds the 
“opening” of Japan, we must admit that there were traits of paternalism in US foreign policy. On 
behalf of the US, naval officers laid claim to the Midway Atoll, made Japan open more ports to 
American trade, and reached agreements on navigation and commerce with Korea, Tutuila in the 
Samoa Islands and Madagascar. US naval expeditions also surveyed possible canal routes in 
Panama, Nicaragua and Mexico.1040 Nevertheless, these expeditions did not cover the fact that the 
US Navy lagged behind in arms, propulsion and armour by the early 1880s when compared to 
paternalist Britain.  
 
The USA started rebuilding its navy in the early 1880s. The timing was no coincidence. Following 
the reconstruction after the Civil war, the economy prospered, making allocations for the Navy 
easier to defend. Furthermore, the technological development at this stage had reached a plateau, 
making investments in the navy look less risky; a ship designed in the early 1880s was unlikely to be 
outdated by technological innovations in a near future. Thirdly, the consolidation of the US and the 
growing economy made for a surplus of attention that could be directed outwards from the North 
American territory to international relations. Closely related to this was the tremendous growth of 
American industry; the domestic market was bound to be saturated, making foreign trade an obvious 
solution for further growth. At this stage, domestic and international levels of explanation again 
meet; American businessmen saw clear hindrances to increased foreign trade in the new era of 
imperialism. Inherent in this age was the tendency towards British, German and French monopolies 
of commerce and production. It therefore seemed a logical conclusion to American policymakers to 
build a larger merchant marine and a stronger navy to protect the former. The Republican Party, 
gaining control of both houses of Congress in 1880, was determined to amend the state of the weak 
US Navy.1041 President Garfield appointed William Hunt secretary of the navy. Hunt soon set up an 
advisory board to draw up different alternatives for the future fleet. After heated debates in 
Congress, construction of three cruisers was finally authorised in 1883, a year historians are prone to 
see as the junction separating the old and the modern US navy.  Although the size of the new fleet 
                                                 
1039 Potter, 1981: 155-156 
1040 Potter, 1981: 156 
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was not particularly impressive by the standards of major powers, the vessels were nevertheless 
highly modern.1042 What mattered in the longer term was that ever after 1885, Congress each year 
granted funds for naval construction, the fleet grew slowly but consistently in size and levels of 
sophistication. While initially inexperienced at shipbuilding, American dockyards steadily improved 
and had reached the elite division by the late 1880s. In the process, American steel industry also 
blossomed. Thus, the infant of the so-called military-industrial complex was born; the steel industry 
soon was an important ally in the struggle for congressional funding.1043 In tandem with this 
development, US senators also began to question the doctrine of commerce raiding, and called for 
full-fledged battle fleets that could “break up a blockade and defeat any enemy fleet that attempted 
to support a coastal invasion of the United States”.1044 In fact, by 1889 eleven states had larger 
navies than the United States.1045 Congress authorised the building of three seagoing battleships in 
1890. It is natural to remark, however, that this certainly was not the navy of an imperialist 
power.1046 If the US had harboured paternalist ambitions on the international scene, it would have 
had to build a stronger extraterritorial arm.1047 On the domestic side of the coin, though, there is little 
doubt that the US by 1890 had acquired the skill and the organisational capability to build 
outstanding naval vessels. Considering the industrial and economic capacity of the United States of 
America, most strategists at the time appreciated it as a potential enemy or alliance-partner. The 
Naval Academy was established at Annapolis Virginia, and in 1873, the United States naval Institute 
was added as an institution to educate  the Navy officer corps. The Academy published the United 
States Naval Institute Proceedings, a magazine that became a vitalising factor for the Navy, while 
the next new navy institution was formed in 1885 as the Naval War College.1048 Perhaps even more 
important both to US state formation and to the calibration of the USA as an actor in international 
relations, was the establishment of the Office of Naval Intelligence in 1882. 1049 This organisation 
stationed naval attachés at American ministries around the world. Thus, a network of agents 
                                                                                                                                                             
1041 Potter, 1981: 159 
1042 For example, the ships were fully electrified, a step further from the traditional ships of the US navy.  
1043 O`Connell, 1993: chapter 3 sees this as important for the further development of the US Navy 
1044 Potter, 1981: 160 
1045 Baer, 1993:9 
1046 Indeed, as Baer, 1993: 21-24 shows, even US naval officers were quite puzzled as to what tasks the ”new” Navy 
should have.  
1047 Furthermore, ”Concentration of forces for defense of the homeland meant keeping the battleships close to home. 
Along the coasts were secure bases and reliable fuel supplies” Baer, 1993: 25. By the early 1890s, upholding the 
Monroe doctrine was the conceptual limit of most naval thinking in the US.  
1048 Potter, 1981: 161 is, like most American scholars, mistaken in the assertion that “the Naval War College so 
proved its worth that the major navies of the world established similar colleges”. As we have seen, the German 
Navy had founded its Marine-Akademie earlier. The first “idologist” of sea power in Germany, Stenzel, worked at 
the German Academy already as early as 1875. 
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monitoring naval developments worldwide was created, making naval issues much more integrated 
with the foreign services in general. The series of reports became a central mean to assess and 
evaluate US war plans and contingency plans.  
In sum, then, the US in the period from 1875 till 1890 acquired permanent state institutions of a 
modern navy. It had the organisational and technological skills to build, man and operate modern 
warships of the industrial age. Until the 1890s, however, this organisation primarily was a part of the 
consolidation of the state, and did not make itself particularly felt on the international scene.1050 In 
fact, compared to ALL the other states analysed here, the differentiation of specialised military 
institutions took place in the US long after such institutions were established in Europe. In the words 
of Samuel P. Huntington; 
 
“Not until the turn of the century [i.e.1900] did the United States have many of the institutions of 
professional officership which the European states had acquired many decades earlier. The division 
of power among governmental institutions perpetuated the mixing of politics and military affairs, 
and enormously complicated the emergence of a modern system of objective civilian control”1051 
 
The result, I dare say, was a too long distance between politics and strategy, pluss a lack of 
comprehensive and consistent developments of national doctrines for the application of US military 
power 
The international, and partly domestic, effects of American sea power were to become much more 
pronounced in the next decade. Embedded in this development was a public “love affair” with 
battleships.1052 Increasingly, the battleships and the Great White Fleet came to be seen as symbols 
for the power and the glory of the US. After the 1902 crisis off Venezuela, for example, naval 
squadrons were frequently sent on displays to ports of friendly countries.1053 By 1915, Bradley Fiske 
publicly mused what would happen if the battleship would run on land; “It could whip an army of a 
million men, knock down all the buildings in New York, smash all the cars, break all the bridges, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1049 One should notice that all the institutions mentioned here are still thriving. The office of Naval Intelligence with 
its headquarters in Washington D.C., for example, is by far the most vigorous agent in naval intelligence in the 
world. At the time of writing, no other institution even comes close in resources and span of activity. 
1050 Howarth, 1999: 226 
1051 Huntington, 1966: 400 
1052 Baer, 1993: 33, and especially O`Connell, 1993: chapters 3-5 
1053 Baer, 1993: 42 
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and sink all the shipping”1054. While such a view was not representative of the US populace or US 
politicians, it is nevertheless tempting and not implausible to see the period from 1890 till 1903 as a 
juncture in US foreign policy. In this period, we have shown that the US Navy grew steadily. But 
this alone is not evidence of a change in US foreign policy. The number and nature of US 
interventions in international relations will be a much better indicator of the development of the 
foreign policies of the United States. Furthermore, the context of US naval war plans, War Plan 
Black and –Orange, must be considered in order to grasp the nuances of US policies, since these two 
plans shows the central dilemma in application of extraterritorial violence by the United States; the 
emphasis on the Atlantic versus the Pacific. But the context cannot be read out of the war plans 
themselves, being staff documents prepared for contingencies that most of the public opinion was 
unprepared for. Instead, we will seek to trace the dominant traits in US naval policies and the 
ideologies that shaped it.  
 
4.3.2 The dog that never really barked; The USA as a regional Imperial power 
Why did even the international liberalist USA for a short period become a state that acted as 
something resembling an imperial power around the turn of the century?  
Scholars who are inclined to stress material factors will undoubtedly point to the expanding US 
economy as the answer. As we have seen, US industrialists and politicians did indeed see an 
increase in overseas trade as vital to continued economic growth. However, I have great difficulties 
in seeing any causal connection between increased trade and the impulse to exercise a more 
paternalist foreign policy through sea power and territorial annexations. To the contrary, the North 
American conception of international trade was precisely that mercantilist policies were 
incompatible with free trade, and that mare clausum of the British model was incompatible with the 
liberalism that Americans held so high. Besides, one should be aware that Pax Britannica (1815-
1890s) served US interests well on the oceans, and –the ideological differences between the two 
powers not withstanding- the relationship between Britain and the US was relatively good. 
Materialist explanations alone will not suffice to explain the particular trajectory of US 
extraterritorial ambitions.  
The most traditional explanations from mainstream IR literature will point out that the always 
competitive, not to say regressive, nature of international relations simply meant that an expanding 
                                                 
1054 Cited in O`Connell, 1993: 85 
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US economy indicated an increase in the tasks of protecting national interests. Thus, the US is a 
straightforward example of a power that adapted to the realities of the international state system. 
There is clear evidence that US policymakers indeed feared tendencies towards monopolies and a 
modern variant of mercantilism that they perceived among the European Great powers. If the 
dominant perception of policymakers in the US was the one found in balance of power theory, or in 
a Darwinist perception of world affairs, then achieving and protecting overseas trade through 
extraterritorial violence was a logical way to enhance national interests. However, I believe it to be 
an incomplete explanation. The nature of the international system cannot alone adequately explain 
the changes in US thinking. I believe this is evidenced both in the fact that sea power as an ideology 
proper was born in the US, and in the writings of that particular character chiefly responsible for 
pronouncing it. In other words, I postulate that an ideological impulse different than the traditional 
liberal values of the US for a short period of time reached support in the political leadership of the 
United States. This impulse to a large degree stemmed from the writings and teachings of the 
American naval officer A.T. Mahan. 
Captain A.T. Mahan was appointed president and chief instructor of the Naval War College in 1886, 
chiefly based on his merits as a naval historian of the American Civil War. It is a curious fact that 
initially, Mahan like most of his fellow countrymen was firm in his belief that the US should avoid 
acquiring overseas territories. In his mind, it would impose too much of a burden on the navy in 
addition to create a caste of military and imperial rulers too far away from the control of the 
democratically elected government. The fact is that Mahan prior to his assignment to the College 
simply accepted the limited role of the US Navy as an arm to protect an isolationist continent, but he 
allegedly was driven by the desire to raise “the profession in the eye of its members”.1055  
The converting of Mahan, according to one popular account1056, largely took place as he started to 
study history on a large scale in preparation for his duties at the War College. In his own words, he 
“discovered” that “control of the sea was an historic factor which had never been appreciated and 
expounded”.1057 In reality, of course, Mahan drew heavily on the British Empire as the empirical 
case on which to build his theory.1058 This is not to say that “The Influence of Sea Power upon 
                                                 
1055 O`Connell, 1993: 64 
1056 Potter, 1981: 161-163. Hobson, 2002, on the other hand, claims that this process started on an official duty to 
Latin America. In a library there, or so Mahan claimed, the importance of sea power as a historical force suddenly 
appeared to him when studying Mommsen`s works on the Roman Empire. I find the latter claim highly dubious. If 
this vision appeared to Mahan long before his assignment to the war College, it seems very inconsistent with his 
strong adversion to overseas possessions immediately after this assignment, although opportunism might explain 
this. 
1057 Quoted in Potter, 1981: 162 
1058 While the ”checklist” of what makes a state into a sea power certainly was the part of the book that drew most 
attention in political circles, his generalisations seem somewhat shaky today.  
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History” (ISPUH) (1890) was not a pioneering work. It clearly illustrated the way a small island had 
utilised its resources at the maximum rate and became a truly hegemonic naval power. But out of 
this unique historical experience, Mahan generalised too much. To US readers, one of the most 
exciting and debated proposals in ISPUH and “The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and 
Future” (1897) was that the US possessed many of the factors that had made Britain a sea power of 
first rank. Thus, a strong seagoing navy would increase the wealth and influence of America, to put 
it crudely. But inherent, indeed explicit in his argument, was the assumption that imperialism was 
part of being a sea power; thus, colonies was something a great power ought to have; “In yet another 
way does the national genius affect the growth of sea power in its broadest sense; and that is in so 
far as it possesses the capacity for planting healthy colonies”.1059 Furthermore, overseas trade 
necessitated sea control; the naval securing of communications at sea for the merchant marine. And 
in the industrial age, logistics demanded overseas bases and stations to support the naval vessels. 
How were these bases to be supported? Mahan’s answer was that they were best situated in colonies; 
then they would be more or less self-supplied, since the bases existed for the navy, and not the other 
way around!  
It is a testimony to the strength of US liberalism that this message was less enthusiastically received 
by the public in the US than in paternalist nations as Britain, Germany and Japan. William II, for 
example,  
 
“…Ordered translations placed in the wardroom of every ship in his new navy, and his admiralty 
distributed it to all schools, public libraries, and government departments. The Japanese 
government provided translated copies to its army and naval officers, political leaders and 
schools”1060 
 
Initially, in the US, it primarily influenced a limited number of senior officers and politicians, most 
notably the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. Above 
all, it influenced Theodore Roosevelt, first serving as assistant secretary of the navy.1061 But overall, 
                                                 
1059 Mahan, 1890/1987: 55 
1060 Potter, 1981: 163. The Japanese development is not covered in this thesis, but the influence of Mahan upon 
Japan is a fascinating historical case. To Japanese policymakers, the demonstration of how a small island nation 
could become a world power through naval force certainly was fascinating. The teachings and publications of 
Mahan were especially central to the 16 Japanese that attended the US Naval Academy in the years up to 1906. 
1061 ”Roosevelt`s interest in naval matters was lifelong. Whether reading naval stories, visting warships or sitting at 
the feet of his uncles, James and Irvine Bullock, old Confederate naval officers, Roosevelt had much cause in his 
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the response to Mahan was lukewarm in the US. In fact, while Mahan was being read by senior 
politicians and populace in the industrial world, he was initially seen as an embarrassment within the 
US Navy. When Mahan asked to be excused from sea duty in order to continue writing and 
lecturing, he was told by his superior, Commodore Ramsay that “It is not the business of naval 
officers to write books”1062, turning down Mahan’s request. But Mahan managed to get ISPUH 
published at a time when it struck a nerve; its timing was perfect; “His book appeared precisely 
when Darwinian nationalism, a growing sense of racial supremacy, and dreams of overseas markets 
were diverting Americans from the previous preoccupation with domestic affairs””.1063 
 
For those labelling the USA as an imperialist power, the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and the 
earlier Spanish-American War are cited as the best examples of the paternalist traits in American 
foreign policy.1064 Such claims, and especially when linked to the navalist imperialism of Mahan, 
certainly deserve attention, since they seem to suggest that the label of USA as an international 
liberalist is misleading. Thus, I will lay particular emphasis on the Spanish-American War in order 
to interpret the meaning and praxis of US behaviour; did North America become a paternalist 
“imperialist” at the turn of the century, and what was the particular content of the contest between 
liberalism and paternalism at this critical juncture? What is beyond doubt, is that after 1898, the US 
was no longer a bandwagoning state, but had assumed a role as a world power. 
There is no denying that the Spanish-American war can be interpreted as a turning point in the 
history of US foreign policy, although the degree of internationalism in foreign policy would go 
through repeated changes in the decades that were to come. It was both a reflection of, and a 
reminder of, greater US participation in world affairs. The war both involved North America in the 
problems of the Far East as well as testifying to Europeans the increase in US capacities. In its 
genesis, however, the war arose out of conflict located far closer to North America, to cut a long 
story short. The Spanish ruled Cuba, but was not prepared to stop a fierce rebellion on the island.1065 
By 1896, the Spanish government sent General Valerio Weylor to the island, brutally curbing the 
                                                                                                                                                             
youth to develop affection for the Navy. In 1879, while still an undergraduate at Harvard, he demonstrated this 
affection by launching a study of the naval war of 1812”, Karsten, 1971: 586 
1062 Cited in Howarth, 1999: 237. O`Connell, 1993: 63 notes that Mahan ”was never really liked” by his 
contemporary colleagues in US Navy.  
1063 O`Connell, 1993: 69 
1064 Following the war against Iraq and the split between European powers and the USA has fuelled the debate on 
US foreign policy at the time of writing. This debate will be analysed through the concepts of this thesis in chapter 
8.  
1065 Potter, 1981: 176. Note that ”Beacuse of its commercial and strategic interests, the US had already offered to 
buy Cuba from Spain on three occasions”, Howarth, 1999: 247 
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revolution, partly through the use of “concentration camps”1066. It was on the background of this 
humanitarian crisis that Congress passed a resolution demanding recognition of Cuban belligerency. 
The reaction of the president was nonetheless typical; Cleveland would not have any imperialist US 
policy and ignored the resolution. Foreign policy, claimed Cleveland, was the domain of the 
presidency. The crisis seemed more or less resolved with the introduction of a more benign Spanish 
rule and increased political autonomy for Cuba. Then, in February 1898, two events eagerly and 
vividly employed by the media,1067 stirred American sentiments. 
The first was the publication in the New York Journal of an indiscreet letter written by the Spanish 
minister in Washington. The letter more than hinted at Spanish duplicity in pending trade 
agreements. The second, and graver incident for the Spanish, was the tearing apart by an explosion 
of the US battleship Maine at Cuba. Again, the US press was a contributing factor, fuelling the 
popular belief that a mine planted and triggered by Spaniards caused the detonation.1068 The 
importance of the explosion was magnified by media, and brought pressure on the government to 
act. In order to be able to concentrate forces in the advent of conflict with Spain, the majority of the 
US Navy was already concentrated in the Atlantic. The American east Coast, however, broke into a 
state of hysteria as the Spanish admiral Cervera steamed from Cadiz to the Cape Verde Islands in 
April 1898. Fearing bombardment and even invasion, investors and populace actually fled the coast 
for the inland. It was in this context that demands for US coastal guns and naval vessels all along the 
East Coast arose.1069  
We should also note this very specific background to understand US sentiments leaning towards 
“paternalism”; the East Coast populace and the media interpreted the situation as one of “clear 
and present danger” to the US mainland; “when the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera left 
the Cape Verde Islands for the western hemisphere [US], citizens panicked in ports on the American 
east coast”.1070  Even President Mckinley, anti-imperialist and isolationist in his worldview, could no 
longer ignore the cry of the usually non-interventionist Democrats to “Free Cuba!”. Especially so, 
since he realised that he was certain to lose the next election if he dared to overlook the concerns of 
the political elite and populace alike. Thus, on April 11th 1898, he sent a war message to Congress, 
                                                 
1066 It is safe to say that the US press made the most of this. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Spain applied 
harsh means, and that thousands of children and women died from disease mainly because of the appalling 
conditions of the camps. 
1067 An (somewhat sarcastic) interpretation is given in ”Citizen Kane” by Orson Wells. In reality, media magnet 
Hearst told his reporter on Cuba; ”You’ll furnish the pictures, I’ll furnish the war”, cited in Brogan, 1999: 440 
1068 Experts examined all available evidence in 1975. This US investigation concluded,”The characteristics of the 
damage are consistent with a large internal explosion”. Cited in Potter, 1981: 176. Spontaneous combustion of coal 
probably ignited gunpowder in an adjoining magazine. 
1069 See Howarth, 1999: 259-260 for a description.  
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requesting authority to use both the Army and the Navy.1071 Yet, we should also note the specific 
content of the following resolution in Congress, a resolution stressing the humanitarian concerns 
underpinning the following US actions. It called for a free and independent Cuba following Spanish 
withdrawal. It also included the Teller amendment, pledging that whatever the outcome, the US 
would not annex Cuba.1072 US “imperialism” stretched that far, no further.  
However, it would be foolish to deny that there were persons in power that saw opportunities for 
scoring victories in such a setting. One of them certainly was the young assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. He had early seen the opportunities open at the Philippines, owned by 
Spain, and protected by coastal guns and a small fleet. Thus, on order from “Theodore Rex”, 
Commodore Dewey sailed from Hong Kong on April 27th to conquer the Philippines. Dewey 
managed to destroy the Spanish fleet off the Philippines. And under combined US army and naval 
bombardment in August 1898, Manila capitulated.1073  
The entire US Naval conduct of the Spanish-American war in fact displayed something never 
witnessed previously; a global US strategy. It struck at the Philippines and Cuba almost 
simultaneously. The US Navy sought to “control the waters of the major Spanish island colonies to 
wring concessions from the Spanish government. US warships on offensive commissions won two 
decisive battles on opposite sides of the globe”.1074 In tactical and strategic terms, it was an 
astounding victory. But the most significant aspect in retrospect is the new impetus for interventions 
beyond the Monroe doctrine that was evident in the war. The seizure of the Philippines is 
undoubtedly an example of US imperialism, in that it was an incursion into the sovereignty of 
another people. The isles were taken by force and occupied by US troops. It took the army and the 
navy three years to control the insurrection among the Filipinos, who had hoped for independence. 
Eventually, it would take some fifty years before the US granted them this right. That parts of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1070 Baer, 1993: 31 
1071 Potter, 1981: 178 
1072 The Teller amendment stated that the US: ” hereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, 
when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." (Library of Congress, 
Hispanic Division) 
The Senate passed the amendment on April 19. True to the letter of the Teller Amendment, after Spanish troops left 
the island in 1898, the United States occupied Cuba until 1902.  
The Teller Amendment was succeeded by the Platt Amendment introduced by Senator Orville Platt (R-Connecticut) 
in February 1901. It allowed the United States "the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, 
the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty..." The Platt 
Amendment was finally abrogated on May 29, 1934.  Source; the Hispanic Division, Library of Congress: 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/teller.html 
1073 See Potter, 1981: 180. It was this invasion that pre-empted a German invasion, and thus angered the Kaiser to an 
astonishing degree. 
1074 Baer, 1993: 27 
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American society saw this occupation as a civilizing process does not undo the fact that it was a 
paternalist foreign policy on behalf of the US.1075 In this respect, it is an exception to our labelling of 
the USA as an international liberalist. But in fact, the Philippines were useless in the short run for 
North America; the Philippines were valueless as markets, and expensive to defend, 6000 miles 
from the American continent.1076 Moreover, the most damaging aspect for the US was the harm to 
its image of itself, fighting a colonial war for three years against a people who only pleaded for 
independence.  Therefore, it is characteristic of American imperialism that it soon turned into US 
soul-searching, domestic criticism and embarrassment.1077 On April 11 1902, Henry Cabot Lodge 
published the so-called Gardener Report, which produced national outrage due to the descriptions of 
US atrocities on the Philippines.1078 The following confessions of US Army officers led President 
Roosevelt to head a full investigation of the conduct of the US Army on the archipelago. In the 
aftermath of this investigation, the Philippines civil-government bill passed Congress, “promising a 
legislative assembly, an independent judiciary, and an expanding array of civil rights”1079 It was also 
in this context that Roosevelt declared the American occupation of Cuba as terminated the same 
spring.  
Indeed, ANY extraterritorial adventure fostered heated debates in Congress. Typically, the 
Democratic Party often opposed, at other times was split on, questions of active foreign policy. 
Andrew Jackson’s party, in which politicians from the South played leading roles, “was not likely to 
be insensitive to the demands of national honor, but in the early twentieth Century the antimilitarist 
tradition that could be traced back to the party’s other great hero, Thomas Jefferson, was more 
marked”1080. The Democratic Party of this era was prone to be anti-British and anti-interventionist. It 
opposed the occupation of the Philippines and other territories in 1898 as violations of the principles 
underlying the Declaration of Independence, while being much more supportive for intervention on 
Cuba, partly on humanitarian grounds.  
However, the occupation of the Philippines can also with some justification be interpreted as a 
turning point in US foreign policy.  After 1898, The US was permanently involved in the affairs of 
                                                 
1075 Puerto Rico and Guam also became colonies within the new American empire. Part of the alleged civilizing 
process was to be the conversion of the Philippines to Christianity. The Philippines were catholic. 
1076 Brogan, 1999: 442-443 
1077 Indeed, direct intervention by force into the sovereignty of other powers seem to foster what Abernethy has 
labelled a guilt complex; an encompassing expression in public in favour of mending past sins. Perhaps this 
mechanism has been stronger in the US than among the European Great Powers? See for example  Kissinger, 1982: 
introduction and chapter 1. On the other hand, those states that were defeated in major wars went through much 
more thorough self-examination, i.e. Germany 
1078 Morris, 2002: 99 
1079 Morris, 2002: 104 
1080 Thompson, 2002: 79 
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the Far East. Thus, although US imperialism never took off, its security interests in the region 
became institutionalised. The Philippines became an important base for the US Navy, and was 
perceived vital after the ascendancy of Japan as a naval power, so powerfully demonstrated after its 
victory over Russia in 1904-05. In addition, while the overseas ambitions of the US were modest, 
there was an increased awareness among US expansionists of the potential of the Caribbean. Indeed, 
one could also point out that the Treaty of Paris had given the US an official protectorate of 
Cuba.1081 The picture painted by American strategists was in this way much more complicated than 
previously; what if US interests were threatened on two oceans? This dilemma reinforced the 
arguments for a canal through Nicaragua or Panama.1082 The canal was indeed built between 1904 
and 1914, and the same ten years marked a high point in US interventionism in Latin America and 
the Caribbean islands. As the scope of US naval action grew, it became paramount to set up some 
sort of centralised naval command to coordinate operations. This body was to become the Naval 
War Board, a central strategy board largely manned by a staff of senior naval officers and 
specialists.1083 US politicians and large portions of the populace were enthusiastic about their 
humanitarian intervention on Cuba. Although the distance and complexities of this operation made it 
an easier undertaking than, say, the British participation in the Boer War, it was beyond doubt 
perceived by many North Americans as a defining moment. An expeditionary force of 16000 
soldiers was sent in June 1898. Although the cooperation behind the naval and land forces proved 
worse than desirable, the fleet of Cervera was beaten and gained the US undisputed command of 
Caribbean waters. An American force also landed on Puerto Rico, and the sum of defeats made 
Spain sue for peace. In a final treaty signed in Paris in December 1898, Spain relinquished all claim 
to Cuba and ceded Guam, the Philippines and Puerto Rico to the US.  
All in all, then, the years from 1895 till 1898 witnessed a growing pressure within the US in favour 
of a more active US foreign policy, culminating in overseas invasions and occupation of foreign 
territories in 1898.1084 This year then, could easily be interpreted as a vast change in US foreign 
policy. There is little doubt, at least, that to contemporary Americans, Europeans and inhabitants of 
the occupied territories alike, the alteration indeed mattered. The US had de facto acquired an 
overseas empire. We should note, however, some of the less striking yet principally important 
                                                 
1081 Brogan, 1999: 442 
1082 Partly due to the research carried out on the experience from the Philippines campaign, America had found a 
way to defeat yellow fever. This made a canal in Latin America seem possible; the French workforce that tried to 
build a canal there in the 1880s was more or less viped out by the fever. 
1083 Albion, 1945: 300 
1084 To mark off one exact year as a critical juncture is difficult. From 1890 till 1917, the US by my counts 
intervened in Latin America 33 times. However, the Spanish-American war stands out as the most complex and far-
            
 4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945
 
 
 
           
 
 
300 
characteristics of this empire. Firstly, the occupations were motivated more out of humanitarian 
concerns than as means to address an international balance of power. It is true that especially 
Guantanamo and Puerto Rico made defence of the US homeland easier, but the addressed 
humanitarian motives and the profit of all the other territories were frustrated in a matter of years. 
The former was best exemplified by the Philippines as we have mentioned above and in chapter two. 
Speaking of the benefits to the US, the Pacific possessions certainly yielded more burdens than 
profit. In economic terms, the Philippines were simply not a territory from which to extract 
resources. Simultaneously, just keeping it generated considerable costs. For the US navy, and indeed 
for the armed forces of the US in general, an overriding concern during decades to come was the 
problem of how to defend the Philippines. The archipelago was nearly 7000 miles from the US, but 
1000 from Japan and only 300 miles from Japanese-held Formosa. To establish and maintain fleet 
superiority against Japan in Far eastern waters was deemed impossible. And once lost, the recapture 
of the Philippines would require nothing less than securing control over most of the Pacific. Neither 
choice would rule out the necessity of fortified base facilities. In effect, the overseas possession and 
the “open door” policy generated a domino effect upon the objectives of US foreign policy; these 
policies created fierce political debates within the US from the outset. The rift was opened swiftly 
after the defeat of the Spanish fleet off the Philippines in 1898. In the short run, the expansionists 
were victorious, managing to gain a majority in congress in favour of the annexation of Hawaii in 
1898. Wake and the Samoa Islands followed in the following years. This, however, was to mark the 
high point of US imperialism. Congress did not allow further suggestions in direction of overseas 
expansion to turn into policies.  
The most profound effect on the US, and the international scene, of these expansionist policies was 
the fact that the US to a degree unprecedented in its history became part of the international balance 
of power. One might easily point to the following policies of the US in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, Cuba and the Far East as an imperialist policy. However, I will claim that such a label on 
US policies fails to distinguish the limitations on imperialism in the US when compared to the 
paternalist policies of the European great powers. This is not denying the series of imperialist –type 
actions that the US in fact implemented. What must be noticed is that even at its most “imperialist”, 
US foreign policy did not turn paternalist to the degree that it replaced international liberalism as the 
dominant ideology in the prevailing US view of international political economy.  
                                                                                                                                                             
reaching expedition in a literal sense. Itr also marked the genesis of permanent US national interests in the Far East. 
Thus, one could plausible make the case that 1898 was a critical juncture in US foreign policy.  
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Political science has not been in the forefront of theorising leadership as a political variable.1085 As 
in the case of Germany, personalities did matter in fostering interest in US extraterritorial power. In 
the case of US, the dynamic Theodore Roosevelt had particular influence on the direction of foreign 
policy in general and in naval policy in particular. He addressed the Naval war College in 1888, 
where he met Mahan for the first time. Mahan, developing a friendship with Theodore Roosevelt, 
had also become a chief propagandist in favour of US expansion. The use of American sea power 
was both in the national interest, a civilising mission and a way to counter “The yellow peril”.1086 
The civilising mission was applied at the Philippines according to Mahan, and he also argued that 
the US should occupy Hawaii to “erect a barrier against the spread of Chinese barbarism into the 
Pacific”.1087But we must note that this kind of rhetoric belonged to A.T: Mahan, and not Theodore 
Roosevelt. 
To claim that Mahan became his mentor in naval affairs is perhaps an exaggeration.1088 
Nevertheless, a close symbiosis developed between the two. Roosevelt praised ISPUH in a review in 
the Atlantic Monthly, and his adaptation of the principles of a strong battle fleet and a fleet-in-being 
as a political tool was total.1089 His strong leadership as president and his influence through his 
handpicked successor William Howard Taft, to an unprecedented degree in a democracy made the 
naval policies of the state identical to that of one person.1090 He never tried to cover up his 
worldview and the role he thought the US should play in the society of states; 
 
“Is America a weakling to shrink from the world work of the great world-powers? No.  Young giant 
of the west stands on a continent and clasps the crest of an ocean in either hand. Our nation, 
glorious in youth and strength, looks in the future with eager eyes and rejoices as a strong man to 
run a race”1091 
 
                                                 
1085 Of course there are attempts at this. See Mann, 1993: chapter 8 for one example 
1086 Hobson, 2002: 168. See also Mahan, 2003 
1087 Hobson, 2002: 168 
1088 A detailed account of the correspondence between Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt in office as president is given 
in Karsten, 1971: 589-597. Karsten also shows that it perhaps was Roosevelt that inspired Mahan just as much as 
Mahan inspired Roosevelt. This might be an answer to the question why Mahan became a more interventionist 
spokesman during his career.  
1089 Potter, 1981: 187 
1090 Morris, 2002: 44, and naturally, domestic and foreign policy are always interrelated in the field of naval 
construction. See also ibid; 22 and 24 
1091 Morris, 2002: 8 
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This is not to say that “Theodore Rex” was not part of a structure in the US polity; we have seen the 
influence of Mahan, and we have also mentioned the first tracings of the alleged military-industrial 
complex in the form of a common interest between the navy and the American steel industry. 
Nevertheless, Theodore Roosevelt stands out as an anomaly among US presidents. One year after 
his inauguration, contemporaries dubbed him “the strangest creature the White House ever held”1092 
Faced with criticism of his perceived tacit support of the “revolution” in Panama, he simply “did not 
understand what Hoar and other moralists meant when they talked of “conscience” in foreign-policy 
making”.1093 
The role of private industries increased with the vitality of the US economy. Shippers, exporters and 
shipbuilders all had common interests in expansionist policies. In this respect; the mechanism was 
similar to the one in Imperial Germany. As in Germany, navalists formed an organisation working in 
favour of an increase in naval spending, the Navy League of the United States, 1903. The sum of 
this pressure was a praxis where a larger US Navy was seen as appropriate for such a strong society. 
This was reflected in the material basis of the extraterritorial powers of the US. In the decades prior 
to WWI, the Navy increased by an average of two capital ships per year, even if the costs of each 
ship grew significantly in tandem with technological developments. This also made it self felt in the 
spending of the state, as can be seen in table 4.3.2 below. 
 
Table 4.3.2: Naval expenditures and Total federal expenditures in the US, 1890-
19141094 
Fiscal year Total federal expenditures Naval expenditures Percent of total 
1890 318.040.711  22.006.206  6.9 
1900 520.860.847  55.953.078 10.7 
1901 524.616.925  60.506.978 11.5 
1905 567.278.914 117.550.308 20.7 
1909 693.743.885 115.546.011 16.7 
1914 735.081.431 139.682.186 19.0 
 
                                                 
1092 Morris, 2002: 108 
1093 Morris, 2002: 302 
1094 Expenditures in US dollars, not corrected for inflation. Source; Potter, 1981: 187. The size and the complexities 
were the major reasons for the increasing naval expenditures.  
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The role of naval officers cannot account for the increased emphasis on modernising and increasing 
the navy in any direct way; US politicians were highly conscious of the importance of political 
control of the military. Thus, the secretary of the navy opposed a general staff –a suggestion 
enthusiastically proposed by the services themselves. Instead, a general board of the navy was 
institutionalised in 1900, but with mere advisory duties. In order to improve coordination between 
the services, a Joint Army-Navy Board was set up three years later. All the members of the Navy 
general Board were disciples of Mahan. The hallmark of Mahan thus set its footprint in three vital 
aspects of US naval policy. Firstly, large battleships were advocated. Ideally, such a fleet should be 
used concentrated as a fleet in being. Secondly, the strategic doctrine of Mahan emphasising the 
possession of bases as repair facilities and coaling stations was implemented in a literal manner. 
Thirdly, the construction of a canal across Central America in order to move fleets between the 
oceans was given paramount priority.  There is no doubt then, that as in Germany, the influence of 
Mahan made it self deeply felt in both the officer corps and the senior politicians of the country. 
There was also a political will in the US to enhance its strategic possibilities, embodied in Theodore 
Roosevelt’s words that it should “speak softly and carry a big stick”. However, we must note that 
this policy was in fact seldom applied to global affairs, but primarily was meant to use within the 
“sphere” of American influence. We should also pay attention to the fact that the cleavage in the US 
polity between interventionists and isolationists was in place during the entire period. Moreover, 
there was often a certain distance between the Navy and the political leadership on naval policies. 
More often than not, politicians represented the definite limit to naval grandiose schemes, or in the 
words of Henry Stimson; 
 
“The psychology of the Navy department frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a 
dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the 
only true Church”1095 
 
It seemed that North Americans applied one standard of foreign policy in Latin America, the 
Caribbean and the Philippines, and a quite different one in its dealings with larger powers. This is 
exemplified in the question of the Panama Canal, which in effect represented a change of 
geopolitical realities. The first step towards the realisation of the project was negotiating a 
termination of the 1850 treaty with Britain that stated that any such canal should be built and owned 
                                                 
1095 Cited in O`Connell, 1993: preface 
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by the two states in concert.1096 The US Congress eventually ratified the second Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty that gave the US exclusive control of the canal and the right to fortify it.1097 The French 
consortium was skilful at convincing US politicians of the merits of the Panama solution, on January 
9 1903. An agreement was reached between the US and Colombia –of which Panama then was a 
province- to this effect.1098 This so-called Hay-Herran Treaty secured the USA a 6-mile wide transit 
way for 10.000.000 US dollars and a 250.000 annuity. Unfortunately for the US and the French 
company, the Colombian senate refused to accept the agreement. It was at this stage the French 
company under the leadership of one Bunau-Varilla decided to engineer a revolution in Panama. 
Counting on the temper of T. Roosevelt, Varilla calculated that US would enter the turmoil under 
the cover of the Treaty of 1846 with Colombia, which pledged the US to maintain “free transit” on 
the Isthmus.1099 The “synthetic revolution”1100 consisted of some 500 individuals, allegedly 
equipped and paid 500 US dollars ahead, and did indeed trigger a US naval deployment to Panama. 
Thus, on November 4 1903, the Republic of Panama was officially born. In this situation, there was 
not much the Colombian government could do, since; 
 
“There was no overland route from Bogotá, and Colombian troops sent by water were politely told 
they could not land, since America had treaty obligations to uphold, and for them to proceed would 
obviously create an unneutral disturbance. The guns of the Nashville were an eloquent unspoken 
argument. Presently the Dixie arrived with a force of marines for any necessary policing ashore. On 
6 November, the United States recognized the revolutionary government of Panama”.1101 
 
Already 15 days after the revolution, the US Senate promptly ratified the Treaty.1102 With the 
completion of the canal in 1914, the USA had a valuable transit way between the widely separated 
coasts of its mainland. In fact, the US could exercise as much military, civil and judicial authority as 
it deemed prudential in the Zone, administered by a seven-man Isthmian Canal Commission. The 
                                                 
1096 The termination of the former treaty meant that the UK accepted ”granting the United States exclusive right to 
build an interoceanic waterway in Central America”, Morris, 2002: 67 
1097 Potter, 1981: 188 
1098 ”Panama’s political status as a provinvia of Colombia was…Tenous. It had spontaneously joined the New 
Grenadian Federation in 1821, and seceded with its disintegration in 1839. Bogotá had reasserted control twelve 
years later, and from then on Panama had alternated stormily between semi-autonomy and subjugation. Roosevelt 
counted no fewer than fifty-three isthmian insurrections, riots civil disturbances, and revolts since 1846” Morris, 
2002: 273 
1099 Morris, 2002: 88 
1100 Potter, 1981: 189 
1101 The quote is not from a leftist scholar, but that of Potter, 1981: 189. Confer with Morris, 2002: 294 
1102 Not that there was no criticism of the US role from US newspapers and NGOs, though. See Morris, 2002: 295-7 
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whole Panama affair nevertheless became a burden to the moral consciousness of US politicians and 
central actors in civil society. Some liberal journals labelled it an act of international piracy, and the 
US government eventually paid 25 million dollars to Colombia as an apology in 1921.1103 To my 
knowledge, no European paternalist power paid such sums to earlier or contemporary colonies to 
redeem past sins.1104 By 1977, a US-Panama agreement was reached on the ultimate return of 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone to Panama.1105  
If we examine the paternalist traits of US foreign policy under the two terms of Theodore Roosevelt, 
it is also clear that US intervention in Latin America were to assume a character and purpose that 
must be understood in geopolitical terms. Roosevelt was to regret his blunt statement from 1901 that 
“If any South American country misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country 
spank it”.1106 This was a dangerous utterance in the golden age of modern imperialism. Especially 
so, as in the long run, the eventual opening of the Panama canal would make the entire region as 
well as the Caribbean islands far more accessible in the international economy. By 1902, Britain had 
persuaded the paternalist powers Italy and Germany to join in her blockade of the coast of 
Venezuela (the latter had repudiated her international debts). Roosevelt soon had second thoughts, 
seeing the Monroe doctrine threatened; “The thought of the Kaiser acquiring land rights anywhere in 
the Americas was enough to freeze Roosevelt’s blood”.1107 So, when the Dominician republic after a 
series of riots and revolts became virtually bankrupt, Roosevelt made up his mind to act before 
Germany would be tempted to collect its debt by force. This act was what was to be called the 
                                                 
1103 Again, the cleavage on foreign policy between the Democratic and the Republican Party was marked. See 
Thompson, 2002: 81 
1104 Several countries in Africa by the beginning of the 21st Century claimed a right to an enormous compensation 
from the earlier colonial powers. This issue remains to be settled, if it ever will. In contrast, US efforts to smooth its 
past were a result of the internal guilt-complex.  
1105 President Carter made it a top issue in US relations with Central America. Already in 1948, US Supreme Court 
stated that while the US exercised control of the Canal, it had no sovereignty over it. Under President Gerald Ford, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on behalf of the US signed a memorandum of understanding with Panama, where 
US in principle agreed to hand over sovereignty of the canal to Panama. In accordance with the agreement from 
1978, Panama formally took over control of the Panama Canal on January 1, 2000.  Henry Kissinger, the chief US 
negotiator of the treaty, was later condemned as a "Soviet agent" by right-wing US commentators, partly due to the 
Panama Canal Treaty. 
1106 Cited in Potter, 1981: 189 
1107 Morris, 2002: 26.One should note that although Roosevelt was an admirer of Germany and passionately 
interested in German history, he on some occasations took a tough position on German foreign policy. Especially in 
the Venezuelan crisis of 1912, where he explicitly told the German ambassador to Washington, von Holleben, that 
he would wage war on Germany if German troops landed in Venezuela. In order to give William the opportunity of 
saving face, he did of course not make this threat public, nor was the message recorded in any official archives. 
However, the threat was backed up by a huge Naval exercise in the theatre, led by no lesser figure than Dewey, 
Roosevelt’s hero from the 1898 taking of the Philippines. The situation is described in detail in Morris, 2002: 189-
191, Roosevelt’s rationale for it in ibid: 177-179. One should also note that Germany had war plans covering 
America and a possible war with the US. The German navy adopted the so-called Bûchsel plan formally in 
November 1903. It focused on the Caribbean and possibilities for German expansionism in South America. In the 
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“Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. It affirmed nothing less than that the US would feel 
obliged “...in flagrant cases of…wrongdoing or impotence...to the exercise of an international police 
power” in Latin America.1108 In other words, the US set itself up as the dominant international 
institution within the region. And it was more to it than just rhetoric. Britain backed down in the 
Venezuelan crisis, the British Prime Minister assuring that Britain respected the Monroe Doctrine 
and withdrew its squadron after the blockade of Venezuela (by this move, Balfour also successfully 
isolated Germany. This, perhaps more than the threats secretly given by Roosevelt, was a main 
reason for the eventual German withdrawal).1109 The first actual use of the Roosevelt corollary was 
to take over the customs collection of the Dominican Republic. In its administration of the 
Dominican economy, US assured that 55 percent of the receipt went to settle her foreign debts. Was 
this an act of formal imperialism? It was, in the sense that it directly intervened in the politics of 
another sovereign state, but the purpose was not state or personalised aggrandisement on behalf of 
US authorities. Moreover, the policies of the US directed against its “colonies” were markedly less 
paternalist in its content than those of European great powers in the same era. While US intervention 
often was deemed prudent due to geopolitical factors, Americans were almost consistently moved by 
the desire to do “good” as well. Thus, naval and marine forces in Nicaragua, Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic were part of governmental administration, education and health care as well as 
campaigning for Uncle Sam. The range of activities from public health to road building was 
astounding. One hundred years after the occupation of Cuba, one might reasonably conclude that  
 
“Wood’s two-and-a-half-year governorship had been a spectacular success. A trained surgeon, he 
had transformed Cuba from one of the world’s most pestilential countries into one of its 
healthiest…As a result, Cuba was free of yellow fever for the first time in almost two 
centuries...Havana was now a more sanitary city than Washington, D.C”.1110 
 
Furthermore, one should also note that US interventions by and large sought a basis in decisions in 
democratic institutions. When the outbreaks of anarchy on Cuba in 1906, 1912 and 1917 made the 
US send the marines, the authority for these interventions was not the Roosevelt Corollary, but the 
Platt amendment (see footnote above). This amendment permitted US armed forces to intervene if 
                                                                                                                                                             
advent of war with the US, it called for German seizure and fortification of Puerto Rico. The ultimate war aim 
would be to make the US renounce the Monroe Doctrine. See Howarth, 1991: 279 and Baer, 1993 
1108 Quoted in Potter, 1981: 190 
1109 Baer, 1993: 36 
1110 Morris, 2002: 105 
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required to keep law and order or uphold Cuban “sovereignty”. The Platt amendment in fact was an 
international agreement between Cuba and the US, and had even become part of the Cuban 
Constitution.1111  
Moreover, the adventure at the Philippines became more of an embarrassment than an asset to the 
US. The continuation of US presence in the Philippines was motivated by strategic considerations, 
not out of the wish for economic surplus, and it was the perceived requirements for the protection of 
the Philippines that made the US annex Guam, Hawaii, American Samoa and Wake. But there is no 
doubt that the Philippines was perceived as a springboard for another interesting market for US 
politicians and business interests alike.  American merchants believed they saw an enormous 
potential market for US goods in China, in particular. Although China was de jure a sovereign state, 
it appeared as if it was about to be partitioned by the European paternalist powers. To get a share in 
this market, the US either had to scramble for a sphere of influence of her own, or somehow 
convince the other great powers not to divide up China.1112 It is characteristic of the international 
liberalist that it sought the latter rather than the former approach. It went down in history as the 
“Open Door”. It consisted in the mutual assurances of each power that every part of China should be 
open to the trade of all “friendly nations”, and was sought implemented by Secretary of State Hay 
from 1899. Initially, the open door policy had the effect intended by Hay; reducing the threat to the 
sovereignty of China as well as lessening suspicions between the European great powers. But to the 
Chinese, the Open door policy did not really seem to matter much, since all major powers involved 
in the Chinese market kept considerable institutions on the Chinese mainland and navies in Chinese 
waters. The Chinese populace increasingly resented this presence. This was the pretext for the Boxer 
rebellion, as is well known. One facet of the international force sent to quell the uprising is 
nevertheless of particular importance to our discussion of US extraterritorial policies. Anxious not to 
become tainted by association with imperialist powers, the US announced that its troops acted 
independently, and were not an integral part of the joint force. Furthermore, when the Chinese 
government eventually had to accede to pay an indemnity of 333 million dollars to the allied 
powers, the US later returned most of her share to China to provide scholarships to Chinese men for 
study in the USA. Again, then, what on the surface seemed as a US foreign policy similar to the 
imperialist policies of the major European powers, in fact had a content marked by a major power 
somewhat ashamed of using power in unjust interventions. What is even more significant in 
                                                 
1111 By a provision of the amendment, the US also leased Guantanamo as a naval base, a practise that since the war 
in Afghanistan from 2002 has become widely known to the public worldwide. Although the Platt Amendment was 
abrogated by treaty in 1934, and even after the diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba was severed in 1961, 
the US Navy just continued to use the base.  
1112 Potter, 1981: 191 
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connection with the Boxer rebellion, was that the US partaking in stopping the rebellion gave her a 
say in the following deliberations on Chinese sovereignty, and that she used this influence in a 
different direction than other great powers. The US simply stated that it stood for the territorial 
integrity of all China. Thus, even amidst “the heyday of imperialism”, US foreign policy was 
principally different in its content than those of other major powers; it had not simply imitated other 
large powers, or adapted to the state system. The US was a state founded on ideas. This mattered for 
its foreign policy, and so it was to matter for the content of the international system at large four 
decades later. In contrast to this, Imperial Germany sent her soldiers with, in effect, blessings from 
the Kaiser to apply what bot Chinese and Us eyewitnesses saw as brute and indiscriminate force.1113 
Russia seized the opportunity given her by the Boxer rebellion to tighten her grip on Port Arthur, 
occupy Manchuria and dominate Korea. Japan prepared for war, and indeed Japan and Russia soon 
fought each other. The intensity of extraterritorial violence was demonstrated in the battle of Tsu 
Shima on 27 May 1905, in which “Russia`s Baltic Fleet was annihilated in a holocaust of two 
thousand shells per minute”1114.  
 
What was the US response to this harsh climate in international affairs? It certainly was not entering 
entangling alliances, but it was not naïve idealism either. Especially after the Russo-Japanese war 
and Tsu Shima, Roosevelt intended to show the “big stick” of American power, successfully getting 
Congress to allocate money for more battleships and ordering a world cruise to be taken by the 16 
first-line battleships of the US fleet.1115 It started in December 1907, lasted fourteen months with a 
sailing distance of 46000 miles. There can be little doubt that US policymakers by this stage saw 
Japan as a potential enemy; especially the defence of the Philippines from a Japanese attack was laid 
out in one war plan after the other.1116 During the Spanish-American war, Britain was the only great 
power that expressed approval of US goals. The permanent withdrawal of the British West Indies 
Squadron from Jamaica by 1905, due to increased German strength in the North Sea, was an 
unspoken acknowledgement of American dominance in the Caribbean. As we have seen in the 
section on British sea power, these were calculated moves by British cabinets, based on what 
admiral Colomb already in the 1880s had stated; a war with the US was impossible for the Empire. 
                                                 
1113 See Massie, 1991 for a vivid recollection 
1114 Morris, 2002: 387 
1115 ”The Great White Fleet”. ”If we have such a navy – if we keep on building it up – we may rest assured…that no 
foreign power will ever quarrell with us about the Monroe Doctrine”, Roosevelt cited in Morris, 2002: 207 
1116 It was certainly not the intent of Roosevelt to challenge Japan, though. It is nevertheless fair to point out that 
Roosevelt grew more and more skeptical of Japan during the peace negotiations following the Russo-Japanese war. . 
See Morris, 2002: 397, 485, 493-4. Already in the summer of 1904 Roosevelt remarked on Japan that ”if they win 
out, it may possibly mean a struggle between them and us in the future”, Howarth, 1991: 281 
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It is striking to notice the increasing difference in US-German relations compared to US-Britain. 
Germany repeatedly aroused suspicions among American policymakers. We have already 
mentioned the crisis in Venezuela, where the Kaiser went furthest of the involved powers, 
permitting his fleet to bombard the Venezuelan coast. The German conduct in quelling the Boxer 
rebellion also awoke strong American antipathy. The fact is that the German leadership, and 
especially William II, unintentionally fertilised traits of anti-American attitudes in Germany after the 
US occupation of the Philippines. The German Kaiser had hoped to occupy the archipelago for 
Germany, and when the US moved against it, he aspired to secure at least parts of it. Thus, Germany 
sent a fleet stronger than Dewey’s for this purpose. The following friction between the fleets of the 
two countries nurtured a legend in both countries as to the hostile intentions of the other.1117 It is on 
the background of tenser relationships with both Germany and Japan that US naval priorities must 
be properly understood.1118 By 1905, the US was determined to counter the eventuality of any future 
Japanese attempt to seize the Philippines and to compete with Germany in becoming the second 
largest naval power after Britain.1119 The at times rude appearances of William II, Germany’s rather 
brute development of colonies in Africa, her leasehold of Tsingtao, her purchase from Spain of the 
Carolines, The Marshalls and the Marianas – islands that were all between the US and the 
Philippines, in sum contributed to a US image of Germany as a paternalist power of first rank. It was 
typical of the era of Mahan, however, that the US war plan (Warplan Black) against Germany was 
restricted to the notion of a naval war. 1120Again, the war conceived possible in the future would be 
a battle between major warships fought on the extraterritorial arena, free of the complexities of 
occupation, refugees, prisoners of war, devastation of infrastructure; it would rather be a duel, not 
unlike the sea battles of the Victorian age.1121 However, an openly aggressive policy against any 
                                                 
1117 See Potter, 1981: 193-194 and Massie, 1991 
1118 Morris, 2002: 201 
1119 Potter, 1981: 194 and Morris, 2002: 207.  
1120 The other, and the plan given most consideration by US strategists, major US war plan was plan orange, directed 
at an attack on japan in the advent of Japanese occupation of the Philippines. As in The Black Plan, the Orange plan 
was primarily a naval scenario, but with the addition of amphibious assaults to secure islands and atolls in the 
Pacific on the approach towards japan. See below for a description of further implications.  
1121 See Spector, 2002: chapter 2 of this very interesting view on war at sea. Warships were seen as symbols as well 
as arms of national pride and technology. Wars by navies could be decisively won by fleets of battleships that would 
fight in the good old gentlemanly manner that had “always” characterised war at sea. Paradoxically, navies, that by 
their very nature made for interaction with other states, were institutions which personnel often were rather isolated 
from their motherland. This made, and still makes the naval profession special in many countries. O`Connell, 1993: 
13-14 thus has written on the US naval officers that “frequent socializing among the officers of the major maritime 
powers became an important and traditional aspect of naval life. Driven together by loneliness and mutual 
professional interests, officers were received by their counterparts with extreme courtesy, practically without regard 
for international affairs. Therefore, Admiral George Dewey`s men thought it natural to exchange social calls with 
the Spanish naval officials they were about to replace in the Philippines – behavior reminiscent of the European 
military aristocracy during the anci`en regime” 
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European power was unconceivable before WW I.1122 In spite of the isolationist elements of the US 
as a player on the world scene, the US Navy nevertheless was in the front of the technological 
development. Needless to say, her industrial base also made her potential as a naval power 
remarkable. When the shift from coal to oil in warships was a fact, the US was in the best of 
positions compared to other powers, given her ample source of domestic petroleum. The US Navy 
was also quick at converting into turbine ships, commissioning five destroyers with turbines as soon 
as 1907. Even submarines were taken into the service as early as 1900, with batteries and electric 
motor for underwater propulsion. In time, this weapon alone would make Mahan’s doctrine that a 
guerre de course was ineffective against a naval power, obsolete. One of the most fascinating 
aspects of the extraterritorial arms development in this “first new nation” was the innovative and 
creative approach to new technologies. No single weapon was to become more American than the 
airplane. In this respect, the US military was far more daring than the military institutions of Europe, 
with the possible exception of the Zeppelin arm applied by Germany.1123 The military potential of 
the plane was seen in the US almost immediately after the successful pioneering work by the Wright 
brothers in 1903. Already by 1910, successful takeoffs from ships had been conducted by US 
personnel and with US equipment. By 1912, the US Navy devoted resources to the torpedo plane, 
with a torpedo release gear and a self-propelled torpedo that had the potential of transforming future 
naval battles. This activity was also given an institutional basis through the first naval aviation unit 
established in 1912 at Annapolis, Maryland.1124 The most useful potential of the plane in the short 
run, however, was the use of planes for scouting, a practise that became part of exercises from 1914. 
Control of the extraterritorial means of violence was also greatly improved in this phase through the 
introduction of radios on all naval vessels. Needless to say, this instrument in the field of tactics 
gave better possibilities for exchanging information and orders, but also in peacetime, the radio 
greatly facilitated coordination of ships, stations and bases.  
In sum, there is little doubt that the US, in the years with Theodore Roosevelt as assistant secretary 
of the Navy, then as Vice-President and in his two terms as US president, built a strong arsenal of 
means capable of extraterritorial violence. During his first four years as President, annual 
appropriations for the US navy rose from 85 to 118 million dollars.1125 The use of this weapon was 
                                                 
1122 Unconceivable for all Americans except military staff officers, which task it is to make contingency plans. See 
Baer, 1993: 51 
1123 The Zeppelins were applied for gathering intelligence on land and sea. In some instances, they spread terror 
among in the British populace by air bombardment of cities. Conversely, Britain sought to destroy Zeppelin hangars 
by planes. The most effective means to stop the zeppelins, however, were by machineguns from airplanes. 
Ultimately, therefore, the use of the large, slow zeppelins did not become a lasting weapon. See Massie, 2003. 
1124 Potter, 1981: 196 
1125 Howarth, 1999: 282 
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applied in both real-political and humanitarian terms, and it institutionalised a foreign policy that 
made the US into a power with overseas possessions. However, the legacy in foreign policy was of a 
much more limited scope. 
Not until the Soviet Union was beaten and had ceased to exist and Secretary of state Madeleine 
Albright during the Clinton Administration stated that the US was the “indispensable nation”, would 
US self-esteem reach the same heights. In essence, according to the worldview of Theodore 
Roosevelt, it was necessary for the US to monitor and partly keep up with the arms race in Europe, a 
sentiment that was not shared by all US politicians. To Roosevelt, however, the introduction of the 
British Dreadnought class made him prioritise all-big-gun battleships for the US navy,1126 and 
authorise the first full US dreadnought in 19071127. It was the parade of the Great White Fleet, the 
sixteen best battleships of the US Navy literally painted in peaceful white, in Chesapeake Bay in 
December 19071128 that visualised the US as a first class world power.  
 
4.3.3 Isolationism, Internationalism and the attempt at establishing world 
order through international institutions 
In this section, we will discuss the particular form of international liberalism as expressed by leading 
US politicians in the period from 1900 till 1945. The US administrations aptly demonstrate the 
different traits in the culture of national security and thinking on international relations in the US 
polity, since they reflected nuances of importance within this culture. In particular, it is interesting to 
scrutinise the alleged shift from isolationism to international interventionism on behalf of the US. 
This thesis has postulated that there exists a significant causal connection between the ideology and 
self-identity of a hegemon and attempts at regulating or imposing world order in the international 
system. To the degree that this hypothesis is correct, we should expect to see clear attempts from US 
administrations to mould the world order according to its preferred ideational and material 
preferences. Here, much emphasis is laid on the ideational part of the equation. I will also question 
the often-held view that US politics shifted between clearly defined phases of either isolationism or 
interventionism. One alternative to the pendulum-argument that US foreign policy shifted between 
international activism and isolationism is the notion of a more or less constant struggle between 
                                                 
1126 Howarth, 1999: 283-5 
1127 Ibid: 285 
1128 Howarth, 1999: 286. To grand effect, Roosevelt used the spook of Japan and the possibility of a threat to the US 
mainland as PR-stunt to gain support for his fleet program. In this he was successful, by 1909, the US was the 
keeper of the second largest organisation for extraterritorial violence in the world.  
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these views in domestic politics. In order to achieve a fuller grasp of US naval policies, we probably 
cannot think in terms of binary values in these variables. It is entirely possible, for example, to be 
active on the international arena while at the same time favouring disarmament; i.e., to be an 
interventionist “pacifist” rather than navalist. At the same time, we will also look into whether these 
various facets of US ideology made its naval policy vary significantly through the era. In other 
words, did extraterritorial strategy closely follow ideology? If this is not the case, then US naval 
priorities had already been relatively fixed at an earlier junction, notably the Spanish-American war 
in 1898. Lastly, we will address the question whether the combination of technological 
development, US naval strategy and the US assessment of the international system reshaped the very 
nature of extraterritorial means of violence and their application through new doctrines and new 
modes of projecting power.  
 
In the field of naval strategy, there is little evidence that US policies changed significantly between 
1902 and 1917, in the sense that preparing the fleet followed a familiar US path. The fact that US 
naval war plans did not shift significantly between 1902 and 1914 supports this claim, as it supports 
the interpretation that US foreign policy fostered few incentives to get embroiled in European 
politics. Thus, the Spanish-American war and the following fleet policy of Theodore Roosevelt can 
rightfully be seen as a critical juncture that “froze” US naval policies until WWI. The USA had built 
a Navy that was ill suited for war in the Atlantic. For example, there was a dramatic absence in the 
Navy of smaller ships that could be applied in anti-submarine operations. Moreover, and even more 
telling on the political side, was US war planning. As late as 1915, US war gaming was almost 
entirely based on the assumptions in War Plan Black, which covered engagements with enemy fleets 
(most notably German) in the Caribbean.1129 The Navy department at this stage was not able to shift 
its focus to war in Europe, or even to the North Atlantic.1130 This fact belies easy speculating about 
any grand US scheme to enter the war and model the state system in its own vision once the 
Europeans had been bled to death. Thus, a historian of the US Navy has simply concluded “The Taft 
years (1909-1913) were filled with naval thought, much of it focused on the Far East and most of it 
ineffective”.1131 Taft inherited a strong fleet, but national naval policy was rather undefined. The 
same year that Woodrow Wilson became President, Germany’s ambitious level of shipbuilding 
                                                 
1129 Potter, 1981: 225 
1130 The US road to war and US naval operations will not be discussed here, for reasons stated at the outset of this 
chapter. However, US policies during WWI and up to 1945 will be addressed with emphasis on ideology and 
foreign policy connected to naval priorities. 
1131 Howarth, 1999:291. Baer, 1993: 60-63 may more emphasis on the importance of the Caribbean in US naval 
thinking, but basically agrees that the US Navy was largely unprepared for a war with European countries.  
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passed that of the United States. Up till WWI, US naval planning was a process that was rather 
isolated from political control. War Plan Black and –orange were both examples of this; plans that 
seldomly were analysed or even questioned by senior US politicians. Thus, one could postulate that 
US naval planning was an example of a bottom-up shaping of US foreign policy preferences. It is 
important to note, however, that whatever the degree of bureaucratic power prior to the European 
war, the policy process was firmly guided by the President after 1914. Wilson repeatedly overruled 
his admirals (attempts at creating something similar to the General Staff known from Germany, 
were blatantly turned down by Wilson`s Secretary of the Navy in 1913).1132 In this respect, even the 
influence of Mahan did not make for anything remotely similar to the role Tirpitz played within the 
German polity. In the US, the requirements of a policy of neutrality made the President at times 
dictate detailed naval policies. Commenting on WWI, for example, Baer states that:  
 
“The nature of the war, and Wilson’s political purpose however, gave the Navy missions of another 
kind for which it was not prepared: antisubmarine warfare, antisubmarine escort (convoy duty), 
coalition cooperation, and above all, the safe transport of American soldiers to France”1133 
 
The isolated character of US Naval planning was addressed through reform in 1915 by the 
establishing of the Office of Naval Operations. But on the political side, again, the fact remains that 
when the war broke out in 1914, the main worry in Washington was the British blockade measures 
rather than the later envisaged potential hegemony of Germany! US official reaction to the 
“European war” was strict neutrality. While US authorities consistently insisted on mare liberum, 
US merchantmen were repeatedly stopped by British patrols, making long inspections delay 
transportation by sea. However, the vast demand for goods from Britain and France as the war 
continued, made exportation on American keels more and more profitable, making for increased 
shipping across the Atlantic. It was this commerce that was exposed to German U-boats during the 
war. This fact, German clumsiness (i.e. the Zimmermann Telegram) and skilful British propaganda 
did much to tilt American sympathies in the direction of Britain, a pattern also facilitated 
domestically by The Navy League. Yet, the US hesitated long before entering the war. This process 
vividly illustrates US traits of isolationism. Wilson’s second note of protest after the sinking of 
Lusitania, for example, made the pacifist Secretary of State Bryan resign due to the wording of the 
                                                 
1132 Albion, 1945: 301. This line was followed by FDR in his service as assistant secretary of the Navy and as 
President, citing the requirement of civilian control of the military. 
1133 Baer, 1993: 73 
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protest. Parallel to this almost pacifist stance, Wilson managed to create the Naval Act of 1916, with 
its explicit goal of a US Navy “second to none”.1134 It was as if “peace through strength” should be 
taken literally by a President that by realist scholars has been erroneously labelled a naïve idealist. 
Included in the Naval Act was a huge increase in US surface ships, submarines and the establishing 
of a Naval Flying Corps and a Naval Reserve Force.1135 The build-up did not amount to a clear 
purpose to enter the war, but rather as a long-term asset that could be applied for intervention on the 
post-war arena.1136 Part of the explanation why the US was so reluctant to take a clear stand in the 
war, was that Wilson was acutely aware of the sentiment of the US public. Millions of Americans 
sided with the countries from which their forefathers had come. Unsurprisingly, this of course 
included the large German-American community. But one should also note that other groups also 
had a clear tendency to support the Central powers; Jewish-Americans (chiefly out of hostility to 
Russia), Swedish-Americans (also hatred of Russia and historic relations to Germany), and to some 
degree Irish-Americans (due to their feelings toward England). Various groups naturally supported 
the other side, the British-Americans being the largest single group.1137 No wonder most Americans 
understood the meaning of the slogan that Wilson had used in order to be re-elected “He kept us out 
of the War”. In addition to this, it was reassuring to state that the values of the US were superior to 
those of the European countries;  “This country does not intend to become entangled in this war. It 
would be a crime against civilization if we entered it”, as Wilson put it.1138 The vision of the war as 
evil was echoed in the famous speech by Wilson in Congress that “The world must be made safe for 
democracy” on April 2 1917.1139 But by this time, pressure for entering the war had become 
irresistible. Again, it was the very ideological foundation of the US as a polity that was evoked in 
favour of intervention. No other motivation could be applied. The new thing about this 
interventionism however, was a moral conviction that precisely this ideological state had a mission 
to lead on the world arena; the balance of power and the Europeans could not look after themselves, 
to put it crudely.1140 Contrary to economic reductionism, not even the economic aspect of the U-boat 
                                                 
1134 See Thompson, 2002: 117-118 and Howarth, 1999: 303-4 notes that ”Not even Theodore Roosevelt or 
Admiral Mahan had asked for that much”. See also Baer, 1993: 59-61 
1135 Potter, 1981: 226 
1136 Baer, 1993: 60-61 
1137 See Thompson, 2002: 100-101 
1138 Massie, 2003: 700 
1139 Potter, 1981; 226. ”It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war. But the right is more precious 
than peace. The world must be made safe for democracy. The day has come when America is privileged to spend 
her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth” Quoted in Massie, 2003: 713-14 
1140 Thompson, 2002: 142-149 proposes the argument that neither national security nor economic motives played 
any significant parts in the reasoning or the feelings that made the Wilson Administration (i.e. Woodrow Wilson) 
decide to go to war. However (ibid: 155), he quotes Wilson saying ”When the war is over we can force them to our 
way of thinking, because they will, among other things, be financially in our hands”. In other words, the most logic 
conclusion that Wilson did not want to restore a balance of power in Europe, but nothing short of a new world order. 
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threat against the increased US exports to Britain could explain the US entrance into WWI. To 
Wilson, in particular, what seems to have mattered most in favour of intervention was his perception 
that the torpedoing of merchant ships without warning was illegal. Upholding the rights of 
American citizens, Wilson believed, was a cornerstone of genuine neutrality. Thus, the development 
of war could be raised to no less an issue than the Rights of Humanity.1141 One might say that the 
actual naval contribution to WWI was undramatic, but this ignores the US assistance to allied 
convoying and the escort of US troops and supplies to the European theatre of war.1142 However, US 
naval losses during the final one and half years of WWI were insignificant. The moral and material 
effect of the US strengthening of the allied cause was primarily through supplies and in increasing 
allied strength on the continent. We should also note that the war effort had an effect upon the US 
state itself. During the nineteen months of participation in WWI, the US raised an army of four 
million men, transported more than half of them to Europe by sea and “increased the level of its 
spending by a factor of 25 (the cost of the war to the United States exceeded the previous total of all 
federal expenditures since the establishment of the constitution).”1143 
To our argument in this thesis however, the naval priorities so telling of, and vital to, US foreign 
policy in the following decades are of more central concern.  In the US, realist thinking and idealist 
foreign policy ideology merged to a greater extent following WWI than is often assumed. Clearly, 
the defeat of Germany made Japan the foremost opponent of the US, hence the strong emphasis on 
the Pacific fleet of the US. This was a continuation of US naval priorities since the occupation of the 
Philippines,1144 and belies the notion that US foreign policy was almost solely based on Kantian or 
Wilsonian idealism in the wake of WWI. In US policies towards the European powers, the elements 
of idealism was of course evident in Wilson’s fourteen points, of which the second1145 was a blatant 
demand for mare liberum suiting a truly international liberalist.1146 The content of this principle as it 
was proposed by the US, as well as the seriousness of US policymakers in backing it up, is a telling 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, this idealism was not incompatible with realism. If Britain fell, a scenario predicted by no lesser figure 
than First sea Lord Jellicoe of the British Admiralty in April 1917, the US could face the possibility of a coalition of 
Germany, Austria and Japan.  
1141 See Thompson, 2002: 107-109. The sinking of Lusitiania, for example, caused a storm of protest in the US that 
might seem incomprehensible.  
1142 The ferrying of US troops across the Atlantic was the biggest such enterprise ever undertaken. Not one single 
soldier was lost by enemy action at sea. Indeed, Baer, 1993: chapter four, suggests with good reason that the Us 
participation in WWI was a way of warfare without Mahan. There were no US partaking in big clashes of battleship 
fleets. Policy ruled over tactics. 
1143 Thompson, 2002: 142 
1144 The importance of increased US naval strength was also recommended by Mahan since 1900 
1145 ”Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war, except as the 
seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants”. Cited 
in Potter, 1981: 232. 
1146 See also O`Connell, 1993: 233-4 
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demonstration of what we have claimed to constitute a difference between the US and the paternalist 
sentiment inherent in the major European powers. Even in Britain, linguistically and culturally so 
similar to the US, the mare liberum demands as laid down by the US were perceived as shocking. 
That Wilson also was serious on its implication went beyond what European diplomats could 
conceive.  
Characteristically, the fact that the US had declared war on Germany to preserve neutral rights on 
the high seas was by most European politicians seen as a mere technicality. To Wilson and his 
supporters, on the other hand, the question of mare liberum was a crucial component of a liberal 
world order.1147 This indeed was international idealism, but when the British succeeded in getting 
the second point removed from the peace conference agenda, Wilson demonstrated his ability to 
play by the rules of the realist game; he not only requested Congress to revive the suspended 
capital-ship building program of 1916, but asked for a doubling of this very heavy schedule! In 
other words, if a liberal world order could not be achieved through reasoned deliberations at 
international conferences, then a further tilting of the balance of power in favour of the US could 
perhaps do the trick to achieve the same purpose. Thus, the only theoretically possible way for the 
British Empire to remain the first-rank naval power would be to literally throw in all its resources in 
an arms race with the US. Although we do not have precise knowledge of Wilson’s motivations,1148 
it is fairly obvious that he anticipated that he meant his proposal for a grand US navy as a means to 
enhance US negotiation strength versus Japan and Britain.1149 In the case of Britain, Wilson simply 
wanted to make the paternalist more inclined to support the League of Nations and adopt a more 
liberal foreign policy.1150 Another factor that seems to have been very important for Wilson, and 
which could be an attribute of both Wilson the idealist and Wilson the realist, was the wish to keep 
European powers out of the Western hemisphere, i.e. to keep the central purpose of the Monroe 
doctrine alive. Also, it should be noted that an interpretation where we see Wilson’s decision for a 
massive naval build-up as a tbargaining chip against Britain, seems to correspond well with the 
eventual outcome: ”The messy situation worsened in April 1919, when Lloyd George stipulated that 
                                                 
1147 Indeed, and to much consternation in Britain, Wilson already in 1916 pointed to the freedom of the seas as the 
cornerstone in his vision of the post-war world. In a speech delivered to the League to enforce Peace, ”Remarkably, 
the first object of the ”universal association of the nations”, Wilson called for would be to maintain the freedom of 
the seas” Thompson, 2002: 125 
1148 Wilson was not inclined to share his inner thoughts with Congressmen or members of his cabinet. See 
Thompson, 2002 for some striking descriptions. More than his visionary worldviev, this introvert attitude coupled 
with a very weak institutionalised bureaucracy around the Presidency, is perhaps the chief reason why Wilson`s 
grand scheme failed. 
1149 Howarth, 1999: 325 concludes plausibly that Wilson was bluffing when it came to his request for an enormous 
US naval build-up. O`Connell, 1993: 240-1 concludes in a similar fashion.  
1150 See Potter, 1981: 232-3 
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an end to the naval rivalry was the condition for his agreement to include the Monroe Doctrine in the 
League’s covenant”.1151 
Woodrow Wilson has been described as a dreamer, a portrait largely due to the descriptions of 
contemporary European observers. This, often rude and cynical portrait, to a large degree obscured 
the fact that his arrival in Europe by many Europeans was treated as something resembling the 
Second Coming. Largely due to his vision of a “new world order”, the streets of Paris were 
crammed with people cheering him upon his arrival. Even J.M. Keynes observed that “When 
President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence throughout the world 
unequalled in history”.1152 And yet, Keynes, along other reporters from the Peace conferences, saw 
Wilson like most educated upper-class people of paternalist powers saw the American president; “he 
had not much even of that culture of the world which marks M. Clemenceau or Mr. Balfour as 
exquisitely cultivated gentlemen of their class and generation”.1153 Sigmund Freud publicly 
compared Wilson to Don Quixote, applying the Christian Science to politics, and E.H. Carr twenty 
years later did as much as possible to portray Wilson as the embodiment of idealism.  
But the fact was that Wilson already in 1917 much feared a settlement after the war that would spoil 
the victories of war to the damage of Europe as well as the world at large; “…the war shall not end 
in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible 
rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong”.1154 It was for the 
purpose of a lasting peace that Wilson became the first president of the USA ever to go overseas 
while in office.1155 The problem was that the Congress was far more isolationist than Woodrow 
                                                 
1151 Baer, 1993: 87 
1152 Cited in Thompson, 2002: 3 
1153 IBID: 5. The Reception of other US presidents 70 or 85 years later shared some of the same European snobbish 
disdain.  
1154 Cited in Thompson, 2002: 163, 119, 133: ”It must be a peace without victory…Victory would mean peace forced 
upon the loser, a victor`s term imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at 
an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would 
rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand” and ibid: 231: ”and there ensues upon it, in the suitable 
darkness of the night, the nightmare of dread which lay upon the nations before this war came. And there will come 
some time, in the vengeful Providence of God, another struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from 
America will have to die, but as many as millions as are necessary to accomplish the final freedom of the peoples of 
the world” 
1155 And to this day, no US president has ever stayed for so long outside of the US! The major weakness of Wilson 
was his remote leadership and failure to use his cabinet to gather support for his international vision at home. 
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Wilson.1156 Congress rejected the 1919 building program, and the senate rejected the League of 
Nations.1157  
The elected Republican president Harding explicitly favoured a return to “normalcy”, which for 
Americans meant disarmament, and for Harding to reject the Navy`s strategic assessment.1158. The 
US nevertheless sought to utilise its improved standing after WWI through orchestrating 
international peace conferences, the first one was the Washington Conference with Britain, France, 
Japan and Italy participating late in 1921. In this conference, North America had an undisputed role 
as a leader, and in effect her proposals on a ten-year “holiday” in construction of capital ships and 
the scrapping of ships equalling a final ratio of strength of 5:5:3 for the US, Great Britain and Japan 
was accepted.1159 The popular support for the US proposals was widespread, largely due to the 
reciprocity embodied in the treaty drafts. Technical committees by the participating countries soon 
produced the Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty, which also contained mutual restrictions on 
fortifications in the Pacific. This in many respects must be seen as an American success in limiting 
extraterritorial state activity in the form of military power. The success continued through the Four-
Power Pact and Nine-Power Treaty.1160 The first stated that the US, Japan, Britain and France would 
respect each other’s Far Eastern possessions, in the latter treaty, the signatory powers were joined by 
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and China in reaffirming the territorial integrity of China 
and endorsing the Open Door Policy.1161  However, voices critical of the treaties were soon to be 
                                                 
1156 See Thompson, 2002: 240-1. Congress was determined not to yield sovereignty to an international organ. 
Especially article 10 in the covenant, regarding intervention in the advent of war, was highly problematic to the 
Congress.  
1157 That the US increasingly returned to isolationism is well analysed by David Kennedy, 1999. In ibid: 386-7, for 
example; ”The idea of isolation was as old as America itself. From John Winthrop’s declaration that Americans 
dwelt in a ”city upon a hill” through George Washington’s admonition to beware ”the insidious wiles of foreign 
influence”, Thomas Jefferson’s repudiation of ”entangling alliances”, Mark Twain`s satirical anti-European 
diatribes in “The Innocents Abroad and A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court”, and Henry James’s 
sensitive ”Transatlantic novels”, down even to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s poetic conclusion to his 1925 novel “The 
Great Gatsby”, with its lyrical invocation of ”the fresh green breast of the New World”, Americans had thought 
of themselves as not simply distant from the Old World but different from it as well. That difference, indeed, 
defines for many the essence –and the superiority- of the American national identity. International involvement 
was therefore worse than useless. It risked contaminating the very character of the nation. ”Rejection of 
Europe”, the novelist John Dos Passos once wrote, ”is what America is all about”. In the Great war –what 
Americans often tellingly called ”the European war” –the United States had haltingly abandoned that centuries –
old cultural wisdom, only to reembrace it with deepened conviction in the war`s aftermath” To many US citizens, 
the war demonstrated that Europe yet had not become a modern society. See Thompson, 2002: 153. The conferences 
were also politically controlled tightly; military officers were excluded from all meetings, with the exception for the 
Japanese delegation. See Baer, 1993: 93. 
1158 On the latter, see Baer, 1993: 93 
1159 Potter, 1981: 233. One should note that this included the scrapping of 847 750 tons of US naval tonnage. But 
also Japan and Britain had to abandon a huge number of ships, thus the comment that US Secretary of State Hughes 
”sunk in 35 minutes more ships than all the admirals of the world have sunk in a cycle of centuries”, Potter, 1981: 
233 
1160 See Howarth, 1999: 338-342 
1161 Potter, 1981: 234 
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heard, also within the US. The Naval Limitation Treaty ignored cruiser tonnage, an opportunity 
eagerly exploited by Japan and Britain. US officers saw the non-fortification agreement as an 
underwriting of Japanese supremacy in the Far East, while the Treaty undoubtedly also made the US 
scrap more tonnage than Britain.1162 
What is more, the US attempt at regulating the maritime world order continued, only to become less 
effective. The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 to impose the 5:5:3 ratio on cruiser tonnage, for 
example, was an American effort that failed completely. Again, it is striking to note that US-British 
disagreement was in the forefront of discussions.1163 Not until the London Conference of 1930, for 
example, did the two states settle the single item of the cruiser issue.1164 Otherwise, US influence on 
the international arena through the medium of negotiations was reduced, The general Disarmament 
Conference in 1932-3 and the Second London Naval disarmament Conference 1935-6 both 
succumbing under unilateral strategies.  
It was a lesson that came with a high prize, but the rapidly shrinking power of the US on the 
international scene did not only come about out of international rivalries. The isolationist camp 
within the US was important in the sense that it does much to explain the limited role of the US in 
international politics between the Washington Conference and the outbreak of WWII. Congress was 
more or less consistently against ambitious naval programmes. It is true that Congress authorised 
building of eight cruisers in 1924. But when president Coolidge only built two, then regretted this 
after the failed Geneva conference, congress sharply cut back the plan. During the office of pacifist 
President Hoover, not one single naval ship was constructed. But the US reluctance to engage more 
intensely on the world scene must chiefly be understood as caused by the very constitution of the 
American polity. US administrations could play by the rules of political realism just as much as they 
could appeal to US idealism, but at the end of the day, the isolationist sentiment always present in 
North America before 1941 limited the scope of both. In the words of Minnesota Senator Thomas 
Schall: “To hell with Europe and the rest of those nations!”1165 The tendency towards isolationism 
was not wholly incompatible with the liberalist creed in the US either, rather to the contrary. The 
earlier active enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine eased considerably during the 1930s. At the Pan-
American Conference in 1933, FDR instructed the State department to vote in favour of a resolution 
                                                 
1162 Howarth, 1999: 342. One should also note the criticism of the treaty by US Naval officers who clearly saw that 
the limitations on tonnage did not preclude a technological race, a race on speed and range, plus increased efforts at 
modernising submarine fleets.  Furthermore, ”There was no verification process for any of the naval arms-
limitations treaties, which was one of their chief weaknesses, and the US government and the League of Nations 
preferred ignorance to onsite inspection”, Baer, 1993: 126. Ibid: 94-103 gives a detailed account  
1163 See Baer, 1993: 109 
1164 Potter, 1981: 234 
1165 Quoted in David Kennedy, 1999: 381 
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with the wording that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
another”.1166 In effect, FDR abandoned formally what already had been abandoned de facto during 
Hoover`s administration; the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. FDR consistently 
followed up on this by releasing Cuba from the Platt amendment in 1934. 
Naturally, military decision makers felt uneasy about the effects of US isolationism.1167 Again, the 
looming potential of Japan did most on the international scene to impress US naval personnel. In 
1930, for example, the Japanese navy conducted an exercise to test the US defence of the 
Philippines. The US office of Naval Intelligence concluded that the US fleet would have been totally 
destroyed if it had been an operation of war and not an exercise.1168 But such Japanese 
demonstrations, even its invasion of Manchuria in 1931, did not produce a US fleet build up; nine 
days after the Manchuria invasion, President Hoover “halved the Navy’s destroyer construction for 
1932 and cancelled all naval building for 1933”.1169 Moreover, this isolationist policy took place in a 
context where it was evident that the League of Nations was impotent at halting aggression. In spite 
of US isolationism however, the behaviour of Japan made the US Navy General Board revise its 
Plan Orange. But this was not a step towards interventional interventionism. The US naval policy 
under FDR can also be seen as paying the dues for earlier isolationism. Thus, “In 1932, at the end of 
Hoover`s presidency, Japan had a 4:1 advantage in modern cruisers”1170. Neither did the US impress 
other major powers through their other military services; in 1930, the US Army counted only 
145000 men.1171 The isolationist traits of the US polity that made for insignificant extraterritorial 
ambitions were partially circumscribed through increased naval spending by FDR in 1933. Like his 
cousin, FDR had served as assistant secretary of the navy and was acutely aware of the relationship 
between diplomacy and military power, although he often could make an impression to the 
contrary.1172 There is little doubt, however, that the commissioning of US naval ships during the 
1930s also served a domestic purpose. The first big naval authorisation of FDR was “a relief 
measure to assist the depressed steel and shipbuilding industries: The National Recovery Act of June 
1933 authorized construction in cruisers and lesser types to full treaty strength”1173 One year later, 
the Vinson-Trammel Bill called for an eight-year building program, replacing older ships and 
amounting to 102 new ships. Although isolationism was still holding its ground in Congress, FDR 
                                                 
1166 David Kennedy, 1999: 391 
1167 By 1935, it had begun to worry FDR as well. See David Kennedy, 1999: 393. 
1168 Howarth, 1999: 350 
1169 Howarth, 1999: 351 
1170 Baer, 1993: 123 
1171 Baer, 1993: 125 
1172 But FDR was also aware of the isolationist sentiments in the depressed US. See David Kennedy, 1999: 390 
1173 Potter, 1981: 235.  
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did nothing to halt naval allocations after Japan and Germany had withdrawn from the League of 
Nations in 1933.In addition, by December 1934, Japan announced that it would no longer be bound 
to any treaty limiting naval construction.  
In fact, from 1934 to 1940, implementing the Visnon-Trammel Bill made US naval appropriations 
grow every year, ultimately reaching one billion dollars a year.1174 Moreover, in 1938, the second 
Vinson act explicitly granted a twenty percent overall tonnage increase above the former treaty 
limits. This “military Keynesianism”1175 also gave room for experimentation and the crafting of new 
types of units. Along with Japan, the US was the major power that put most emphasis on naval 
aircraft and carriers.1176 This policy also resulted in new naval bases and air stations. Indeed, it is 
probably no exaggeration to claim that FDR was seduced by air power theory. In 1938, he mused 
whether not “pounding away at Germany from the air”, would devastate the fighting moral of 
Germany. It was a tempting strategy for a President restriced by an isolationist polity; “This kind of 
war would cost less money, would mean comparatively few casualties, and would be more likely to 
succeed than a traditional war by land and sea”.1177 Few casualties in this context meant few 
American casualties.  
In hindsight, it is easy to point out that the US could have done even more in these years to prepare 
for the gathering storm. In retrospect, it seems all too obvious that Anglo-American relations could 
have been developed further also in military policy. With the historian’s knowledge of what was to 
come, one could perhaps make the claim that the US should have built more and even better aircraft 
carriers.1178 But such reasoning fails to consider the very essence of the limits to North American 
extraterritorial policies; the isolationist elements in the US polity itself. It was only with the fall of 
France in 1940 that this limiting factor on defence expenditures was shattered. From this year on, the 
only limits to increasing extraterritorial means of violence were the industrial capacities of the 
American society. On the day of Pearl Harbour, the US thus had the following fleet in commission 
and building; 
 
                                                 
1174 See Baer, 1993: 130-1, 134-5 
1175 See Howarth, 1999: 351-358 
1176 Potter, 1981: 235. Although the US Navy was not in the very forefront of Naval aviation, it had also earlier 
demonstrated willingness to utilise the potential of planes in naval war. From April 1917 till 1919, for example, the 
US Naval Air Service rose from 250 to 50000 personnel. Howarth, 1999: 331 
1177 Cited in David Kennedy, 1999: 429 
1178 Potter, 1981 claims both. However, Howarth 1999: 345 is certainly right in emphasising that comparing carrier 
tonnage gives an unfair picture of strength in Naval airpower. For example, in 1929, 250 planes took part in US fleet 
exercises, while the corresponding number for the Royal Navy was 150.  
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Table 4.3.3: US Fleet in December 19411179 
Type In Commission Building 
Battleships  17  15 
Carriers    7  11 
Cruisers  37  54 
Destroyers 171 191 
Submarines 111   73 
 
The attack on Pearl Harbour might be seen as the definite blow to US isolationism in the 20th 
Century. However, table 4.3.3 also illustrates that the US under FDR was on its way to become the 
maritime hegemon of the world already prior to the Japanese attack. In my view, it is difficult not to 
conclude that FDR worked in favour of a stronger navy also to be better prepared for a great-power 
war, at least after 1935. By 1937, the Joint Board strongly pointed out that the Navy had to focus on 
the Atlantic, and that “Germany might once more penetrate the Western hemisphere”.1180 In contrast 
to a largely isolationist Congress, both the armed services and FDR was aware of a “gathering 
storm” in international affairs.1181 
What “Pearl Harbour” meant for the US polity, however, was that the isolationism in American 
politics vanished for four years, and forever was given a more modest place in US foreign policy 
decision-making. When US Congress declared war on Japan December 8, there was only one 
dissenting vote. By contrast, fifty representatives and six senators had voted against the resolution 
taking the US into WW I in 1917.1182 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was a tactical victory 
and a strategic blunder. Mussolini and Hitler were also foolish enough to declare war on the US, 
which then recognised a state of war with Italy and the Third Reich on December 11, 1941. Thus, 
FDR had the pretext he needed for supporting the allied cause in Europe in a more wholehearted 
way, which would have been difficult to achieve as he was faced with the priority of the Pacific by 
the Navy.1183 
The hatred against Japan, and the Navy’s wish to prioritise the Pacific were both a reflection of US 
strategic and foreign policy thinking during the interwar decades. Nationalist Japan was in the US 
perceived as a real threat to the Philippines and the Open Door policy in China. To Japanese 
                                                 
1179 Source, Potter, 1981: 235 
1180 Baer, 1993: 127 
1181 See David Kennedy, 1999: chapter 13 for a discussion of FDR`s growing antipathy for the isolationist mood and 
his thoughts of the public opinion on foreign issues in the US after 1935 
1182 See David Kennedy, 1999: 523 
1183 See D. Kennedy, 1999: 523-26 for a discussion 
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strategists, to be sure, the hostile reception especially directed against their naval policies came as 
something of a surprise. At least, their purpose with the fleet was not to invite great-power rivalry, 
but to become a dominant regional power; after all, their interest in large ships and sea power was 
only a reflection of the naval ambitions on grandiose display in Britain and partly even the United 
States before the war. The Japanese were simply following Mahan. Again, the role of perceptions in 
foreign policy making was crucial. 
The perceived threat from Japan practically shaped all US naval planning, and thus also 
technological applications in the armed forces, force structures and doctrine. The Orange Plan 
assumed that Japan would conquer the archipelago. The US plan was to concentrate its fleet and 
then to take it across the Central pacific, threaten the Japanese home islands and force a decisive 
battle at sea.1184 To a far larger degree than the Royal navy, the US Navy meant that the aircraft 
carrier would be important in such vast strikes. In order to build aircraft carriers, the US simply 
converted cruiser-hulls that otherwise would have been scrapped under the Naval limitation treaty. 
Thus, two aircraft carriers were commissioned in 1928, providing the platform for experimentation 
and practical experience that would become a cornerstone of US hegemonic power. From 1937 on, 
the sophistication of the new arm had reached a level that justified steady building of carriers. By 
this year, Britain had 204 carriers, Japan 461 and the US 709 Aircraft carriers!1185 At this stage, it 
was apparent to even the most conservative European navalists that the US experience and the 
improvement of aircraft meant that in addition to being paramount for intelligence, carrier aircraft 
could deal severe blows to enemy fleets. The naval dive-bomber “became the hammerhead of the 
naval war”, in the words of naval historian E.B. Potter.1186 For state power, it meant two things. 
Firstly, naval war became even more complex and expensive. Only an organisation with the 
economy and expertise of a great power would be able to build, man and utilise such an arm 
effectively. In other words, the military gap between a first-rank and a second-rank power widened 
considerably. Secondly, and this was paramount for US hegemony for the rest of the century, US 
aircraft carriers for decades seemed to be the most formidable conventional weapon of modern war 
as well as a political instrument to project power and manage crisis short of war. With the carrier 
fleet, the us in effect possessed a platform that could fight targets on land, in the air and at sea. 
                                                 
1184 Baer, 1993: 120 shows that prior to WWII, the Orange Plan was a staff construction. But as Potter, 1981 argues, 
the plan was backed up by new weapons, platforms and a tactics that eventually proved efficient in the Pacific war. 
1185 Howarth, 1999: 361. 709 is an astounding number, and shows that although US isolationism still was a very 
strong factor limiting US foreign policy, the Administration of FDR carried on a slow but steady naval build up 
from 1933. 
1186 Potter, 1981: 237 
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Furthermore, the Orange Plan to defeat Japan also harboured doctrinal assumptions that refined US 
specialties that would prove important in future war. It was assumed that Japanese bases would have 
to be taken by amphibious assaults.1187 Studying the series of mistakes made by Britain in the 
Gallipoli campaign, the US navy and the US Marine Corps developed a very detailed amphibious 
doctrine, first published for use in the services in 1934.1188 This also added to a change in modern 
warfare. From now on, the US Navy would have to coordinate ships, artillery planes and land forces 
during amphibious operations. Entirely new vessels were designed to land soldiers; the LCVP 
(Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) that could discharge tracked vehicles directly onto the 
beach. In addition, the larger LST (Landing ships, tank), attack transports, command vessels and a 
whole series of new equipment were at least being designed when the US entered WW II. Moreover, 
the Orange Plan in effect made US attempt to become the most efficient builder of new military 
bases in the world. The stepwise advance on Japan through the island-studded Central pacific would 
also require the ability to convert conquered islands and atolls into operational bases with the 
greatest possible speed. Thus were the Navy’s Construction battalions born (“Seabees”). In addition 
to this came the entire range of logistical support required to create a viable basis for prolonged 
overseas warfare; “oilers, tenders, repair ships, floating drydocks, ammunition carriers, and 
more”1189 In short, already in the 1930s, the technological and organisational know-how and 
equipment for a first-class naval power with the material sophistication unparalleled in world history 
was founded even in the then isolationist, liberal US.  
Indeed, the 1930s perhaps stand out as something of a heyday (or low point) of isolationism coupled 
with conspiracy theories in the American public.1190 The fact is that many US citizens accepted the 
proposal that US entrance into WWI had been a mistake, and that such a mistake should never again 
be repeated. In 1934, for example, a public roar was created through the hearings of the Nye 
committee in the Senate, where it was claimed that US industries had made fortunes out of the war. 
The reports of the committee made a scandal, and did much to strengthen US isolationism at a 
                                                 
1187 One should note that although the US navy and USMC were strengthened from 1933, it had one fundamental 
drawback compared to the Japanese extraterritorial forces; experience. As the US naval attaché in Tokyo pointed out 
in 1938; ”From August 12th 1937 her naval aircraft have been continuously employed in combat operations…She 
undoubtedly would not hesitate to undertake offensive operations”, cited in Howarth, 1999: 365 
1188 One can only speculate on some of the more perverse side effects the doctrine had. It called for an immensely 
detailed and elaborate preparation of an operation. The details were so important because of the difficult logistical 
requirements of an amphibious operation carried out far from the motherland, and because of the need to 
synchronise all units and commanders in the theatre. The coordination of artillery, aircraft, vessels and landing crafts 
was an immensely organisational problem that had to be solved in order to have any hope of success. The side 
effects of such a doctrine were that it perhaps merged with the rigidities that already existed in a military system. 
Thus, initiative in lower ranks might become hampered through bureaucracy.  
1189 Potter, 1981: 238 
1190 See Thompson, 2002: 123 for a fuller description of various peace-organisations active in the US already prior 
to WWI.  
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critical stage in US naval build up.1191 Pacifist groups as the World Peaceways promoted the belief 
that industries that profited from the war actually were responsible for US involvement in WW I. 
The incredible effect such sentiments had on US policy are testified in the neutrality legislation of 
the 1930s “Which unilaterally surrendered those neutral rights the United States had four times gone 
to war to preserve”.1192 Through the 1935 Neutrality Act, the selling or transportation to belligerents 
were simply forbidden. This was slightly modified in 1937 when exceptions were permitted for 
other goods than munitions, provided the transactions were carried out on a cash-and-carry basis, 
and provided that the belligerent carried the goods on its own ships. The US would not react if such 
ships were sunk by other powers. This was a policy designed for keeping the US out of trouble, or in 
the words of Potter; “To avoid being challenged on the seas, Americans planned to retreat from the 
seas”.1193 As late as 1939, a new neutrality regulation came in effect that lifted the arms embargo, 
but on the other hand granted the President the right to forbid US merchantmen to enter “war 
zones”. In contrast to the majority of Europeans, most Americans took the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
seriously, at least judging from Legislation acts of the US Congress in the latter half of the 1930s. 
However, US war planners and the administration of FDR had fewer illusions about the threats to 
US interests.1194 With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, US naval planners immediately started 
working on contingency planning for naval operations in two oceans simultaneously, and this had 
occurred only one time earlier in the history of the US, in the Spanish-American war of 1898. The 
older war plans were remodelled through the application of five different scenarios. In three of 
these, US naval operations in the Atlantic were included.1195 Considering the extensive list of 
publications on WW II and the US participation in it, there is little need to dwell upon US warfare 
from 1941 till 1945.  
What is interesting to our theoretical ambitions here, however, was the effort by FDR to claim US 
influence on the world stage through a new attempt at creating a world order through international 
organisations (see chapter 5 for further discussions). This time it was primarily to be the United 
                                                 
1191 Howarth, 1999: 359 
1192 Potter, 1981: 239 
1193 Potter, 1981: 239, or Howarth, 1999: 366 ”Congress had passed a series of Neutrality Acts intended to keep 
America out of anyone else`s wars”. 
1194 Only after Münich, however, did FDR publicly state intentions that could be interpreted as a break with the 
neutrality law. See his State of the Union address January 4th 1939 and David Kennedy, 1999: 419-21. As David 
Kennedy notes, Roosevelt soon had to back away from neutrality rcvision due to the isolationist mood in the US 
public opinion. 
1195 The exact date of this change in naval thinking in the FDR administration should perhaps be set at March 15 
1939, when German forces entered Prague and Japan annexed the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. But FDR 
had probably made up his mind on the need for a more active US foreign policy far earlier. On January 4 1939, for 
example, he publicly declared that ”We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our 
neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly – may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim”, 
cited in Howarth, 1999: 366 
            
 4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945
 
 
 
           
 
 
326 
Nations. But the very concept of involving the US in world politics on a permanent, institutionalised 
basis was not new. Indeed, FDR was partly inspired by a former President he had greatly admired; 
Woodrow Wilson. His ideas were to be echoed by FDR, Jimmy Carter, George Bush Sr., and indeed 
also Ronald Reagan. “Wilson was ahead of his time, and did not live long enough to know what 
great and commanding relevance many of his ideas would acquire before this century was out”, 
George Kennan wrote in 1991.1196 The essence of Wilson’s most lasting contribution was his 
solution to override US isolationism. Indeed, this attempt was not naive idealism (but unrealistically 
ambitious in 1919), but coupled with realism. No less a realist figure then Henry Kissinger could 
therefore write in 1994 that in bringing the United States to play a more profiled role in world 
politics, Wilson was “an astonishing achievement”. Building on the assumption that the US “lacked 
both the theoretical and the practical basis for the European-style diplomacy of constant adjustment 
of the nuances of power from a posture of moral neutrality”, Kissinger writes, Wilson 
comprehended better than his contemporaries “that America’s instinctive isolationism could be 
overcome only by an appeal to its belief in the exceptional nature of its ideals”1197 Indeed, the 
sociological constitution of the state, or “Culture of national security”, in short; its ideational 
foundations, matter in international politics.  
However, empirical reality tells us that US interventionism did not succeed until WW II. This has 
not only contributed to enmesh the legacy of Woodrow Wilson as a controversial figure, but also to 
raise a scholarly discussion of US motives in extraterritorial policy. Based on a materialist 
interpretation of history, which some realists and many on the left might be prone to endorse, one 
might indeed question the very notion of American idealism: either it was mere rhetoric, or just 
naivety, at times both.1198 This also raises the possibility that Woodrow Wilson and FDR were 
somewhat more Machiavellian than many observers believed. It has also been suggested that the 
idealism and the preferred world order advocated by Wilson and FDR indeed were designed to 
enhance US influence and position in the international system. In other words, these presidents were 
“realists” rather than “idealists”. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a “new” history was written 
in the US that challenged earlier views on Wilson, for example. Gordon Levin thus saw Wilson as 
an advocate of a sophisticated plan to shape international relations in the interests of the US, not 
only to make US involvement compatible with US values, but to contribute to a world order 
                                                 
1196 Kennan, 1991: 330 
1197 Kissinger, 1994: 44-45 
1198 Carr, 1939 set the standard here, but he was also acutely aware of the limits to political realism as a normative 
foundation for politics. If one accepts his criticism, one should also accept that realism has limits in analysing and 
ecen describing political processes. Wallerstein, 1980, 2000, goes far in saying that liberalism was a result of 
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favourable to US national interests.1199 In much the same fashion of explanation, Samuel Wells 
wrote that the peace “became for Wilson the means of global reform which would bring an 
automatic expansion of America’s political and economic influence”.1200 Indeed, there is a similarity 
between Wilson’s program and that of the FDR Administration after the Japanese attack in 1941; 
“Solely from the standpoint of the interest of the American people themselves, who saw straight and 
who thought straight twenty years ago?”, asked Undersecretary of State Summer Wells on Armistice 
day 1941.1201 Thus, one might claim that Wilson was way ahead of his time. The problem was 
exactly that; he was far too much ahead of his time. Thus, the US society and the US state apparatus 
were not ready for the US contribution that Wilson`s plan had relied on. Although the US navy grew 
rapidly during WWI, it was not a favourite pet of the North American society. There existed no joint 
US institution for analysing military or political intelligence that resembled those of say Britain or 
Germany. The US had no unified Defence Department, and the White House Staff consisted of 
“Wilson’s Political secretary Joseph P. Tumulty, his personal stenographer, and a few clerks”1202. 
This did not make a basis for North American hegemonic leadership. However, Wilson in some 
respects was an embodiment of a US trait that mattered in US foreign policy throughout the 20th 
Century; a secular evangelism that always saw its extraterritorial activities as serving more than 
narrow self-interest on behalf of the nation. Wilson sought to translate this directly into the naval 
service in a manner that to some degree has marked the monopoly of violence of this state 
throughout the century. This was epitomized in his address to a class of graduating naval officers; 
“Every time you let the Stars and Stripes free to the wind, it means that you are on an errand which 
other navies have sometimes forgotten; not an errand of conquest, but an errand of service”1203 The 
power and national pride represented by the US Navy came to be unparalleled by any state during 
the entire cold war, even the Soviet Union would never achieve parity with the US in terms of 
extraterritorial power.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
economic interests. Hegemons have always supported liberalism because it more often than not favoured the 
hegemon.  
1199 Levin, 1968: VII: ”The ultimate Wilsonian goal may be defined as the attainment of a peaceful liberal capitalist 
world order under international law, safe both from traditional imperialism and revolutionary socialism, within 
whose stable liberal confines a missionary America could find moral and economic pre-eminence” 
1200 Wells, 1972: 419. See also Thompson, 2002: 7 
1201 Cited in Thompson, 2002: 7 
1202 Thompson, 2002: 9. In essence, Wilson in person WAS the Wilson administration; ”One British official at Paris 
recorded his astonishment when, after a session of the conference, the President ”gave someone instructions to 
telephone for his typewriter. We conjured up visions of a beautiful American stenographer, but in a short time a 
messenger appeared, bringing with him a battered typewriter on a tray…The typewriter was placed in a corner of the 
Conference room and the President proceeded to tap out a long memorandum. It is a strange sight to see one of the 
greatest rulers in the world working away in this fashion””, Thompson, 2002: 10 
1203 Quoted in Thompson, 2002: 78 
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The isolationist trait in US policy was so enduring that when FDR announced US neutrality the day 
after the British declaration of war in 1939, the US president received an overwhelming public 
support. And yet, FDR`s administration pursued a policy of naval build up in spite of the isolationist 
tendencies in the US polity. On June 14 1940, FDR signed an act that meant an 11 per cent 
expansion of the Navy. Even more telling of the US move away from isolationism is the fact that 
Congress approved a further 70 per cent naval expansion on July 20 1940!1204 By this stage, it was 
also evident that US exported strategic goods to “friends” and embargoed “enemies”, i.e. Japan. In 
many ways, the policies of FDR can be interpreted as a series of acts to prepare the US public for 
war; in the winter of 1941, the number of men registered for the draft passed 16.4 million, the 
Atlantic Fleet was reactivated, Greenland came under US protection in April 1941, and on May 27 
1941 the President announced that “The war is approaching the brink of the Western Hemisphere. It 
is coming very close to home”.1205 By September 1941, the United States had voluntarily extended 
its protection to cover the whole western Atlantic. The USMC had occupied Iceland since early July, 
and US destroyers were actively assisting the Royal Navy in the hunt for submarines.1206 
It was in these months from 1940 and 1941 that the traditional US isolationism as a factor of 
significant importance to foreign policy was buried for the rest of the century. Traditionally, US 
isolationism was founded on two pillars; non-intervention in European affairs, and a defence very 
closely attuned to protect the national interest in a narrow sense of the term. It had been one thing to 
seize the Philippines and meddle in the Caribbean and Latin America. Those were controversial 
issues in the US polity all the way. But a further involvement with or against major powers had not 
been an appropriate theme in US politics since 1919. Both these assumptions were broken by 1941, 
and I might dare say prior to Pearl Harbour. The increased involvement in international politics 
proper by the US was signalled in earnest through Lend-Lease assistance decided on March 27, 
1941,1207 and the Atlantic Conference in August 1941. It was a gesture of support towards Great 
Britain, but it was also a signal to US isolationists and the coming enemies of the US. Moreover, it 
was a demonstration of the vision FDR had for world politics after the war. While much controversy 
surrounds the importance FDR and Churchill attached to the Charter, it is quite frank in its echoes of 
old US principles in foreign policy; the abandonment of colonies and the freedom of the seas are 
embraced, implicitly for the former principle, explicitly for the latter. In one sense, the meeting that 
produced the Atlantic Charter created a momentum of its own; the agreement to aid the Soviet 
                                                 
1204 Howarth, 1999: 375 
1205 Howarth, 1999: 377-9 
1206 Howarth, 1941: 380 
1207 Baer, 1993: 157 
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Union materially, the endorsement of principles that became parts of the United Nations Charter and 
in time, it became a focal point during the war and in the first months of peace in Europe.1208 Again, 
the interplay between domestic and international politics was also peculiarly strong. Through the 
Atlantic Charter with its liberal rhetoric, Roosevelt was able to raise domestic support for a more 
active US involvement in the war;  
 
“On the liberal principles of the Atlantic Charter, by which Churchill and Roosevelt had pledged to 
support self-government in Europe and free movement at sea, Roosevelt could base an anti-German 
policy in wartime, in peacetime, or in between. It is for good reasons that Roosevelts`admirers and 
detractors, then and now, have been reminded of Woodrow Wilson and the sequence of declarations 
and events that led to war in 1917”1209 
 
In this way, the US became a cobelligerent with Britain in the battle of the Atlantic, though not yet 
formally at war with Germany. Roosevelt, one should presume, must coolheaded have calculated 
that such participation only increased the possibilities of clashes between German and US vessels. 
The economic and industrial power of the US made for a gigantic extraterritorial arm. To claim that 
the combination of industrial capacity and US entrepeneurship in the “war of machines” produced 
lasting results is no exaggeration. By 1942 American armaments output passed that of Britain. In 
1944, it was six times greater.1210 The enormous governmental demand for weapons – over 100 
billion dollars in the first six months of 1942 for a start- changed the US, both as an actor on the 
world stage and as a society. According to historian David Kennedy, the US in four years produced 
5777 merchant ships, 1556 naval vessels, 299.293 aircraft, 634.569 jeeps, 88.410 tanks, 2.383.311 
trucks, 6.500.000 rifles and some 40 billion bullets of various kinds.1211It terminated unemployment, 
improved the entire infrastructure to meet the demands of a war economy, raised domestic demands 
for products, increased family incomes, increased levels of taxation and changed the demographic 
pattern of society itself. These domestic alterations, while modified after the war, left a permanent 
imprint on the US society. The federal government ever after was a big spender, the costs of military 
expenditure not being the least of factors in this pretext (see chapter 5). 
                                                 
1208 See Crockatt, 1995: 40-41 
1209 Baer, 1993: 161 
1210 David Kennedy, 1999: 654 
1211 David Kennedy, 1999: 655 
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While our aim in this thesis is not to give an account of warfare, it suffices to say that this enormous 
mobilisation of US resources is unprecedented in world history. Sea-lanes of communications were 
vital for the winning of the war. In the Atlantic, it was a battle to ensure that enough material arrived 
to the Isles and to Soviet Russia, in the Pacific; it was an inferno of fighting in the air, at sea, on 
beaches and small islands on the march towards Japan. It was the prospect of a long (the Plain of 
Tokyo was calculated not to be in allied control before April 1946) and bloody (the Joint Chiefs 
estimated 1.5 million allied soldiers) continuation of the struggle with Japan that made Truman 
authorise the use of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.1212 It is tempting to say that the Pax 
Americana allegedly started where Pax Britannica ended, in 1945. One could find support for such a 
proposition in the words of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in 1947, for example, when he 
stated that the US navy had “more or less inherited from Britain the job of keeping the sea lanes 
open and stabilising areas from which exports come”.1213 I believe the notion of a changing of the 
guards in 1945 to be too simplistic, however. Firstly, as we have seen above, Britain was no longer 
the undisputed sea power by 1918.1214 Secondly, and much more open to scholarly debate, is the 
question of US foreign policy, the motives and ultimate aims of central US decision makers, the role 
of financial and industrial interests and the role of international structures and interactions. Each and 
every one of these subjects has been open to intense and voluminous debates among scholars and 
laymen in every thinkable fields of study. This debate will undoubtedly continue, and I would have 
little to add to this debate but one not totally irrelevant note; the development of US means of 
Extraterritorial violence. In addition to the monopoly of the atomic bomb, the US possessed 1194 
major combatant vessels, 1256 amphibious transports and over 41000 aircraft in 1945. In total, it 
was more than double the size of the Royal Navy. It is striking to note then, that within the three 
years that followed, only 267 major combatant vessels remained active in the US Navy. 1215  Again, 
the constitution of the US society did not make a transition into an imperial power possible. Thus, I 
believe it to be too strong a claim to write the history of US foreign policy as one of “manifest 
destiny”.1216 A lasting transformation of states occurred in Europe as well. This change also applied 
                                                 
1212 Rhodes, 1986 seems to become the classic reference here  
1213 Cited in Howarth, 1999: 476 
1214 If it had not been evident earlier, it became painfully so in 1940; ”The British Navy, long the shield of the 
western hemisphere, was after 1940 dedicated to national survival. In the Pacific, where until 1940 the United States 
had expected a measure of assistance from European naval powers, no serious aid was any longer possible”, Baer, 
1993: 147. Confer with Modelski, 1978: 223: ”By 1900 it had become clear to many that Pax Britannica was well 
past its prime and that the world system was swiftly losing its ordering capacities” 
1215 See Howarth, 1999: 476 
1216 See Stephanson, 1995. One should note that the very broad picture painted by Stephanson is primarily huilt on 
two decades of US history. ”I have concentrated on two periods of strong territorial expansionism: the 1840s, when 
the United States seized half the territory of Mexico; and the time around the turn of the present century, when war 
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to overseas possessions. During the war, as European powers faced the Germans; the French, the 
Dutch and the British Empire started to lose control of their colonies. The Vichy government of 
France conceded Japanese occupation of the north of Indochina, the Dutch could not protect the East 
Indies and the British naval strategy for the Far East crumbled. Moreover, the vision in the Atlantic 
Charter became embodied in the United Nations and the international political framework (see ch. 5) 
to such a large degree envisioned by the superpower that perceived itself an anti-imperialist polity; 
the USA.  
 
4.4 From Pax Britannica to WWII: Hegemonic stability vs instability and 
the peripheries of Northern Europe and the Netherlands 
After 1856, the Nordic countries, and even the former paternalist Scandinavian states, became more 
peripheral in the international politicial system. This is especially striking in terms of military 
power. In sum, neither of these territories had a base of resources that could be turned into major 
political power on the international scene. Nevertheless, the transforming of Sweden and Denmark 
from paternalists to bandwagoning states with indirect overseas interests is as spectacular as the rise 
in formal sovereignty that all the Nordic states would experience after WWII (see ch. 5). With the 
exception of Denmark, none of these polities controlled overseas territories, while Norway did 
administer arctic Svalbard as a mandate from the League of Nations under the Svalbard treaty from 
1920. Therefore, one can rightly conclude that the dominant foreign policies of the Nordic countries 
until 1945 was one of adaptation to the balance of power, often practised as formal neutrality. In 
terms of foreign policy habitus, the naval aspects of world politics influenced all the Nordic states, 
especially the Atlantic peripheries Iceland and Norway, and to some degree Denmark. It is this 
consolidation of territories in a dynamic international system that will be briefly addressed here; to 
what degree and in what form did these peripheral states develop a lasting security culture during 
this era. The case of the Netherlands also deserves some attention, since it clearly was an old, 
relatively liberal state with significant overseas possessions and a legacy of once having had 
hegemonic maritime ambitions. Indeed, the Netherlands stands somewhere in between the major 
powers and the peripheral states in the sense that it held on to large overseas territories well into the 
latter half of the 20th century. This makes for an interesting comparison with the Nordic countries. In 
sum then, our hypotheses from chapter 2 indicates that The Netherlands was a “bandwagoning 
liberalist”, Sweden and Denmark were “former small empires” with only indirect overseas interests 
                                                                                                                                                             
against Spain and the ensuing suppression of the Philippine independence movement added colonial possessions 
overseas” (ibid: xiii) 
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and mare liberum ideology, that Iceland and Norway until 1905 were sovereignty-seeking 
peripheries, while Norway after 1905 was a bandwagoning mare clausum state.  
 
4.4.1 The Nordic states 
Finland remained under Russia until 1917, Iceland under Denmark until 1944, while Norway ceased 
to be a “province” under Denmark, only to enter a (“personal”)1217 union with Sweden in 1814. 
Norway achieved full independence in 1905, twelve years before Finland. Correspondingly, 
Denmark and Sweden “shrunk” by abandoning the union with Norway. Denmark nevertheless kept 
Greenland throughout the 20th Century, and their colonies in the West Indies until the early 20th 
century. Denmark-Norway had had a common foreign policy, naturally controlled by Copenhagen, 
while Iceland remained entirely peripheral in political, not to mention foreign policy, decision-
making.  
While IR theory has a certain tendency to describe the behaviour of small states as either allying 
with, or bandwagoning behind, major powers,1218 the fact is that in the era covered here, the means 
of formal alliances was not used. Instead, I believe my initial concepts of sovereignty-maximising 
peripheries and bandwagoning were mixed in the Nordic states; more or less, all the states covered 
here with the exception of Finland sought protection under the umbrella of the Royal Navy. But at 
the same time, the political leaderships of the Nordic countries to a great extent sought to uphold 
their status of formal neutrality during conflicts until, and in the case of Sweden even during, WWII. 
On the other hand, none of the states sought an alliance with Britain. Also interesting is the fact that 
the Nordic countries did not themselves form an alliance, although this at times was publicly 
debated, and in spite of the formalisation of Danish and Swedish paternalist policies towards Iceland 
(until 1944) and Norway (until 1905). Moreover, the peaceful resolution to the questions of 
sovereignty for Iceland, and in particular Norway makes the Nordic picture even more complicated. 
Were the sinews for the Nordic Area as a “security community” or a “Zone of peace”1219 built 
during this period?  
That the Nordic countries all should become sovereign nationststates during the 20th century was no 
inevitable outcome. Up to the 1860s, the popular movement of the so-called Scandinavianism even 
worked in favour of a political union of the three Scandinavian territories, and at least wanted a 
                                                 
1217 Riste, 2001: 52. The term is contested. See also Terjesen, 2001:chapter 2 
1218 See Schweller, 1994: 72-107 for an overview of the theoretical question. 
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defence union. This social movement did not die until 1864, when Sweden and Denmark disagreed 
on the defence of the southern border of Schleswig. Thus, Denmark was left to fight alone against 
Prussia and Austria-Hungary, to great agony for the Danes and the supporters of 
Scandinavianism.1220 
 
4.4.1.1 Two diverse small mare clausum states: Norway and Iceland1221 
“No-one can suspect us of egoistic or narrow interests or motives. In our case, one knows that we speak from 
an entirely objective love of peace and on basis of the belief in the growth of feelings of justice between 
nations” 
Norwegian PM Mowinckel, 19261222 
 
In the personal union between Sweden and Norway, Foreign policy largely was a prerogative of the 
(Swedish) King, with some major amendments. The Norwegian constitution of 1814 demanded that 
the King consult an “Extraordinary Ministerial Council” in Norway in matters of declaring war and 
concluding peace.1223 The degree of influence granted Norwegian political institutions became a 
dominant issue of friction in the union. The 19th century history of the union is largely a story of 
increasing Norwegian autonomy, with some setbacks. However, although national historiography at 
times sought to argue to the contrary, this should not obscure the fact that in the international arena 
“Norway was very much a subsidiary of Sweden”.1224  
On the other hand, Icelanders and Norwegians undoubtedly and increasingly saw themselves as 
nations with clear aspirations to full state sovereignty. It is also beyond debate that the international 
community saw Norway and Iceland as distinct entities, although peripheral in European politics (if 
not in all economic sectors, where both states continued to be considerable exporters, and Norway 
became a prime carrier through its merchant navy. In fact, the size of the Norwegian merchant navy 
was of such proportions that it was more of a mare clausum bandwagoning state than a sovereignty-
seeking periphery after 1905). Correspondingly, their roles in influencing international institutions 
                                                                                                                                                             
1219 Karl Deutsch et al, 1957 saw the Nordic countries as security community,i.e. a set of territories with common 
values and a high degree of cooperation. For a discussiopn of the term ”Zone of Peace”, see also Archer, 1996: 451-
467, and Bonnèn et al, 2002 
1220 See Bonnèn et al, 2002: 4 
1221 Although Iceland was under the sovereignty formally at least, of Denmark until 1944, Iceland is analysed 
together with Norway here. This is based on the assumption that they both were peripheral Atlantic territories, and 
with some similarities in their political history; especially their loss of sovereignty to Denmark, and in the case of 
Norway, to Sweden (1814-1905) 
1222 Cited in Fure, 1996: 189 
1223 Riste, 2001: 53. Also note that the King of Sweden had to consult a Swedish Ministerial Council in most areas 
of foreign policy. 
1224 Riste, 2001: 55 
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were negligible. This is particularly true in the case of Iceland, where the predominant way of life 
lay in fishing and whaling. The export of these products was largely controlled by Danish 
companies, which made control over own resources an important aspect in the growing Icelandic 
national identity. This is a chief explanation of the Icelandic mare clausum policy throughout the 
19th and 20th century. The true significance of these coastal states lay in their economic resources, 
i.e. as exporters of fish and in the case of Norway, timber, copper and sulphur.1225 Thus, these two 
Nordic peripheries adopted, as they always had, the twin principles of mare clausum for their coastal 
resources, and simultaneously mare liberum for “international” waters. In this, Norway and Iceland 
shared a common characteristic, true to our typologies in chapter two. However, there can be no 
doubt that Norway had moved from being a sovereignty-seeking periphery to a bandwagoning state 
by 1905, but the unique mixture of shipping and fishing interests made it paramount to Norwegian 
governments to balance these maritime principles. In the North European security complex, both 
nations sought to carve out the largest possible degree of sovereignty over their coastal resources 
(claiming mare clausum of their fisheries). This position was the dominant stand of policy. At the 
same time, they claimed that beyond the littoral of their states, transactions that involved ocean 
faring should be as free as possible. In other words, they both adopted a position of the weak, 
leaning towards a neutralist and low profile policy in crisis and war.  
While we have argued that the role these peripheries played in international relations was negligible 
if we see them as actors in European politics, they nevertheless are apt illustrations of the conditions 
that made their survival possible. While it remained true that they were living at the mercy of larger 
powers, as long as the maritime hegemony of the UK prevailed, these peripheries seemed to gain an 
advantage from the codification of international maritime rules after the Crimean War. While the 
policies of the Maritime hegemon during the Napoleonic wars could be devastating (witness the 
British seizure of the Danish-Norwegian fleet at Copenhagen 1807), the challenge from Germany 
and to some degree the US made the Empire more careful in its dealings with small European 
coastal states out of primarily strategic reasons. The British recognition of the immunity of neutral 
flags was an advantage to all the Nordic states.1226 The Declaration of Paris did not endanger coastal 
maritime resource-extraction, but it codified the right to free passage at sea, thus helping to secure 
exports and imports in Northern Europe, which the Nordic countries in particular were dependent 
                                                 
1225 See Riste, 2001: 95-98. Sulphur for example, was vital for the German production of ammunition. Both the 
exports of copper, fish and Sulphur made Norway an important pawn in the game of Germany and Britain in the 
20th Century; together, of course, with the strategic position of Norway with ice-free harbours and direct access to 
the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. 
1226 Appendix III clearly illsutrates this, with an extraordinary take-off for the shipping sector in all the three 
Scandinavian states between 1850 and 1880. 
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upon. The advantage lasted until 1914. The outbreak of both world wars naturally changed this 
logic, and damaged the merchant fleets. Until WWI, however, the before mentioned international 
framework (The US and modern, second-rate navies in the European powers constituting a potential 
alliance against an eventual British destruction of the international fabric), greatly facilitated the 
otherwise fragile and modest Nordic economies.  
For Iceland, the full effect of this came from around 1900, due to the problems of over-population 
and a colder climate in the last half of the 19th century.1227 Thus, physical conditions made Iceland a 
special case in the latter half of the 19th Century.  
Norway was probably the single state among the Nordic countries most favoured by the 
international institutional setting after the Crimean war. In particular, the maritime sector proved 
enormously rewarding for this coastal state with its many ice-free harbours. In addition to fishing 
and whaling, a huge resource of timber and waterfalls that made transportation from the inland to 
the sea was hugely beneficial for exports. The abundance of waterfalls leading to the ocean also 
made possible the construction of sawmills by the river routes where the timber was transported.1228 
In tandem with this development, the small peripheral society of Norway turned itself into one of the 
largest transporters in the world. The size of the Norwegian Merchant fleet increased by 500% from 
1850 till 1875!1229 Only a benign hegemony under Pax Britannica could enable a state like Norway 
to become the third largest merchant navy in the world, in sharp contrast to its tiny navy. In this 
respect, the pattern was set in the period 1815-1830, in which only ten per cent of the annual defence 
budgets were allocated to the Navy.1230 It is true that Norway was part of a union with the militarily 
speaking stronger Sweden, but nor was Sweden a maritime power of European significance by the 
19th century. The fact remains that a weak periphery rich in maritime know-how1231 and some 
natural resources could prosper in Europe following the Crimean War. This fact cannot be 
accounted for without reference to the maritime regulations at the international arena, in which a 
predominant, if not hegemonic, Britain was careful not to upset the international equilibrium. 
Indeed, the unilateral yet peaceful Norwegian abandoning of the union with Sweden was a 
remarkable political event in the Nordic countries until 1917, when Finland achieved its 
independence from Russia. The formation of the Swedish-Norwegian union was part of the 
settlement after the Napoleonic wars, and the abolition of the Union could hardly have taken place 
                                                 
1227 Karlsson, 2000 
1228 Riste, 2001: 55.  
1229 Bergh et al, 1983: 111 
1230 See Ulriksen, 2002 
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had the major powers not consented to it. Apart from the economic significance of exports from the 
Nordic countries, the major European powers tacitly agreed that Scandinavia should not become a 
tempting bone of contention for any of the other powers, thereby threatening to complicate the 
European balance of power even further. Russia raised no significant arguments against the abolition 
of the union, since such an outcome could only weaken Sweden, its most traditional antagonist 
among the Scandinavian states. On the other hand, Britain was inclined to disencourage a 
strengthening of Swedish ties to Germany (and obviously, if Norway stayed in union with Sweden, 
the situation would be even more detrimental to British interests). However, Britain played 
carefully, and pressured Sweden to achieve a peaceful solution to the Union question, while at the 
same time allowing King Oscar II to save face publicly.1232 Russia was the first state to acknowledge 
Norwegian sovereignty, Britain the first to establish an embassy in Oslo.1233  
I believe it is fair to say at this point, that the traditional nationalist Norwegian argument that a 
strong national defence deterred Sweden from invading Norway is less credible. It is true, though, 
that the Norwegian defence allocations increased significantly from 1890 till 1905. In this setting, 
the very high priority of border fortifications and the building of four battleships after 1895 might 
seem evidence of the wish to create an effect of deterrence against Sweden, and to some degree they 
were.1234 Especially in the liberal party (Venstre), most politicians saw Sweden as the most probable 
antagonist in a future war.  However, the motivations underlying increased Norwegian defence 
expenditure were somewhat more complex. It is a fact that prior to 1890, the Norwegian armed 
forces were utterly un-modern. A vast program of modernisation was required even to be able to 
uphold the neutralist policy in Norwegian waters. In this respect, what was more appropriate in the 
Mahanian age than to acquire new battleships? But the international balance of power was also 
significant at the regional level. Prior to the defeat of Russia in 1905, Norwegian politicians and 
officers to a significant degree viewed Russia as a potential enemy, especially so, as the Northern 
territories increasingly became industrialised and the railway network made transportation of troops 
                                                                                                                                                             
1231 Allegedly, one owner of an Anerican Fruit Company in the 1880s answered ”We don`t charter your ships, we 
charter your captains”, when asked why they preferred Norwegian freighters. See Bergh et al, 1983: 112. ”Our 
honour and our power was brought to us by white sails”, according to national poet Bjørnson in 1868.  
1232 The outcome of the British policy process was of outmost important for the Norwegian effort to gain full 
independence. Lindberg, 1966:104-120 has demonstrated that kaiser William supported a further existence of the 
union, and the British cabinet was initially inclined to hold the same view. King Edward personally involved himself 
strongly in the question. However, the Norwegian government made a clever move through Wedel jarlsberg, who 
proposed that Prince Carl of Denmark, the brother-in-law of King edward, be the new Norwegian King. Through 
this move, the Norwgians managed to get King Edward as a frenetic supporter of the abolition of the union. See 
Lindberg, 1966: 159-168 
1233 Needless to say, scholars in the Scandinavian countries, and especially Norwegian scholars in the first half of the 
20th century, have been prone to stress domestic reasons for the peaceful dissolving of the Union. 
1234 Riste, 2001: 66. See Ula, 1946: 215-218 for a colourful description of how battleships were celebrated symbols 
of national pride even in peripheral Norway in this period. 
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westwards more feasible.1235 An explanation must also consider the nature of the domestic 
ideologies and political institutions as explthe Swedish-Norwegian union.1236  
Apart from the alleged role the Norwegian defence played in the dissolving of the union, it is also 
significant to note for this thesis that even a small mare clausum state as Norway did acquire modern 
battleships. Indeed, both Norway and Sweden allocated huge sums (in a Scandinavian context) for 
extraordinary defence after 1899. But again, a central Swedish motivation was to strengthen the 
defence against a possible Russian attack via Finland, whose status had become ever more 
precarious after 1899. It is nevertheless striking to note that the Norwegian extraterritorial means of 
violence reached something of an all-time high by 1905: it had acquired four battleships, one 
destroyer and 29 fast torpedo boats. It is striking to note that the golden age of navalism had a huge 
impact also in a peripheral European state.  
It lies in the nature of small states with a mare clausum inclination to try to shield itself from large-
power rivalry. Therefore, the path of neutrality that was to follow Norwegian foreign policy for 35 
years was set immediately after the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union. As the first 
secretary of state told the Norwegian parliament in 1905, the aim of the Government was “to avoid 
involvement in combinations and alliances that could drag us into belligerent adventures with any of 
the European warrior states”1237. Herein lies a core in the identity that underpinned Norwegian 
foreign policy; it saw itself as a state that could not significantly alter the international balance of 
power, had no wish to do so, and eventually saw itself as somewhat morally superior to states that 
practised power politics. The result until WWI was a curious blend of neutrality coupled with a very 
weak navy (Norwegian secretary of Defence Gunnar Knudsen expressed most clearly the 
assumption behind this policy; "We trust in the British Navy").  
Although the attempts at upholding neutrality in Norwegian territorial waters during WWI largely 
were unsuccessful, the economic and security benefits of staying neutral during the Great War were 
such that this material factor only reinforced the ideology of the sovereignty-seeking periphery. It 
simply tried to hold on to, and expand, as much of its sovereignty in coastal territories as it could 
under the present circumstances. This made Norway a passive state in international affairs in 
general, but it simultaneously made her a rather clear mare clausum state in northern waters. Along 
                                                 
1235 This perception was strenghened under the Russian General governor Bobrikov. In effect, he tried to make 
Finland a full-fledged province of Russia. During 1899, for example, a series of constitutional rights for Finland 
were simply put aside. Lindberg, 1958:1099, Carlsson, 1985: 229 
1236 Terjesen, 2001: especially chapter 10. This explanation, that the democratic maturity of the Swedish political 
institutions helped create a peaceful solution, was –as Terjesen, 2001: 186 also points out- given by Halvdan Koht 
already prior to WWII. However, the detailed analysis by Terjesen certainly lends substantive support for this 
hypothesis. 
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its coast, for example, it claimed sovereignty over a 4-mile territorial water zone,1238 while the major 
powers were of the opinion that international law only permitted a 3-mile territorial zone. The claim 
to a 4-mile territorial sea was typical of Norway as a sovereignty-maximising periphery. Both the 
Norwegian and Swedish claims to the 4-mile rule existed even prior to the international recognition 
of the territorial seas measured as a 3-mile zone.1239 By and large, the Norwegian territorial limit 
was recognised by states that only had a 3-mile limit.1240 However, neither of the paternalists 
Germany and Britain respected or acknowledged the 4-mile territorial sea.1241  
As exercise of sovereignty, however, Norway did not have the military means to do the job. 
Incredibly enough, as soon Norway had gained independence from Sweden, it continued to build 
fortifications on land along the border, but it almost totally neglected its navy. In 1910, for example, 
one single ship of the British lion Cruisers had a larger displacement than the entire Norwegian 
Navy.1242 Instead, the Navy was primarily a navy of small patrol boats and obsolete battleships (by 
this time, the 1905 effort had faded). In spite of the fact that Norway had the world’s third largest 
merchant navy (and lost 2000 sailors during WWI), the policy of neutrality that kept her out of WWI 
was seen as a success in retrospect. Thus, although Norway had a considerable stake in world 
overseas transportation, held Svalbard under a mandate from the League of Nations since 1920 and 
claimed a 4-mile territorial sea along its long and strategically important coast, her navy was only 
suited the task of guarding neutrality in home waters between 1914 and 1940. Most historians today 
agree that Norway’s policy between the world wars rested on the assumption that the Royal Navy 
would protect it in case another power sought to challenge her sovereignty.1243 After, all, being one 
of the leading maritime transporters in the world, Norway felt secure that its good relations with 
Britain made her willing to secure Norwegian interests if another major European power would seek 
to subdue her. Moreover, the framework set up through the League of Nations was seen as 
something of a new era in international relations by many Norwegians in high office.1244 This 
combination; the hope of a successful pacification of international relations, and the protection from 
the Royal Navy should the League fail, made Norway cling to neutrality far beyond what the 
international institutions could guarantee from the early 1930s. But to Norwegian politicians, this 
international framework seemed a promising one for maximising sovereignty outside of the spheres 
                                                                                                                                                             
1237 Cited and translated in Killham, 1993: 39 
1238 The basis for the claim was a unilateral declaration from 1812. See Holst, 1985:350 and Fleischer, 1977 
1239 Fure, 1996: 12 
1240 See Fleischer, 1977 and Janset et al 1998: 62-64 
1241The annales of the Norwegian parliament, S.tid 1948: 1259 
1242 Ulriksen, 2002: 124 
1243 Riste, 2001, Fure, 1996 for a few examples 
1244 Fure, 1996 gives a good portrait of these sentiments. 
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of interests of the major European powers. Such aspirations even turned into overseas interests 
beyond the merchant navy. Thus, the Norwegian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference was 
instructed to seek to achieve sovereignty over Svalbard1245 In this it was successful, although the 
Peace conference added two reservations to Norwegian sovereignty; nationals “of the states 
signatory to the treaty would enjoy equal rights to exploit the economic resources of the area, and 
the islands were not to be used for “warlike purposes””.1246 The formal treaty was signed by 
Norway in February 1920 and within 5 years also by 45 other states. One might also claim that 
Norway fostered further ambitions of territorial expansionism.1247 In 1931, for example, a 
Norwegian expedition declared a private “occupation” of east Greenland (a territory disputed by 
Denmark and Norway). The ultimate outcome nevertheless was a condemnation of the occupation 
by the International Court, thereby reaffirming Denmark’s sovereignty over the entire island of 
Greenland. The most controversial issue in fact was the Norwegian claim to 4-mile territorial waters. 
This caused repeated clashes between Norwegian and English fishermen in the contested waters, but 
the Norwegian government largely settled disputes with Britain over such questions through 
diplomacy. Nevertheless, it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that the dispute with Britain over the 
territorial seas was the most important conflict in Norwegian foreign policy between 1918 and 
1940.1248 But much worse was to come. 
The Norwegian position that the Royal navy would come to its rescue in the event that Germany 
threatened Norway (an unofficial policy that resulted in low defence spending and a lack of 
preparations for co-operation with Britain) proved disastrous. The attack on Norway naturally came 
by sea, but the Weserübung carried out on April 9th and following weeks in 1940 was a daring 
German operation that quite simply took the Norwegian cabinet by surprise.1249 On the other hand, 
the nature of German expansionism and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, which 
changed the basis for Nordic neutrality, certainly should have warned the Norwegian Cabinet into 
stronger defensive measures earlier. To Hitler, the occupation of Norway was a means to forestall 
                                                 
1245 Riste, 2001: 115 
1246 Riste, 2001: 117,  see also Fure, 1996: 117-118 
1247 Fure, 1996: chapter 2 sees these attempts at possessions in the Arctic and the Antarctic as a very significant trait 
in Norwegian foreign policy in the interwar years. As far as I can see he judges it as kind of an imitation of larger 
powers already having acquired overseas possessions in the southern hemisphere. 
1248 Fure, 1996: 247 
1249 An enormous body of literature and debate, by Norwegian standards, exist on this event and the following five 
years of German occupation. See Fure, 1996, Sverdrup, 1996, Riste 2001 and Ulriksen 2002 for some recent 
overviews and assessments.  
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British intervention in Scandinavia and the Baltic, to secure the supplies of Swedish iron ore to 
Germany and a way to extend the sphere of operations for the German navy and air force.1250 
I believe it is sufficient to say that the ensuing occupation became a central facet of the national 
memory on the domestic side, and almost just as embedded in Norwegian foreign policy on the 
international side. During its exile in London, the Norwegian Cabinet soon entered private 
discussions with British, American and Soviet politicians on the future position of Norway in an 
Atlantic and an international community of states.  
 
Compared to Norway, Iceland was less internationalised; it was a small country dependent upon 
local and regional fisheries, had no significant merchant navy, no organised military defence beyond 
a small coast guard, and was seen as a less vital territory by the great powers prior to WWII. 
Nonetheless, the case of Iceland well illustrates how the international balance of power made both 
paternalist and and the international liberalist increasingly occupied with the status of this Arctic 
island. The very development of Icelandic sovereignty in the 20th century in fact demonstrates how 
the relationships between North European powers and the role of the US influenced nation building. 
Two parallel developments ensured this. First of all, Denmark (as we will see below) became both a 
weaker power and simultaneously a state with much less paternalist ambitions than in the 19th 
century. The latter development primarily was a domestic alteration, in which earlier traits of foreign 
policy aspirations were incompatible with the national self-image and resources. Secondly, Danish 
grip on the North Atlantic islands (in addition to Iceland, the Faraoe islands and Greenland) became 
generally more precarious due to the naval arms race between Germany and Britain, and weakened 
through the two world wars. Due to the battle for command of the North Sea, Britain watched 
Iceland much closer than it ever had done previously. It sent a consul to Reykjavik in 1914, and 
discreetly informed the Danish cabinet that if Denmark gave consessions to Germany on Iceland, 
future Danish rule over this island would not be supported by Great Britain.1251 Although such 
threats never became actualised, the more pronounced low-profile Danish praxis of foreign policy 
caused an upswing for the Icelandic independence movement during WWI, and to a degree that 
caused problems for the Danish Zahle cabinet. The first problems in Danish-Icelandic relations arose 
                                                 
1250 Haggløf, 1960: 159. Lidegaard, 2003: 95-98 has shown that German staff officers already in 1917 had been 
convinced that control of the North Atlantic was a prerequisite in a war with Britain. And the North Atlantic was 
better controlled if Germany could control the Western coasts of Denmark and Norway. Danish politician Eric 
Scavenius was introduced to this line of thought in his secret meetings with the German general staff in 1917. 
However, it appears that he never told anyone about the 1917 German strategic assessment and the German wish to 
control Denmark based on the reasons cited here.  
1251 Lidgaard, 2003: 113 
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in 1915 over the revision of the constitution. In contrast to Greenland and the Danish West Indies, 
Iceland and the Faraoe Islands were not colonies but “bilande”1252 with a degree of autonomy, 
foreign and defence policies being common. The strife between Copenhagen and Reykjavik 
particularly centred upon the degree of autonomy for the Icelandic parliament, Alltinget. This 
problem was solved pragmatically, but another contentious issue, the rights of Icelandic civilian 
ships to use the Icelandic flag, repeatedly caused political friction. The outcome of this and some 
related issues could hardly have materialised the way they did had it not been for the role of Britain, 
who consistently saw her interests best served in weaker ties between Denmark and Iceland. Thus, 
Britain signed a commercial treaty with Reykjavik in 1916, without seeking any form of blessing in 
Copenhagen. This asserted Icelandic feelings of increased autonomy, while being highly unpopular 
among Danish politicians.1253 During the last year of WWI, Iceland and Denmark nevertheless 
settled the questions through the new union treaty of 1918. This treaty asserted that Iceland was a 
sovereign state, a considerable step towards independence for Iceland, although the two territories 
remained tied through common political institutions; the monarch and foreign policy, pluss a 
monetary union to expire by 1922. To Denmark, this was a successful policy of balancing the 
interest in keeping close ties to Iceland against the obvious fact that since Iceland was dependent 
upon the Royal Navy, Denmark could not provoke the British cabinet to force an abolition of the 
union.1254 
Politically, the public opinion was strongly in favour of changing the terms of the 1918 Union treaty 
with Denmark. By 1928, all parliamentary groups in Iceland proclaimed their support for its 
abolishment.1255 In The Allting a special committee overseeing foreign relations was established, 
and in 1934 a cabinet minister was appointed with the same function on behalf of the executive. The 
question of the relationship to Denmark in Iceland became an issue of whether to remain connected 
to Denmark through a personal union (not unlike the pre 1905 union between Norway and Sweden) 
or a total abandonment of special ties to Denmark.1256 The context in which the question was 
addressed changed after 1940 and the German occupation of Denmark. The war did initially not 
alter the foreign policy habitus of Iceland, however. The political leadership was determined that 
Iceland should remain neutral. Even after the German invasion of Denmark proper, of which Iceland 
constitutionally was part, and a British proposal offering protection of Iceland, this policy did not 
                                                 
1252 Which perhaps could be translated into dominion in English. 
1253 Lidegaard, 2003: 114 
1254 The union treaty of 1918 stated that the parties could claim the right to re-negotiating it in 19141, and if no result 
was achieved three years later than this, the union treaty could unilaterally be dissolved by either party.  
1255 Karlsson, 2000: 319 
1256 Only the Socialist Party worked in favour of the latter option 
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change. Indeed, the very occupation of Denmark immediately cut old political ties to Iceland. As for 
almost all overseas dependencies, colonies and dominions, WWII meant that European states in war 
with or attacked by Germany, lost some or all of their control of their overseas possessions. Already 
the day after the German invasion of Denmark, the Icelandic parliament, the Allting, declared the 
Danish King unable to uphold sovereignty over Iceland, and his powers were therefore assigned to 
the Icelandic parliament.1257 By implication, it meant that the political institutions of Iceland had to 
exercise sovereignty on Iceland and its territorial waters. That it was ill equipped to do so in a world 
war was quite another matter. It was evident to Churchill that as both Denmark and especially 
Norway had fallen by April 1940; the territory of Iceland could be of outmost importance to the 
future trajectory of the war. If Germany seized Iceland, it would establish naval bases both in 
Norway and Iceland, which would make the German navy much more able to control the North Sea 
and the North Atlantic transit to Northern Europe and the Murmansk area in northern Soviet Union. 
Thus, the British army occupied Iceland on May 10th 1940, seized major public buildings in the 
capital Reykjavik, and installed a British minister for Iceland acting as liaison to the Icelandic 
cabinet. True to its role as a neutral, sovereignty-maximising periphery, the Icelandic government 
protested formally but had to comply with the British occupation. Britain faced overstretching as the 
German army reached the English Channel the same year, however. In order to have the majority of 
its troops back while avoiding a German seizure of Iceland, the idea came up in London to invite the 
US to take over the military presence in the north. This was a somewhat awkward arrangement for 
both Iceland and the US at the time, but they soon reached an agreement. On July 7th 1941, the US 
took over the protection, on the assurance that US troops would leave Iceland as soon as the war was 
over. Thus, the first US dispatchement of troops to Europe in WWII became a reality with as much 
as 60000 soldiers to this island in addition to a British unit that remained throughout the war. To a 
large degree this, in the view of most Icelanders vast, military presence was a benevolent 
“occupation”.1258 However, the US already in March 1945 suggested to the Icelandic PM that the 
US military stations should remain manned after the war. This was a delicate issue, and has 
remained so ever since, because the left parties in the Allting did not favour the US military 
presence. A compromise was reached in 1946, where an agreement was made to the extent that the 
Army troops leave Iceland, while a vast military airport at Keflavik remained with staff and 
equipment. In parliament, the Icelandic Independence Party voted for the treaty, the Socialist 
against, while both the Progressive Party and the Labour Party were split. The final outcome was 32 
                                                 
1257 See Karlsson, 2000: 314 
1258 One interesting exception was the arrest of the editorial staff of an Icelandic socialist paper in April 1941. The 
British held the editor and his colleagues imprisoned in London until the end of the war. See Karlsson, 2000: 316 
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votes to 19 in favour of the US-Icelandic treaty. Thus was created a permanent American military 
base in the North European periphery and an enduring cleavage in the Icelandic polity as to the 
nature of its policies. In the advent, the political ties to Denmark were changed for eternity. An 
Icelandic referendum on the question of the union was held, in which only 0.5% voted against the 
dissolution of the union.1259 Thus, the Republic of Iceland was established on June 17th 1944. 
In sum, the foreign policies of both Norway and Iceland were restricted in this period through their 
unions with the former Nordic paternalists Sweden (union with Norway until 1905) and Denmark 
(de facto in union with Iceland until 1940, de jure until 1944). Their aspirations to maximise 
sovereignty thus was partly a result of their relationships to stronger Nordic countries. In addition, 
their dependence upon the maritime sectors made for repeated attempts to codify the extension of 
their territorial waters. Both countries sought to remain neutral, and in this they were successful in 
WWI, to a large degree because of the strength of the Royal navy. Being small states, but important 
in geopolitics,  they both failed to remain neutral, as the relative power of Britain had declined by 
1940. Both Norway and Iceland would continue to praise their independent standing as sovereign 
states after 1945, but in a context where only formalised ties to the new western hegemon would 
make such sovereignty possible. To Norway, this was a smaller step than it was for Iceland, the 
former having been a bandwagoning state under Britain from 1905 till 1940. 
 
4.4.1.2 Denmark - from paternalist to a former small empire with indirect             
overseas interests 
“A reliable defence is an impossibility, it cannot be produced in Denmark” 
                                                               Danish secretary of Defence, P.Munch, 19131260 
 
This section will firstly address the trajectory of the foreign policy and its domestic sources in 
Denmark proper. Next, we will look into the Danish colonies and dominions, making a vast sweep 
in political geography from the Virgin Islands to the North Atlantic peripheries (Iceland was covered 
above). The pronounced decline of paternalist traits in the Danish polity, and the simultaneous 
intensified great power rivalries changed the logic of both Danish foreign policy and the sovereignty 
over its former and present overseas possessions, I will argue. In the war against Prussia and 
Austria-Hungary in 1864, Denmark lost the territories of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg. This 
changed Danish foreign policy for the next 76 years. I will claim that the period is characterized by a 
                                                 
1259 Karlsson, 2000: 322 
1260 Cited in Lidegaard, 2003: 20 
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stepping down from a paternalist foreign policy habitus. By WWI, Denmark held a low profile on 
the international scene, although its overseas interests illustrate the legacy of a former small empire. 
I choose 1917 as the last year of Danish paternalism, since the government at the Faraoe Islands that 
year requested London, not Copenhagen, to guarantee supplies to the population. Denmark was no 
longer capable of managing its Atlantic territories.  
It has been said of the 1864 defeat that Denmark lost whatever faith it had had in Scandinavianism 
and a common Nordic security concept.1261 Naturally, Denmark was much more preoccupied with 
the threat it, rightly, perceived from Prussian military power and a unified Germany, whereas Russia 
was the traditional large power antagonist most feared in Sweden. The sum of foreign policy 
ideology and the Danish geopolitical considerations in this period makes it tempting to conclude that 
Denmark was somewhere “between Scandinavia and Europe”.1262 In addition to the aforementioned 
fact that Denmark was closest to the continental powers among the Nordic countries, it also 
remained a paternalist -in the sense that it kept overseas territories- longer than Sweden, to which we 
will return below. However, the age of industrialisation left Denmark as a highly weakened power; 
it could only theoretically play the paternalist role on issues and in geographical areas where the 
major powers allowed her to do so. But even that opportunity dwindled away, partly out of 
international reasons, partly as a result of the transformation of the Danish society itself. The war of 
1864 marks a juncture in the history of Danish foreign policy, from this traumatic experience on, 
paternalism was seen as less and less viable and desirable to the Danish opinion and to Danish 
politicians. The Danish conduct of diplomacy leading up to the war was, according to Danish 
historian Erling Bjøl, built on two erroneous assumptions; the hope of assistance from Britain and 
Sweden, and the strength of its own army.1263 In the following decades, these disappointments left a 
distinct mark on Danish foreign and defence policy.1264 The alternative position was formulated in 
1878 and in effect meant rapprochement with Germany.1265 By the turn of the century, the left had 
adopted the doctrine to mean accommodation to any major power in Europe that could threaten 
Denmark. After all, it was in a precarious position if a war were to break out between any of the 
major powers in Northern Europe (Germany-Russia, Germany-France, Germany-Britain). But the 
trajectory of Danish nation building also made the defence issue an ideological cleavage. When the 
new Liberal Government in 1901 sought to reconcile the strong pacifist sentiments in its left wing 
                                                 
1261 Bonnèn et al, 2002: 4 
1262 Bjøl, 1986 
1263 Bjøl, 1986: 603 
1264 See in particular Lindegaard, 2003: 13- 21 
1265 By the German victory over France in 1870, earlier plans for the Danish army to join France in a combined 
attack against germany were abandoned for good. See Lidegaard, 2003: 16 
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with the necessities dictated by growing tensions in Europe, the party eventually split in 1905.1266  
The outcome was nevertheless a weak Danish Navy and army, even weaker than in the case of 
Sweden.1267 Thus it was natural for Denmark, as it was for all the other Nordic countries, to remain 
neutral during WWI. Indeed, the calculation that Germany during WWI would see its interests best 
served through a neutral Scandinavia was basically correct; it ensured Germany of imports from 
Scandinavia1268 and simultaneously made the northern states into a neutral flank for German forces. 
That neutrality succeeded, and that the Versailles settlement even brought home the Danish part of 
Schleswig (1920), also reinforced the low profile of Danish foreign policy towards major 
powers.1269 Moreover, in the wake of WWI, both Russia and Germany had been reduced to a very 
humble status as players on the European scene. However, we should also note that the very policy 
of neutrality for a coastal state with overseas possessions, as Denmark was, required naval forces to 
uphold sovereignty. Thus, the Danish Navy remained a part of the Danish state structure even during 
the low-profile period par excellence in Danish history. As institutions always seek survival, the 
Danish Navy eagerly sought –and was successful at- adjusting to the new climate in domestic 
politics.1270  
The “radicals”1271 (Det Radikale Venstre), so dominant in the interwar years, were eager supporters 
of the League of Nations, and the alternative solution of bilateral “confidence-building” when the 
League deteriorated in the 1930s. Indeed, this policy had broad political support in Denmark. The 
1932 defence reduction, for example, was an outcome of the simultaneous approval of Radikale 
                                                 
1266 Einhorn, 1975: 494. The defence dilemma for the Danish cabinet was that strong fortifications at the coast could 
be sized by Germany in the advent of war, in order to stop British sailing into the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, 
Danish politicians were eager to reassure the Germans that their defence was not aimed at Germany. The final 
outcome, to put it crudely, was almost no Danish defence at all. After all, what could more clearly state a policy of 
neutrality? 
1267 After the so-called Odense programme of 1905, the Radicals declared that the fortifications surrounding the 
capital should be abandoned alltogether. The Social Democrats followed suit, declaring that no other country in 
Europe had a weaker defence. The latter was of course a gross exaggeration. Lidegaard, 2003: 19-20 
1268 It seems that a Danish argument in favour of not interfering with Danish shipping made some impression in 
Berlin. Even though Denmark and Norway also exported large quantities of food and raw materials to Britain, te 
Danes argued, an attack on Scandinavian shipping would also cripple both imports and exports to denmark and 
Norway. This would hurt the German ecomomy even further. See Lidegaard, 2003: 56-58 for overview 
1269 The reunion with Danish Schleswig is perhaps the most emotional moment in the history of Denmark after 1864. 
1270 Nevertheless, an argument telling of the Danish foreign policy arose between the Admirals and the Cabinet as to 
the actual practise of neutrality. The former argued that an armed neutrality was the only de facto way to practise 
neutrality. The Cabinet was much more restrictive, emphasising that naval vessels should be unarmed or at least 
avoid all exchanges of fire! Such a policy directive from the cabinet is testimony to the degree that Danish foreign 
policy had changed after 1864.  
1271 I use the term Radicals here as in Bjøl, 1986. One should not exaggarate the Radikale Venstre in this period as a 
very ideologically extreme party, however. Already when it formed its first minority cabinet in 1905, it carried on 
the defence commitments by the previous liberal cabinet. Nevertheless, Radikale Venstre was radical compared to 
contemporary European political parties that achieved cabinet posts. 
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Venstre, the Social democrats and economy-minded liberals.1272 Even in the years from 1937 till 
1940, it was not so much a cleavage between the parties on defence policy, as it was a cleavage 
within almost every other party; should Denmark have a military neutral guard or a defence that 
actually would be able to resist an (German) attack?1273 The debate did not change the outcome: 
unpreparedness for war. The rapid capitulation in 1940 was the almost inevitable outcome of such a 
transformation of the earlier paternalist Danish national habitus. But as in Norway, the war left 
neutrality discredited in Danish politics, and even embarrassing to the national self-image (witness 
the Danish-German Non-Aggression Pact of May 1939, for example).1274  Thus, Danish security 
policy was based on other assumptions by 1945. 
On the other hand, and in clear contrast to the passive Danish foreign policy of the interwar years, 
Denmark partly was a former small empire through its overseas possessions. In this respect, 
Denmark is a case that illustrates how even a weakened power can keep intact paternalist sentiments 
towards weaker societies. However, it is typical of Danish politics in this period that its 
“decolonisation” was carried out in an ordered, peaceful way. In this respect, Denmark is also an 
example of how a former empire with diminishing power on an international scene where the rules 
of the game changed, could carry out a peaceful abolition of an empire. The Danish West Indies was 
sold to the US in 1917, to some degree in exchange for US support of Denmark concerning 
Greenland (see below). The orderly reduction in Danish rule over overseas territories also applies to 
its overseas possessions in Europe. Iceland was granted home rule in 1918, and Denmark was in no 
position to protest the unilateral Icelandic declaration of independence in 1944 (see above).  
The Faraeo islands also belonged to Denmark as a “biland”, as in the case with Iceland (see above). 
As a territory of interest to the major powers, the Faraoe Islands is also similar to Iceland, since the 
islands were seen as important in British naval strategy. On the domestic side, however, the question 
of independence was more controversial than on Iceland. At the international level, the British fear 
of German annexation of the islands were not sheer fantasy; the German navy in fact worked out a 
plan to this effect in 1916, but it was never put into effect. The continued British command of the 
sea ensured that a German attempt at seizing the Faraoe Islands never materialised. But this naval 
hegemony also made Britain into the only power that could secure the Faraoe Islands from outright 
                                                 
1272 Einhorn, 1975: 495. One should also note that both the Radicals and the Social democrats by this stage had 
abandoned anti-military traits. The social democrats in particular, saw both the Navy and the Army as national 
institutions that should guard the Danish democracy against the twin threats of communism and fascism. Thus, 
every worker should serve in the military and see it as an institution to their own interest. The defence budgets did in 
fact increase in the 1930s. See Lidgaard, 2003: 262-266 
1273 Lidgaard, 2003: 312 
1274 Even more starkly than in Norway, the criticism against the cabinet and the senior Danish officers of 1940 has 
been harsh. At times, the debate has been based on counter-factual hypothesis that are impossible to verify or falsify. 
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occupation; in this respect, Copenhagen with its relatively weak navy was helpless. Thus, the 
government of the islands in 1917 requested London to guarantee future supplies to the Faraoe 
islands, causing alarm in Copenhagen, since this could destroy the strict Danish policy of 
neutrality.1275 The compromise nevertheless secured the population of the islands as well as 
avoidance of foreign occupation. The interest in the Faraoe islands as a thinly populated but 
strategically important territory nevertheless continued among all Northern states with aspirations 
for sea power. Thus, the appeal for national independence was not disencouraged neither by London 
nor Washington, since strategists in both capitals saw these islands as important for naval strategy in 
the North Sea and the North Atlantic. The Faraoe Islands, as well lay right in "the gap" between 
Iceland and Britain. Nevertheless, Britain in particular could not push its case too far unless it 
actually could compensate for a disruption between Denmark and the islands through a continous 
naval protection of the islands. Thus, The Faraoe Islands remained connected to Denmark. The 
population on the Danish Faraoe Islands held a referendum that yielded a majority for independence 
from Denmark in 1946 and home rule in 1948, but it has remained tightly connected to Denmark 
throughout the 20th century. It remains a Danish External Territory with autonomy. Thus it is Part of 
The Danish Rigsfællesskab, the Commonwealth of the Realm The same applies to Greenland, the 
largest island in the world, which achieved home rule in 1979, but has remained a part of Denmark. 
Both the Faraoe Islands and Greenland elect two representatives to the Danish National Parliament 
(Folketinget). 
Greenland deserves special attention, since it is the largest island in the world and still remains in a 
political union with a small European Nordic power. It also came in the focus of larger powers 
during the 20th century. Indeed, the very trajectory of the political history of Greenland in the 20th 
century to a large degree is a result of the interaction between the US and Denmark. 
The possibility of using the vast Greenland territory for both military puposes and aviation bases 
became apparent during the interwar years, especially due to the improvements in aviation 
technology. This made Denmark, Norway, the US and Canada interested in Greenland. The question 
of sovereignty on Greenland nevertheless seemed a tricky question for all these states, since 
different polities claimed different principles for the division of Arctic and Antarctic territories.1276 
Nevertheless, states, industrial companies and NGOs all supported expeditions to these areas in 
order to analyse the possibilities for mining, air fields and military bases. It was apparent to all the 
major powers that Greenland and Iceland, situated in the middle of the northern airway between 
                                                 
1275 Lidgaard, 2003: 116 
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Northern America and Northern Europe was strategically important. Historically, Denmark had 
traditions for establishments on Greenland. Thus, during the negotiations with the US in 1916 over 
the question of the Virgin Islands, Denmark sought to make the US relinquish all claims to 
Greenland territory. In this Denmark was successful, and the US even paid 25 million dollars for the 
three Virgin Islands known as the Danish West Indies (see below).1277 This did nothing to dampen 
US interest in Greenland later, however, and in addition Britain, Norway and Canada were sensitive 
to the perceived Danish attempt to seize the sovereignty of this vast island. And indeed Denmark 
also sought formal recognition from Britain concerning Danish sovereignty over Greenland. The 
reason for this policy was the justifiable fear that Norway, with a history of settlements and 
expeditions to East Greenland before 1700, would annex a territory on eastern Greenland. Denmark 
argued that this claim was invalid because of the 1814 Treaty of Kiel. It was this treaty that had 
ceded Norway from Denmark to Sweden, but the Faraoee Islands, Greenland and Iceland had not 
been part of the transfer.1278 Thus, Denmark meant that it had an international agreement that 
codified its right to these Atlantic territories. At the international level, this was a question of 
principle that could have severe implications for many states in the developed world: should 
sovereignty claims be justified by historic claims regarding exploration, or on occupation and de 
facto administration of the territories concerned? The Permanent Court settled the dispute between 
Denmark and Norway over East Greenland in 1933. East Greenland became Danish. While this 
added a significant amount of territory to the Danish crown, the very notion of sovereignty in Arctic 
territories and –waters remained a contested subject. One group of states, predominantly Britain, 
Canada and Russia, based their claims on the so-called sector principle, which stated that the Polar 
Regions should be divided into wedges or sectors.1279 According to these states, “the boundaries of a 
sector were established by extending longitudinal lines from points marking the eastern and western 
extremities of nations in the subarctic to the North Pole”1280. If this theory gained international 
recognition, the Arctic and the Antarctic –as well as adjacent islands- in their entireties would be 
                                                                                                                                                             
1276 The same question arose fifty years later in questions on dividing up sea territory and economic zones between 
states. The different principles were largely the sector principle and that of a midline. See below 
1277 Pendleton, 1917: 267. This amounted to ca 100 mill. Danish crowns, or the half of a Danish state budget. In 
addition, the Us accepted not to interfere if ”Denmark extended her political and economic interests to the entire 
Greenland territory”, Lidgaard, 2003: 81, see also ibid: 177-180 for an interesting analysis. The bilateral settlement 
in 1916 also sent a strong signal from Washington to the major European powers; it was not left for Europeans to 
settle questions of the staus of territories in the Western hemisphere. The 1916 Treaty therefore became an excellent 
card for Denmark whenerver questions arose over the status over her North Atlantic possessions. Thus, Denmark 
unilaterally issued a decree in 1921 that declared Danish sovereignty over the entire territory of Greenland.  
1278 Fogelson, 1989: 54  
1279 Fogelson, 1989: 56 and Fure, 1996 
1280 Fogelson, 1989: 56 
  
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945 
 
 
            
 
 
 
349
under the sovereignty of existing states. By such a principle, however, Norway and the US would 
hold very small sectors (compared especially to Canada and Russia/the Soviet Union).1281  
By 1933, aviation technology had reached a level where the US state department considered 
purchasing Greenland and Iceland from Danish sovereignty. This was a result of a consideration as 
to what implications enemy bases on these North Atlantic islands could have for the US. The 
bureaucratic interest in Greenland did not diminish in the years preceding WWII. By April 1939, the 
issue was clearly politicised when the Senate recommended a purchase of Greenland.1282 To some 
US politicians, but most notably to the US Navy department, both Greenland and Iceland were now 
seen as possible bases for planes, submarines and light naval craft. More important perhaps, was the 
prospect that either of the two islands fell into enemy hands. After the 1940 German invasion of 
Denmark, FDR feared that the Third Reich also would claim sovereignty over the Danish 
“colonies”, i.e. its Atlantic islands. However, a direct annexing of Greenland territory was too 
drastic an incursion for the international liberalist. The solution to FDR was to construct airfields on 
the island. Thus, a secret US expedition examined the possible sites for building a base that could be 
used for ferrying bombers to Europe via Greenland. In 1941, when Germany extended its war zone 
to Greenland, Henrik Kauffmann, the Danish Minister to the US - who had already refused to 
recognise the German occupation of Denmark - signed a treaty with the US placing the island 
under American protection and allowing the US forces to establish stations there.1283 A major and 
more lasting airstrip was built at Thule in 1945.1284 Thus, as in the case of Iceland, an Atlantic island 
inhabited with a native population with long historic traditions were heavily influenced by both 
Denmark, and after WWII, the US. US policies towards these territories were not imperialist, but 
they certainly reflected the increased power and role the US played in international relations, and 
how this affected Northern Europe.1285 While Iceland broke out of the union, Greenland has chosen 
to stay within the Danish realm. 
 
As we mentioned above the so-called Danish West Indies also ceased to be ruled from Copenhagen, 
but were simply sold to the US. The purchase, needless to say, was presented as a benevolent 
attempt to let the 27000 inhabitants on these three Virgin Islands (St.Thomas, St. John and St. Croix) 
                                                 
1281 The debate on these principles has remain heated to this day. Norway and Russia, for example have not reaced 
agreement on the sovereignty of the Barents Sea where Russia argues that the sector principle applies, Norway 
claiming the so-called midline principle. See Fure, 1996 
1282 Fogelson, 1989: 61 
1283 This was later dubbed the Greenland Treaty of 1941. 
1284 Fogelson, 1989: 62 
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shape their own destinies, freed from European colonial rule. That these islands also were seen by 
the US as strategically important goes without saying. But in the context of Nordic politics, the 
Danish possession and 1917 selling of distant overseas possessions to a major power is unique. 
These small islands had a history of foreign rule under the Dutch and British prior to the first Danish 
settlement at St.Thomas in 1666.1286 The Danish colony primarily produced sugar and tobacco, 
applying slave labour from Africa under harsh conditions (St.John was in Danish possession from 
1684, St. Croix was bought by Danes in 1733). Inspired by some of the same motives that led him to 
free the serfs of Denmark proper1287, King Frederik VI prohibited the Danish slave trade in 1792. To 
the US, the value of the Danish West Indies became apparent during the Civil war, these islands 
being seen as useful for coaling in future naval operations. Thus began a series of negotiations in 
1866 between Denmark and the US on the purchase of these Virgin Islands, only to be aborted due 
to disagreements between the Senate and the Administration1288 After 1896, Germany expanded 
commercially on the islands, trying to disencourage both Danes and Americans from the idea of 
purchase. It was partially successful at this; the offer from Theodore Roosevelt to purchase the 
Danish West Indies was turned down in Copenhagen as well as the Senate in 1902. This German 
meddling came to an end through WWI, and the US proposal to purchase the islands for 25 million 
dollars was ultimately accepted by 1916.1289 This outcome was just as much the outcome of internal 
Dansish deliberations as it was a reflection of Denmark`s geopolitical situation. The two sets of 
factors were intimately interconnected. First of all, the islands in themselves were problematic for 
the Danish policy of strict neutrality in WWI. In order to exercise sovereignty, a neutral country at 
least needs to be able to credibly uphold neutrality in its territory including territorial waters. As we 
have seen, the neutralist and indeed almost pacifist inclination that marked the Danish polity after 
1878 made such a policy impossible to implement for islands so far away from the motherland. 
Indeed, the North Atlantic positions were problematic enough. Secondly, as we also have seen 
directly above, the Danes tried repeatedly to sell the islands to an international liberalist. This was a 
policy compatible with the decreased paternalism of Denmark, and it was a necessity in order to 
avoid the European paternalists in getting too involved; this could upset the careful neutrality 
balancing during war. Thus, selling the island to a distant, neutral state was a fitting outcome for 
                                                                                                                                                             
1285 In the 21st century, the US plans for a national missile defence system has created new US enthusiasm for 
maintaining its base at Thule 
1286 Pendleton, 1917: 269 
1287 Denmark is an exception to the Nordic avoidance of absolutism, and had the strongest nobility among the 
Scandinavian countries. A system of strong and stable absolutism had been established in 1660. 
1288 Pendleton, 1917: 285. Pendleton also cites evidence that after these negotiations failed, Germany exercised 
pressure against the Danes to stop US influence on the islands. See also Koht, 1945 
1289 By 1915, the US had grown so uneasy about the possibility that Germany might use the islands as a base for U-
boats that it urged a settlement with Denmark as soon as possible. See Lidgaard, 2003: 80-81 
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Danish foreign policy. Ideologically, there existed no strong ties between the Danish West Indies 
and Denmark proper anno 1916. When the West Indies political leader David Hamilton visited 
Copenhagen in 1915 to publicly express the local problems created by Danish colonialism, most 
Danes felt that their colonies on the Virgin Islands were something of an embarrassing relic of the 
past.1290 In the referendum held after the announcement of the sale, an overwhelming majority of the 
Danish electorate voted in favour of the sale.1291  
Regarding the theoretical categorisation of Denmark, it seems evident that Denmark was no longer a 
clearcut paternalist power after the Napoleonic wars. There is some sense in categorising Denmark 
during the 19th century as a bandwagoning state under Britain during much of the time. As one 
Danish scholar has remarked, "Economically speaking, Denmark must indeed be considered part of 
the British empire from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century".1292 But the presence of a 
unified Germany made too clear-cut political bandwagoning behind Britain impossible for the 
Danes. It therefore restricted a limited paternalist habitus within its overseas “empire”, but gradually 
created a more peripheral political role for itself. By WWI, Denmark was only a former small 
empire, and its mare clausum pretensions were limited indeed. This perhaps suited the “peasant 
ideology” that had been strengthened in Denmark during the 19th century. Noone expressed it better 
than the priest Nikolaj Grundtvig, who after the defeat in 1814 decided to re-establish what he 
perceived to be the original Danish habitus: 
"Far whiter mountains shine splendidly forth 
Than the hills of our native islands, 
But, we Danish rejoice in the quiet North  
For our lowlands and rolling highlands, 
No peaks towered over our birth: 
It suits us best to remain on earth"1293 
 
4.4.1.3 Sweden, Finland and the Åland islands 
It is also interesting to note that the small-state paternalist Sweden that was left so weakened as an 
actor in the European state system after the first half of the 18th century, experienced a crucial 
economic growth after the Crimean war. According to the respected Swedish economist Eli 
Heckscher, “In the case of Sweden, the fifty years between 1860 and 1910 witnessed an import of 
                                                 
1290 Lidegaard, 2003: 80 
1291 Only 37 per cent voted, 283.670 in favour, 158.157 against sale. 
1292 Østergård, 1992: 5 
1293 Cited in Østergård, 1992: 14 
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foreign capital which in all probability was a vital prerequisite for the country’s rapid economic 
upswing”1294The military power of Sweden was much more modest on a European scale, although it 
remained a regional power of significance. In fact, ever after 1815, Sweden has managed to stay out 
of war. As we noted in the section on Norway, the chief concern in the Swedish political elite was a 
Russian incursion into her sovereignty, especially since Finland remained a grand duchy under 
Russia until 1917. This, and not the wish to coerce Norway in the union up till 1905, was the main 
reason for the effort to keep a modern Swedish defence. It hardly had reasons for outbuilding 
Norway; by 1905, Sweden had 11 battleships to Norway’s four, 5 torpedo cruisers while Norway 
had none. Moreover, its army counted 170.000 against the 76000-strong army of Norway.1295A 
direct comparison of naval and total defence allocations in the two countries demonstrates this 
further, and shows that the Russian policy in Finland after 1899 did much to raise Swedish defence 
expenditure. 
 
Table 4.4.1.3 Naval and total defence expenditure in Sweden and Norway 1892-1905, 
in millions Swedish kroner. 1296 
 
Year Naval Norway Naval Sweden Total Norway Total Sweden 
1892  2.7  6.3  13.7  31.4 
1893  2.8  6.5  10.1  31.6 
1894  2.8  6.9  13.0  34.8 
1895  3.0  7.0  26.8  35.7 
1896  3.4  7.0  15.6  36.9 
1897  3.7  7.0  16.4  43.2 
1898  4.1  7.0  23.6  45.3 
1899  3.3  7.2  22.5  42.8  
1900  4.5  7.5  20.3  54.5 
1901  4.1  8.7  20.4  58.6 
1902  4.3 10.5  21.4  67.7 
1903  4.3 11.7  20.6  71.1 
1904  3.9 12.6  15.9  77.4 
1905  4.3 13.0  17.0  77.1 
 
                                                 
1294 Heckscher, 1968: 210 
1295 Terjesen, 2001: 130 
1296 Data from Terjesen, 2001: 122 
  
4 Extraterritorial violence in the Industrial age, 1856-1945 
 
 
            
 
 
 
353
As we see from the table above, both naval and general Swedish expenditure rose quickly after 
1899, while the total defence expenditures of Norway did not show a steady increase in the same 
period. The Swedish Army reform of 1901 did much to increase Swedish defence expenditure, but 
neither army reform nor the decided building of three extra battleships in 1899 seem to be linked to 
a wish to deter Norway.  
Moreover, it is striking to note that the Swedish state was much more active on the international 
arena than Denmark, not to say Norway, in the intensified arms race in the years before WWI. It was 
primarily the fear of the Russian empire that spurred Sweden into further modernisation of its Navy 
and Army until 1914. In fact, the perceived threat from an expansionist Russia made the Swedish 
government authorise secret conversations between the German and Swedish military staffs in 
1910.1297 Sweden wanted some sort of a German reassurance in the case that Russia threatened its 
sovereignty, while German authorities primarily sought to exploit the Swedish role to provoke 
Russia to place larger forces in northern Europe. If they were successful at this, the Russian threat to 
Germany from the east would be lessened. Needless to say, this was a risky foreign policy. The 
outcome was that the Swedish foreign minister privately assured Berlin of “benevolent neutrality”, 
while all other powers were promised only “strict neutrality”, i.e. according to the rules of 
international law. However, Sweden was surprisingly successful at staying out of war. In August 
1914, for example, the Russian Baltic Fleet headed towards the island of Gotland, apparently to 
destroy Swedish naval forces there, but then only to return to Russia.1298 Germany tried to get 
Sweden on its side again in 1915, but failed. Sweden, as well as Denmark and Norway, had to adapt 
as well as it could to the conflicting demands of the central powers and the Allies over the 
distinction between contraband and non-contraband goods (all three states were important exporters 
to the belligerents during WWI).1299 
Moreover, the fact that Sweden stayed out of WWI made her international economic standing even 
better. In this respect, Sweden was similar to Norway. Sweden became a net exporter of capital after 
1918. Although the per capita foreign trade was a bit lower than in Denmark and Norway, the 
Swedish volume of exports by 1914 was thirty times higher than in 1830. How beneficial Pax 
Britannica had been for Sweden was exemplified by the experience of the allied blockade during 
WWI. The very strict policy of neutrality adopted by Sweden made for conflicts with Britain. The 
                                                 
1297 Killham, 1993: 40, See also Lindberg, 1966: 182-199 for a fascinating account 
1298 Åström, 1989: 15 
1299 The ingenius ways to pass the contraband regulations make for good anacdotes. ”The Swedes turned copper 
ingots into little statues of Marshal von Hindenburg, which were judged to be non-contraband as objèts d`art. 
Denmark, not to be outdone, imported twelve times as much lard as it had before the war. This normally innocous 
commodity was then sent to Germany to be turned into glycerine to produce explosives”, Killham, 1993: 42 
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outcome of this was rather severe restriction on Swedish trade in general, and Swedish exports to 
continental Europe in particular. Considering that approximately one quarter of Swedish 
consumption of food cereals came from imports, this damaged Swedish society. In this respect, the 
more pragmatic Danish and Norwegian policies during the war were less costly. Like the two other 
Scandinavian states, Sweden was also a supporter of the League of Nations. Politically however, 
Sweden pursued just as strong –or even stronger- policies of neutrality as did Norway and Denmark. 
But it was typical of Sweden that it initially was sceptical towards the League, since it could at least 
theoretically get Sweden involved in military operations. Thus, Sweden 1924 explicity ruled out any 
military operations as part of its membership.1300 In the economic sphere, too, the Swedish society 
managed to maintain strong ties to continental Europe without endangering its neutrality until the 
1930s. Sweden experienced an economic boom in the 1920s and was not hit by the depression until 
the late 1930s. Partly, it has been argued, this was a result of anti-cyclic state intervention in the 
domestic economy.1301 However, the arms race prior to WWII also stimulated exports of Swedish 
steel, iron ore and machinery. The German steel industry was heavily based on imports of iron ore; 
half of the annually required 20 million tons came from Sweden.1302 This made the Swedish policy 
of neutrality especially vulnerable after 1939. Through the naval agreement of 1935, Britain had 
renounced her naval influence in the Baltic, and the Swedish ore could perfectly well be shipped 
from Baltic ports. In addition, the German-Russian pact of August 1939 upset the balance of power 
that in practise had been the basis of Nordic neutrality. With the German navy supporting Soviet 
submarines in the war against Finland, it was also a question whether Britain would intervene 
directly through Norway or in the Baltic proper. Churchill in fact proposed exactly such plans in 
September 1939, but received only lukewarm British support for the Norwegian scenario, and none 
for operations in the Baltic. Thus Sweden was able to remain neutral during the war. While Swedish 
military power never was to reach the heights experienced in earlier centuries, neutral Sweden was 
perhaps the one among all the states studied here that came through WWII with the least damaging 
effects on its economy, state institutions and infrastructure. In fact, out of the 20 European states that 
declared their neutrality in September 1939, Sweden was among the five societies that managed to 
remain neutral until 1945. Pre-war stockpiles of food and a policy of rationing dutifully followed by 
a disciplined population made the isolation of the war bearable. Yet this political isolation spared the 
Swedish society the burdens of war that befell its neighbours. Compared to them, Sweden was 
perceived as a strong state and a vibrant society by 1945. It is not, perhaps, entirely far-fetched to 
                                                 
1300 Logue, 1989: 47 
1301 Heckscher, 1968: 273-275 
1302 Haggløf, 1960: 154 
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compare the small state of Sweden with the superpower US in this respect. Both avoided wartime 
destruction of its territory, and instead found themselves in an improved economic position 
following WWII. This never transformed into spectacular military ambitions in Sweden, although 
the Cold War made a large defensive capacity a necessity. However, while Sweden did maintain a 
significant merchant navy in a regional perspective, it only had indirect overseas interests after 1905, 
with very limited aspirations for far-reaching mare clausum demands. In sum, it was, like Denmark, 
turned into a former small empire with a low profile on the international scene. 
The trajectory of Finland is a special case in the Nordic context, and its role as an extraterritorial 
power has not been significant. Some remarks on Finland are included here only to show how the 
international balance of power affected the relationship between Sweden and Finland. Its dramatic 
political history nevertheless sheds light on the destiny of the last Nordic territory we will mention 
in this chapter; that of the Åland islands, situated between Sweden and Finland at the entrance of the 
Gulf of Bothnia. When Finland gained sovereignty in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution in 
Russia, Sweden and Finland disputed the status of the Åland islands. The League of Nations and the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 1918 eventually solved this. In other words, as in 
the case of Icelandic home rule and the abandoning of the Swedish-Norwegian home rule, it was a 
territorial disagreement solved through peaceful means. This particular outcome did not seem likely 
at the outset, however. When Petrograd recognised the former Romanov duchy as the sovereign 
state of Finland in December 1917, 40000 Russian troops still remained in Finland. In Finland, 
tension between socialists and conservatives/liberals was already high, so a struggle between Red 
and White guards soon broke out, the former supported by Russia, the latter by Germany. In this 
war, Germany intervened with naval forces on the Åland islands in March 1918, and eventually 
supported the White guards under Mannerheim to victory in May 1918. Thereafter, Sweden 
managed to send a force of 600 men to the predominantly Swedish-speaking inhabitants on the 
islands in May 1918, which seemed a bit too activist a policy for a neutral state. It probably was an 
ill-timed Swedish decision. In spite of the fact that the large majority of the islanders wanted to 
become part of Sweden, both the islanders and the Swedish government failed to persuade the 
League of Nations. Thus, the League awarded the islands to Finland, under the requirement that 
Finland guarantee the citizens rights to govern themselves and preserve their culture and Swedish 
language. In addition, the Ålands should be demilitarised. Finnish foreign policy was highly 
influenced by its relationship to its eastern neighbour; witness the war with the Soviet Union in 
1939. In spite of formidable efforts on the ground by Finnish soldiers, the war ended in March 1940, 
costing Finland more than 10 per cent of its territory. After 1944, more than 400000 Karelian 
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refugees were resettled in other parts of Finland,1303 and Finnish foreign policy was to be highly 
restricted by the presence of the Soviet Union till the latter ceased to exist.  
 
In sum, if we compare the Scandinavian states (Finland and Iceland were negligible in naval terms), 
throughout the period 1856-1945, the naval policies of all were modest indeed. It is true, of course, 
that Denmark, Sweden and Norway all remained maritime states with some naval capacity. With the 
possible exception of the Norwegian fleet programme at the turn of the century, the diminishing 
naval power of all states nevertheless is the most striking feature of the Scandinavian states during 
the industrial revolution and the era of total war. The reasons for this development are complex. 
Two explanations nevertheless seem plausible. In material terms, the incredible rise in expenditure 
that modern warships required deemed Scandinavian efforts at building and maintaining navies 
modest. Secondly, in their evaluation of the international context, all these states prospered during 
Pax Britannica. Since the international balance of power and the law of the sea all in all favoured the 
Scandinavians, they were also less eager to spend huge sums on large-scale fleet programmes. 
Furthermore, one lesson from WWI seemed to be that they could stay out of the titanian military 
struggles between the larger powers. For Sweden, this analysis proved correct, for Norway and 
Denmark the result was the contrary. The reason why the Scandinavian states became more 
peripheral in the first place was their geopolitical history. For Norway, sovereignty-maximizing 
behaviour to a large degree represented continuity, since it had been the lesser nation in two political 
unions from the 16th century until 1905. However, the overseas interests through one of the largest 
merchant fleets in the world made Norway a bandwagoning mare clausum state that mixed coastal 
interests with the preference of the freedom of the seas for transportation. It was the significant 
coastal interests combined with an inward-looking habitus that made Norway into a mare clausum 
rather than a liberal, bandwagoning state. In the Swedish case, the defeat of 1721 and the rise of 
Russian sea power changed Sweden as an actor on the international arena. However, it was not until 
the abolition of the union with Norway in 1905 that it lost all pretensions of being a paternalist state. 
The same goes for Denmark, whereas the unified German state and the Danish defeat in 1864 were 
both the geopolitical fact and manifestation that changed Danish foreign policy forever. In sum then, 
the Scandinavian polities that once fought repeatedly over the control of the western Baltic Sea, 
turned into one sovereignty-seeking periphery (Iceland), one band-wagoning state with predominant 
mare clausum ideoilogy (Norway) and two former small empires with only indirect overseas 
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interests (denmark and Sweden). What they all shared was a support for attempts at regulating 
international affairs through international institutions. 
 
4.4.2 The Netherlands-still liberal after all these years 
“There is no profit at all in an empty sea, empty countries, and dead people” 
(Allegedly from a Dutch critic of Jan Coen, Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies)1304 
 
From the end of the 18th century, the resemblance between the British and Dutch trajectories is 
small.1305 As historian Seymour Drescher succinctly stated “the Netherlands entered three decades 
of acute economic distress, overseas disasters, and political upheaval between the 1780s and the fall 
of Napoleon”.1306 It lost its great power status during the 18th century,1307 but kept large overseas 
territories in a Dutch empire well into the 20th century. This makes the Netherlands an interesting 
contrasting case with the Nordic countries, as well as the major powers covered earlier in this 
chapter. Compared to the Nordic countries, it is a reasonable assumption that the Netherlands bears 
most resemblance to Denmark among the Scandinavian countries, since Denmark kept sovereignty 
over overseas possessions in the West 
Indies until 1917, and exercised de facto sovereignty over Iceland, the Faroe islands and Iceland 
during the 20th century (see above). What distinguishes the Netherlands from our discussion of the 
Nordic countries is that it most certainly does not belong to the category of the sovereignty-
maximising peripheries. The question is which of the ideal-types of international liberalism, 
paternalism or bandwagoning state is most appropriate in the Dutch case. We have argued (chapter 
two) that the Dutch republic could be labelled an international liberalist during the 17th century, but 
the chief analytical question here is to analyse the extent to which the Netherlands` diminishing 
status on the international scene turned it into a bandwagoning state.  
                                                 
1304 Cited in Adams, 1996: 12 
1305 Since we did not see it as crucial to the present analysis to include the Dutch Republic in chapter six, I will 
briefly pick up the que from chapter five here on the Dutch trajectory. 
1306 Drescher, 1994: 47-48 
1307 Indeed, the loss of power on the international scene to a very large degree must be understood as a result of the 
relative decline of Dutch extraterritorial power. In this respect I totally agree with Modelski, 1978: 221 ”The great 
war against Louis XIV took the best part of a generation., were fought all over the world and finally came to an end 
in the Treaty of Utrecht 1713. The Dutch had held their own against the French, but the price was the effective 
transfer of global power to what had just become Great Britain. As the English navy took over the chief burden of 
fighting the French on the high seas and the Dutch concentrated on the land campaigns, the Dutch navy lost the 
impetus of its expansion and began to suffer neglect” (italics added by me) 
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After the defeat of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna redrew the map of Europe. In the Dutch case, 
the result was that in order to create a buffer state between the continental powers, the southern 
provinces were again united with the north. Thus, two distinctive territories with different historic 
experiences were united in a common Monarchy.1308 This soon resulted in opposition and the 
declaration of an independent Belgium in 1830. King William eventually accepted the terms of 
separation in 1839. Thus, The Netherlands was formed as a linguistically homogenous entity, but it 
was still divided into predominantly Protestant and Catholic areas and communities. The nature of 
the political control of Dutch overseas possessions changed significantly, but primarily only since 
the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies during WWII. We will return to the status of these 
territories in the next chapter, but at this point it is sufficient to say that resistance against Dutch rule 
in these territories existed prior to WWII, only to be reinforced during the war. What really sets the 
Netherlands apart from Denmark and Sweden in this context, is the fact that the former had a legacy 
of once having had hegemonic maritime aspirations. Did this make a departure from the imperial era 
more difficult? 
On the side of economics, it is striking to note that the earlier dynamic of the old Dutch republic did 
not keep pace with Britain, Germany or even Belgium during the initial phase of the industrial 
revolution. As an example, scholars have estimated that in 1830, the largest Dutch machine factory 
only employed between eighty and one hundred workers, and that the total number of steam engines 
in the Dutch economy in 1837 was 73.1309 Thus, the separation from Belgium was regrettable in 
economic terms from a Dutch point of view. One important explanation for this relative stagnation is 
the obvious fact that the Netherlands had no iron and practically no coal. This disadvantageous 
position was in many ways also a distinguishing trait of the Dutch overseas empire. In fact, the 
Dutch were the last to legislate slave emancipation in their colonies; “They perfunctorily abolished 
slavery in 1863, after their Swedish, Danish and French neighbours”1310. But by this time, the slave-
worked colonies did not matter significantly to the economy of the Netherlands. Even among the 
sugar refiners of Amsterdam, there was no collective protest, since their imports came from a range 
of plantations others than the Dutch West Indies. In other words, the colonies had ceased, to a very 
large degree, to be perceived as economically beneficial to the Dutch economy by the 1860s.  
However, the late Dutch response to anti-slavery movements might point in the direction of clear 
paternalist traits in the Dutch polity. We must therefore examine closer the nature and extent of the 
Dutch empire in the imperial age from the beginning of the 1880s. In a time when even small 
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countries like Portugal and Belgium developed colonies, the fact remains that The Netherlands took 
no share in the partition of Africa. It is true, of course, that the Dutch traded on the Congo estuary, 
had a presence on the Gold Coast and earlier had established a white colony in sub-Saharan Africa. 
But at the Berlin Conference in 1884, the Netherlands showed no interest in participating in the 
partitioning of sub-Saharan Africa. The fact is that the Dutch delegation at the Conference band-
wagoned behind Britain. This was as evident in the Dutch support for the British appeals to the 
humanitarian tasks at the Conference as it was in Dutch lack of territorial ambitions.1311 
Furthermore, on the question of the Free trade zone in the Congo, the principal aim of the 
Netherlands was to make such a zone as large as possible. The Netherlands supported ALL 
suggestions for free trade in Africa at the conference. In the end, the Dutch political leadership 
expressed utter satisfaction with the outcome of the Berlin Conference; “Dutch neutrality had not 
been damaged and free Dutch trade had been guaranteed”.1312 This was the position of a state of a 
predominant liberalist, mare liberum ideology. The loss of power on the international scene thus 
makes the Netherlands in the latter half of the 19th century neatly fit our ideal-type of a 
bandwagoning state. Yet, the age of imperialism and the international context from 1885, made the 
Dutch position an awkward one in international affairs. The imperialist policies of neighbouring 
states made the prospects for an informal empire in Dutch overseas possessions less probable, while 
at the same time, the very position of the Netherlands as a polity with such possessions and a 
political weaker power was even more precarious. Thus, Dutch foreign policy in this era can be 
interpreted as one of abstention and neutrality, carefully manoeuvring between Germany and Britain 
in order to uphold its interests. Thus, the Netherlands stayed out of the race for new colonies. It was 
not the lack of opportunities that caused this abstention. As Wesseling notes; 
 
“The small countries had enough opportunities – as was proved by Belgium and Portugal. It was 
the result of unwillingness. In the Netherlands…the political will to operate as an imperialist power 
was missing. Whenever it was necessary to act in such a manner, the Dutch did so hesitantly, with 
reluctance and often with dread”1313 
 
The comparatively speaking liberal beliefs that constituted the assumptions inherent in Dutch 
thinking on overseas possessions also underlay, and were paralleled in, the particular background 
                                                                                                                                                             
1310 Drescher, 1994: 44 
1311 See Wesseling, 1981: 504 
1312 Wesseling, 1981: 506 
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and nature of Dutch neutrality, or independency, in foreign policy. This facet of the Dutch polity 
must be analysed a bit further, since it demonstrates the very essence of Dutch liberalism both in 
foreign and domestic policy (I will return to this below). 
On the international scene, the position of Holland was precarious mainly out of two factors; the 
might of the German army and the British hegemony at sea.1314 A too appeasing policy towards 
Germany could mean the loss of Dutch overseas possessions; alliance with Britain could lead to loss 
of sovereignty of the motherland. Neither did the Netherlands have sufficient resources to deter such 
adversaries in the industrialised age.1315 The result was a foreign policy of neutrality, where the 
Netherlands sought smooth relationships with the major powers and in effect promised that it would 
not share forces with any major power.1316 But at the same time, geography dictated that the Low 
Countries was just too central for the strategy of both Germany and Britain. For Britain it was 
paramount to prevent Germany from controlling the channel coast, to Germany the Netherlands was 
both a possible advance route in any invasion of France, and at the very least a critical flank during 
an invasion where Dutch territory was not infringed. The worst possible outcome was a German 
invasion and occupation of the Netherlands (more likely if the Netherlands allied with Britain), the 
next worse was an alliance with Germany that would lead Britain or other sea powers to cut off or 
even annex Dutch overseas possessions, and the best solution was a successful Dutch policy of 
independence. The political leadership of the Netherlands hoped and sought for the latter, and for 
British assistance in the case of a German invasion.This policy was a success until Hitler attacked on 
May 10 1940, but at this time it also had become a total failure. In what ways did the national 
trajectory and international relations interact to influence Dutch foreign policy? 
In spite of the depression of the early 1930s, that particularly struck the economies of the Dutch 
overseas possessions, Dutch industry developed significantly between 1918 and 1940. It achieved 
remarkable results in domestic coal mining, almost reaching a level of self-sufficiency by 1940.1317 
It also was successful in a number of other industries, slowly but steadily changing Dutch society. 
On the level of politics, it seems pretty clear that the foreign policy of neutrality was compatible 
with the Dutch trajectory of state- and nation building. After the Congress of Vienna, the 
Netherlands was locked in a position of neutrality by necessity, surrounded by mighty neighbouring 
states. In particular, Britain was eager to support the Netherlands as a neutral zone between France 
and Prussia, later Germany. Thus, Britain restored Java and the other East Indian islands to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1313 Wesseling, 1981: 508 
1314 See Tuyll, 2000: 711 
1315 Schokking, 1947: 345 
1316 Tuyll, 2000: 711-12 
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Netherlands after the fall of Napoleon. The British and Dutch preferences for neutrality were only 
seen as ever more acute the more the military power of Germany grew. This policy was extended 
after WWI, when the Netherlands, in line with its membership in the League of Nations, called it 
independence rather than neutrality. And the peculiar thing is that this policy of “independence” by 
now rooted in the social constitution of the Netherlands, was highly compatible with the foreign 
policy ideals of another liberalist power, the US. The ideas and principles of Woodrow Wilson 
found huge support in the Netherlands. It is striking to note that perhaps only Sweden and Norway 
was as supportive of the League of Nations as the Netherlands among the European states. As one 
scholar has remarked; “organizing peace as the Dutch understood it meant initiating a universal 
juridical order, based on rational and generally recognized moral principles, and working without 
political bias”1318 Thus, it is no exaggeration to claim that in ideological terms, the Netherlands 
resembled the US more than any of the other European states analysed here. Moreover, in addition 
to the presence of Germany and Britain, this policy was in line with the Dutch view of the 
development of its overseas possessions. After all, the dominant view in the Netherlands was that it 
was a liberal kingdom developing the economies and societies in the overseas territories it 
controlled. It followed that neutrality, and an international order based on liberal principles suited 
the Dutch foreign policy habitus.  
Did this foreign policy and worldview also interact clearly with Dutch domestic politics? Some 
evidence seems to support such a hypothesis. As a neutral power, the Netherlands could afford 
patient deliberations, carefully preparing decisions built upon detailed and intricate arrangements. 
Where politics ended and administration began was thus not always easy to tell (note the similarity 
to the US until WWII). This also made it possible to seek consensus in domestic politics, since 
endogenous pressures were not seen as acute during the interwar years. Proportional representation, 
for example, was worked out at the end of WWI in a manner that tried to accomplish mathematical 
precision. Neutrality only reinforced this view of internal politics; in much the same way as the 
polity itself increasingly saw the world in light of their own image. The twin images of neutrality 
and international free trade combined to produce “more than directives for their own conduct; they 
gradually acquired the value of general and unimpeachable norms”.1319 History indeed is path-
                                                                                                                                                             
1317 Schokking, 1947: 344 
1318  Schokking, 1947: 347 
1319 Scokking, 1947: 348, moreover; ”Cobden`s conception of free trade as being simultaneoulsy a cause and a 
guarantee of peaceful relations between peoples was nowhere more wholeheartedly supported than in Holland`s 
commercial cities. Thus the Netherlands came to connect the demands of national interest with those of general 
peace and prosperity” 
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dependent, and the ideology of international liberalism was part of the Dutch domestic equilibrium, 
elegantly fitting with Dutch foreign policy from 1839 till 1940.  
But the image of international liberalism easily becomes victim to the grim realities of realpolitik for 
a neutral power with scarce resources in an era of industrialised state warfare. Although a part of the 
Dutch Navy continuously was stationed in the Indies, it had a small navy compared to the major sea 
powers of the era. This navy did not contribute to the international balance of power. Neither was 
Dutch naval construction or –technology between 1856 and 1940 ever in the forefront. Therefore, it 
should not be seen as a vital component in an analysis of the international institutions of maritime 
power in this period. Nor did the Navy serve much of a purpose de facto other than as a national 
symbol in an era where Pax Britannica largely worked in favour of Dutch overseas transportation as 
part of British policy to keep the Netherlands neutral. 
Moreover, army strength could not possibly compensate for this in strategic terms. In retrospect, the 
overseas territories of the Netherlands do not seem a cost-effective national business in the 20th 
century. Firstly, it required large and continued investments in infrastructure and social policies. 
Secondly, it drew a significant portion of the military forces of the Netherlands long away from the 
motherland, only to decrease the strength of defence in 1940, at the same time without hindering 
Japanese invasion of the East Indies in 1941. The result of WWII was dramatic in the short run for 
the Netherlands. Infrastructure was gravely damaged, and it took some time to have the 500.000 
workers deported for forced labour in Germany repatriated into society. The power of the Dutch 
work ethic nevertheless set the country fast back on track. In the ideological realm, much became a 
return to normalcy in 1945, with the very notable exception that a neutral foreign policy had been 
literally crushed by the German invasion. However, the first Dutch government after the peace 
immediately saw forward to an international order based on the Atlantic charter and free trade.1320 
Thus, our labelling of the Netherlands as a band-wagoning liberal state seems on safe ground for 
this period. It did not have the power to play a very significant role on the international arena, 
shaping the world order the way it did during the 17th century, but neither did its praise for free trade 
and a comparatively speaking liberal world order diminish in spite of its decline in world politics. In 
sum, the Netherlands remained a case of bandwagoning liberalism throughout this period, not so 
much a result of a merchant navy (see appendix II), but rather as a result of a very distinct ideologic 
heritage. 
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4.5 Conclusion; arms races, globalisation and maritime politics in the 
industrial age 
A naval arms race paralleled the industrial revolution. The naval race in technology and naval 
engineering was the first really sophisticated technological rivalry between truly modern states. 
Britain remained a hegemon until WWI, but could do so only by increasingly taking into account 
second-rate sea powers. The efforts of second-rate naval powers and weaker coastal states were to 
appeal to international law. Following the Crimean war, the 1856 Declaration of Paris could be 
interpreted as a juncture in this process.  
British policymakers realised the limits of hegemony. These limits more than anything else 
consisted of striking deals, agreements and alliances with second-rate sea powers, thus achieving 
equilibrium of forces. Britain was a true paternalist when it came to regulations of the use of the sea. 
As of Britain, her main foreign policy preferences indeed seemed eternal. Upholding the empire also 
made the quest to remain the leading naval power seem axiomatic. The support for the Royal Navy 
became ingrained in the British national habitus, and in a characteristic British way ever after 
1807.1321 However, such dominant paternalism eventually was set under a pressure that not even the 
Empire could ignore. Britain gradually lost her ability to shape the international maritime order.  
Both France, Russia and last but not least, the US, saw their interests served by a higher degree of 
mare liberum in world politics.1322 For the US at least, the interest melted together with ideology and 
political culture. At sea, in colonial questions and in the question of neutral rights at war, it was the 
combination of Russia, the US and France that checked the influence of the paternalist hegemon. 
What material interests made states with relatively benign relations to the dominant paternalist 
nevertheless favour mare liberum? The prime reason for this rests in the fact that neutral powers had 
important interests to defend in rivalries where they were not directly involved. To put it simply, all 
coastal states other than the belligerents shared the wish to be able to continue using the oceans, 
ensuring “business as usual”. This made the efforts at upholding maritime law into a proper 
constraint on the policies of the Empire. By 1900, the new major European power, Germany, had 
taken over the role as a chief cause of worry in the British government. In other words, the historic 
inclination towards paternalism that we have traced in the British polity was checked by the balance 
of power. Simultaneously, as we have tried to point out, the Royal Navy as the predominant naval 
force was a credible instrument to ensure a certain degree of freedom of the seas for the smaller 
                                                 
1321 See Ferguson, 2002: 164-173 for one vivid interpretation. The Royal Navy literally knit the Empire together, or 
represented the "annihilation of distance" together with the telegraph. 
1322 Semmel, 1986: 152-154 
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western powers. On the whole, this was beneficial for the smaller North European countries, and 
particularly for the coastal states Denmark and Norway (see appendix II). 
British ideology of sea power was a phenomenon of path dependency. After the Napoleonic wars, 
Britons saw the Empire and the Royal Navy as even more interconnected; one could not be had 
without the other. Thus, Britain consistently tried to out build any potential competitor to her naval 
predominance. After the British-Japanese treaty, Germany and the US were the chief rivals that 
influenced British naval policies. Both Germany and the USA were latecomers in the society of 
states, and both had scarce naval experience. The US developed a foreign policy towards the 
Western world that was in line with its ideological foundations; bandwagoning liberalism, later a 
liberalism that swung between the extremes of interventionism and isolationism. Germany was a 
traditional European paternalist power, acquiring a colonial empire and soon building its navy in 
comparison to the Royal Navy, but with the aim to improve its position, not to enter a war in which 
Britain would be an opponent. The naval policies of Imperial Germany helped achieve the opposite 
of what intended. Faced with the strongest army in Europe and a strong German fleet, Britain lined 
up with the antagonists of Germany. The German efforts at becoming a sea power were parts of 
increased aspirations for exercising paternalism. With practically no naval experience prior to the 
1870s, the German navy nevertheless was a very modest institution prior to the early 1890s. The 
army was seen as a much more important factor in protecting the Empire up to that point. The 
German constitution gave much room for manoeuvring in foreign policy for the Chancellor, and in 
military issues for the Kaiser. Thus, heavily influenced by the writings of Mahan, Kaiser William II 
and Admiral Tirpitz were successful at getting the Reichstag and the German opinion adopt a 
favourable opinion for increased naval spending. However, there was hardly anything peculiar about 
the ideology of German navalism. In many ways, it can be seen as an attempt to imitate Britain, and 
there is no evidence that German politicians or officers saw this naval policy as a preparation for a 
desired war with Britain. The nature of German imperialism nevertheless makes it a clear example 
of a paternalist power.  
The US on the other hand, was marked by its political distance to the old, paternalist European 
powers, and only entered the wars in 1917 and 1941 at stages when participation in the war seemed 
the only feasible action. One should note, however, that the US hesitated in engaging as a major 
power through extraterritorial violence, in spite of her energetic industries and vital economy. It is 
only through taking into account domestic politics heavily shaped by the processes of state- and 
nation building we can understand these interactions of the three major powers covered here. 
Material factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions to explain the outcome of WWI and 
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WWII. In this respect, the rise of the US as the major economic power compared to the other great 
powers is a major factor. Historian Bairoch, for example has estimated that it was in the years 1900-
1913 that the US became the strongest economic power.1323 
However, US economic power was not directly translated into political power. Materialist theories 
of international relations cannot explain this, while models that take domestic politics are at least 
capable of addressing this question. That Germany sought a much higher profile than the US in 
international affairs was a result of its ambitions to become a sea power. That these ambitions 
eventually contributed to the outbreak of WWI cannot be explained without taking into account the 
peculiar British preoccupation with countering any tendency in the international balance of sea 
power that it saw as threatening its naval predominance. It was the rise of another European 
paternalist power armed with a strong navy that fuelled the British naval build-up, while German 
politicians saw their strengthening of the Imperial navy as nothing more than an effort to achieve 
near parity with Britain. The outcome in both world wars was a German defeat, a weakening of the 
British economy and a strengthened US. Moreover, in the US, involvement in old, “pre-modern” 
Europe awoke little enthusiasm until 1941. Ideologically, the prevailing view in the much more 
liberalist US was that the whole international institution so dominant in Europe, the balance of 
power, had to be abandoned in favour of a different institution. In this respect, the policies of FDR 
echoed Woodrow Wilson, the latter being too far ahead of his time and his polity to succeed in 
administering and disciplining the European paternalists. Thus, the US continued to act like a 
liberalist in international relations, although paternalist traits surfaced between 1898 and 1909. In 
the latter period, largely due to the ideology of sea power as developed by Mahan and practised at 
least in part by Theodor Roosevelt, the US at times carried out a paternalist extraterritorial policy. 
However, these policies were controversial within the states, were geographically limited, and were 
consistently coupled to rhetoric of a civilising mission. Admittedly, the US also did give 
humanitarian relief in the territories it intervened in, but the distance between US idealism and the 
nature of occupation at the Philippines ultimately became too big. Thus, the US anti-imperialist 
ideology became incompatible with the practise of occupation. US foreign policy soon was brought 
back to equilibrium. After the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, the USA swung between 
isolationism and precarious interventionism, the latter reaching its highest level only from 1941. It 
was significant of these major shifts however, that only direct aggression from other states in world 
wars could curb the isolationism that had prevailed in Congress. After WW II, no other nation could 
compete with the US for leadership within the western camp. While other former major powers were 
                                                 
1323 Source: Bairoch, 1982: table 8 
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severely weakened “As a thunder squall ionizes the sultry summer air, World war II left the 
American people energized, freshened , and invigorated”, to use the language of David Kennedy.1324 
The US by now had transformed itself into the economic and industrial powerhouse of the free 
world.  
The smaller states analysed here all were weak powers on the international scene in the first half of 
the 20th century. The former liberal internationalist -the Dutch Republic- was transformed into a 
bandwagoning state after the Napoleonic wars. Although it kept overseas territories well into the 
20th century, the Netherlands combined liberalism with legalism in international affairs, and was a 
relatively weak naval power that was dependent upon the Royal navy for protecting its maritime 
sector. It nevertheless had to balance this with the fear of a German invasion, thus making it follow a 
neutralist foreign policy.  
The same neutralist policy is clearly recognisable in all the Nordic countries, although the political 
status of Norway, Finland and the North Atlantic islands was changed in this period. Norway 
unilaterally abandoned the union with Sweden in 1905, Finland was independent from Russia in 
1917, only to enter civil war and later Soviet invasion, forcing Finland to cede territories to the 
Soviet Union. Sweden consistently followed a neutralist policy during the entire period, protecting 
its trade with Germany while trying to avoid confrontation with Britain and Russia/USSR. In this it 
was remarkably successful, but this policy also implied adopting a very inward-looking definition of 
the national interest. Denmark’s position changed dramatically following its defeat by Germany in 
1864. From being a paternalist power, it entered a path of neutrality defined in very strict terms, in 
the hope of avoiding further hostility with Germany. At the same time, neutrality had to imply a 
modest military, so that Denmark might not become too tempting for any of the major powers, 
making them wage pre-emptive wars against Denmark in the advent of a European crisis (the Danes 
did not forget that Britain did this in 1807, seizing almost the entire Danish-Norwegian navy). This 
made the position of her overseas territories very precarious. Thus, Denmark sold the Danish West 
Indies to the US in 1917, compensated with US support for Danish claims for sovereignty over 
Greenland. It also lost Iceland formally in 1944. A policy of neutrality was impossible to combine 
with sovereignty over overseas territories that had become strategically important for the major 
powers. Nevertheless, the combination of Danish rule in the North Atlantic islands of Greenland and 
the Faraoee Islands, the clear alteration of the ideology of the Danish policy and the decreased 
influence of Denmark on the international arena, made her more peripheral with reduced paternalist 
pretensions and only indirect overseas interests, characteristic of a former small empire. As we have 
                                                 
1324 Kennedy, 1999: 747 
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seen, Sweden belonged to the same category by 1905. Conversely, Norway and Iceland both tried to 
gain as much sovereignty as the international forces allowed them during this era. By definition, 
gaining independence from Sweden and Denmark respectively were the major aims of their policies 
in the early phase of their new sovereignty. WWII made both countries dependent upon US military 
and political support; while the British maritime hegemony had secured the sea-lanes prior to the 
war, WWII ensured that both peripheries had to adjust their foreign policy to the nature of the new 
hegemony. The difference between the two was that Norway had a significant merchant fleet. 
Although coastal interests made her stick to mare clausum throughout the 20th century, this was 
balanced with mare liberum in international waters, making Norways`s mare clausum ideology less 
pronounced than in the case of Iceland.  
 
5 An American Empire? The US and liberal International 
Institutions, 1945-2001 
On previous pages, I have argued that historically, two polities gained maritime hegemony and thus 
influenced the international institutions and the states affected by these. The predominance of the 
Dutch republic in the later 17th century came first. This was a weak and short-lived "hegemony" 
compared to later ones, but nevertheless a hegemony through sea power and economic strength that 
to a considerable degree made her capable of defining the rules of the international praxis of 
maritime activities. Britain was the second hegemonic power, and was much stronger than the Dutch 
republic had ever been. The Pax Britannica lasted until WWI, although its predominance was least 
threatened in the period from 1815 till the 1890s. The changing nature of the British Hegemony and 
the increased international economic and political competition after the 1880s made the British 
predominance ever more precarious, and it also restricted the paternalist traits of British foreign 
policies. In retrospect, it is also evident that the relative decline of Britain after 1880 made her 
attempts at establishing international institutions based solely on her own preferences impossible 
faced with other strong paternalist powers and a steadily empowered international liberalist -the US.  
At the time of writing, it has become commonplace to dub the post-war US predominance as an 
American “Empire”. In this chapter, I will argue that the states in this analysis voluntarily sought 
protection under common rules and resources, and that the specific design of the institutions that 
were created for this protection was a result of US ideology. Furthermore, the polities of Northern 
Europe actively sought US participation through international institutions. These policies were 
balanced against the military power of the Soviet Union, a balance that restricted the conduct of the, 
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comparatively speaking, liberal US hegemony just as much as USSR made most democratric states 
support the US. The fact that the domestic politics of the US also restricted the praxis of US foreign 
policy has often been ignored by European commentators.  For these reasons, the ideology and 
nature of the US maritime hegemony will be addressed in the context of the Cold war. We will also 
analyse how this ideology gave weaker western powers opportunities to protect and even expand 
their degree and scope of sovereignty, and how the interaction between the US and North European 
ideologies made for cooperation as well as friction within the western camp. Empirically, the 
analysis is restricted to international institutions for maritime policies, chiefly the institutional 
framework set up under the United Nations (UN). Evidently, this framework was embedded in the 
entire post-war world order, and issue-linkages between policy-areas as well as interdependence 
complicate the presentation.  Indeed, the structure of the following chapter will seek to illustrate the 
degree of this embeddedness. However, I will also argue that all the states covered here exercised a 
degree of sovereignty within the international institutions, and that these institutions in fact were 
instrumental for this purpose. This makes a comparative logic possible, in spite of the high degree of 
diffusion of ideas and ideology between territories within the international institutional matrix. In 
this period, the theoretical notions of globalisations and a world-system of interconnected units are 
reflected in empirical evidence to an even higher degree than in the preceding period. This makes 
the comparative approach challenging, and the test of locally valid ideal-types a cumbersome 
process. A justification in favour of a comparative perspective of this era is the degree to which such 
an approach indeed might question the political significance of “globalization” or 
“interdependence”. While it is easy to demonstrate that communications, media and common 
environmental problems made observers of world politics more aware of the necessity of 
international cooperation, this did not necessarily translate into successful institutionalisation of 
international relations or decreased sovereignty for each state. To be somewhat more specific, is it 
not feasible that whatever de jure reductions of state sovereignty membership in international 
organisations amounted to, it in fact increased the de facto autonomy of small states with limited 
political and military power on the international arena? The period also makes a close analytical 
connection between the domestic and international level of analysis a necessity, more so than for 
any previous period. Thus, I have chosen to lay much more emphasis on the interaction between 
states that took place within international institutions, simply because a much higher portion of such 
interactions did indeed occur in institutions after WWII. In other words, a major assumption here is 
that international relations among western powers became more institutionalised after WWII than in 
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previous epochs of history.1325 Since the history and processes of the UN, NATO and the EEC/EU 
all have been covered by a substantial body of scholarly work elsewhere; I will not embark on a full 
analysis of these institutions. Rather, I will seek to isolate the maritime institutions and negotiations 
on maritime and naval matters that were seen as belonging to the realm of high politics by the states 
affected by the issues. This makes the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the sea 
(UNCLOS) of particular importance. Therefore, I will begin the analysis with the US and the role it 
played at the international level during the entire period covered here.  In other words, I link the 
alteration, or lack thereof, of international law for sovereignty of the seas and international maritime 
disputes closely to the role of the US. Needless to say, such a position might lead to a distorted 
picture of international affairs in the post-war era in which the role of the US is exaggerated.1326 On 
the other hand, I will try to show that the US indeed was vital to the particular content that the 
international institutions achieved, and the chapters addressing the other states will complement the 
analysis of the international institutions. The basis of the legitimacy of the post-war US hegemony 
must be highlighted, and we must ultimately discuss whether the foreign policies of the 
administration of Bush the younger changed US foreign policy beyond the ideal type of international 
liberalism. 
 
5.1 Forward deployment and the translation of the New Deal to the 
international scene; the US and the Post-war international institutions 
In this section of the chapter, I will seek to demonstrate that the American hegemony was 
substantially different than any of its predecessors, and how this difference changed the content of 
international law on maritime sovereignty. Materialist modes of explanations all too often fail to 
address this fact, as perceived by a scholar in 1993;  
“The multilateralism that characterizes postwar international regimes is a fundamental 
characteristic of a liberal world order. In particular, it is characteristic of international institutions 
                                                 
1325 This hardly is an original position, but one that nevertheless is debated. It is in particular criticised by some, but 
not all, political realists. The so-called English school deviates from hard-core realists on this issue. In this chapter, I 
will seek to demonstrate that both political realists and world-systems theoreticians often exaggerate the degree that 
material power alone can shape international relations.  
1326 The question of UN autonomy and whether the UN can be seen as an actor in world politics, was addressed by 
Oran Young in 1968. Young rejects both the realist interpretation of seeing the UN as merely a reflection of its 
component members, as well as an excessively idealist position that equates UN with the international system itself. 
Young (1968: 903) argues that the UN is ”1) a device for regulating relationships of power in the international 
system; 2) an effector of agreements among the major powers in the system; 3) an instrument for the 
accomplishment of political change; 4) a tool of partisan interests in world politics; 5) a creator of norms and a 
source of collective legitimisation; and 6) a contributor to the development of long-term viability for the states and 
nation-states in the system” 
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designed by the United States – the liberal state most inclined and most able to project its domestic 
political and economic arrangements onto the world”1327 
                                                                                              As I have argued previously, it was not 
the point that the US did not apply covert operations, supported client groups and at times brute 
military force in interventions in other states to further its perceived interests. This did indeed 
happen during the cold war, but the US hegemony nevertheless was different than previous maritime 
hegemonies under European states. The chief difference was not the use of force –in this respect a 
powerful international liberalist can apply the same means as paternalist powers- but that the 
American idea of liberalism, for better or worse, came to matter so much for the entire Western 
world after WWII.1328 In other words, the purpose and content of US foreign policy was more 
ideologically coloured than those of the major European powers (with the exception of the Third 
Reich but with no comparison to the US otherwise). While even its main post-war antagonists in the 
USSR eventually came to doubt their own ideology; the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of history, US 
policymakers from Woodrow Wilson and FDR to Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush, all continued to believe in what they saw as the fundamental truth and value of 
American political virtues, institutions and the sacred value of human rights and market 
democracy.1329  Needless to say, the US developed a strong geopolitical perspective during the cold 
war. Some will undoubtedly also argue that there were differences between US administrations. Yet, 
they all had shared common ground ideologically. As Henry Kissinger once said of the most 
despised American president of the post-war era, Richard Nixon:“With all his tough-guy 
pretensions, what he really wanted to be remembered for was his idealism. On his first day as 
                                                 
1327 Burley, 1993: 124. I am indebted to Burley for the argument that serves as the heading of this section of the 
chapter. That is not to say that there are not some substantial differences in views among us.  
1328 The ideology of the US, international liberalism, provided it with legitimacy on the international scene for much 
of the period covered here, in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union. There is little doubt that weakness also was an 
inevitable consequence of the liberal identity. As Henry Kissinger (1982: 12, 23) once wrote of the North 
Vietnamese during the Vietnam war: “Like a surgeon wielding a scalpel, Hanoi dissected the American psyche and 
probed our weaknesses, our national sense of guilt, our quest for final answers, our idealism, and, yes, even the 
values of its sympathizers, whom it duped no less cold-bloodedly than its adversarie…Hanoi had exploited 
America`s hesitations and self-doubt. Pilgrimages of antiwar Americans to this Mecca of revolutionary rectitude 
became a regular event”. The brute realities of the US intervention in Indochina proved a dramatic background for 
this venture. But this also made it tempting to see US conspiracies wherever political upheavals took place.  
1329 In a commencement speech given at Notre Dame University in June 1977 for example, Carter reviewed 
what he believed should be the ideals and realities of American foreign policy: “But I want to speak to you 
today about the strands that connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation. I believe 
we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power 
and influence, which we have, for humane purposes”.  
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President he had called for Woodrow Wilson's desk and he used it while he was in the Oval Office; 
a portrait of Wilson graced the Cabinet room”.1330 
One might argue that this idealism primarily was paying lip service to Congress and the American 
opinion, but in this section I will demonstrate that American ideals did matter. They mattered for the 
entire institutional matrix of the post-war era, and after some general comments on this, I will 
continue to show how it mattered in questions of maritime resources and –policies. Based on our 
ideal-type of the international liberalist, we should expect to find clear evidence of US insistence 
upon liberal principles in the formation, alteration and operation of these institutions. On the vision 
underlying the UN and its sub-organisations and legal framework, one should not overlook the fact 
that FDR and other US politicians that had direct experience with the US New Deal shaped the 
Bretton-Woods institutions and the Marshall plan to a considerable degree. In addition, FDR had 
committed the US to becoming “the great arsenal of democracy”.1331 This was to materialise through 
clear US commitments and significant US contributions on the international arena, but within a 
multilateral framework.1332. The US was well equipped to do so by 1945; it had the historically 
unique combination of ideological, economic, military and political power that gave it hegemony in 
the western world.1333 There were obstacles to actually exercise this power on two analytically 
distinct levels; the domestic and the international. On the domestic level, the craft of the FDR and 
Truman administrations was to gain support for US foreign policy in a new international context 
with the historical experience of the US as a polity. Thus, US foreign policy could not appear 
imperialist, overly committed in material military terms, nor too unilateralist. At the international 
scene, the military power of the USSR restricted US foreign policy with many of the same effects as 
the domestic US factors.1334 But in addition, there was genuine hope in Europe that the US would 
assume an active role in political reconstruction after 1945.1335 The latter factor contributed 
significantly to especially US commitments to participate in what became NATO. The USA acted 
swiftly in setting up the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the USSR did not 
participate in neither. Both organisations were favourable to US interests,1336 but were also seen as 
                                                 
1330 Kissinger, 1982: 1183 
1331 David Kennedy, 1999: 476 
1332 See Ruggie, 1993 
1333 Confer with the IEMP-model of Michael Mann, 1993. Mann also states that in geopolitics, political leadership 
matters. Leadership is a relational function to be sure, and I believe it is fair to say that at least in Western Europe, 
one looked to Washington for assistance in the huge task of reconstruction after WWII.  
1334 The USSR, in the words of Paul Dibb (1988) was an ”incomplete superpower”, but I would like to add that it 
nevertheless was a military superpower throughout the Cold war. 
1335 Thus, the necessary conditions existed for the US to become an ”Empire by Invitation”, in the words of historian 
Geir Lundestad (1986) 
1336 See Wade, 1993 for a recent and somewhat provocative exposure of this point 
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benign in most Western European countries.1337 The Marshall Plan of economic aid is also an 
example of a US policy that was simultaneously endorsed by Western Europe and instrumental in 
increasing US influence on the international scene.1338 The shift in US foreign policy in the years 
from 1940 till 1955 represented a merging of the Wilsonian internationalism and the more 
nationalist sentiment inherent in traditional isolationism.1339 By 1945, the US had become so strong 
that it could influence the whole world with its liberalism; the old isolationist fear that involvement 
would contaminate the US was largely gone at this point. The US did no longer need to fear the evil 
forces of the world, now was the time for evil forces to fear the US. This shift in the praxis of US 
foreign policy fuelled by old traits in the US polity and new opportunities at the international level is 
evidenced by the extent of US military activity, in which the US Navy played an instrumental role. 
The Defence budget was one billion dollars in 1938. After the war, the US Defence budget was 
around 12 billion dollars each year; by 1953 it passed the 50 billion dollars mark. In 1938, the USA 
had no military alliances and no significant military units stationed overseas. By 1955, the United 
States had signed numerous alliances and treaties with states in Western Europe and Asia, and had 
some 450 bases in 36 countries.1340 But there was no anonymous “historical forces” that dictated this 
outcome. Why did the US get so much more involved in general terms in international relations in 
this period compared to the interwar years, and why did the US seek a multilateral framework for 
this engagement? One source of understanding the American shift lie in the 1943 publication of 
“Prefaces to peace”, a compendium of four books written by prominent US politicians from 
different parties and loyalties. In this project, Wendell Wilkie (republican presidential candidate in 
1940), Herbert Hoover, Henry Wallace and Sumner Wells all argued that the US had to plan for the 
construction of an international order that should follow immediately after the termination of the 
war. Even a former isolationist like Wilkie voiced concern that US not repeat the mistake of 
withdrawing from the international organisations that by necessity would have to be set up after the 
war was settled, and that a framework for international political economy had to be created anew. In 
particular, the United Nations organisation was conceived in the spirit created by the war; of allied 
cooperation in seek for peace, not for unilateral aggrandisement on behalf of the US, as some 
Marxist scholars have later argued. We have already pointed out in chapter seven that the 1941 
Atlantic Charter, formulated by FDR and Churchill in 1941, was based on a liberal ideology. But 
one must also add that it was a document with a vision of an international order based on 
                                                 
1337 There were exceptions to this. But Lundestad, 1986: 268, and Hathaway, 1981 clearly demonstrate the point 
1338 Crockatt, 1995: 13 
1339 Schurman, 1974: 46 
 
1340 See Ambrose, 1980, Lundestad, 1980: 23-24, and 1986: 265, Gaddis, 1974,  
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multilateralism.1341 Needless to say, historians ever after have debated what FDR and Churchill 
really believed they were committing themselves to.1342 Admittedly, Roosevelt was the most 
committed to what the Charter actually said; for Churchill the main hope was to achieve the support 
of the US at a time when Britain was in an extraordinarily precarious position. Yet, the document 
and the meeting set the tone of the allied cooperation, and above all became a source of inspiration 
for both the leaders of the wartime alliance as well as for national leaders throughout the 
Commonwealth.1343 Thus, I will go so far as to say that the Atlantic Charter in earnest opened a 
Pandora Box. The Charter contained the phrase that Britain and the US “respected the rights of all 
peoples to choose the form of government under which they live”1344 It did not take long before the 
British Cabinet sensed that this formulation might entail serious consequences to the British 
Empire.1345 And indeed they were correct; US politicians as well as nationalists in European 
colonies took the phrase literally in the years to come. To the US, this also created a momentum of 
its own; once the Charter was seen as committing the USA to help abolish the very principle of 
imperialism as a part of the post-war settlement, it could hardly back down. Thus, when the United 
Nations Charter itself was hardly any more committed to a practical scheme for abandoning 
imperialism, the notion of foreign rule over territories separated by salt water was seen as harder and 
harder to defend. It had become incompatible with the aspirations inherent in the vision for the new 
world order, to a large degree as a result of the liberalism of the US, together with the fuelling of 
genuine desire to national independence in colonies that had experienced that ties to the imperial 
motherland were cut during the war.1346 The geopolitical result of the US-British-Soviet wartime 
alliance was also a shift of foci. By the time of the Tehran Conference in 1943; “The United States 
                                                 
1341 The four last points in the charter read as follows; “Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest 
collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor 
standards, economic advancement and social security; Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, 
they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within 
their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their 
lives in freedom from fear and want;Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas 
and oceans without hindrance;Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well 
as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be 
maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may 
threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and 
permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise 
aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing 
burden of armaments”.  (source: http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm) 
 
1342 See for example Wilcox, 1963: 683-703, Hughes, 1974: 177-190 and Crockatt, 1995: 40-42 
1343 Hughes, 1974 
1344 http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm 
1345 Lloyd, 1996:316 
1346 The defeat in South-East Asia, for example, also affected the relationship between UK and Autralia and New 
Zealand.  
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turned its main attention within the alliance from Britain to the Soviet Union: western strategic 
policy changed from a Mediterranean focus, largely inspired by British ideas, to a Western 
European focus reflecting largely American concepts”1347 To the US, the balance of power in other 
parts of the world definitely mattered, but Europe was the prime concern in the years following 
immediately after WWII. In this respect, overseas colonies not only were incompatible with the 
ideologically coloured US vision of the post-war era. The possible continuation of European 
overseas sovereignty was seen as complicating both the defence of Europe and US relations with the 
USSR. The first major instrument through which the US would seek to discipline the former empires 
was the UN. WWII ensured widespread support for US participation in some sort of collective 
security organisation, in congress and public opinion alike. Already by 1942, three quarters of the 
American citizens favoured such US involvement.1348 But FDR was convinced that this time, the 
multilateral Wilsonian version of idealism should be coupled to a dose of realpolitik within the 
organisation itself. This was as much a result of, as a genuine hope in, that the cooperation among 
the allied powers could stand a chance of survival after the war. FDR`s inclination to demand Big 
power predominance was reflected in the Dumbarton Oaks Plan of 1944, in which representatives 
from the alliance states agreed in principle to a Security Council, while the universalist pretension 
was embodied in the notion of a General assembly of all member states. The quarrels over UN 
procedures nevertheless mirrored the differences in view among the major powers.1349 In practise, 
the oncoming cold war ensured that the UN thus not became the dominant arena to address security 
issues either by the US or USSR during this period. But the organisation was relevant on another 
level; all subsequent multilateral treaties to which the US participated was designed not to be a break 
with the UN Charter, and the UN did become a framework for solving whatever international policy 
issues that the bipolar balance of power permitted. Included in the latter development was a more 
institutionalised world polity, although East-west antagonism limited the scope of this 
institutionalisation. The significance of this framework is often overstated by idealists who came to 
see the UN as synonymous with the international community, but it was just as much ignored by 
scholars who saw the international scene during the cold war as one singularly determined by 
security and power solely based on military capabilities, and on the basis of this assumption 
concluded that the UN was irrelevant.  We will demonstrate the importance of the UN framework 
below, but this is certainly not to deny the importance of power politics in traditional terms. The 
                                                 
1347 Sainsbury, 1985: 307 
1348 Gaddis, 1972: 26 
1349 One notable discussion was whether USSR should have 16 votes in the assembly, reflecting the sixteen 
”autonomous Republics” in the USSR, matching the separate votes accorded to the nations within the British 
Empire.  
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extraterritorial power apparatus of the US naturally grew from 1946 as the commitments and 
ambitions of the US increased. The German question, the Marshall Plan, the Truman doctrine, the 
nuclear arms race, the formation of NATO and SEATO, the US-Japanese security treaty, the 
creation of the CIA and the NSC 68 etc, were all manifestations of the increased US role in world 
politics as well as a reflection of East-west antagonism. This had important bearings on the US 
polity itself, and the prevailing view of how the US should behave as a unit in international affairs. 
At the domestic level, the significant shift in US politics was that a high-profile foreign policy 
gained increased support both within the political institutions and in the public. It is true that 
isolationist politicians still made up a percentage of the members of Congress, but these became less 
and less relevant to the formulation of US foreign policy after 1950. After the Korean War, in 
particular, the mood had swung from the earlier tradition of criticising administrations for being too 
interventionist, to the position that the US government was not doing enough to serve the interests of 
“the free world”. Confronted with what many Americans saw as a monolithic threat from a 
Communist world, this fertilised the perception that the US had “lost” China, and in the 1950s, even 
that the Government itself was corrupted – not primarily by big business interested in an arms 
industry, but by communist fifth-columnists! The international liberalism of the US had reached full 
maturity. Yet, this was also a product of the longue duree of US foreign policy. According to Henry 
Kissinger: 
 
“The Foreign service’s approach to foreign policy nevertheless reflected much of American attitudes 
and historical experience. The Foreign Service had developed in the earlier years of our history 
when no direct physical threat to America’s security was apparent. America’s foreign involvement 
was considered to flow less from a concept of national interest – which was thought morally myopic 
– than from enlightened notions of freedom of trade and the implementation of moral, or at least 
legal, principles. We believed that the decision to be involved with matters beyond our shores was 
entirely ours to make…we would take no responsibility for the day-to-day management of the 
balance of power; indeed, we tended to deny its importance and even demonstrated our moral 
superiority by denouncing it as a contributory cause of international tensions”1350 
                                                 
1350 Kissinger, 1982: 444. Of US ideology and foreign policy, the same author (ibid: 239) remarked that “Two 
schools of thought developed. The liberal approach treated foreign policy as a subdivision of psychiatry; the 
conservative approach considered it an aspect of theology. Liberals equated relations among states with human 
relations. Thjey emphasized the virtues of trust and unilateral gestures of goodwill. Conservatives saw in foreign 
policy a version of the eternal struggle of good with evil, a conflict that recognized no middle ground and could end 
only with victory...American idealism drove both groups to challenge us from different directions”. As Kissinger, 
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While the support for US interventions abroad did suffer a setback after the Vietnam War and the 
Watergate debacle that weakened the executive branch, the dominant trend until the 1990s was one 
of strong domestic support of very considerable US overseas commitments, both in terms of the use 
of economic and military power. And this was seen as both in the national interest as well as 
compatible with the values of the US society. The very ideology that had been seen as bulwark 
against foreign contamination of the US had now been expanded to cover the entire “free world”.  
Although this policy eventually has been called “imperialism” by the left, its ideological origins 
were far from the ideology of imperialism. Given the history of the US, international factors alone 
are not sufficient to explain how the US polity took such a vast step after WWII. The implication of 
such a position also means temporarily downplaying international factors, in order for us to grasp 
the genesis of the multilateral approach in US foreign policy after 1945. The development of 
international law and international organisations often has sources in changes of law and domestic 
politics. The US administrations during WWII and the immediate post-war years to a very 
considerable degree were influenced by the New Deal, and this coloured their vision of the UN and 
Bretton Woods institutions. This link is essential to grasp the following increase in 
institutionalisation of international maritime questions. To understand the shift properly, we need to 
address the worldview in the FDR and Truman administrations. This, or rather these, views both 
shaped US foreign policy and the international institutional order in the post-war era, and not solely 
in purely strategic terms. The great depression and the reconstruction added nuances to the dominant 
view of the relationship between the market and public policy among the most influential group of 
US politicians. Although it is perhaps an exaggeration to claim that this made for a precise doctrine, 
both politicians and bureaucrats in the FDR administrations clearly realised that a laissez-faire 
economic theory did not necessarily produce market recovery. In effect, this naturally meant that the 
Federal Government ought to "stimulate" the economy through various means, and that state 
regulation should be carefully applied to forestall market failure. The other side of the coin was that 
market failure, a wildly fluctuating currency, and resulting high unemployment could cause a threat 
to the very fabric of modern society. The latter was evident in the fall of the Weimar republic of 
course, but the severe difficulties on the American continent during the depression brought this fear 
very close to US policy-makers.1351  Intimately linked to such fears was the notion that the state 
ought to take responsibility where the market failed to do so; at least by a minimal standard, social 
                                                                                                                                                             
1999 has noted, the merging of liberalism and conservatism in the form of neoconservatism in the 1970s made for a 
particularl amalgam of US idealism. I will return to this exotic configuration of thought in the next chapter. 
1351 David Kennedy, 1999: chapter nine gives an impressive portrait of how this appeared to FDR and his closest 
associates. Crisis often seem much more manageable with the benefit of a retrospective perspective. 
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welfare was a question of public policy. This shift in US politics occurred prior to WWII. But after 
1939, a consensus in the FDR administration was gradually reached where these principles were 
seen as vital also for the post-war settlement and to the future world order. In retrospect, the 
resulting vision might seem unrealistic, lofty –even hypocritical. But the context of this development 
was so serious that it created a momentum for genuine aspirations for the improvement of both 
domestic societies and the international society at large. For FDR and his planners during WWII, the 
most dominant reservoir of thought on how to redraft the institutional set-up of the international 
community was the legal and administrative reforms of the New Deal.1352 Thus, the US tried to 
create relatively politicised regulatory organisations on the international level following WWII. 
Quite clearly, this was a break with US detachment as well as a break with traditional balance-of-
power approaches to international affairs. Perhaps even more fundamental, this new approach also 
resonated well with traditional US ideology in the respect that it envisioned an international law and 
a set of institutions for persons in addition to states; it became a vision for nothing less than 
mankind. Indeed, we might argue that both the League of Nations and the United Nations was based 
on liberalism, and that a US-articulated idealism served as bases for both organisations. But the 
point is that the UN was inspired by another form of liberalism than was the League of Nations. 
Whereas the League had been inspired by a doctrine of laissez-faire economics and the night-
watchman state, the 20th century vision to a large degree was the result of liberal welfare-state 
notions. In the words from the 1956 famous treatise “Swords into Plowshares” by Inis Claude, the 
latter liberalism; 
                          “Supported the assumption by governments of vastly expanded functional 
responsibilities and a capacity for regulatory intervention in many areas formerly considered 
outside the range of their appropriate concerns. Correspondingly, the Charter reflected a newly 
enlarged conception of the necessary and proper role of international organisation in world affairs; 
it envisaged for the United Nations and Specialised Agencies a functional”1353 
 
Surely, one might argue that this was a trend in the entire western world after WWII, but the most 
significant contribution to actually transcend increased state activity to the international scene came 
from the US. In fact, if we look at the entire period after WWII and compare it to pre-war standards, 
US liberalism in this respect was never to become the same again. A very substantial degree of state 
expenditure and state intervention in the market became a hallmark of US liberalism, often in 
                                                 
1352 Burley, 1993: 126 
1353 Claude, 1956: 88 
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contrast to the rhetoric of US politicians. Thus, it was not so much that international institutions in 
the post-war era had to accommodate to domestic interventionism,1354 but almost the other way 
around; the institutionalisation of the international community was to a large degree a result of 
domestic changes in the thinking on state and market. The result was that the introduction of the UN 
system, in an ideological and partly administrative sense, was a natural extension of the social 
welfare state in the US and Western Europe.1355 More precisely, it was the US effort at translating its 
own vision of politics and market to the world at large, whatever disappointments and lost illusions 
such a move would lead to, that produced the initial institutionalisation of world politics through 
organisation. As Dean Acheson once remarked, there was the opportunity to “grab hold of history 
and make it conform”.1356 The Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations began the 
first phase of post-war planning for this purpose already from 1939. As the war went on, the field of 
addressed issues rose steadily. Following the attack on Pearl Harbour, FDR authorised a broader 
committee, the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, with members from Congress and 
a wide array of US federal institutions and chaired by the Secretary of State. The committee was 
divided into subcommittees, and a number of special advisory groups, producing tentative policy 
options in twenty-six policy fields in preparation for the Dumbarton Oaks discussions alone.1357 That 
the body of proposals eventually became so wide-ranging and voluminous reflected a dual 
acknowledgement; that the New Deal philosophy could be a fruitful approach to world security after 
a cataclysmic war, and that no other western power had the sum of ideological, economic, political 
and military power to influence international affairs after WWII. And if the US did not do "the job", 
what would the results be? The US hope in the peaceful intentions of Josef Stalin declined 
considerably during the war. Translating plans into responsibility also meant organising the 
international community according to similar institutional designs as the US government. That this 
preference at some junctures was modified through negotiations with the participating states does 
not obscure the fact that the concrete institutional principles applied were American. To be more 
specific, as Burley has demonstrated, the members of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign 
Policy were almost exclusively “the actual planners and beneficiaries of these domestic solutions 
[the New Deal]”.1358 While the FDR Administration definitely wanted to construct a world order 
through organisation with the ultimate aim of securing peace, the Committee also to a very large 
degree focused on how to further US interests through this process of increased institutionalisation. 
                                                 
1354 See Ruggie, 1993 and 1998 for an analysis of so-called ”embedded liberalism” 
1355 Again, the analogy between domestic and international politics was much more conceivable for North 
Americans than it was for Europeans.  
1356 Cited in Ryan, 2000: 15 
1357 Burley, 1993: 131 
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This was to be ensured through the Security Council, but perhaps just as much through the 
organisations for specialised functions related to the UN. The liberalism inherent in this US attempt 
might seem naïve to European students and practitioners of power politics, but few in the FDR 
Administration and their planners had international power politics as their dominating experience; 
their main inspiration toward institutionalism was that of domestic problem-solving in the USA. The 
ideals of the New Deal as defined by Roosevelt in his speech on January 6 1941 (freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, freedom of want and freedom from fear) were projected unto the world stage. 
Included in this projection was also the belief that legalism could solve problems on the 
international arena (in this respect, the parallel to Woodrow Wilson is clear). Thus, The International 
Court of Justice, at The Hague, should act as a “world court”. It should be empowered to the degree 
that it “decides in accordance with international law disputes of a legal nature submitted to it by 
States”.1359 In addition, international organs and agencies are entitled to call upon it for advisory 
opinions. It was created in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations to be the principal judicial 
organ of the Organization, and its basic instrument, the Statute of the Court, forms an integral part of 
the Charter. Political realists predominantly have not found it difficult to illustrate the shortcomings 
of this institution. As we will see, however, the Court was to become a substantial contributor to the 
regulation of state sovereignty. While there is little purpose in elaborating the workings and 
processes of the UN in further detail for our purposes here, the implications of the American-
inspired world order is outstandingly illustrated by the development it triggered regarding regulating 
maritime resources. The UN system and the evolution of international law became important for 
increased sovereignty for most former colonies and dominions of the earlier European-led empires. 
This was a very American-inspired approach from the outset; FDR wanted to combine the concepts 
of the “Four policemen” and a gradual and orderly implementation of self-determination for the 
colonial territories. The result was a careful balance between idealism and realism, one that 
produced a notion similar to the one described in a third school of thought in IR; institutionalism. 
Against such a US position, it is easy in retrospect to see how this would create an almost permanent 
dilemma in US foreign policy.  On the one hand, the US in principle supported de-colonization, and 
would eventually end up defending “free peoples” for this purpose in overseas territories. On the 
other hand, such support more often than not had to be balanced against not pushing allies too far 
away. If the US did push the former European empires too far, the cohesion of the NATO alliance 
would be endangered. If aspirations for sovereignty in former colonies were too easily ignored, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1358 Burley, 1993: 133-134 
1359 http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm 
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Washington perceived that it would contribute to the spread of communism.1360 Thus, the legacy of 
FDR would become one in which the US repeatedly had to apply both carrot and stick.1361 That FDR 
already in mid-1942 began to express the belief that European empires should be replaced by 
independent nation-states linked to a new world organisation,1362 echoed Woodrow Wilson, but this 
time the principle was meant to include The World, not just the European territories embraced by 
the idealism of Wilson in 1919. To call this pure idealism obscures the fact that it was also seen by 
FDR and the Truman administrations as beneficial to US extraterritorial power. If the European 
overseas empires were abolished, would it not mean that it increased the window of opportunity for 
the US?1363 Of course it did, because the US was the strongest economic and extraterritorial power 
on earth, which included carving out a global strategy that it would embed in international 
liberalism. Thus, the “American Empire” would not appear as an empire to Americans, but would 
nevertheless ensure that the USA through bilateral and regional agreements with former colonies 
and weaker states could gain the overseas bases and military stations that a global reach required. 
Moreover, this remains much more than an a priori assumption or creation of the fantasies of 
scholars within the world-system analysis camp. Historians have shown it through recent 
research.1364 FDR, through his earlier service as assistant secretary of the Navy, had a clear 
perception of what the post-war geopolitical context might require to ensure a Pax America. This 
was evident in the Pacific, where FDR put several atolls in the Central pacific under the control of 
the US Navy already in 1934. In 1935 and 1936, three of the British-administered Line Islands were 
nothing less than taken over by US troops, however peacefully this happened. The same move was 
repeated with the Canton and Enderbury islands in British-controlled Phoenix group of territories. 
Moreover, the Administration of FDR was furious that the British and Australian governments 
refused to grant Pan American Airways landing rights in British Empire territories. On August 16 
1939, the US claimed –through official channels- title to 23 islands under British and New Zealand 
jurisdiction. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the US desire for control of the Atlantic also 
made it establish permanent bases at Greenland and Iceland. But the liberalism inherent in the US 
self-perception required that the US in the post-war context formally based its overseas possessions 
on invitation and agreements with sovereign polities. This helped trigger a formalisation of the 
rights of the inhabitants of these territories. Thus, consolidating the “American Empire” had a huge 
impact on international affairs, and it also changed the strategy of US extraterritorial military power. 
                                                 
1360 Homan, 1990: 130 
1361 See Ryan, 2000 for an interpretation in accordance with this line of argument 
1362 Orders, 2000: 63 
1363 This question is raised by Burley, 1993, but she leaves the question without theoretically or empirically 
analysing it in a thorough manner. In this respect, the following marks a contrast to Burley, 1993 and Ruggie, 1993 
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We have noted earlier in the chapter that the US Defence budget increased significantly during the 
early years of the cold war. Yet, the overwhelming US naval superiority in 1945-1946 (The USSR 
was not a major sea power at this stage), also seemed to justify a considerable down-scaling of the 
US Navy. With the introduction of the Bomb and long-range bombers, the dominant belief in the US 
indeed was that air power would be the chief instrument of extraterritorial violence. Thus, as Ronald 
Spector has noted for the period following WWII, “the navy was rapidly demobilized. Scores of 
ships under construction were cancelled, 2000 were put in mothballs, and 7000 were sold for 
scrap”.1365 While the US navy had almost 3.4 million men under arms in 1945, the number was 
reduced to 380.000 by 1950. The intra-service rivalry during these years are unparalleled in US 
history, witness the "revolt of the admirals" in 1949. Through the National Security Act of 1949, the 
navy, army and the new Air Force were established as equal services, under tight control of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, itself under strict political control though the increased power of the Secretary of 
Defence as the leader of a unified department. Secretary Johnson so intensely disliked the navy 
arguments in favour of their service that he expressed the view that the navy be reduced to one 
single carrier “for the Old Admirals to ride around on”.1366 Prior to 1950, such sentiments were 
fostered by the belief that the Navy's plan to deal with the Soviet threat was unrealistic and 
unnecessarily expensive. The US Navy then came up with the concept of combining control of the 
seas with a new capability to project power from the sea. The main reason was the new Soviet 
strategy of utilising a strong submarine fleet. This fleet, the US admirals argued, would be so strong 
as to render the traditional tactics of convoy and anti-submarine warfare obsolete and inadequate. 
The only credible counter-measure would be to attack the very source of Soviet sea power, applying 
naval air to attack subs in their bases and destroying support facilities. Only power-projection from 
the sea could apply such tactics.1367 By and large, this was a logical doctrine in the sense that it was 
the only reliable strategy in case of an all-out war with the USSR. It also created a lasting imprint on 
US foreign policy. In peacetime, the new Navy doctrine called for permanent stationing of the most 
advanced parts of the fleet far from home. This became the strategy of “forward deployment”, in 
which the US sought to station its chief means of extraterritorial violence so near future theatres of 
war as possible. Although the critics of this naval thinking saw such a conventional war with the 
USSR as merely a theoretical possibility, the emerging pattern of US overseas deployments were 
heavily influenced by the forward deployment doctrine. In fact, it was evident already after 1946, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1364 See Orders, 2000 for a balanced overview 
1365 Spector, 2001: 316 
1366 Cited in Spector, 2001: 320 
1367 A counter-argument was that Soviet planes would interdict such operations. To this, the navy responed that only 
carrier-based US aircraft could fight the Soviet planes, and that long-range bombers alone could not do the job. 
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when the US established a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean, what would later be 
designated the Sixth Fleet. But whether the US Navy would receive the required allocations of 
money to carry out such a strategy on a literally global basis was uncertain until 1950. The Korean 
War removed this uncertainty within months. The communist progress in the initial phase of the 
conflict showed that the US Seventh Fleet, with the Western Pacific as area of responsibility, had an 
inadequate level of fighting power with its single aircraft carrier, single cruiser and “handful of 
smaller ships”1368 Since North Korea had captured all US air bases in Korea in four weeks of 
fighting, this war demonstrated how aircraft carriers could be the perfect tool for the US. Since 
international waters were, and are, not submitted to the jurisdiction of any state, the US could 
reinforce its military strength in practically any theatre of war or crisis in the world by redirecting its 
carriers to the war zone. Moreover, faced with the strong conventional forces of the communists on 
the Korean peninsula, UN ground forces repeatedly pleaded for tactical support from US carrier-
based aircraft. In addition to the carrier and its carrier-based planes, the landing of an amphibious 
force led by Macarthur off Inchon, reintroduced the potential of amphibious forces, with all its 
requirements of support from destroyers and battleships. Needless to say, the Korean War definitely 
altered the US defence policy in the direction of forward deployment and strengthened conventional 
naval platforms, ever more technologically advanced by the introduction of jet planes in large 
numbers. Interdiction by carrier-based aircraft; close air support and protection of sea-lanes of 
communication in a war where practically all Allied forces and material came by sea; naval gunfire; 
blockade and amphibious landings- and withdrawals; all were vital capacities also in the nuclear 
age. Faced with the perceived Soviet threat, this meant two things with bearing both on US naval 
strategy and international maritime affairs. Firstly, the US Navy became a global force with the 
capacity of conventional as well as nuclear strikes. This created a huge spin-off in forms of naval 
deployments and surveillance at sea. An incredibly huge project of a Sound Surveillance System 
(SOSUS) with hydrophones on the ocean floor was instituted by the US in order to keep track on 
Soviet submarines. These hydrophones were anchored through the Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea and to 
the Sea of Japan. In effect, it constituted an entirely novel logic of state intelligence on a global basis 
that monitored military activity in the oceans. In order to be prepared for war, it also logically 
followed that US submarines as well as surface hunter-killer groups had to be available in all major 
theatres of warfare at any given time. Since the submarine was increasingly seen as the most potent 
killer of other submarines, such submarines increasingly became autonomous units with the outmost 
endurance. Thus, the US commissioned its first submarine propelled by a nuclear power plant, 
                                                 
1368 Spector, 2001: 320 
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Nautilus, in 1955. The Soviets duplicated this feat by 1958, and by the mid 1970s, the USSR had a 
number of nuclear submarines able to cruise submerged at speeds exceeding 30 knots.1369 Armed 
with powerful nuclear tactical and strategic missiles, such subs became the most lethal –and least 
visible- of all naval platforms, and made surface carriers ever more vulnerable, and submarines ever 
more important both at tactical and strategic levels. Although nuclear-propelled submarines and 
surface ships alike were able to operate on long patrols lasting for months, the scope of the US 
Naval strategy ensured that overseas bases were needed for the optimal functioning of these 
platforms. This created the second major alteration; the need for the US to extend and strengthen its 
overseas bases. Such ventures were only seen as possible by entering bilateral agreements with 
sovereign states. Needless to say, as the USSR increasingly became a major sea power, it too 
became a contester for overseas influence. Thus, maritime questions became embedded in the cold 
war. The development of increased state sovereignty over coastal and maritime resources was part 
of this macro change in US military strategy that required a shift in US foreign policy, and in few 
policy areas did the strengthening of state sovereignty become more apparent in the post-war world. 
Abandonment of the idea and notion of empire gained such momentum, that in ocean politics, it 
eventually came to threaten the dominant liberal and mare liberum preferences of the US. 
Paradoxically, then, the US would become the chief modifying state on these questions in the latter 
decades of the 20th century. After the successful US efforts to abolish Western-led overseas empires, 
the chief worry of US administrations became to control the forces set in motion. This dynamic 
would eventually lead to attempts at reaching equilibrium between state sovereignty over oceans and 
the freedom of oceans as an international waterway and a commons for resource-extraction by all. 
To understand this highly complicated development, it is required that we look into the very process 
at the international level. While I do not propose that the international development determined the 
formation of national policies, it will become evident in the following that the structuration of 
international maritime issues deeply affected national trajectories in this period.  
 
5.2 The evolution of international maritime cooperation 
The changing nature of US liberalism became apparent on the international scene immediately after 
WWII. This also was a sign as to how the New Deal regulatory state was projected into foreign 
policy concerning maritime resources. Harry Truman declared on September 28th 1948 that “the 
Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the 
                                                 
1369 US submarine design followed suit. The US Sturgeoon-class for example, was capable of similar speed. See 
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continental shelf beneath the seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States, as appertaining 
to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control”.1370 After the increased belief in state 
regulation within the US polity had been consolidated, and after the discovery of petroleum on the 
US continental shelf1371, this only seemed appropriate to the Truman administration. This US move 
set in motion an international trend in increased explicit state claims to extraterritorial sovereignty. 
Peru and Chile followed suit in 1947, claiming sovereignty of the resources 200 nautical miles from 
their shores.1372 The Santiago declaration of 1952 increased the momentum, since Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Peru all claimed jurisdiction within a 200-mile zone.1373 By and large, the claims to 
national jurisdiction of the continental seabed did not cause conflict among the American states, 
since the oceanic boundaries between them could be interpreted pragmatically through bilateral or 
regional consultations. However, the issue was much more delicate for smaller states that claimed 
large zones, or wherever states could be seen as geographically sharing the same seabed (in time, the 
Law of the Sea negotiations sought to define the special rights of such states under the label GDS – 
geographically disadvantaged states). Prior to 1958, no international framework existed to regulate 
these questions. Furthermore, an overriding concern for all states with a shipping industry was to 
avoid that national claim to oceans or maritime resources came to complicate international shipping.  
Although the question of the sea bed was but one of the possibly complicating issues in the praxis of 
mare liberum, the western states early realised that a common institution dealing with traffic at sea 
could help reduce transaction costs. In 1948 an international conference in Geneva adopted a 
convention formally establishing IMO (the original name was the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization, or IMCO, but the name was changed in 1982 to IMO, which will be used 
in the following). 
The IMO Convention entered into force in 1958 and the new Organization met for the first time the 
following year. The purpose of the Organization, as summarized by Article 1(a) of the Convention, 
was "to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental 
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in 
international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable 
standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control 
                                                                                                                                                             
Breemer, 1983: appendix A 
1370 Cited in Oda, 1976: 341 and Lay et al, 1973: 106 
1371 Fleischer, 1977: 35, Sinjela, 1983: 238-239. By a continental shelf, the 1958 UNCLOS conference settled for 
the following definition; ”as referring  (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but 
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil 
of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands (Original Treaty text). 
1372 Confer Sinjela, 1983 
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of marine pollution from ships".1374  IMO's first task was to adopt a new version of the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the most important of all treaties dealing with 
maritime safety. This was achieved in 1960 and IMO then turned its attention to such matters as the 
facilitation of international maritime traffic, load lines and the carriage of dangerous goods, while 
the system of measuring the tonnage of ships was revised.  
While the creation of IMO in itself was an instrument to protect the US preference for mare liberum, 
the question of national sovereignty at sea developed in an incremental manner. As we will show in 
greater detail in the section on Norway, the question of the drawing of the limit of the territorial sea 
became the first major international alteration of extraterritorial sovereignty in the 20th century. The 
importance of the dispute between Norway and Britain as to the demarcation of the Norwegian 
territorial sea lies in the fact that it was settled in the International Court in 1951, and that the Court 
concluded that the Norwegian claim was in accordance with international law. To simplify a 
complex jurisdictional procedure, this old dispute concerned which baselines the demarcation of the 
territorial sea should be based on. The Attlee cabinet claimed that the territorial sea should follow 
the actual coastline as demarcated at low water on officially proved maps. The Norwegian 
Gerhardsen government claimed that this was highly impractical due to the very high number of 
fjords, islands and archipelagos along the coast. Therefore, the territorial border in the oceans should 
follow a straight baseline established on the basis of islets along the coast. 1375 With ten votes to two, 
the Court settled in favour of this argument. In an international perspective, this seemingly trivial 
verdict was of outmost importance; it moved the international law of the sea in favour of the smaller 
coastal state for the first time in modern history.1376 The court did not find that the Norwegian 
government had violated international law, and furthermore that “in these barren regions the 
inhabitants of the coastal zone derive their livelihood essentially from fishing. Such are the realities 
which must be borne in mind appraising the validity of the United Kingdom contention”1377 When 
seen in a long perspective, such a conclusion is a testimony to the increased degree of 
institutionalisation of international affairs that took place after WWII. Great Britain, the paternalist 
former ruler of the seas and leader of a vast empire, had abided by the decision of an international 
court. Moreover, the court was also building its verdict on what appeared to the lawyers as a just 
cause on behalf of the weaker state; in the citation above, it is evident that the International Court 
takes the North Norwegian dependency on the fisheries into consideration. The result of the Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
1373 Oda, 1976: 345-6, lay et al, 1973: 231-233 
1374 http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
1375 See Stortingets tidende, 1948: 1260, Fleischer, 1977, O`Connell, 1982: 199-202 
1376 Fleischer, 1977: 45,  Eriksen et al, 1997: 358 
1377 International Court Journal, 1951: 133 
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decision was that states increasingly declared extensions of their territorial seas, as well as exclusive 
fishery zones under national jurisdiction. International disputes over the width of territorial waters, 
the width of base lines for demarcating territorial waters, and bilateral disagreement on the actual 
process of demarcation soon ensued. From 1950 till 1972, more and more states converged around 
the 12 nautical mile territorial limit, while a significant number of states laid down claims to even 
wider zones of national jurisdiction, as seen in table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5.2 Changing patterns of claims to territorial waters; Number of states 
claiming different width of territorial waters. 1378 
 
Territorial waters Year: 1950 
Number of states 
1965 1972 
3 nm 40 32 25 
4 nm 4 3 4 
6 nm 9 16 10 
9nm 1 - - 
10nm 4 2 1 
12 nm 3 26 56 
18nm - - 18 
30nm - - 3 
50nm - - 1 
100 nm - - 1 
130 nm - 2 1 
200 nm 1 1 8 
 
The states with the most ambitious claims to wide territorial waters were South American, while the 
most restrictive group that stuck to 3 nm in 1971 were former colonial powers in Western Europe 
and their by now “independent” former colonies. But already after the 1951 International court 
decision, it was evident that unilateral claims to wider territorial waters and fishery zones constituted 
a problem of collective choice. Extending the territorial waters/fishery zone in one Western 
European country, for example, meant that fishers from other countries were excluded from their 
traditional activity in these waters, while the fishermen from the same state could enjoy more 
restricted territorial waters off the other states. This was evident in Northern Europe as Iceland in 
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1956 announced that it would consider widening its fishery zone.1379 The improved capabilities of 
modern trawlers made this problem acute, and several of the fishing stocks by this time showed 
symptoms of being depleted. On the other hand, the US in particular saw that a development of 
increased national jurisdiction over oceans (and not only the seabed) as a phenomenon that might 
evolve into an increased mare clausum institution that in the long run could threaten mare liberum 
and the traditional right to free and innocent passage through straits and territorial waters in general. 
In sum, these questions called for attempts at codifying international praxis. Thus, the United 
Nations initiated the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), in 1958.  
UNCLOS I lasted for seven weeks from February 1958, and was divided into five sub-committees 
based on issue-areas.1380 A General committee, consisting of the Conference president, 13 vice-
presidents and the chairmen of each sub-committee, led the conference. The most controversial 
issues during the conference were the questions of the territorial sea and the contiguous fishery zone, 
plus the question concerning the access to the seas of land-locked (LL) and geographically 
disadvantaged states (GDS). In the former question, the American proposal (a 6-mile territorial sea 
and access for fishing by other states in a 6-mile contiguous fishery zone), gained most support, but 
not the 2/3 majority required for a final decision.1381 This, and in practise all other questions 
addressed at the conference, is a witness to the degree of change in the international system in the 
latter half of the 20th century. Small states, including many newly independent states in the “third 
world” had significant voting power. Especially African states claimed that their status as LL/GDS 
states in particular should reflect a new system of redistribution of maritime resources. This view, 
which was to dominate the legal discourses on extraterritorial sovereignty for the next two and a half 
decades, meant that poor societies should be paid a dividend of surplus from sea drilling, offshore 
oil and gas industries and fisheries in the world at large, or at least in their own region.1382 In many 
ways, this was a revolutionary claim in international affairs, and a proposal that ran counter to the 
US notion of international liberalism. While no western LL states supported special privileges for a 
GDS category, the USSR and its allies supported it for strategic reasons, the cold war now being 
practically global in scope. The land-locked western states by and large were satisfied with status 
quo, seeing the US-inspired institutional matrix as favourable for their economies, while all the 
major western sea-faring nations categorically were rejecting the notion of international 
                                                                                                                                                             
1378 Source: United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1971: 137-8 
1379 Fløistad, 1982: 74-75,  Hallenstvedt et al, 1976: 407-410 
1380 Stortingsmelding 42/59 
1381 The US proposal gained 45 votes, 33 voted against, while 7 states absented. UNCLOS official records 1959.  
1382 Needless to say, however such a system should be set up and work, would require a very complicated 
institutional framework. 
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redistribution at this point.1383 Moreover, the US proposal for a 6-mile territorial sea and access to 
fishing for other states within the contiguous zone did not constitute a huge step towards increased 
mare clausum praxis in maritime policies. While the support this proposal achieved at UNCLOS I 
made wider territorial seas more likely and legitimate, the US initiative was moderate compared to 
the increasing pressures from smaller coastal states to expand extraterritorial sovereignty. To the 
US, increased international acceptance for wide zones of territorial seas could endanger both free 
trade as well as the movements of the US Navy. Since the US definitely had a stronger navy (at least 
in terms of surface ships) than its communist antagonist, mare clausum -or so it was perceived- 
would endanger the military hegemony of the US in the western world, and its defence 
commitments to Japan and South Korea. It would indeed damage the very effectiveness of the US 
naval system of overseas bases and stations that gave it practically global reach. Thus, the uni- and 
bilateral declarations from South American states were anathema to most US policymakers. If other 
states were to follow the claims of these states to 50 or even 200-mile territorial seas, the 
transaction-costs of the US economy and the room for manoeuvre for the US Navy both would be 
dealt a blow. Thus, a 6-mile territorial sea proposal was seen as a decent compromise between the 
sovereignty-maximising peripheries and the paternalist former imperial European states (i.e. 
Britain). That it was a useful compromise became evident during the conference, where eventually 
all western European states except Iceland voted in favour of the US proposal.1384 But it is important 
to note the limits to US power on this and following occasions; it could not produce a majority 
decision for its preferred outcome. Equally significant is the fact that the US accepted such an 
outcome: it did not retreat from the multilateral forum, in spite of the lack of progress and direct 
opposition to US proposals from the Eastern Bloc, South America and some of the Asian states. In 
many ways, this constituted leadership of the western states; the US did not impose its will, but 
neither did it withdraw from responsibility. The result was that UNCLOS I, despite the substantial 
disagreements, in fact did produce four interventional conventions. These conventions were the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on Fishing 
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone. All the final treaty texts received the required 2/3 majorities. 
Especially regarding the conventions for the continental shelf and the territorial sea, the smaller 
coastal states could leave the conference with net gains. But the Convention on the High Seas 
ensured that all states with a significant merchant navy also had been able to gain a precious price; 
                                                 
1383 Stortingsmelding 42/59. 
1384 Stortingsmelding 42/59: 12. 
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mare liberum remained the dominant institution for international waters.1385 All in all, the extension 
of the territorial seas to six nautical miles constituted only a minor infringement of the oceans as a 
vast common. Although the six mile territorial waters principle increased the scope of extraterritorial 
sovereignty, the contiguous fishery zone in practice meant little; the 1958 treaty text gave in 
principle all states right to fish beyond the territorial seas. But whereas this can be seen as a victory 
of liberalism, it also ensured that pressure groups in the coastal states would seek to influence their 
governments to proceed unilaterally with declarations of extended fishery zones. By 1958, the 
numerical balance between mare clausum and mare liberum states were quite even, but in the longer 
run, decolonisation meant an increase in the number of states eager to gain increased sovereignty in 
coastal waters. Iceland led the way by unilaterally declaring a 12-mile fishery zone in September 
1958.1386 This soon led to the first of what became a series of cod-wars with Britain (see below on 
Iceland). Moreover, the Faraoe islands soon imitated Iceland. Naturally, the fishing industries of 
Norway and Denmark soon raised concerns that their own states should follow suit. With the above 
mentioned exceptions, however, the states analysed here acted in accordance with the 1958 treaties. 
This partly was a result of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas, which encouraged regional cooperation to forestall depleting fish stocks. The 
initiative for such a treaty came from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and the 1958 
treaty led to the establishment of several commissions for different seas.1387 The Convention stated 
that each state, either alone or in cooperation with regional polities, had a duty inherent in its 
sovereignty to regulate fisheries in designated areas. Thus, increased cooperation at both 
administrative and political levels was an important effect of the 1958 convention. One of the most 
significant frameworks for regional cooperation was the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) from 1959, and at the same time, this attempt at solving a collective dilemma illustrates 
                                                 
1385 Article 2 of this convention read as follows; ” The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly 
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid 
down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-
coastal States:  
(1) Freedom of navigation;  
(2) Freedom of fishing;  
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.  
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised 
by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas”.  
http://www.univie.ac.at/RI/KONTERM/intlaw/konterm/vrkon_en/html/doku/high-sea.htm 
 
1386 Fleischer, 1977: 49 
1387 Fløistad, 1987: 2 
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well the problem inherent in multilateralism.1388 In fact, while the ratification of the UNCLOS 
treaties took time, the agreement on the NEAFC was ratified by Britain, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, the USSR, Spain, Poland, Belgium, France, Ireland, Portugal and 
Western Germany even before the convention was meant to be effective (in 1963).1389 The general 
idea was that the commission should, through negotiations by the parties, determine the quotas for 
fishing in international waters in the East Atlantic. But the number of participants and the lack of 
supranational authority in such commissions made for imperfect compromises (each state could veto 
a decision) and lack of enforcement of whatever regulations were actually agreed upon. Thus, this 
attempt at regional cooperation could not go longer than the least cooperative of the signatories 
would allow.1390 It was one thing for the coastal state to regulate fisheries through national 
jurisdiction in the narrow confines of territorial waters and the contiguous zone, but doing the same 
in international waters proved to become a prisoner's dilemma. In the NEAFC, for example, only 16 
per cent of the agreements on total quotas were within the limits advised by the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), and more often than not, annual fishing amounted to 
a far larger catch than allowed even by the NEAFC-determined quotas. 1391 Inspection of fishing in 
these waters was carried out only sporadically. The EEC countries and Norway withdrew from the 
Commission in 1977-78.1392  
 
The domestic pressure for increased fishery zones and symptoms of overfishing was repeatedly 
addressed through new attempts to create international conventions that sought to regulate maritime 
resource-extraction. Thus, the UN sought to move further through a second conference on the law of 
the sea in 1960, UNCLOS II.1393 By and large, this conference produced fewer results than the 1958 
process, no treaty texts reaching the necessary consensus. The US-Canadian compromise text lacked 
one single vote to pass. Nevertheless, such a balance between the states as reflected in this vote 
signified a strengthening of claims to extended fishery zones. Even prior to the conference, the 
sovereignty-seeking peripheries declared that they unilaterally would declare extensions of their 
                                                 
1388 This institution has been studied in great detail by Lay et al, 1973 and especially Underdal, 1980 
1389 Lay et al, 1973: 395 
1390 Underdal, 1980: 36 
1391  The convention of the ICES dated 12 September 1964. See Underdal, 1980 
1392 The introduction of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone by this date seemed to make bodies such as NEAFC 
outdated. The institution was reinstitued in 1980, howeever. The states did not solve the problem of 
resourceextracting in international waters or at the ocean floor by extending their sovereignty over larger portions of 
the oceans.  
1393 The following is particularly based on UNCLOS off records 60/141, St.meld. nr 75/1959-60, S.tid. 1960:3105-
3109, Eriksen & Pharo, 1997: 359-362, Fløistad, 1982: 76-82, Ulfstein, 1982, Fleischer, 1977, Fløistad, 1987 
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fishery zones if consensus was not reached through UNCLOS II. At this point the Faraoe Islands, 
Iceland and the USSR all had 12-mile fishery zones contiguous to their territorial waters. Chile 
(1950) and Ecuador (1916) both had laid claim to a 200-mile zone, and combined with the 
widespread belief that several European states would introduce a wider fishery zone no matter what 
the outcome of the UNCLOS II; this produced a number of such unilateral moves through the 1960s. 
In addition to the states mentioned above, polities that extended their fishery zones to 12 nautical 
miles included Canada (1970), New Zealand (1965), Sudan (1960), Sweden (1968), France (1971), 
United Kingdom (1964), Spain (1967), Portugal (1966), Yugoslavia (1965), Mexico (1969), Turkey 
(1964) and Poland (1970).  
While the discourses in UNCLOS II undoubtedly increased the legitimacy of such unilateral 
declarations, it only incrementally changed state behavior. In practice, the states that extended their 
fishery zones sought to regulate fishing in these waters through bilateral and regional agreements 
with other governments. Thus, states that had traditions of fishing in the contiguous zone of another 
state, often gained fishing quotas from the coastal state that claimed sovereignty in the contiguous 
zone. Moreover, the fact that international conferences carved out treaty texts and that states voted 
in favor of these, did not necessarily mean that the same states ratified the very treaties that they had 
supported on the international scene. The importance of domestic politics and pressure groups are 
nowhere more evident than exactly here. By February 1972, for example, only 32 states had ratified 
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living resources of the High Seas from 1958. 
Even while rhetorically praising multilateralism, a state such as Norway in fact only had ratified one 
single convention, that of the Continental shelf, by 1972.1394  
While a detailed narrative of the interpretations of the fishery zones might seem tedious, the 
increased state sovereignty-claims to the continental shelf in the short run proved to be more 
important. Various US administrations, ever from the first Truman government and onwards, 
reasoned that while national zones of the ocean masses could restrict the freedom of the oceans, the 
same fear was not raised over the issue of the ocean bed. Since state ownership of the seabed did not 
infringe on the rights and possibilities even for submarine transits, and since an oil-consuming 
society like the American could use all the oil it could have, increased sovereignty over the 
continental shelf was in line with US national interests. By and large, the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf at first seemed a clear-cut deal. It stated that the coastal state had sovereign rights 
(article 2) of the resources at the seabed out to a depth of 200 meters, and beyond that out to the 
                                                 
1394 Oda, 1976: 25 
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limits of resource extraction of seabed resources that the depth of the ocean permitted.1395 Needless 
to say, the latter formulation made the convention subject of interpretation, since a coastal state 
reasonably could claim that deep-sea mining could make extraction of oil, gas and minerals from the 
seabed possible at ever greater depths as the technological development made such enterprises 
possible. While the potential for offshore oil and gas-industries clearly was realized by policymakers 
in most coastal states early in this period (with some ironic exceptions, as Norway), from the 1960s 
the potential of deep-sea mining for minerals made the issue highly contested. In the early 60's John 
Mero's thesis seemed to demonstrate the economic potential of manganese nodules. This was 
followed by "nodule fever" with industrial companies investing millions of dollars in the 
development of mining and processing technology. In the 1960's, the competition for copper, nickel, 
and cobalt drove prices upward and many nonferrous metals were in short supply. Ferromanganese 
nodules and ferromanganese crusts have a wide distribution and have in common a composition 
dominated by manganese and iron oxides.  
Naturally, the sum of the perceived potential economic importance of the seabed now made even 
tiny adjustments of national boundaries at sea into high politics. Some states could claim that their 
continental shelves were enormously large, due to the shallow waters off their coasts. Other states 
faced the opposite problem. In addition, national claims to even seemingly ludicrously small atolls 
and islets made for bilateral quarrels. The most peripheral territories in the world now entered 
center stage in international relations, not only of military-strategic reasons, but for economic ones. 
One prominent example is the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. In addition to the strategic 
location of these tiny islets, both China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines now affirmed 
territorial claims to these islands (at the time of writing, this dispute is not settled, and have become 
a central part of the entire security complex of the region. The very distinct Chinese wish to 
establish a mare clausum regime in this ocean is not unlikely to cause tension with the US). As will 
be demonstrated in the sections on the individual states later in the chapter, this issue of 
extraterritorial sovereignty became deeply problematic for Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. 
But it mattered for the superpowers as well. High-tech industry, and particular military production, 
had a huge demand for some strategic minerals. This made the issue of minerals into a strategic 
question, especially for the US. The reason for this is evident if we consider the land-based mineral 
reserves in the major production countries in 1977; 
                                                 
1395 Fleischer, 1977: 35. This was stated in article 1 of the Convention; ” to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to 
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas” 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/contsh.htm 
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Table 5.2.2 Land based reserves of minerals in major production countries, in 
percent of world total land based reserves, 19771396 
State                            Copper                      Cobalt              Manganese            Nickel 
Australia    8.0  9.2 
Canada  6.8   16.1 
New Caledonia  27.1  43.7 
USA 18.4    
USSR  7.9  8.3 37.5  9.6 
South Africa   45.0  
Chile 18.4     
Cuba  13.8   5.7 
Peru  6.5    
Zaire  5.6 27.7   
Zambia  6.3 14.2   
SUM % 69.9 91.1 90.5 84.3 
Nr of states with 
significant reserves 
7 5 3 5 
 
The oil crises had both increased the self-confidence of societies in the “periphery” of the 
international system as to their strategic value, as well as US awareness of the delicate position the 
industrial countries of its “empire” faced when pressured on strategic raw materials.1397 Japan, 
Western Germany and the UK, for example, were totally dependent upon all the minerals above. 
The same applied to the US regarding cobalt and manganese. The table above also illustrates well 
the special distribution of these resources. The refiners and exporters of manganese and cobalt, for 
instance, were for all practical purposes third world countries, the USSR and South Africa. Needless 
to say, this made all the US administrations after 1972 wary of the entire question of the CHM 
proposal. On this question, the US went further in breaking with its allies than in any other question 
regarding the law of the sea. Interest groups played a major part here, according to Schmidt; 
“By 1977 the industrial lobby had generated such concern about mineral supplies and mining rights 
in a Congress worried about shortage of resources that the sea-bed issue assumed a prominence out 
of all proportions to its real place in long-term United States ocean interests”1398 
 
                                                 
1396 Source: OECD Observer, nr 93, July 1978: 13-15 
1397 See Schmidt, 1989: 204-206 
1398 Schmidt, 1989: 86-87 
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Partly, the US wariness was a result of security concerns; partly it was an outcome of strong 
industrial interests. Mining consortia within the US carried out an intense series of lobbying on this 
question. The so-called Quaker-organisation of US drilling companies was particularly active in 
congress, and also had its own observers in the US UNCLOS delegation. In early 1974, only a few 
US companies were actively seeking to start extraction of the deep sea nodules. By 1976, four 
international consortia had been formed for the same purpose. With the Reagan administration, US 
resistance to the seabed-convention reached new heights. 
               In sum then, increased national sovereignty over the seabed unleashed a whole series of 
complicated policy-questions not anticipated by the Truman administration. In fact, the perception 
that deep-sea mining would almost completely alter the available quantity of minerals on the world 
market made the issue of the law of the sea even more complex than in previous decades. The 
increased tension created by deep-sea mining and the following grappling with the question of 
jurisdiction over the seabed firmly affected the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCOS III), lasting from 1973 till 1982. 
While UNCLOS III were to address a whole array of concerns regarding the law of the sea, it is no 
exaggeration to claim that the question of the seabed in fact triggered the entire conference. Arvid 
Pardo, the UN-ambassador of Malta, in 1967 proposed that the values of the seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction should be reserved for peaceful purposes and utilized “in the interest of mankind”1399. 
Since US President L.B. Johnson had uttered a similar view, although in a non-committed way, the 
idea soon gathered strong support in the third world. At the time, scholarly publications gave rise to 
an enormous optimism as to how deep-sea minerals could be extracted for commercial purposes. 
According to John Mero1400, there was enough nickel in the Pacific to cover the world total 
consumption for the next 400.000 years, while the current land-based mines would only suffice for 
the next century. The increased efforts to address the question through a political process of 
international jurisdiction were to preclude an international race for these resources by states and 
transnational corporations. Therefore, the Pardo - inspired slogan that the deep sea resources were 
the “common heritage of mankind” soon appeared as an appealing idea.1401 By 1967, this entirely 
new idea1402 in international law had become a contested concept in international relations, and one 
that in particular brought the north-south dimension into the realm of international maritime issues. 
                                                 
1399 Andresen, 1987: 19-20, Schmidt, 1989: 24 
1400 Mero, 1965: 274, see also Schmidt, 1989: 20-22. Optimism particularly centred upon the so-called mangan 
nodules at the bottom of the sea. These nodules were compounds of mangan, copper, nickel and cobolt. 
1401 Ulfstein, 1982: 33 
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Thus, the law of the sea invoked interest also among politicians with little previous experience with 
maritime matters, and the entire issue complex became linked to the economic, political and judicial 
aspects of world order at large. Needless to say, the questions on maritime resources became ever 
more embedded in ideological beliefs and the clashes between such opposing beliefs. The newly 
independent states of former colonial territories in particular played important roles in this respect. 
The new International Economic Order (NIEO) was a third world manifesto first articulated by third 
world leaders at an Algiers summit in 1973. By May 1974, the UN General assembly adopted a 
Programme of Action for the establishment of NIEO, and reflected the voting power of the new 
states acting in accordance with states that had nothing to lose from committing themselves to such a 
venture (including all LL and most GDS states). In tandem with the development of the NIEO 
rhetoric, the law of the sea was soon seen as a part of the NIEO itself. If substantial resources could 
be extracted from the seabed beyond the jurisdiction of states, was it not a reasonable and noble 
thought that part of the income from such enterprises be redistributed to poorer countries? Based on 
the recommendation from Pardo of Malta, the UN in 1967 constructed an own committee for the 
ocean bed, a body that became permanent from 1968. On December 17th 1970, the UN General 
assembly through UN resolution nr 2749 reached the broadest possible consensus that the deep 
seabed should be regarded as the common heritage of mankind (CHM).1403 
In principle, this was a step towards redistribution and democratization of world politics. It had no 
precedent in the history of international organizations. Furthermore, in the rather “progressive” era 
of the early 1970s, it did not seem infeasible that such a principle could be extended to include other 
policy areas as well. If all the states represented in the General assembly could reach agreement that 
the ocean bed belonged to mankind, could not the same be said to apply to migrating fish stocks?  
As events unfolded, however, it was demonstrated that the step from ambiguous program 
declarations to practical policy is often endlessly long in international relations. As to the CHM 
principle, the UN resolution did not contain any definitions of the very essential terms like “the sea 
bed” or the “ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction”. Moreover, as UNCLOS III convened in 
Caracas, the preparatory work of the sea-bed committee constituted six volumes of different and 
conflicting principles.1404 The predictable result was an avalanche of different proposals for such 
definitions, each tailored to suit the national interests of the individual states. To an international 
liberalist like the US, moreover, the whole idea seemed too much of a socialist scheme of imposing 
                                                                                                                                                             
1402 One might argue that nothing is new, and that in the case of the UN, Immanuel Kant had urged an introduction 
of Weltbürgerrecht (Friedrich, 1947: 29), but as a subject of serious debate in world politics, the idea nonetheless 
was new to policymakers, in that the UN system was conceived as more far-ranging than the League of nations. 
1403 UN OFF text LOS, 1983: 192 
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a bureaucratic regime for regulating resources that should be exploited by the actors who had the 
ability and will to do so. It was true that the US followed a multilateral approach during the cold 
war, but it was -after all- a multilateral approach based on liberalism, not social democracy. 
Such was the background for the UNCLOS III negotiations, lasting for nine years, if we not include 
the preparatory work by the seabed committee from 1967, three sub-committees, and an 
extraordinary number of informal negotiations carried out on a bilateral and multilateral basis prior 
to and during the official conference. The negotiation delegations of the participating countries were 
convened for a total of 93 weeks of official negotiation. These deliberations involved a set of issues 
that were explicitly linked to one another: the hope was to reach a “package deal” of international 
law of the sea. The problem with this was twofold. Firstly, the cleavages on the various issues often 
split close allies, and even different domestic groups represented by one single state negotiation 
team. Considerable disagreement arose at the outset, as states disagreed whether the 1958 Law of 
the Sea should be seen as the basis for the future treaty, or whether the negotiations should start 
from scratch. Thus, the same teams both had problems in creating tacit alliances and coalitions with 
other states, as well as problems with domestic pressure. One widely applied approach to deal with 
the latter was that representatives of various political parties, lobbyists and representatives of interest 
groups participated in both formal and informal negotiations. Thus, the mare clausum versus mare 
liberum cleavage not only split groups of states into different sub-groups, but made even the 
behavior of the individual states at times seem exotic. Domestic constituencies of the coastal states 
wanted it both ways; to gain as much sovereignty over fisheries and continental shelves as possible, 
and at the same time eating the cake too, in the form of freedom of transport at sea.  Secondly, to top 
it all, the issues addressed at the conference were linked to other issues. The conference itself was 
embedded in two macro-cleavages in the international system; the east-west conflict as well as the 
north-south dimensions ensured that each group of states carefully monitored the intentions of one 
another. In this manner, a proposal from one side became the subject of painstaking analysis and 
critical assessment by several other groups. Needless to say, the eastern bloc led by the USSR 
sought to utilize the opposition to the north that could be found in ample existence among the G-77 
states. The western bloc, heralded by the US, sought to forestall this, and was seemingly pressured 
into accommodating to the wishes of third world countries. Interestingly enough, the smaller 
northern states thus had the opportunity of pretending to build bridges between north and south, and 
to some degree between east and west. The Norwegian cabinet member Jens Evensen, for example, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1404 See Official records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement no 21 (A/9021). 
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assured that the Norwegian position was identical to “the interests of the world society”.1405 The 
result was an avalanche of proposals, counter-proposals, special committees, sub-committees, 
advisory groups, computer-simulations and a competition between scientific societies to provide 
data and interpretations that suited the national interest, and thus gave impetus for further research 
through state-sponsored research: 
 
“Scientists…tend to testify that more research is required before there is basis for action. Successful 
politicians, because they got where they are by successfully manipulating the system – tend to put off 
making major changes in that system. Those leaders who do not want to rock their various boats 
join the scientists in demanding more data”1406 
 
To make way through this maze, we divide the conference into two broad issues for the sake of 
simplicity; firstly the question of fishing zones and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and secondly 
the issue of the seabed. 
The smaller North European states covered in this thesis were instrumental in setting the agenda for 
increased state sovereignty over the ocean masses. Iceland unilaterally extended its fishing zone to 
50 nm in 1972.1407 This immediately made the issue a hot topic in domestic politics in the other 
coastal states in Northern Europe, as well as producing a predictable rise in the already considerable 
tensions with paternalist Britain. But in fact, this Icelandic decision eventually gained increased 
support. Firstly, evidence at this stage accumulated to show the increased number of fish stocks that 
were becoming depleted. Secondly, fishery zones did not mean decreased freedom of navigation and 
transit through the fishery zone, it only regulated fishing. Thus, even in the US, the fishery sector 
increasingly supported the proposal to extend fishery zones. The Icelandic government pointedly 
drew attention to this US phenomenon; by 1971 six of the states desired a 200 nm national fishery 
jurisdiction.1408 This even helped to modify sentiments in the UK. In Norway, Jens Evensen urged 
patience, realizing that the 200nm zone might capture the better of two worlds; national jurisdiction 
over the living resources within that zone, but a limited territorial water as defined in the 1958 
treaty. Before the conference was about to convene in 1974, therefore, Norway proposed that an 
informal group of 40 international lawyers be set up prior to the conference to examine various legal 
                                                 
1405 Dagbladet 7/3 1975 
1406 L. Timberlake, in Andresen et al, 1989: 18 
1407 Tamnes, 1997: 281, Petersen, 2004: 116 
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aspects of the issues. While the role of Evensen easily falls prey to exaggeration, this group became 
vital for the following negotiations; it represented all major regions of the 155 participating states, 
and most of its members became leaders of their respective delegations during UNCLOS III.  
The whole idea of the EEZ as a concept was an Australian-Norwegian effort to combine mare 
liberum and mare clausum that served their national interests, and at the same time could be 
conceptualized in a manner that could gain support from the superpowers and the third world 
countries alike. Both Australia and Norway naturally wanted to extend their national jurisdiction at 
sea in order to protect their own fisheries. At the same time, both states had a strong merchant navy 
with a high degree of influence in domestic politics. Therefore, they wanted to restrict too strong 
mare clausum-proposals, such as those set forth by some African and South American states that 
wanted a 200-mile territorial sea. Against such claims, the adherents to the EEZ principle could 
argue that such a zone would grant all coastal states jurisdiction over the resources of the sea and the 
seabed, without challenging NATO and the USSR by restricting freedom of navigation. If the 
territorial sea were extended to 200 nautical miles, then the sea-lanes for merchant navies and 
regular navies would suffer a serious blowback. Problems in particular would arise over the right 
and procedures for passage through straits. In this manner, supporters of the EEZ-principle could 
claim, not without justification, that the poorer countries would achieve much more by supporting 
the EEZ rather than aiming at large extensions of the territorial seas. Next, Norway in particular 
sought to buttress the EEZ proposal by offering these states a deal. The bargain was that supporters 
of the EEZ also would support the CHM principle, with potential for huge benefits for all poor 
states, and for LL and GDS in particular. The crucial element was to gain the support for the EEZ 
among the NATO countries and above all the US. As we have mentioned above, the coastal regions 
of the US were beginning to see an increase in the scope of national jurisdiction in a more favorable 
light. Next, almost all Western European states with vital fisheries felt that the competition for 
scarce resources was becoming more intense. Due to the fact that European trawlers now were 
denied fishing from the banks off Latin-America and West Africa (due to an extension of the 
territorial waters in these regions), an intense competition took place in the Barents Sea and the 
northernmost part of the Norwegian Sea. Western Germany increased its catches from 2000 to 
76000 tons per year in these waters from 1972 till 1974. Portuguese fishermen who had no previous 
record of fishing from this area increased their annual catches to 40000 tons. French companies 
equaled Portuguese in this respect. Then the Icelandic 50-mile fishery zone only made this problem 
more acute, making the British fishing industry voice grave concerns as to the future of their 
                                                                                                                                                             
1408 The Icelandic government, information leaflet 1972: 22. See also Sunday times, March 14 1971 “Russia – 
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outcomes. Negotiations within the NEAFC only produced stalemates in the same period.1409 Quite 
clearly, all these states realized that an extension of the territorial seas in the Northern waters would 
have large consequences not only for fisheries and the seabed, but might also cause considerable 
friction between otherwise close allies within the West European security complex. If states in 
Northern Europe achieved increased national jurisdiction, this jurisdiction would also apply to 
islands as Greenland, the Faraoee Islands, Iceland, Jan Mayen, Svalbard, Bjørnøya etc. In sum, 
national jurisdiction as understood in the treaty of the territorial sea extended to 200 nautical miles, 
would de jure close the northern waters to third parties altogether and create numerous disputes as to 
where the ocean boundaries should be drawn between territories closer to one another than 400 nm. 
To the USSR, such increased national jurisdiction was not necessarily seen as a benign 
development. One could reasonably argue, for example, that Denmark, Norway and Iceland all 
would grant the US Navy considerable room for maneuver in these zones, while following a much 
more restricted policy for the USSR. This would, at least in Soviet perception, amount to a distortion 
in the balance of power in the region (we now know how intense the intelligence war in these waters 
were. At present, there are 8 officially acknowledged collisions between Soviet and US submarines 
in these waters during the cold war).  
 
Such was the background for the complex UNCLOS III negotiations that started in earnest in 
Caracas in June 1974. 136 states participated in this first session, many of which had no coast at all. 
The goal, as articulated in accordance with the UN GA resolution from November 16th, 1973, was to 
reach one convention for the entire complex of the law of the sea. As mentioned, this would make it 
easier for each state to bargain on various issues. It nevertheless had the drawback that if the 
conference stalemated on one of the major topics, the entire conference would also be jeopardized. 
The first major issue therefore became how the conference was to reach decisions when faced with 
disagreements that made “gentlemen's agreements” impossible (the aforementioned UN resolution 
stated simply that decisions should be arrived at by such an assumption; there should be no vote 
before a “consensus” was reached on the topic subject for vote). On the session at Caracas, there 
was consensus on applying a 2/3 majority rule, i.e. when all other compromises had been emptied, a 
2/3 majority produced an agreement.1410 Procedural questions were addressed by the same rules as 
applied in the UN GA. One might argue that the 2/3 requirement was a hindrance for reaching 
                                                                                                                                                             
overkill on the High Seas” 
1409 See Ulfstein, 1982: 13-15, Tamnes, 1997: 281, Underdal, 1980, Yearbook of Norwegian Foreign Policy, 1974, 
1975, 1976, NOU 1975: 50, Stmeld 81/75-76, StPrp nr 62/77-78 
1410 See Ulfstein, 1982, Nordquist et al, 1985: 6-8, Evensen, 1980: 8, Stmeld 40/73-74:5 
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conclusions, but in retrospect it nevertheless seem logical; a decision with less than a 2/3 majority 
would not gain much legitimacy in the international system. In particular, one feared that the law of 
the sea would become a farce if third world countries by simple majority would be able to reach 
treaties that never would be ratified or followed by NATO countries or even the Warsaw Pact. 
Needless to say, the complexity of the issues addressed at Caracas was of such a nature that this 
conference session hardly was able to reach conclusions on any of the more than 100 topics on the 
agenda. The EEZ suffered this fate, and it was rather obvious that the question of the seabed would 
become a particularly difficult subject. In the committee on the seabed, 91 states had participated 
with much vigor for five years prior to the first session of the UNCLOS III. This tortuous work had 
not resulted in ANY unified proposals, but a six-volume catalogue filled with all the various 
suggestions.1411 Since the whole idea was that the committee should have a unified proposal for the 
UNCLOS conference prior to the first session of the latter, the result was a predictable stalemate. As 
the number of participating states grew to 156, and the number of registered NGOs with status of 
observers grew to over 100, the whole conference became a test of patience.  
This was not exactly the world governance as envisaged by FDR some thirty years previously. Yet, 
the novelty of such a truly global forum, set up in order to address questions of international law and 
global redistribution, was an important sign of a change in the process whereby international 
questions were addressed. For all the frustration frequently expressed during these years, this was 
the first forum in which practically all habitated territories of the world came together to find 
solutions to problems as old as the conception of polis, and as enduring as human conflict itself. In 
itself, the gathering of delegations from the US and Britain alongside African leaders can be 
interpreted as a practical step towards globalization of international policy decision-making. It is 
easy to ridicule the lack of efficiency at making decisions at UNCLOS III, but the very novelty of 
the conference itself was a sign of the degree of increased interdependence of world affairs. 
Without the consensus-principle, the small coastal states had the numerical strength to reach 
majority on every single issue they submitted to voting.1412 In this respect UNCLOS III set a 
precedent for later UN conferences with states as participators; consensus was a much more secure 
way of achieving legitimacy for the resolutions that in the end were produced. Yet, the inevitable 
drawback of such a procedure was the lack of decision-making efficiency. In some respects, the 
process adopted at UNCLOS III, with nearly 160 states and over 100 NGOs participating, was 
                                                 
1411 UN Off Text, 1983: 192, Ulftsein, 1982: 33, Stmeld 40/73-74. This was a warning of what was to come. The 
complete records of the UNCLOS conference makes for a lifetime study for entire departments of scholars. 
1412 Schmidt, 1989: 109 
  
5 An American Empire? The US and liberal International Institutions, 1945-2001 
 
 
            
 
 
 
401
beyond the competence of human beings to manage (at one point, computer engineers and 
mathematicians from MIT were hired to try to solve some of the problems through algebra).  
Sticking to the consensus principle perhaps was the only way to hold the conference afloat, but the 
growing pressure from domestic fishery interests and mining consortia ensured that the two-level 
games that governments tried to play became increasingly difficult. In short, the pressure for 
unilateral extensions of jurisdiction over the oceans mounted ever higher.  
This complexity at the domestic level was paralleled by increasing complexity at the international 
level of negotiations. A decisive difference between the 1958 and 1960 conferences and UNCLOS 
III was the number of participating states. Sinjela has documented that both the number of players 
and the ideological gaps between them was a result of decolonization.1413 The ratio of strength 
between traditional mare liberum states and a large number of sovereignty-seeking peripheries made 
a compromise inevitable, if there ever were to be a treaty. Stephen Krasner (1985), for example, 
argues that the third world states in fact applied a rather coherent strategy based on mare clausum 
ideology; they wanted increased sovereignty over their coastal resources, simply because they saw 
the amounting pressure from the large trawler fleets of richer countries. Simultaneously, this was a 
historic opportunity to consolidate their regimes through increased zones of national jurisdiction that 
could give significant economic gains. Moreover, their ideologically laden rhetoric for this purpose 
was hard to refute for the former imperial powers; there was a certain amount of claims for justice in 
this ideology that was hard to resist publicly in a decent manner. Their aspiration was to gain 
sovereignty of resources out to 200nm, and to secure that the resources on the seabed beyond this 
zone was not exclusively utilized by huge companies with the know-how and resources for deep-sea 
mining solely based in the western world. For the smaller states of Northern Europe, it was easy to 
see how this made for the closest alliance with third world countries that opportunity permitted.  
The LL and GDS countries also gained much attention during the conference, especially from the 
1976 sessions and onwards. In fact, these states amounted to 52 votes, or practically one third of the 
states participating at UNCLOS III. Through their numbers, they were able to veto decisions. Being 
a set of highly diverse states, however, they had considerable difficulties in coordinating their 
initiatives. This could be utilized by other participants. Norway, for one, spoke warmly of the rights 
of LL/GDS states (not only should they have a portion of the profit from the CHM, Norway even 
argued that profit from the EEZ of richer countries should be given to these states. 25 of the poorest 
countries in the world were defined as LL/GDS states at UNCLOS III. Needless to say, this 
                                                 
1413 Sinjela, 1983. See also Schmidt, 1989: 45-48, Evensen, 1980: 4, Brown, 1994, Nordquist et al, 1985, Krasner, 
1985; ch 1&2, Ulfstein, 1982: 171, Andresen, 1987: 41 for similar conclusions. 
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redistribution has yet to materialize some 30 years later).1414 Given the diversity of these states, 
Norway argued, their exact status should be addressed through bilateral and regional conferences, 
not a global one. The sum of complexity ensured that no significant progress was reached neither at 
the session in Caracas nor in Geneva in 1975. Faced with this stalemate, most coastal states 
unilaterally declared EEZs, a majority did so within 1978. It was seen as a necessity by most states, 
since “every other state” did the same, or was at the brink of doing it. Thus, this situation resembled 
that of the problem of collective choice modeled on the prisoners’ dilemma. A state without a 
200nm EEZ seemed to be faced with a bonanza of trawling activities off its coast in the advent that 
most other states had extended their national jurisdiction at sea. Thus, unilateral modesty rather than 
unilateral extension appeared to be equivalent to political suicide for governments of coastal states. 
The predictable result was a race for increased sovereignty at sea, and in this race, the noble CHM 
principle was pushed aside. Not few delegation leaders from third world countries witnessed this 
with bitter emotions, as expressed by J. Logue; 
 
“Unfortunately, the Law of the Sea Conference lost Pardo`s common heritage vision. The 
participating nations grabbed as much of the common heritage as they could. Inside the conference, 
they worked hard and successfully to insert “give-away” articles into each of the successive treaty 
drafts the conference was to consider. Outside the conference, in their capital cities, they passed 
unilateral legislation which claimed more and more of the common heritage as a national 
patrimony”1415 
                                  While the global conference definitely had value, the primary vehicle for the 
development of the law of the sea was a gradual change in state praxis, indirectly facilitated by 
UNCLOS III as an arena for bilateral and regional contact and information-sharing. Step by step, 
governments in particular regions coordinated their policies, and timed the implementation of 
unilateral declarations for mare clausum. Thus, states used the international institution as an arena 
to change the law of the sea; it was the states that created the new body of law, not the UN in any 
direct meaning of the word. The result was that UNCLOS III continually had to adapt its agenda and 
framing of the issues according to changes that already had occurred in state praxis. Thus, the 
international conference ended up strengthening the formal sovereignty of the states, and not the 
                                                 
1414 The limits of altruism were rather clear. The Norwegian government must have calculated that this international 
redistribution was utopic. It is hard to avoid such a conclusion when one reads St.meld. 40/73-74: 20. Nevertheless, 
it was a rhetoric with appeal both in domestic politics and at the international scene from the mid 1970s, where 
radicalism, anti-imperialism and disillusionment of major powers seemed to reach a peak in much of the western 
world.  
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contrary. Moreover, this only legitimized the unilateral declarations by each single state. The 
gradual changes in state praxis are evidenced by historical data. As we have mentioned, Iceland 
introduced the 50nm fishery zone in 1972, while Chile, Ecuador and Peru already had introduced the 
so-called “off-shore zone”, which, for all practical purposes, meant state jurisdiction over the ocean 
and seabed out to 200nm.1416 This initiative spread to other countries; Argentine (1967), Brazil 
(1970), Benin (1976), Guinea (150 nm 1974), Sierra Leone (1971), Somalia (1972), El Salvador 
(1950), Panama (1967) and Uruguay (1969). These mare clausum policies on behalf of African and 
South American states naturally made it difficult for supporters of the CHM to claim that it was the 
industrialized, western nations that grabbed as much as possible of the oceans; it was the poorer 
countries that initially set the train in motion. It remains a fact that the strongest claims to mare 
clausum came from the coastal states of the south. Thus, the picture of a unified or monolithic 
“south” during the UNCLOS III proceedings is misleading. While the LL/GDS states undoubtedly 
raised deep-felt objections to the policies of the Western powers, it was not the latter that were 
instrumental in pushing for increased mare clausum. It would be more accurate to point out that the 
African and South American coastal states expanded the scope of state sovereignty, and that the 
western powers sought appropriate ways to modify this process. Not under any circumstances could 
the south have it both ways; it was impossible to demarcate the largest possible ocean areas as CHM 
and at the same time grant all coastal states national jurisdiction of the sea out to 200 nautical miles 
from the base line, and beyond that for the seabed. Indeed, it is not wholly inaccurate to argue that 
both the Warsaw-Pact countries as well as the NATO states in fact curbed the movement towards 
too large an increase in mare clausum: no country in neither of the two organizations claimed a 
territorial sea beyond 12 nm.  
In this context, however, the 200 nm EEZ increasingly came to be seen as a viable middle ground 
between the freedom of the seas and increased national jurisdiction over maritime natural resources. 
While few states had proclaimed anything resembling the EEZ prior to the UNCLOS III 
Conference, a series of states did so during the conference, and several years prior to the conclusion 
of the negotiations. These states included Chile and Peru (1947), South Korea (1954), Costa Rica 
and Bahamas (1972), Bangladesh (1974), Iceland (1975), Guatemala, Mexico and Nicaragua (1976), 
the USSR (1976, implemented March 3 1977), France (1976, implemented February 1977), the 
USA (1976, implemented March 3 1977)1417, and Sri Lanka (1976, implemented January 15 1977). 
                                                                                                                                                             
1415 Logue, 1980: 24 
1416 The introduction of the off-shore zones met with fierce criticism at the international level. For domestic reasons 
however, the South American states found it impossible to reverse its policy. See Buzan, 1980: 16-17 
1417 In strict legal terms, the US only declared a 200 mile fishery zone in 1976. An American EEZ did not follow 
until 1983. In other words, the US was one of the very few states to withhold a unilateral declaration until after 
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In addition, all of the following states declared 200 nm EEZs in 1977; Denmark, Cuba, French 
Guyana, Canada, Norway, the UK and Western Germany.  
The very substantial alteration of the international maritime institution and the corresponding 
increase in scope of national jurisdiction can be illustrated by figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Zones of national jurisdiction 1958 versus 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
 
Comments figure 5.2: The diagram above shows a very simplified, basic outline of the important                                    
distance markers for the international zones of jurisdiction over the adjacent sea and the seabed, and how 
                                                                                                                                                             
UNCLOS III. However, the US had unilaterelly declared the seabed out to 200 nm from the US coast as state 
property already during the Truman Administration. In addition to a fishery zone of 200 mile, this in effect 
accounted to an EEZ. See Fleischer, 1977, Tamnes, 1997, Giverholt, 1983.  
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these were changed from the 1958 till the 1982 conventions.1418 In the 1958 convention, coastal states were 
given sovereign rights in the ocean over a 12 nautical mile territorial sea and a 12 mile contigous zone, both 
drawn from a baseline. In addition, states had sovereign rights on the seabed 200 miles from the contigous 
zone, but no jurisdiction beyond the contigous zone in the ocean masses. With the 1982 convention, states 
achieved sovereign rights in the ocean masses in a 200 mile EEZ beyond the territorial sea which in effect 
meant a dramatic reduction of the high seas, or international waters. The sea bed beyond the continental 
shelves now was called the area, as a common heritage of mankind (CHM) now to be regulated by The 
Authority under the UN, while this sea bed earlier had been seen as open to commercial pursuit by any actor. 
The CHM aspect of the 1982 treaty has been seen as too radical by the US ever since 1982. 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, the multilateral UN framework had opened up the gate to increased state 
sovereignty over the oceans through unilateral moves. By and large, the outcome through the EEZ 
principle was not incompatible with the international liberalism of the US, while it was also a 
satisfying concession to third world coastal states. However, the major reason for the rapid 
development towards acceptance for the EEZ must be found elsewhere than in the preferences of the 
hegemon. Regional fishery commissions under the existing international law of the sea had proven 
to be utterly unsatisfactory as regards efficient tackling of the problems of over-fishing. Coupled 
with the growing over-capacity of the world's trawler fleets and the cumbersome process of reaching 
anything resembling agreement on UNCLOS III, therefore, the principle that the coastal state itself 
should regulate the extraction of marine resources off its coast gained increased legitimacy in the 
international system. Inherent in this development was a de facto suppressing of the CHM idea. The 
notion that LL/GDS states could negotiate for quotas from the EEZs of coastal states has yet to 
materialize at the time of writing, some 22 years after the conclusion of UNCLOS III. One of the 
chief inspirators of the CHM idea, Arvid Pardo thus reached the conclusion in 1989 that “The 
Common Heritage regime established for the international seabed is little short of disaster”.1419 The 
ultimate outcome was that states gained very substantial “continental shelves”, often beyond 200 
nautical miles where the depth was not such that it rendered all arguments of "utilization of 
resources" as totally unfeasible. In sum, the seabed areas where it was feasible to extract resources 
                                                 
1418 Illustration from http://2100.org/w_ocw1ill/zones.gif 
1419 Pardo, 1989: 499 
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came under national control, while the much more difficult deep seabed was what remained as the 
“Common Heritage of Mankind”. 1420 
 
Moreover, the eventual treaty was too much to swallow for the US under the Reagan 
Administration. In the final session in 1982, the US demanded that it be voted over the treaty on the 
seabed. Although only four states voted against the convention, the fact that the US was among 
these states did much to weaken the status of the seabed convention. The US simply refused to 
accept conditions inherent in the convention. The very polity that had been so instrumental in setting 
up the UN system in the first place, and which had supported de-colonization against the wishes of 
its own allies, had become alienated from the multilateral process. Indeed, the US soon officially 
declared that it did not intend to sign the 1982 treaty on the Law of the Sea, but that it would follow 
the conventions and articles that did not regard the seabed treaty.1421 The US thus seemed to take a 
more unilateral approach to international maritime institutions. In 1994, the Clinton Administration 
submitted to the U.S. Senate a somewhat revised version of the Treaty. This treaty still failed to 
receive Senate ratification. Therefore, the United States' provisional participation thus expired in 
1998. In addition, several states, such as the UK and Western Germany, did not sign the 1982 
treaties. Nevertheless, 142 states did sign, thus making the long journey towards a legal framework 
for the use of, and conduct at, sea more than a farce. In reality, once the 1982 treaty had been 
created, it became a focal point, a point of reference, in most maritime disputes between states. The 
                                                 
1420 One should note, however, that the legalistic outcome in form of treaties nevertheless constituted a serious 
attempt at establishing an international regime that gave LL/GDS states rights, and which harboured institutions in 
order to regulate the extraction and redistribution of the CHM. Article 69, for example, stated that  
“land-locked States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part 
of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or 
region, taking into account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned and in 
conformity with the provisions of this article and of articles 61 and 62.” GDS were granted rights in much the same 
maner through article 70.  
Furthermore, Part XI of the convention sought to regulate the CHM. It was geographically simply called “The Area” 
(articles 133.135). This Area then was to be regulated by The Authority; (articles 157 and 158): 
“1. There is hereby established the International Sea-Bed Authority, which shall function in accordance with this 
Part.  
2. All States Parties are ipso facto members of the Authority.  
3. Observers at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea who have signed the Final Act and who 
are not referred to in article 305, paragraph 1 (c), (d), (e) or (f), shall have the right to participate in the Authority as 
observers, in accordance with its rules, regulations and procedures.  
4. The seat of the Authority shall be in Jamaica.  
5. The Authority may establish such regional centres or offices as it deems necessary for the exercise of its 
functions.  
 
1421 Nordquist et al, 1985: xxvi, 132.35, Brown, 1994: 13-14, UNCLOS Off Records, A/conf/62/k.142, UN Off Text 
LOS, 1983: 190 
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actual implementation of the treaty nevertheless is a testimony to the painstakingly difficult process 
that international cooperation is. Article 308 of the treaty stated that it would become effective 12 
months after the 60th ratification of the treaty by any states. This number of states was not reached 
until 1993. Until then, states felt free to pick and choose according to their own preferences among 
the principles in the law of the sea.  
 
In sum, then, the dominant political change in extraterritorial sovereignty in the latter part of the 20th 
century was not “globalization” or international institutionalization, but rather increased state 
sovereignty. One might strongly argue that the problem of depleted fish stocks, pollution at sea and 
the questions of the deep sea bed all were truly international issues that made states attempt 
international cooperation. This does not change the above conclusion. In order to deal with these 
problems, states replied with the weapon they knew best; state sovereignty. This was just as much 
the outcome of the preferences of consolidated states as it was the outcome of the creation of new 
states in the wake of decolonization. State leaders in the third world wanted what they perceived as 
the same fruits that western powers had enjoyed for centuries; sovereignty over their own natural 
resources. The result was a degree of formalized extraterritorial sovereignty unparalleled in world 
history. In addition, this outcome was partly a result of the fact that states did not manage to solve 
the tragedy of the commons regarding maritime resources. But at the same time, increasing state 
sovereignty over oceans did little to solve the collective dilemma at a later stage. Migrating fishing 
stocks do not move according to social constructs in the form of boundaries at sea. Nor does 
pollution at sea, or the intricate problems concerning the entire ecosystem of the oceans, easily lend 
itself to national control. On top of this, international terrorism and piracy are phenomena that now 
affect the use of the oceans for transport, and that cannot be addressed satisfactorily through the 
existing framework of the law of the sea (see more in last section of this chapter). One unanticipated 
effect of the convention, for example, is that piracy through the 1982 convention is defined as an 
activity that takes place in international waters (or in the words of article 101 “on the high seas”). In 
other words, similar acts in “national waters” are considered a criminal activity subject to national 
legislation. Since many coastal states in Africa and Asia are not capable of exercising sovereignty 
within their EEZ (or even in their territorial waters), this makes piracy (in the sociological meaning 
of the word) into a huge problem in sea-lanes within the EEZ of weak states (we will return to this 
later in the chapter. The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation sought to address this problem). 
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The UN declared 1998 as the “year of the Sea”, in order to set focus on the pressing issues 
concerning maritime regulations. By this date, the FAO categorized 11 out of the 15 most vital 
fishing areas and 70% of the most significant fish stocks as maximally utilized or over-utilized.1422 
Moreover, the oceans store 1000 times more warmth than the atmosphere, and are the keys to 
regulate the amount of carbon dioxide at earth. A further destabilization of the ocean ecosystem 
might indeed change the world, and political geography, in the long run. Political realism and world-
system analysis hold no clues as to how such problems might be solved.  
Liberal institutionalism envisioned that the only way the problem might be tackled is through 
establishing stronger international regimes. There is little evidence of such a development at present, 
and indeed the mechanisms for change as described in this school of thought do not seem readily 
available. One major reason for this is that the hegemon at the turn of the millennium does not 
provide, and indeed does not have incentives for, such alterations of the international system. 
International liberalism does not seek supranational regulation more than necessary for upholding 
the status quo that is part of hegemony.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1422 State of the world, Norwegian edition ”Verdens tilstand”, 1999: 103-104 
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5.3 After Empire; the UK 1945-2001 
“Don't Worry: Barbados is with you”1423 
During the early 20th century, the British Empire reached its greatest geographical extent as well as 
its greatest power for a short period. After this feat, the history of the Empire in large is a story of 
(rather graceful) decline. A relative decline, that is, militarily as well as politically. The 
decolonization within the empire was strikingly rapid.1424 It left only a handful of dependent 
territories, such as Montserrat, Bermuda, Gibraltar and St. Helena.  
Nevertheless, the imperial heritage was part and parcel of the British national identity, as witnessed 
in British popular culture and habitus.  Paternalist traits die hard among former hegemonic powers. 
Without due reference to the history of Empire, British behavior in diplomacy and war is difficult to 
comprehend, even by the turn of the millennium. The afterglow of Empire is vital in order to 
interpret events such as the Suez crisis, British policies towards the EEC and EU, the 1982 Falklands 
War against Argentina, and the so-called “special relationship” with the US in foreign policy. Let us 
look into the foreign policy development of the UK after the war, and how this and the longer 
history of the empire came to color British policies with emphasis on international maritime issues. 
This development is perhaps the most illuminating in showing how imperialism changed as a 
phenomenon in the 20th century. This also necessitates a very broad approach to what Britain and the 
legacy of empire was in the latter half of the century.  
In addition to the development towards a cold war, the question of imperial transition was the 
overriding concern of British foreign policy in the post-war years. Indeed, the entire notion of 
empire had very little legitimacy on the international arena after WWII. Thus, “Commonwealth”, 
which once begun as being synonymous to empire, became its antithesis. “The British 
Commonwealth of Nations” was the informal alliance between Britain and the old dominions during 
the two world wars. The 1961 “Commonwealth of Nations” was quite another structure, at least 
formally speaking, but also -in a very substantial way- a different organization. By the latter year, 
South Africa had left (for time being), and the original states had been joined by four Asian and two 
African members, plus Cyprus, whereas Eire had left.1425 If we go 36 years further on, it is easy to 
see that the “commonwealth” of 1997 was yet another organization; South Africa and Fiji had 
returned, to mention but few of the changes of members. And yet, it is striking to note that “the 
appellation “Commonwealth”, popularized by Imperial federalists eighty years earlier, now applied 
                                                 
1423 A cable from the West Indies to the British Cabinet on September 3, 1939  
1424 McIntyre, 1998:11-44 discusses the question ”When did the British Empire Fall?” in some depth 
1425 See Lloyd, 1996: 362-378 
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to an international grouping larger than the United Nations in 1945”.1426 Before 1965, the 
Commonwealth can best be described as a club within the empire, in which membership served as a 
badge of independence. Yet, this club was organized and led from Whitehall. After 1965, on the 
other hand, the Commonwealth was much more a multilateral organization. 
This outcome was a result of a series of changes in the relationship between the metropolis and the 
imperial peripheries. In fact, each of the landmarks of imperial dissolution made for crises for the 
Commonwealth. Inherent in these crises was the question of legitimate rule. One response to these 
crises of legitimacy was to idealize the commonwealth as the resolution to the problems of imperium 
and libertas. The only solution possible was one of hugely increased flexibility. The Commonwealth 
to a large degree gave this opportunity. Eire for example, remained an external associate in spite of 
her neutrality during WWII. Needless to say, the conditions for cooperation became somewhat more 
strained after 1945, and the intimacy of this climate did not improve as the Asian Dominions, India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon joined from 1948. And yet, had not India become member, it probably would 
have been the end of the Commonwealth. To other former colonies, India’s abstention from 
Commonwealth membership probably would have had grave consequences. At least, this was how 
Mountbatten and the British Cabinet saw it. In reciprocity, “British” was omitted in front of 
“Commonwealth of Nations” in the 1948 communiqué,1427 and the Monarchy faded into a mere 
symbol of the Commonwealth from 1949 onwards. By the mid 1960s, the popular phrase was 
coined that the “Empire strikes back”. A series of proposals for functional cooperation emerged 
from the former dominions and colonies, and these were suggestions in which British interest was 
not overwhelming. A body of organs was nevertheless created in order to fulfill the aspirations of 
poorer countries to take advantage of their membership. To some degree, this can be interpreted as a 
positive and lasting legacy of the empire. Through a network of territories where state officials 
spoke excellent English, and had been influenced by British administrative modes of thought and 
behavior, an international institution with a life of its own was created. The Commonwealth 
Foundation came into being in 1966, and biennial Commonwealth heads of Government Meetings 
were held around the Commonwealth, replacing the Prime Ministers Meeting held in Downing 
Street. As a matter of fact, when decolonization had taken place in the many Caribbean and Pacific 
islands, the Commonwealth by the end of the 1970s had turned into a small states forum. Needless 
to say, many Britons increasingly asked what was in it for Britain. The Commonwealth, it was 
argued, was built on two hypocrisies. “Equality was the founding doctrine, but Britain still paid the 
biggest bills. Non-racialism and democracy were trumpeted in declarations, but military 
                                                 
1426 Mcintyre, 1999: 693 
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dictatorship, one-party rule, and racial strains were rife”1428 within the Commonwealth countries. 
During the reign of Mrs. Thatcher, the climate reached a low-point, as Britain seldom supported 
Commonwealth communiqués, and the British premier scornfully remarked that “if it is forty-eight 
against one, then I’m sorry for the forty-eight”.  
With the end of the cold war, the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the departure 
of Mrs. Thatcher, it is no exaggeration to say that the Commonwealth went through something of a 
renaissance in Britain. The Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991 was largely a British 
construct, endorsing the values of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, good governance 
and market economy. In British eyes, the end of the cold war meant that the Commonwealth indeed 
could be useful, especially to raise trade and investment on the Asia-Pacific rim. Parallel to this 
development, the body of functional offices and non-governmental organizations loosely coupled to 
the Commonwealth also expanded. In fact, the post-colonial Commonwealth was a special case 
among the international organizations at the end of the millennium. It contained a vast number of 
micro-states, and was rather informal in its workings.  Parallel to this development, a very curious 
phenomenon occurred in British popular culture; the idea and memories of the Commonwealth 
became central to identity, revived as part of the national historical heritage. Thus, Britain 
announced 1997 as the “Year of the Commonwealth”. As the post-cold war world order opened new 
opportunities and the efforts at creating a European political union deepened, Britons increasingly 
took pride in the Commonwealth.  
The fact is that the transition from the British Empire to a Commonwealth as a community of free 
nations had taken place in a remarkably smooth manner. Given the sheer size of the earlier empire, 
and the vast potential for bloody conflicts that decolonization had, Britain could take some 
justifiable pride in the abolition of its empire. Moreover, the imprint of the historical empire on the 
current metropolis as well as its earlier dominions on the whole came to be viewed more favorably 
than was the case only two decades ago. The true significance of this legacy, so visible in popular 
entertainment and leisure, architecture, judicial systems, political and administrative institutions, 
education and language, is its potential of creating an identity as well as mobility. Needless to say, 
the common traits found in the organisation are merged with regional, national and local traditions 
to make up a rich and diverse family of national identities. The fact nevertheless remains that the 
common traits of identity facilitates cooperation among the territories of the Commonwealth.  
                                                                                                                                                             
1427 Mcintyre, 1999: 696 
1428 Mcintyre, 1999: 699 
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Britain kept some of her paternalist traits of her imperial age. This was witnessed in the Suez crisis 
of 1956; the unilateral declaration of Independence in Rhodesia in 1965, and one dare say the 
Falklands War of 1982. The Commonwealth nevertheless was part of this change of the paternalist 
power Britain. The Commonwealth, as a heritage of an empire with this particular characteristic, 
made possible a unique movement of people.1429 Since the educational system had made at least 
rudimentary knowledge of English a commonplace all around the Commonwealth, migration to 
Britain was eased both for the migrants and the British society. The result was that British citizens 
whose families had originated in the “New” Commonwealth alone became a significant minority in 
Britain. In 1991, for example, South Asians in Britain alone numbered 1.5 millions.1430  Especially 
the larger cities thus have become truly multicultural and truly multi-religious societies. To some 
degree, although not easily measurable, this also affects the identity of Britain in foreign policy: the 
perspective of international relations predominant in London remains global to a degree beyond 
what could be expected from objective measures of economy and military power.  
 
But if we look a bit closer at the foreign policy of the UK in the post-war era, it is rather easy to 
point out that this factor has been central throughout the period. Thus, the British ambiguity 
regarding the project of “Europe” and its relations with the other North-European states in a very 
distinct way was marked by the peculiar imperial legacy. It was not so much that Britain wanted to 
cling to her role as a metropolis in a formal empire. To the contrary, Britain saw how the US and the 
USSR agreed to cut down the size and importance of the empire, and accepted it. That the 
aspirations to national independence had been raised in the dominions reinforced this choice; the 
alternative would have been bloody colonial wars that Britain was in no position to bear neither 
financially nor ideologically. By the summer of 1945, moreover, Churchill was voted out of office 
and replaced by a Labour cabinet much more preoccupied with domestic politics. In some respects, 
the departure of this leader symbolized a new age for Britain. While the skepticism of Churchill 
regarding the relationship between Britain and Europe (by which he meant continental Europe) 
persisted among large segments of the populace, the demise of the British paternalist role also made 
the period from 1950 till 1980 problematic in the sense that the UK found itself without a clear role 
in international relations. How much should the UK involve itself in the EEC, how fast should 
                                                 
1429 Indeed, as Lloyd, 1996: 345 notes, the Britons saw their empire as racially very tolerant. And the fact is that it 
perhaps was among one of the racially most tolerant of all western nations in the beginning of the 20th century. 
There were very few barriers to migration, and in the British army of WWII, peoples of different ethnicity fought 
together in many mixed units, in contrast to the US for example. This also can be seen as a positive inheritance from 
the imperial age, although the exceptions and shortcomings of tolerance certainly also are visible in the British case.  
1430 See Brown, 1999: 708 
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decolonization take place, and what ties – if any- should be kept to these former possessions? These 
were questions of outmost importance to policymakers especially prior to the 1960s. The solution to 
the colonial question was speeded up with Macmillan's appointment of Macleod as Secretary of the 
Colonies in 1959. Both men were convinced that the residual decolonization should take place the 
sooner the better.1431  
The question of British entry into the EEC was much more tortuous, and heavily marked by the 
ideology and interests of Britain as an informal leader of the Commonwealth. Indeed, for years 
following WWII, Britain saw the Commonwealth and a good relationship with the US as far, far 
more important than the incremental processes of cooperation on the wrong side of the channel. 
After the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Britain nevertheless argued that Britain and a number of other 
west European states should be brought into the customs unions for industrial products, while 
simultaneously allowing them unrestricted free trade in agricultural products. As the EEC countries 
clearly recognized, this in effect would be a highly advantageous outcome for Britain. If it were to 
materialize, Britain would enjoy a much wider tariff-free market for industrial products than the 
Commonwealth, while it at the same time would enable her to import low-cost agricultural products 
from some of the more successful commonwealth nations. Especially to France, it seemed a bad 
bargain indeed to let Britain in on this market without any British concessions on agricultural 
products. One might claim that this was narrowness on behalf of the French, but the British proposal 
was no less paternalistic. Furthermore, it is also a fact that none of the EEC members to any 
substantial degree felt anything but relief when de Gaulle rejected British membership in 1963. 
Clearly, most politicians within the EEC could easily conjure up images of Britain as a member that 
sought the better of two worlds; membership in the EEC to the degree that it suited British interests, 
while simultaneously taking full advantage of the trade within the Commonwealth. However, the 
options available to Britain became fewer with time. The weakness of the British economy during 
the 1960s, which in reality brought down the Sterling Area, is the chief explanation behind renewed 
British attempts at seeking closer cooperation with the EEC. After the third veto against British 
entry by de Gaulle in 1967, Prime Minister Heath was determined to bring Britain into the EEC 
from 1970.1432 This time, of course, it was the Commonwealth members turn to be concerned. As a 
matter of fact, Commonwealth exporters throughout the 1960s sought to widen and diversify their 
markets in order to be prepared in case British membership in the EEC would harm trade with 
Britain. At this, they were at least partly successful. Canada for example, increased its export to the 
                                                 
1431 See Lloyd, 1996; chapter 13 
1432 Kissinger, 1981 is a testimomy to the fact that Heath even downplayed the special relationship with the US 
compared to the issue of British integration within the EEC framework. 
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US by some 65% from 1958 till 1962.1433 When Britain eventually negotiated with the EEC for 
membership in 1971-72, Britain in fact did not pay much attention to these concerns of 
Commonwealth countries. The result was a British market far less open to Commonwealth export, 
and this affected Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India as well as more peripheral territories. At the 
same time, the tiny territories of the former empire, such as those (formally) British islands in the 
West Indies and in the South Pacific, were actually horrified by the development. While 
decolonization certainly was popular in the 1970s, it is an often-overlooked fact that these territories 
actually sought to remain British as long as they could. In the words of one historian of the Empire, 
Britain “set about making it clear to these tiny countries, as politely as possible, that they ought to 
become independent.”1434 The Overseas Development Ministry, the last true remnant of an imperial 
bureaucracy, was closed down in 1970. The entry into Europe seemed more painful than the 
retirement from Empire.  
The British extraterritorial ambitions, and the development of British extraterritorial means of 
violence, was a complex mix of a proud heritage and adjustments to the new role Britain eventually 
played in international relations. On the one hand, The Royal Navy and the Royal Marines to some 
degree remained the one and only truly national institution in the British society. To a very profound 
degree the Royal Navy continued to be a central part of the Kingdom, both as a symbol as well as a 
mean to further foreign policy goals. However, the tight relationship with the US, less ambitions in 
imperial policies and  friendly, yet not all too intimate relations to other states in Northern Europe, 
did not necessitate a senseless prioritizing of the Royal Navy. It remained a strong navy in European 
terms, and a skilled Navy indeed. But the British economy as well as the changing degree of 
institutionalization of international relations did not make gunboat diplomacy feasible or desirable. 
Since the idea of imperialism had lost legitimacy on the international scene, since Britain could not 
cling to empire, and since the UK became part and parcel of the US-constructed international 
institutional matrix, the paternalist foreign policy of Britain was modified utterly. Only on some rare 
occasions, and in its policies towards Northern Ireland, was the old paternalist visible beyond its 
territorial base.  
While the cold war restricted the level of conflict, there is no denying the fact that serious disputes 
indeed took place between the UK and its neighbors. In a sense, it represented a return to British 
concerns for the Mare Britannicum, those oceans that awoke the first conflicts between England and 
the Dutch republic in the 17th century. The reason was the declining interest in the direct extraction 
                                                 
1433 James, 1994: 595 
1434 Lloyd, 1996: 376 
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of resources from the weaker Commonwealth dominions. Thus, British maritime policies regarding 
ocean resources became much more centered upon the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea. It was 
these waters that were most important to British fishing interests and eventually offshore activities. 
With the evolution of international maritime law and the ultimate competition for ocean resources, 
therefore, this particular area sheds light on the foreign policy dispositions of the old maritime 
paternalist. 
Throughout the first half of the 20th Century, Britain refused to acknowledge the Norwegian and 
Swedish claims to a four-mile territorial sea. The conflict was rather dramatically illuminated 
throughout WWI, as Norway failed to uphold neutrality within the proclaimed 4-mile zone. The 
result was a series of “violations” of the territorial sea by both German and British vessels. The issue 
remained controversial until 1950, since neither Germany nor Britain acknowledged the Norwegian 
claim.1435 It is a sign of some degree of residual British paternalism that the Britons continued to 
neglect Norwegian claims to a 4 mile territorial sea also after 1948, and that this policy led to open 
confrontations between crews from both countries as well as sharp diplomatic protests. 
Nevertheless, Britain was more or less forced through the soft power of the US to play the game 
according to the rules of the new international institutional order. The perceived threat from 
communism reinforced these incentives after 1949. The result was that the policies, as well as the 
military praxis, of Britain were civilized in North European waters during the latter half of the 20th 
century. In short, the most valid generalization is that its paternalism was modified.  
This was evident in the British decision to submit the case to the International Court.1436 The result 
was a verdict in favor of Norway, although the outcome was not as clear-cut and unambiguous a 
victory as Norway had hoped for. Moreover, the result was just as much a negative surprise for the 
British Labour Cabinet. However, it seems pretty clear from British as well as US sources that the 
security community being forged through NATO, with Norway as the only North-European state 
with a common border with the USSR, weighed more heavily for the British than fishing interests, 
and that this analysis was supported by the US administration.1437   
The British acceptance of the Court decision had a huge impact on the law of the sea, as figure 5.3 
illustrates. 
 
                                                 
1435 Fure, 1996: 12, O`Connell, 1982: 200, Fleischer, 1977: 46 
1436 On the decision and on the proceedings and effects of the Court, see International court Journals, 1951: 129-139, 
S.tidende 1948: 2524-25, St.meld nr 87/1952, Giverhold, 1952: 1-15, Fure, 1996. 16, Hallenstvedt et al, 1976: 407, 
O`Connell, 1982: 201-202 
1437 Eriksen et al, 1997: 358-9, Hallenstvedt et al, 1976: 407-410 
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Figure 5.3; baseline for territorial sea after 1951; Northern Norway 
 
 
                      
 
Comments figure 5.31438: In the dispute between the UK and Norway concerning the demarcations of the 
territorial seas along the Norwegian coast, The International Court decided that the territorial sea should be 
measured from a straight baseline following the outer islets in the archipelagoes along the coast. Thus, 
Norway achieved very wide territorial sea. Since later EEZs and midline demarcations on the seabed would 
also be drawn from the baseline, a state with such an archipelago had a remarkable advantage over the 
coastal state without such a topography (for example the UK). 
 
To Britain, it nevertheless also gave results that were impossible to accept without resistance. This 
applied particularly to the situation that arose when Iceland extended its fishery zone. The first cod-
war between Iceland and the UK was a direct result of this. The 12 mile Icelandic fishery 
jurisdiction of 1958 was a challenge not only to British fishing interests off Iceland, but should such 
mare clausum policies gain legitimacy in the North Atlantic, then considerable waters in practice 
would be nationalized. And indeed, the Faraoe Islands did imitate the Icelandic decision the same 
year.1439  The increased Icelandic fishery zone in particular hit the “trawler-towns” of Hull, Grimsby 
and Fleetwood.1440 To the Britons, it appeared that the Icelanders utilized its domestic cleavage for 
all it was worth. The threat of an Icelandic demand that the Keflavik airbase had to be abandoned 
was deemed as a cynical game in London. But again, the fact remains that Britain certainly had to 
                                                 
1438 Illustration taken from http://www.claus-schive.com/grunnlinje.gif 
1439 See Fleischer, 1977; 51, Woodhouse, 1961: 100-101 
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abide by US interests. To the US, the security concerns in the North Atlantic and the wish to uphold 
NATO cohesion, made it overrule too drastic British responses. Neither did British entry into the 
NEAFC mean that the UK increased its influence on the maritime policies of the North Atlantic. 
The time had come when British maritime interests increasingly was coordinated with the US. The 
Cod wars with Iceland did repeat themselves, particularly in 1973, but the US firmly tried to cool 
down the intense quarrels and confrontations that occurred during each and every such dispute (see 
next section for a comment on the 1973 confrontation). Britain nevertheless tried to gain as much as 
it could on questions of maritime resources. In 1963-1964, for example, Britain sought to coordinate 
the regulation of fishing in the North Sea with its members, apparently in the hope that it could 
present the EEC with the architecture of a common fishing policy. In fact, Britain managed to get a 
long way towards this aspiration, willing as it was to grant the Faraoee Islands, Greenland and 
Iceland special rights. Norway was utterly dissatisfied with its outcome of the proposals, and 
protested the entire negotiation as this became obvious. Iceland, Greenland and the Faraoe Islands 
also eventually withdrew; all the Atlantic peripheries in fact being utterly frustrated by the British 
conduct at the conference.1441 Thus, the residual element of British paternalism made itself felt 
within the limits permitted by the security community under US supervision. Nevertheless, national 
interests were harmonized with the international institutional environment also in Britain. The 
British cabinet, for example, vetoed its own agricultural and fisheries department's proposal to use 
the import taxes on frozen fish to stop the Norwegian 12-mile zone. To a large degree, the cabinet 
refused to use such pressure because it knew that domestic pressure would then make Norway leave 
the EFTA. 
The next question concerning sovereignty in the old Mare Britannicum was the question of the 
delimitations of the continental shelves in the North Sea. According to the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, article 6 “where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or 
more states whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining 
to such states shall be determined by agreement between them”. Furthermore, the same article stated 
that in the case there was no agreement, the boundary should be the median line, “every point of 
which is equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each state is measured” (on Norwegian and Danish tactics on this question, see 
below). Great Britain agreed on such a median line with Denmark and Norway in 1965. Again, 
Britain did follow the rules of the international game. By agreeing to follow the 1958 convention, 
Britain also was conscious that Norway with its very peculiar baseline, providing it with a territorial 
                                                                                                                                                             
1440 Davis, 1963 
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sea far from the habitated coast, was granted a very ample coastal shelf. At the time of negotiation, 
British diplomats did not seem to invest too much energy in the issue. There were no interest groups 
that pressured the British government on the topic in 1964-65. The fact is that also Denmark, and 
partly Norway, did not appear to be too anxious about the ultimate outcome; the seabed was not 
deemed to be of substantial economic value (see below on the Nordic countries for a qualification of 
this verdict in the case of Norway). The result was that Norway achieved an absolute gain. Five 
years later, as abundant oil and gas were discovered on the seabed in this ocean, the matter had 
already been settled in advance; to much despair to politicians in Britain and Denmark. 
This process, and the fact that the Atlantic peripheries all sought to expand their sovereignty at sea 
during the 1970s, made also Britain join the club of countries that unilaterally declared a 200 mile 
EEZ in 1977. With this, the maritime demarcation in the North Sea was largely settled. For Britain, 
all that remained were bilateral negotiations with Ireland, the Netherlands and France on the precise 
delimitations in the Irish Sea, the Channel and the southern parts of the North Sea. All these issues 
were solved.  
In sum, then, at the political level Britain followed the rules of the game as prescribed in the 
evolving law of the sea, a framework carved out under the US-inspired UN institutional matrix. The 
paternalism of Britain in foreign policy was heavily subdued, partly out of domestic priorities, but 
also partly because the international order was changed. Indeed, the domestic discourse itself was 
intimately linked to international norms. Gone were the times when Britain through sea power could 
pressure weaker states into submission to demands from Her Majesty's Government. Britain did try 
to apply pressure, as in the cod wars, but such pressure lacked international legitimacy. More than 
anyone else, the US played a dominant role in checking British pretensions in Northern Europe, by 
applying the soft power of the hegemon, but also through formalized channels in the Atlantic 
security community, chiefly NATO. “The special relationship” to the US made Britain accepts its 
limited political role, but this special relationship was also a reflection of necessity. Utterly 
weakened on the international arena, Britain did not have the military or economic power to reverse 
the forces of time. But most important of all, in the Atlantic community after WWII, such uses of 
power would not have been productive. Whatever authority Britain was to exercise in Northern 
Europe in the postwar era had to follow from other sources than economic and military power. Thus, 
British foreign policy is also an indicator of the changes in the international system after the two 
world wars.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
1441 See The Parliamentary Records of Norway, S.Tid 1963-64: 2419-20, 2593 
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On the question of the praxis and organization of extraterritorial violence, the reduced political 
significance of the British Empire, the Commonwealth and Britain itself, also made for a relative 
reduction of the use and the size of the Royal Navy. Nevertheless, it is a testimony to the lasting 
habitus of Britain and her rich naval traditions that the Royal navy continued to be a truly national 
institution in which large sections of the British populace and political establishment took great 
pride. The most spectacular exposure of British extraterritorial violence in the postwar era so far has 
been the Falklands War of 1982, fought out over one of the most barren relics of Empire. It was the 
largest naval campaign of the 1980s, Britain alone deploying a task force of some 51 ships 8000 
miles from the motherland to reclaim Las Malvinas, of which most Britons had never heard of. 
Nevertheless, this most dramatic of British post-war extraterritorial expeditions was a testimony to 
the gradual diminution of the once global instrument of power into what had become chiefly an anti-
submarine force in the NATO naval forces. For what should the Royal Navy be if not a supporter of 
the US navy? British naval enthusiasts increasingly found it difficult to defend notions of a stronger 
Royal Navy. Thus, the last true carrier had been scrapped in 1979, and the biggest ships of the 
Falklands Task force thus were the anti-submarine carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible. It is a 
telling contrast to the US navy that these two ships together could carry less than 25 Sea harrier 
fighter-bombers. This was a mere quarter of the number of aircraft carried by ONE single US carrier 
of the Nimitz and Enterprise classes! And at the time the Falklands campaign was fought, the USA 
had 6 Nimitz carriers operational.  
Material factors notwithstanding, the political and military determination to fight the war lacked 
nothing in strength compared to that found in naval expeditions of an earlier time. This was coupled 
with the realities of a highly modern technological modus of operations, however. HMS Conqueror 
became the first nuclear submarine ever to sink a surface ship on May 2 1982, when the Argentine 
cruiser General Belgrano was torpedoed with heavy loss of life. It only took two days to remind the 
Britons that modern naval vessels are vulnerable platforms, their high sophistication in electronics 
and weaponry notwithstanding. Argentine air attacks ensured that two frigates, two destroyers, a 
supply ship and one amphibious ship were sunk before the Falklands had been recaptured, while still 
more ships were damaged.  
 
The Falklands war also demonstrated that a change in the praxis of naval warfare was taking place. 
In earlier exchanges of violence at sea, survival to a very large degree had depended upon gunners 
and fire directors, on the capabilities of the men in the engine rooms to maintain or increase speed, 
and on the seamanship and tactical cleverness of the captain.  
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In the computer age, comparable skills were still important, but another factor in actual combat was 
just as vital: the ability of a few technicians to get hold of, organize and present information massing 
in front of them on lighted screens. With the threat of jet aircraft and missiles, the time factor had 
become more important than ever before in naval combat. The time available from an observation of 
the enemy, own estimation of the observation, evaluating and ordering own conduct and to 
execution had been drastically reduced. While the 19th century naval officers had very few means of 
observation, the late 20th century naval vessel is crammed with sophisticated sensors for detecting 
platforms and weapons in the air, at the surface and submerged in the ocean mass itself. While naval 
gunfire was notoriously inaccurate in the Anglo-Saxon countries right up till the end of WWI 
(Germany during the war was a notable exception), today's vessels fire missiles that hardly can miss 
the target unless by malfunction or by very advanced countermeasures. The spiral of weapons and 
sensors and the corresponding counter-measures against them has reached a level of sophistication 
that made even Great Britain, arguably the proudest naval nation in the world, lag behind the US.  
The curious fact arose for Britain, as for almost all the other states covered in this thesis, that the 
“new world order” seemed to demand an increase in the human and material investment to produce 
effective means for extraterritorial power. Throughout the 1990s and the first years of the new 
millennium, this was a striking characteristic of British security policy. Almost wherever western 
states intervened by military means in this period, the Britons were part of the coalition; in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Britain also carried out a unilateral intervention in Sierra Leone in 
May 2000 under a UN mandate but with more far-ranging goals than prescribed by the world 
organization.  
While Britain did take part in the project of European integration, it nevertheless held on to its 
"special relationship" with the US, spectacularly demonstrated in the attack and occupation of Iraq 
in 2003.  
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5.4 Enjoying and Criticizing Pax America? The Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands, 1945-2001 
If we were to sum up the foreign policies of the Nordic countries in the post-war era in a few 
sentences, one of them should be that the Nordic countries all tried to shield themselves from what 
they deemed too close cooperation with the US, while they simultaneously enjoyed as many benefits 
of the Pax Americana as was possible. For the three Nordic countries facing the Atlantic (Denmark 
through her Atlantic possessions), this meant efforts at keeping as close military and economic ties 
to the US as the international balance of power and the national tradition allowed. In particular, this 
policy of integration applied to military matters. At the time of writing, Iceland and Norway still go 
to extremes in order to keep US bases and installations intact on their territories, while Denmark is 
one of the most eager among the West European states in its support for the US. For Finland, the 
overriding concern was shielding from Soviet pressure, for Sweden, a continued policy of neutrality, 
while this also led to top-secret cooperation in military intelligence with the US. And yet, the 
political history of these countries also show that their political trajectories, their dominant self-
images and the populist sentiments ensured that they sought to construct a portrait of their relations 
with the US with an illusion of full national autonomy. What Immanuel Wallerstein with some 
justification dubbed the “revolution of 1968”, the student protests and the peace movement that 
gained momentum across the western world, added to the peace-loving sentiment in these countries 
in peculiar ways. The traditional legalist approach towards international relations that had existed 
long in these territories eventually came to merge with a normative condemnation of power politics 
in general, and of the US in particular. Therefore, Iceland continued to be a NATO member without 
its own armed forces (all the Icelanders could offer to the alliance was their territory), while 
Denmark and Norway often insisted on adding footnotes to NATO communiqués. Increasingly, 
however, a difference between Iceland and Norway on the one hand, and Denmark on the other 
hand, also became evident. While Denmark joined the EEC in 1973, the other Nordic NATO 
countries have yet to enter the organization at the time of writing. Naturally, it is not erroneous to 
point to the maritime interest groups that worked against EEC and later EU membership. In Norway, 
agrarian interests worked in tandem with coastal fisheries in this respect. Protecting such sectors 
against competition, and yet securing the access to markets in Europe, was perceived as a necessity, 
and the majority of the populaces in Iceland and Norway came to the conclusion that their interests 
were better served outside rather than inside of the EU. And at the same time, it was also a question 
of identity. While granting NATO a huge say in their security policy, giving the EEC and later the 
EU some supranational authority as regards natural resources was much more difficult to the mare 
clausum states of the North Atlantic.  
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Once the barriers of the cold war had been removed, Sweden and Finland entered the EU and 
became energetic members with an approach to the union fitting the protestant work ethic 
sometimes ascribed to the Nordic bureaucracies.  
The second truism concerning the geopolitical status of the Nordic countries during the cold war is 
that the sovereignty-seeking periphery and bandwagoning small states were among the territories of 
the world which benefited the most from the changes of the institutions on the international arena. 
As we have stated earlier in the chapter, it was the tandem development of internationalising the 
issues and the solution of increasing the sovereignty of the coastal states that made the outcome so 
beneficial for Northern Europe. This combination of principles made states like Iceland and Norway 
ideally suited to take advantage of the international institutions to further their national interests. 
This was a novel political praxis, also in this part of the world. Henry Kissinger mused about this 
development after his 1973 visit to Iceland, when an Icelandic-British cod-war seemed a real 
danger: 
 
“Here was an island with a population of 200.000 threatening to go to war with a world power of 
50 million over codfish…Nixon and Rogers made soothing noises while the Icelandic ministers 
implacably insisted on what in any previous period would have seemed suicide…the tiny country 
threatening to make war against a nation 250 times its size and to leave NATO (without which it 
would be defenseless) – said volumes about the contemporary world”1442 
 
In many respects the interstate relationships among polities with interests in the North Atlantic and 
the North Sea is a demonstration of changes of international institutionalisation. The UN Charter 
and the UN itself was a novel factor in world politics that appeared as useful for small states if they 
could simultaneously offer the hegemon a return in the bargain. The US as the leader of the western 
world, however much this leadership has been contested, could not openly embarrass itself by 
violating central principles of the world organisations it had been so instrumental in creating. Thus, 
small states often appealed to international law and the UN as an embodiment of this legalism. 
Needless to say, the presence of the USSR did little to restrict such expressions of justice. Neither 
did it encourage the North European states to break with the USA, with the understandable 
exception of Finland – a state that never had the chance to establish close ties to the US however 
much the population would have appreciated it. It was one thing for Denmark, Iceland and Norway 
                                                 
1442 Kissinger, 1982; 172-173 
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to impose restrictions on their integration in NATO, but at the practical level, the transatlantic 
relationship was seen as particularly important in these countries.  
The third truism is evident in a comparative perspective; the internal stability and relative lack of 
immediate external threats to the vitality of the Nordic countries in this period made them all enjoy 
favorable conditions for security, economic growth and democratization. For our purposes, it is 
enough to notice the following facts. Neither of the Nordic countries experienced domestic terrorism 
or major political upheavals in this period. Their political systems were firmly established, their 
legitimacy in the population high, and the political consensus has struck observers from other parts 
of the world as rather extraordinary. Correspondingly, their minor role in the international system 
did not make them involved in foreign military expeditions beyond UN peacekeeping operations in 
this period. Indeed, their minor international roles and their protection under the pax America 
enabled them to stand on the sideline to evaluate by abstract moral criteria the policies of stronger 
nations. Neither did they have an imperial legacy that made the transition of decolonization in the 
international system problematic. While Sweden's history of empire had become distant history, 
Denmark was the only Nordic country with imperial possessions in a formal sense at the beginning 
of the 20th century. By 1950, even the status of the North Atlantic islands largely had been settled. 
Linguistically and culturally, the Nordic countries with some exceptions (the Swedish-speaking 
population of Finland, the Finns or the Sámi population in Northern Norway, Sweden and Finland) 
were remarkably homogenous. Nation-building as well as state building in these polities had, by 
these criteria, been “successful”, as demonstrated also by the late Stein Rokkan. The situation was 
more complicated from the outset for the Netherlands. This polity also carried its imperial past into 
the post-war era, making the Netherlands an interesting case of comparison. Thus, the Netherlands 
will be addressed towards the end of this section. Added to the largely common domestic traits of 
the Nordic countries, the world order from 1945 was kind to the Nordic countries. In foreign policy, 
this means that the principles and praxis of the Nordic countries should be seen as and treated as 
highly interconnected. Few aspects of world politics demonstrate this more clearly than the issues 
concerning maritime sovereignty. 
As already mentioned, the first battle was fought over the criteria for demarcation of, the territorial 
sea. Here, Sweden and Norway both had declared a four mile territorial sea. The issue was largely 
settled by the decision in the International court, as demonstrated in the previous sections of this 
chapter. What should be noticed as a demonstration of the mare clausum preference was the fact that 
the issue awoke strong passions in Norway. It is remarkable, for example, that Norwegian 
politicians - with their intimate ties to Britain - in 1948 threatened with the use of brute force against 
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British vessels if they did not respect the 4-mile limit.1443 The Court decision that the Norwegian 
policy did not violate international law, immediately led to an extension of the Norwegian fishery 
limit. Iceland followed suit in 1952, and increasingly came to see the Court decision as an 
affirmation of the rights of small coastal states heavily dependent upon maritime resources. This was 
not an entirely unreasonable interpretation, since the peculiar structure of the North Norwegian 
society explicitly was used in the verdict from the International Court. Hence, the development of 
the legal framework only reinforced the mare clausum instincts of the politicians of the smaller mare 
clausum states. The institutionalisation of international relations occurred in tandem with the 
increased scope of sovereignty for coastal states. Great Britain fought against this increase in coastal 
state maritime sovereignty, and after the verdict in the International Court, Iceland was the single 
Nordic state to bear the brunt of British resistance from 1952. The Icelandic announcements in 1956 
and -57 that the Icelandic government was considering further extensions of their fishery zone 
aroused further disbelief in Britain. It were tensions like these that were among the problems 
addressed at the UNCLOS I conference (section above), but which were not “solved” once and for 
all through the 1958 conventions. But all the Nordic countries supported the main impetus of 
extending the fishery zone. None of these states had anything to lose from such a development, as 
long as increases in fishery zones did not infringe on the freedom of the seas in a way that mattered 
to the merchant navies. The latter mattered most to Norway, but even Finland, Sweden and Denmark 
were very dependent upon sea-borne transportation.  
Iceland unilaterally declared a 12-mile national fishery jurisdiction immediately after UNCLOS I; 
and entered the first cod war of the modern era with Britain (see above). That the Faraoe Islands 
imitated Iceland was seen as a testimony to the fact that once the ball had started rolling, it would 
create a momentum that would make it hard to stop. As we have seen, UNCLOS II and the attempt 
to solve the debacle through a regional commission, the NEAFC, did nothing to sort out the 
problems of disputes over national jurisdiction in this region, although all the states with fishing 
interests in the North-East Atlantic signed the convention. This fact is a testimony to the degree of 
intricacy inherent in fishery policy in this region. No bilateral or multilateral agreements over these 
resources were easily settled even among otherwise close allies in this period.1444 Even Norway and 
Sweden, two countries interdependent of each other to an unprecedented degree after WWII, clashed 
furiously over fishing rights in the Skagerrak. No doubt parts of the heated rhetoric of politicians 
and bureaucrats were attempts to signal determination against becoming the “chicken” in the 
negotiation game, but the presence of strong pressure groups in the fishery sector was an especially 
                                                 
1443 S.tid, 1948: 1260.  
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distinct trait of Iceland, Norway and partly also Denmark. The two former states have yet to enter 
the EU, not to an inconsiderable degree a result of the fishery questions.1445  
The contrast to seabed politics is striking during the 1950s and 1960s.1446 The Nordic countries 
were, without exception, convinced that there was no surplus of significance to extract from their 
continental shelves. In retrospect, this seems remarkable, considering the enormous continental shelf 
countries like Iceland and Norway could gain via increased national jurisdiction over the seabed. At 
UNCLOS I, for example, the Norwegian delegation on the conference did not vote on the proposals 
for a Convention for the continental shelf. This abstention was based on a later notoriously famous 
telegramme from the Geological Institute of Norway that read “one can exclude the possibility that 
any quantities of coal, oil…on the continental shelf along the Norwegian coast”.1447 Only lack of 
information and the absence of strong pressure groups in the oil sector can explain this state 
behavior (in addition, the Norwegian merchant marine interests were anxious that the continental 
shelf convention entail consequences for the free passage of merchant ships).  
The most spectacular result of this would be the agreement on the median lines in the North Sea 
between Britain, Denmark and Norway. I believe it is fair to say that in neither Britain nor the 
Nordic countries – perhaps with the exception of Norway - was there much interest in the matter at 
all. However, it was an incremental process within the Norwegian bureaucracy that led Norway to 
declare the sole and sovereign rights of the resources on its continental shelf, despite the 1958 
resistance against the same convention that now was used, despite the fact that no one knew if any 
resources would be found on this shelf whatsoever, and despite the fact that the precise demarcation 
of this shelf had not been carried out. The growing attention soon spread from the bureaucracy, as a 
number of oil companies started to show interest for search for oil on the shelf from 1962 (one 
prominent Norwegian politician later admitted that he thought the representatives from the US oil 
companies had showed up at the wrong office).1448 The first discovery of an oilfield off Groningen 
on the Dutch continental shelf increased the interest to settle matters quickly (clearly, this would be 
more convenient before rather than after a potential breakthrough in the search for oil). In this 
context, all the states in Northern Europe were suddenly interested in claiming sovereign rights to 
                                                                                                                                                             
1444 I have demonstrated this elsewhere, Stensli, 1999 
1445 See Silset, 1997.  
1446 I intend to devote some space to the seabed question in Northern Europe. The reasons are straightforward. 
Firstly, the process and outcome on these questions exemplify both the increase in state sovereignty as well as the 
changing nature of relations between states in this part of the world. Secondly, it is a case that in a remarkable 
manner evidences the fact that extraterritorial policies would have dramatic consequences for the states and societies 
concerned. 
1447 Quoted in Willoch, 1998, hanisch, 1992: 470. See also UN Off rec VI 1958:4, Stmeld 42/59:39 
1448 See Eriksen et al 1997: 370, Hanisch et al, 1992: 43, and Stmeld 22/1965-66 
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their continental shelf, but the precise limits to these sea beds had to be demarcated. When several 
states border the same sea, as in the case of the North Sea, such a demarcation easily becomes a 
delicate issue. On the other hand, the North Sea was not particularly tricky compared to other 
oceans. It was not a closed sea, as the Baltic Sea, and in contrast to the case of the Barents Sea, all 
concerned states agreed to the median principle. The main problem was what to base the median on. 
It could be based on the distance from the territory of the three countries, of course, but what 
territory?  Was it the mainland, islands, islets, or was it the territorial sea? In reality, the issue was 
partly settled the moment when the concerned states agreed to the median principle. At the very 
least, this was the standpoint of the Norwegian government, since the 1958 conventions clearly 
stated that the median line should be drawn on the basis of the territorial seas. In other words, 
Norway, through its “victory” in the International Court some ten years earlier, would then have a 
tremendous advantage over Britain and Denmark. With its fjords and archipelagoes, Norway had 
been granted a vast portion of coastal waters as a territorial sea, and compared to states without such 
archipelagoes (i.e. Denmark and Britain), would base its distance between the median line and the 
territorial boundary that was actually far out to sea from the major coastal cities and communities.  
In order to "nationalize" as vast a continental shelf as possible through gaining support for the 
median principle, Norway tried to reach agreement with the Danish cabinet first. The Danish 
government had signed the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf on its genesis, and seemed a 
more convenient partner for the Norwegians to start negotiating with than the British.1449 But 
interdependence is a double-edged sword. By 1963 Denmark refused to enter a bilateral agreement 
with Norway. The Danish perspective was a product of greater complexity than the Norwegian. The 
Danish Foreign Service argued that an agreement between the two Scandinavian countries would 
have neither legal nor de facto legitimacy. As the Danes pointed out, neither West Germany nor 
Britain had ratified the 1958 convention. The position of the former was particularly worrisome for 
the Danish cabinet, since the Germans refused to acknowledge the median line principle at all.  
Surprisingly enough, the Britons ended the period of waiting and diplomatic probing through a Aide 
memoir to Norway from Her Majesty’s Government dated February 14th 1964, in which the median 
line principle based on the 1958 convention was accepted (this meant that the median line would be 
measured from the islets furthest out in the sea of each state, to put it simple). Through this move, 
complexity was utterly reduced. As Norway, Denmark and Britain accepted the median line as the 
main principle for the demarcation of the sea bed in the North Sea, West Germany faced a fait 
                                                 
1449 Hanisch et al, 1992: 44. This is the most authoritative account I have come across on these negotiations. 
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accompli. It was obvious that also London was in a hurry to straighten out the legal process in order 
to avoid conflicts between offshore activities by all concerned states.1450  
What from the contemporary perspective then seemed almost a trivial procedure nevertheless would 
develop into a national trauma for the Danes. The negotiations between Denmark and Norway lasted 
from September 1964 till December 1965. In the aftermath of this agreement, the Danish secretary 
of energy and oil stated that “the gravest error in the history of Danish offshore activity was 
committed in the negotiations on the demarcation of the North Sea with Norway”1451 One might 
speculate on the conduct of the Danish negotiators. But the fact is that Norway through these 
negotiations achieved the sovereign rights to oil fields of outmost importance. When the British also 
made an agreement with Norway, the search for oil could start in earnest. One can only imagine how 
difficult it would have been to achieve an agreement had the locations of the oil fields been known 
in advance. In retrospect, it is apparent that the Norwegian government and society had been 
extremely lucky. It is true that some major officials in the Norwegian government played the 
negotiation game well, but it is equally true that none of the parties knew what resources actually 
were to be found on the bed of the North Sea. The Norwegian government also hastened to strike a 
deal with Sweden in July 1968, but this deal is an illustration of the point; it has practically yielded 
nothing in economic terms for neither of the states. Thus, in retrospect the Swedish-Norwegian 
boundary-setting of the seabed seems trivial, an act of bureaucratic wrestling, but nothing more. The 
British-Norwegian-Danish negotiations could easily have turned sour. The median-line principle had 
not become settled as a state praxis. A few years later, West Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands found themselves in a deadlocked position, and decided to bring the issue of their 
continental shelf demarcation to the International Court. The verdict of the Court was that the 
median line principle not necessarily should be put to use, sine West Germany had not ratified the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.1452 The same argument could plausibly have been 
utilized against Norway, a country that had NOT ratified the same convention when it reached its 
agreements with Denmark and Britain. Given the change in the direction of the institutionalisation 
                                                 
1450 See Eriksen et al, 1997: 370, Furre, 1992: 366, Hanisch et al, 1992: 46, Oda, 1976: 387, UN Treaty Series vol 
551: 214 
1451 Cited in Hanisch et al, 1992: 47. Adding to the Danish anguish was the all too obvious fact that the Danish 
cabinet had not done its outmost. In the words of Danish historian Tage kaarstad: “during the course of negotiations, 
the Ekofisk field drifted into Norwegian hands. Hækkerup was not operational, and Krag was not oriented of the 
situation. Ekofisk would prove to be of outmost importance” (ibid: 47, 50). 
Fact is that the Ekofisk field ended by the narrowest of margins on the Norwegian side of the median line. This field 
became the start of the Norwegian oil adventure. The conduct of the Danish secretary of state was seen as a disgrace 
by Danish commentators in retrospect.  
1452 Andrsen, 1987: 118-119, Stprp nr 112/1970-71 
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of international relations in the western world, Britain and Denmark could do nothing to change the 
agreements they had made without jeopardizing their international and regional legitimacy.  
 
Although depletion of fish stocks darkened the prospects for the fishing sectors of all north 
European states and North America during the 1970s and 1980s, the proceedings to create a new 
framework for the law of the Sea through the UNCLOS III negotiations was yet another milestone 
on the way towards increased sovereignty for the smaller coastal states. In fact, the smaller coastal 
states of Northern Europe, eager as always to widen the scope of their sovereignty and the status of 
their sovereign rights, increasingly declared their interest in the demands of the poorer third world 
countries. From this tactics, Iceland and Norway had little to lose and much to gain. The concessions 
given to the G 77 groups for example, were costless to the North European states. Conversely, it was 
of outmost importance to gain the support of the G 77 countries in order to secure increased coastal 
state jurisdiction. Still, their policies were adjusted to the realities of the Cold war and the Atlantic 
security community. Much the same can be said of Denmark, Greenland and the Faraoee islands. 
The former at this stage of history was reduced to a peripheral maritime power, but the political ties 
to the North Atlantic communities made Denmark a central actor on issues of maritime boundaries 
in northern waters. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see the development towards the EEZ principle as a 
victory for the scope of Danish sovereignty; it did not fare well in the median-line negotiations with 
Norway, and the population of Greenland and the Faraoe Islands received the most from the 
exclusive economic zone.  
Sweden and Finland were much more reluctant. Finland had to adjust carefully according to the 
Soviet interests, while Sweden as a neutral, relatively small industrial country did not stand in the 
front line on these issues. Nevertheless, the low-profile Swedish policies on these questions were 
also reflections of the regional security complex, and thus, Sweden was not distant from the 
questions or absent from the debate. It was just that it did not play a role on the global scene on these 
matters at all, and that it hardly was a dominant regional player either. Surprisingly, then, the mare 
clausum nations Iceland and Norway, and to some extent even the Faraoee Islands and Greenland,  
played the most active roles of the Nordic countries when it came to the political and legal 
framework for international maritime resources. The tables certainly had been turned, when one 
compares the 1970s with the regional balance some five or ten decades earlier. This alteration of 
influence was a result of the changing degree and character of institutionalization of international 
relations. The Pax America in the western world was extremely beneficial for small, western states 
that cooperated with the predominant power within the institutional matrix at the internatonal level. 
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It was not only that small states increasingly had gained formal sovereignty and independence that 
was remarkable, but the degree to which these polities were taken seriously as members of the 
international community. Could this have been possible with another international order than that 
following WWII? This remains a counter-factual question, but there is certainly little doubt that the 
American hegemony after the war was a liberal world order, and this benefited the smaller western 
states, however much criticism various groups in the same countries could raise against US 
“imperialism”.  
By and large, the policies of the North European small states on these matters were a curious mix of 
small-state realism and idealism, since this was the best mix in order to widen the scope of their 
extraterritorial sovereignty. As one prominent member of the Norwegian parliament once expressed 
it:“For a small country such as Norway, behavior in strict accordance with international law is a 
necessity. This is not a question of doctrinarianism or national legalism. I rather see it as the cold 
facts of realpolitik”1453 
Thus, there seemed to be no contradiction in warmly supporting the idea of the CHM and 
simultaneously doing the outmost that diplomacy allowed in order maximizing the size of the 
continental shelf of one's own state. Iceland bore the brunt of international criticism for unilateral 
actions, but the fact that the coastal states of Latin America, and mainly independent states in Africa 
and the Pacific island states all wanted to increase the geographical scope of their national 
jurisdictions, and given the institutional workings of the UN and the UNCLOS conferences, the 
incremental struggle for increased national sovereignty eventually succeeded. When general de facto 
consensus on the 200-mile EEZ was reached in 1976, the implementation of the principle was 
relatively easy for the North European states, also in regards to the EEC member states, however 
time-consuming the negotiations on the exact demarcations and fishing rights within the zones 
were.1454 The Nordic “zone of peace” ensured that these processes in a comparative perspective can 
only be characterized as smooth (with the major exception of the negotiations with the USSR). Most 
EEC members with significant coasts also introduced EEZs, Sweden, Finland and Norway reached 
agreements on demarcations and mutual rights in almost no time in December 1976. The Faraoee 
Islands, the EEC states and the Soviet Union all demanded agreements of reciprocity. The system of 
reciprocal quotas in the EEZs of each coastal state soon became an international bargain, carried out 
through bi- or tri-lateral negotiations. For many of the developing countries, however, the conduct of 
the Nordic countries was easy to see through. As John Logue once remarked; “if the CHF-Proposal 
                                                 
1453 Tor Oftedal, Labour Party, S.tid 1973-74: 3423 
1454 Tamnes, 1997: 289 
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is endorsed by the 77, the developed nations will probably go along with the proposal even though 
some, i.e. Norway, may be quite reluctant”.1455 Such was the game played; each nation utilized 
whatever coalitions were possible during the conferences in order to further own national interests. 
In this, the Nordic countries were remarkably successful. Only in the Barents Sea was the question 
of extraterritorial demarcation left unresolved, to the dismay of the Norwegian government. It has 
remained an issue of friction between Oslo and Moscow since the first high-level bilateral talks on 
the matter in 1974. 30 years later, the solution seems as distant as ever. There exists a large body of 
scholarship1456 on the demarcation of the Barents Sea, so much that only a rudimentary assessment 
will be given here. This is worthwhile since the issue had some strategic relevance. The wish to 
compete with the US was made more difficult for the USSR after the opening to China, but the 
Soviet Union certainly responded to the forward deployment strategy of the US from the 1950s on. 
The USSR North Fleet had its base on the Kola Peninsula, south in the Barents Sea. The strategic 
submarines (SSBN) of the USSR used this base, and there is no doubt that the US Navy used its 
submarines and surveillance systems eagerly in these waters to monitor the development of and 
operational use of Soviet SSBNs. 
Both states agreed that the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf should apply, but the two 
parties could not agree to the principle of demarcation. In short, this has remained the situation ever 
since; the Norwegian Government argued that the median line principle applied, the Russians that 
the sector principle had a longstanding history in these regions. From the introduction of the EEZ, 
however, the issue was further complicated, since the two states also had to agree on a boundary 
separating the ocean masses. Moreover, while none of the states had immediate plans to begin the 
search for resources on the seabed of the extremely harsh Barents Sea, both realized that an 
agreement on the precise borders of the EEZs was vital in order to control fishing in the area.1457 By 
the mid-1970s, fishing stocks in much of the Atlantic were depleted, and the interest in the Barents 
Sea was tremendous also in this respect. The disputed area (between the median line and the sector 
line) was no less than 60700 square kilometers. The 1977 negotiations stalemated. The parties 
agreed to a temporary agreement for the practical division of zones of national jurisdiction and 
sovereign rights. A so-called grey zone was established. This solution created a zone of shared 
responsibility where 23000 out of the 60700 square kilometers undisputedly were on the western 
                                                 
1455 Logue, 1980: 24 
1456 For primary sources: Stmeld 93/1982-83: 6-7, Stmeld 57/1978-79, NOU 1978. For assessments and secondary 
sources: Frydenlund, 1982, Tamnes, 1997, Østreng, 1990,  Sonders et al, 1989, Sjaastad et al, 1975. The 1977-78 
negotiations became something of a trauma for the Norwegian national psyche, partly due to the outcome and partly 
due to the later investigation and verdict of a central Norwegian official for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. 
1457 Interestingly, at the time of writing,  concrete plans for seabed drilling in the area are now materializing. 
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side of the sector line, only 3000 square kilometers on the eastern side of the median line.1458 Drawn 
up on a map of the Barents Sea, the visual impression was one of a Norwegian loss and a Soviet 
victory. Needless to say, it sparked an intense debate in Norway, although many social democrats, 
the largest unions and a not insignificant part of the fishing sector supported the temporary solution. 
The agreement was meant to expire after one year, but has been prolonged each year until the time 
of writing. In practical terms, the solution was not so bad when it came to regulating fishing. The 
codfish largely migrated from the eastern to the western part of the Barents Sea as it matured, so that 
an intensive Soviet fishing in the eastern part of the area could have depleted the resources in a 
matter of years. 
In the long perspective, the dispute between the USSR and Norway marks the limitations of, as well 
as the beginning of the end to the increased scope of sovereignty for smaller coastal states. There 
were limits to sovereignty-maximizing and opportunistic band-wagoning. In a game of “chicken”, 
smaller coastal states that relied heavily on their maritime resources was in no position to challenge 
a non-liberal superpower. Simultaneously, Norway was not eager to encourage direct support from 
the US or other NATO countries on the questions of the northern waters. This in effect could have 
terminated the so-called “Nordic balance”, and deprived Norway of its independent policies 
regarding Northern Norway and the contiguous seas. The latter challenge was primarily built on the 
assumption that if NATO or the US gained a too free position in the region, it would produce 
increased tension in the Barents Sea.  
 
Between themselves, however, the smaller northern states fought many and prolonged battles at the 
negotiating tables. These battles were not peripheral, however. The outcomes decided the extent of 
national jurisdictions over vast oceans rich in resources, an ever more rare quality as fish stocks 
virtually everywhere became depleted. When the EEZ off the coast of the motherland had been 
consolidated, it was time to redirect the focus to the islands. The principle of coastal state 
jurisdiction also applied to islands separated from the mainland. The question was what qualified as 
an island.1459  
One of the first contested cases was over the island of Jan Mayen. Even to Norway, this barren place 
for decades had been marginal, due to the diminishing stocks of seal and herring in the nearby 
waters. With the introduction of the EEZ, the interest was increased manifold. The use and 
                                                 
1458 Stprp nr 70, 77/78: 3 
1459 Even experts on international law agree that the definition of an “island” is vague in the 1982 Law of the Sea. 
See Brown, 1994: 149-157 for a discussion. 
            
 5 An American Empire? The US and liberal International Institutions, 1945-2001
 
 
 
           
 
 
432 
occasional habitation of the island had become so infrequent that Iceland and Greenland/Denmark 
now disputed the right Norway claimed to an EEZ and a continental shelf around the island. The 
problem was that the ocean was not big enough for all states to draw 200 mile-zones around their 
motherlands and their overseas possessions. Jan Mayen was situated between Greenland and 
Iceland, so that none of the three states of Iceland, Denmark and Norway could draw zones around 
these islands without agreeing to median lines –or some other principle of demarcation- of their 
zones in these waters. The question was suddenly dramatized after a surprisingly large catch of fish 
off Jan Mayen in 1978. After this, negotiations became hard, Iceland demanding a full 200-mile 
zone without any restrictions in spite of the proximity such a zone would have to Jan Mayen.1460 The 
views in the Icelandic Allting were such as to negate compromise. Iceland is a small polity, 
whatever measurement one chooses to use. It was typical, as in this negotiation, that a coalition 
cabinet ensured that the parliament itself almost participated in the negotiations with other sovereign 
states. On the other hand, the Norwegian Labour government also clearly understood that Iceland 
would have a good case if the dispute was to be settled in the International Court.1461 The outcome 
was a Norwegian fishery zone around Jan Mayen, granting Norway fewer sovereign rights in the 
ocean masses and practically speaking none on the seabed around Jan Mayen (not by this agreement 
anyhow). As always when the Icelanders were pressured on the vital access to fishing grounds, the 
rhetoric of closing down the US base at Keflavik was the ultimate threat Iceland could issue in an 
indirect manner. The primary sources that are available to us say nothing that can support the claim 
that this weighed heavily on the conduct of the Norwegian cabinet through US pressure, but most 
secondary sources imply-partly based on utterances from secretary of state Frydenlund- that Norway 
wanted to avoid a deeper conflict with Iceland at all costs. However, the Norwegian Nordli cabinet 
naturally also understood that giving up the median line between Jan Mayen and Iceland would 
make it difficult to claim that another principle should be used towards Greenland. An agreement 
was reached in May 1980. An apparent reason for Icelandic cooperation in the final phases of the 
talks was the fact that Denmark announced a 200 mile EEZ off Eastern Greenland to be effective 
from June 1st 1980. The Icelanders achieved their full, unrestricted 200 mile EEZ.1462  
If the question of Jan Mayen was challenging, the case of Svalbard seemed even more complex, and 
involved a very considerable number of actors. The main reason was the fact that Svalbard had 
                                                 
1460 The negotiations between Iceland, Norway and Denmark on behalf of Greenland are covered in Tamnes, 1997: 
305-9, S.tid. 78/79: 2458, 2498, 2503, 2504, 78/79: 409-481, UD-info nr 34 1979: 1-20, nr 28/80: 21, Stprp nr 141, 
1979-80, Frydenlund, 1982: 57-60. 
1461 This was generally accepted in all but the most activist Norwegian fishery-interest groups. See Vårt Land, 
140279, and 180679, Dagbladet 070779, Arbeiderbladet 230779. Many Norwegian commentators saw the dispute as  
disgraceful-how could Norway insist on state sovereignty over such a vast zone so far away from home? 
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raised interest in many countries even before and during the imperial age. Thus, when the 
Norwegian government was given the role of administering Svalbard by the League of Nations, a 
large number of states signed the Svalbard Treaty that established the degree of sovereign 
Norwegian rights on the archipelago. However, the Svalbard Treaty – conceived and written in an 
age where even a 4-mile territorial sea was deemed radical- only applied to the land mass and the 
territorial sea of Svalbard. The exotic thought then was born within Norwegian departmental circles 
that the seas beyond the 4-mile zone could be seen as a Norwegian EEZ and continental shelf. This 
was announced by Norway in 1974, and largely received with silence in the western world.1463 The 
Soviet Union incuriously refused to accept the Norwegian demand. Was this a Norwegian tactic in 
order to have a horse to trade when it came to the demarcation in the Barents Sea? In retrospect, the 
Soviet claim that the continental shelf around Svalbard should be seen as regulated by the Svalbard 
Treaty, does not seem unjustifiable. Historians have later concluded that the US supported Norway 
quite vigorously on the Svalbard question. Seen from Washington, it was paramount that Norway 
continued to be the main exerciser of sovereignty on the archipelago. But the issue of fisheries 
beyond the territorial sea was difficult; the resources in these waters were indisputable. The problem 
from an ecological point of view was that the introduction of EEZs elsewhere had made trawlers 
from all major fishing nations in Europe catch more off Svalbard, and indeed in all waters that were 
beyond national jurisdiction. The Norwegian solution was to establish what was labelled a “non-
discriminatory fishing zone” instead of a 200-mile EEZ.1464 In practice, the perceived need for 
regulating fishing in this zone was harmonized with the spirit of non-discrimination of signatory 
states embodied in the Svalbard Treaty. States that had a history of fishing in this ocean were thus 
granted quotas of catches in the specific area, to be distributed between the trawler companies within 
each state. This solution came into effect in April 1978. After some initial reservations, the western 
powers agreed to the zone. Moscow refused to accept it, and also denied the Norwegian claim to 
inspect fishing vessels within the zone. It was a suitable reflection of Norwegian prudence and the 
balance of power that made Norway avoid the introduction of quotas in the first years of the 
existence of the zone. But even within the western camp, the ever sharper competition over marine 
resources made the whole issue into a stone in the shoe for Norwegian cabinets. Spain, for example, 
had gained little by the development of the EEZ. Given the fact that most of the catches of Spanish 
fishers came from long-distance trawlers operating far from Spanish territory, Spanish fishers to a 
large degree had been ecluded from some of the best fishing banks. In the Icelandic EEZ, resource 
                                                                                                                                                             
1462 See Fløistad, 1987, Østreng 1990:14 and Tamnes, 1997: 309 for assessments.  
1463 See Stmeld 25, 73-74: 89, UD-info 26/78:2, Tamnes, 1997: 311 
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extraction had been so intense as to nearly deplete the most vital fish stocks. Increasingly then, the 
focus was directed at international waters, still beyond the national jurisdiction of states. Some states 
therefore came to see the fishing zone off Svalbard as an ecologically viable model for preventing a 
total collapse of fish stocks in the North Atlantic. Thus, even the USSR eventually instructed their 
fishing companies to abide by the Norwegian-imposed regulatory procedures in the non-
discriminatory fishing zone off Svalbard. Spain became an enduring enemy of this zone, Spain and 
Norway were –in the words of Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes- "on the brink of a cod war” in 
1986.1465 The use of the coast guard (a 20th century adaptation of home-water extraterritorial force) 
was required to stop a confrontation. Eventually, Spain accepted to follow the policies of the EEC, 
making the issue largely into a topic between this organization, Russia and Norway.1466  
At the level of foreign policies and international law, the UNCLOS III gave many new problems 
that had to be solved (we will briefly return to this on the phenomena of piracy and international 
terrorism in the next chapter). As states swallowed more and more of the oceans and the sea beds as 
national property, demarcations had to be made. Yet, it also increased the value of small islands and 
islets, over which the state had only exercised a symbolic degree of sovereignty. With the new 
international law of the sea, all such overseas possessions became immensely appreciated, since they 
became new departures from which to establish new zones and continental shelves.  
In this respect, the increased scope of sovereignty for the small coastal states was not produced 
without friction, and in the longer run increased national jurisdiction did not solve some of the 
dilemmas inherent in the international institutions regulating maritime resources. 
At the regional level, the political leadership and top bureaucrats invested much energy in carving 
out the most beneficial results in the form of EEZs and quotas, while from a global perspective, the 
overarching problem of depleted fish stocks did not diminish. The result was that coastal states with 
substantial EEZs and fishery zones experienced an increased pressure from less blessed states to 
open up their areas of sovereign rights to resource-extraction for the outside world. Nowhere was 
this more evident than in the northern waters, which during the last two decades were one of the few 
areas with sustainable fish stocks and a sound ecosystem in the world at large. Thus, the increased 
scope of national jurisdiction was bound to come under pressure, despite the framework of the law 
of the sea. For Iceland, Norway, Greenland and the Faraoe islands, the EEC and later the EU 
                                                                                                                                                             
1464 See Stid 1976777: 4327-28, UD-info 7/78: 3-9, Sonders et al, 1987: 7-8, Fløistad, 1987: 42, Ulfstein, 1982: 68-
69 
1465 tamnes, 1997: 314, Fløistad, 1987: 126 
1466 At the time of writing, only Finland and Canada have accepted the Norwegian interpretation of the Svalbard 
Treaty concerning the ocean masses beyond the territorial sea. 
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became one of the chief challengers to full national jurisdiction within the 200 mile zones. On the 
other hand, the same peripheries were dependent upon the EU market for exports of their fish 
products. Thus, access to fishing in northern waters was increasingly traded for market access for 
products from the northern countries within the common market. In the negotiations leading up to 
the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU membership, for example, Norway tried in vain to keep the 
Svalbard area outside of the membership agreement. 
Not only was the pressure on the national EEZs and fishery zones in themselves subject to pressure; 
the fishing activities in international waters beyond these zones became so intense as to threaten the 
entire ecosystem of the northern oceans. To Russia and Norway alike, this problem became acute in 
the early 1990s, regardless of the relative success these two states had in regulating their fishing 
industries. The limits to the word extraterritorial sovereignty for a small periphery is nowhere better 
illustrated than in the case of Iceland. Having secured for its society a vast EEZ, the Icelandic 
government soon found the pressure from its fishing industry impossible to resist. After all, there 
were limits as to how much the Icelanders could fish in their EEZ. By the early 1990s, therefore, 
Iceland was seeking out every imaginable way to find new fishing fields, be it in international 
waters in the Barents Sea, or off Svalbard.  
According to the 1982 LOS, fish stocks that do not wander across EEZs boundaries belong to the 
coastal state as a sovereign right. Migrating fish stocks, however, should be taxed through 
agreement between the states with EEZs within the migration pattern of the particular stock.1467 
Needless to say, this created a problem concerning regulating fisheries in international waters and 
quotas within the EEZs that made the victory of the coastal state seem a Pyrrhic one. None of the 
coastal states covered in this thesis had fought against mare liberum for international waters, a 
policy that would have been programmed to fiasco due to the preferences of the US, the new 
problems were clear indications that the relative lack of supranational regulation was a limit to 
small-state mare clausum pretensions. Apart from the very valuable asset of the seabed, coastal 
states had not found an ultimate solution to the tragedy of the commons.  
Nevertheless, the various organizations and conferences under the framework of the liberal UN 
system proved instrumental in addressing these problems. When the so-called Rio-Conference for 
the Environment and Development failed to make progress in 1992, the FAO ultimately managed to 
reach consensus on a ban on the use of Flags of Convenience for fishing vessels in international 
                                                 
1467 See Ulfstein, 1982: 13.  Stmeld nr 58 1991/82: 7, 72,  Naturvernforbundet rapport 3/96:1 
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waters.1468 However, many states ignored the use of flags of convenience by national companies, 
while other states simply did not have the capacity to do so. Moreover, the lack of will to regulate 
this activity was mirrored in the foreign policies of even the otherwise moderate states within the 
North European security complex. It was not rare for even the warmest supporter of international 
institutions to apply a pick- and choose policy determined by the national interest. Thus, the only 
western state that had ratified the 1982 LOS by 1990: "Iceland, which initially contested Jan 
Mayan` s status as an island, has required of Denmark that the much smaller island of Kolbeinsøy 
in the Denmark strait, is to receive full weight in the determination of the boundary line between 
Iceland and Greenland"1469 
 
The pressure on fish stocks in international waters made coastal states ever more eager to claim  
national jurisdiction over oceans, but this clearly were temporary solutions. The final attempt to 
untangle this complexity was carried out through the treaty "Agreement for the implementation of 
the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks". It was 
opened for signing on 4 December 1995 and became legally binding after ratification by 30 
countries. Again, the international level interacted with domestic concerns. Significantly enough, the 
outcome was one of international disputes and outright clashes between both fishing vessels and 
                                                 
1468 The use of Flags of Convenience (FOC) was increasingly seen as a problem during the 1990s., both by unions, 
social democrats and environmental activists throughout the western world. A flag of convenience ship is one that 
flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership. Cheap registration fees, low or no taxes and freedom 
to employ cheap labour are the motivating factors behind a shipowner's decision to 'flag out'.  By 2002, a very 
considerable part of the western-owned companies had flagged out. This development had many drawbacks, 
although some poor countries and tax havens undoubtedly profitted from it. Casualties are higher among FOC 
vessels. In 1997 46 per cent of all losses in absolute tonnage terms were accounted for by just 8 FOC registers. The 
top ten registers in terms of tonnage lost as a percentage of the fleet includes five FOC registers: Cambodia (1st), St 
Vincent (5th), Antigua (8th), Cyprus (9th) and Belize (10th).  See 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/flags/guide.htm.  
Big companies specialized in helping clients setting up business or registering vessels in small states. As in 
flagsofconvenience.com: "Register your pleasure boat, merchant ship, commercial vessel or aircraft in any of our 
various flags worldwide (102 Countries)." After the US launch of the so-called war on terrorism, this practise 
seemed more precarious. As the Economist reported on March 16th 2002, "OSAMA BIN LADEN, intelligence 
sources would have us believe, is, among other things, a shipowner with a fleet of over 20 ships, probably flying 
flags of convenience (FOCs).... All this is rather ironic. It was America, after all, that helped Liberia to create its 
“open” register as an alternative to Panama, the first FOC, in the late 1940s. American oil companies, with Greek 
shipowners riding piggyback, switched their tanker fleets to Liberia to avoid high labour costs at home (American-
registered ships are required by law to use expensive American crews). Liberia's success spawned many imitators: 
“free flags” are now flown by such unlikely places as Cambodia and landlocked Bolivia. China is a big user of 
FOCs, its main preference being Panama, the world's biggest FOC by tonnage."  
http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1136592 
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naval units. In many ways, this kind of extraterritorial praxis was a return to the past. Reports of 
violence between fishing vessels from coastal and distant-water states became increasingly frequent, 
especially during the "cod wars" of the 1970s. Several countries, including Britain and Norway, sent 
naval ships to protect fishing fleets on the high seas (ironically then, the Norwegian Coast Guard 
fired warning shots against Icelandic-owned trawlers off Svalbard in July 1994, the Icelanders 
returning fire with shotguns). Spanish fishers clashed with British and French drift netters in what 
came to be known as the "tuna wars". Before the UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks was finalized in October 1995, several coastal States had fired shots at 
foreign fleets. In the northern Atlantic, Canada seized and confiscated a Spanish boat and crew 
fishing in international waters just beyond the Canadian 200-mile limit. The negotiations focused on 
the conflict between the coastal and distant-water fishing States. By mid-1993, Canada had declared 
a moratorium on cod fishing off its Atlantic coast until stocks were able to regenerate, putting 
between 20,000 and 30,000 fishers out of work. In the United States, fisheries for Atlantic haddock, 
cod and flounder and for Pacific salmon virtually collapsed. Iceland cut back its domestic fishing by 
50 per cent because of depleted stocks. Meanwhile, unregulated foreign fleets continued to fish just 
off these countries' EEZs. 
Coastal states argued that the high social and economic cost at home (of fishermen out of work in 
order to preserve fish stocks) could not be supported if foreign fleets continued to fish without 
restrictions on the high seas. Russia mounted military surveillance to keep Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean and Polish boats from over fishing pollack in the hotly contested Peanut-Hole, a small area 
of international water surrounded by Russian seas. In the South Pacific, island States tried to stop 
Taiwanese and Korean fishers poaching tuna. At the same time, distant-water states pointed to 
research that suggested coastal States were not sustainably managing stocks within their zones. 
At first, many countries were reluctant to accept the need for a legally binding agreement. But as the 
negotiations evolved, "most coastal states realized the time had come for a meaningful international 
agreement and the distant-water fishing States understood very well that it was time to either play by 
a set of internationally agreed upon regulations or face anarchy on the high seas", according to Brian 
Tobin, Canada's Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.1470  
The result was dramatic, at least in judicial terms, since the freedom to fish on the high seas ceased 
to exist as it did under the previous law of the sea. Governments would be required to cooperate to 
                                                                                                                                                             
1469 Østreng, 1990: 33 
1470 http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/sustdev/fishery.htm 
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regulate high seas fishing or their vessels would not be allowed to fish. Again, this was a positive 
development for coastal states with limited long-distance fishery activity, and a drawback for other 
fishing nations. 
The 50-article Agreement legally binds countries to conserve and "sustainably manage fish stocks" 
and to "settle peacefully any disputes that arise over fishing on the high seas". The treaty also 
addresses the problem of inadequate data on fish stocks, provides for the establishment of quotas, 
calls for the setting up of regional fishing organizations where none exist, sets out procedures for 
ensuring compliance with its provisions, including the right to board and inspect vessels belonging 
to other states; and prescribes options for the compulsory and binding peaceful settlement of 
disputes between states. Responsibility for regulating and enforcing sustainable fishing practices 
falls to the regional fishing organizations, which must also collect, report, verify and exchange data 
on catches. On the basis of a periodic review of the status of fish stocks, they will allocate quotas for 
States fishing on the high seas. 
The Agreement aims to make the fishing industry more transparent. Fishers are obliged to report, 
through their Governments to the FAO and regional fishing organizations, the size of catches and 
the amount of fish they discard. In areas where no regional organizations exist, states concerned 
about declining fish stocks are expected to organize their establishment. It gives any country that is 
a member of a regional fishing organization the right to board and inspect vessels of any other 
states fishing in the area in order to ensure that regional quotas and conservation measures are 
being followed.  
Where there are "reasonable grounds" for suspecting that a fishing vessel is violating conservation 
rules, the inspecting state can notify the flag state. If the flag state does not respond within three 
working days--during which time the inspectors are permitted to stay on board -- the inspecting state 
can require the vessel to go to the nearest appropriate port for further action. If the flag state feels 
that enforcement measures have been taken unjustifiably, it can begin dispute-settlement procedures.  
The North European coastal states ceased the initiative after the successful conference, and through 
the NEAFC this instituted a regime for the international northern waters, where the Norwegian 
armed forces were given a chief role in monitoring and inspecting fishing vessels in the Norwegian 
Sea. In many ways, this evidenced the ultimate success of the small coastal states in the Western 
world; not only had large tracts of the oceans come under national jurisdiction, they also patrolled 
the high seas in order to catch for example British, Dutch or Spanish fishing vessels or any violator 
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of international law in the waters that once had been labelled "Mare Britannicum"  by the premier 
sea power on the globe. 
The questions of extraterritorial sovereignty distinguish The Netherlands from the Nordic countries, 
and make it into a case somewhere in between the UK and the Nordic countries in the postwar era. 
As with the Nordic countries, however, the trajectory of the Netherlands is closely connected to the 
international development, and in particular to relations with the US. The most characteristic trait of 
Dutch extraterritorial policies in this era was the overseas possessions, or in short, what was referred 
to as the Indonesian question. This complex problem is also the most controversial aspect of Dutch-
American relations in the period, and a peculiarity that sheds light on a contrast to the Nordic 
countries. Therefore, the question of Indonesia will be addressed in particular below.   
This is not to deny that the Netherlands had national interests in Northern Europe proper. Far from 
it, the Dutch polity was a substantial naval contributor to the NATO alliance (see below), and a 
participator in European integration. It also had its due share in the questions on demarcation of 
continental shelves and EEZs, although on a more modest scale than Norway, Denmark, Iceland and 
Britain. The Dutch government reached agreement with Denmark on a boundary between their 
continental shelves in the North Sea in March 1966.1471 The problem with the agreement was that it 
imposed severe limits on the ocean area available to West Germany. The three states therefore 
requested the International Court to decide what principles should apply to the demarcation of the 
shelves of the three countries (the following legal discourse defies description in its complexity, but 
did not have any lasting impact on the international institution of maritime sovereignty). The Court, 
in the view of many experts on international law, failed to make a clear statement, but chose to 
instruct the three states to reach agreement based on "equitable principles". The ultimate result was 
that West Germany was able to gain a continental shelf stretching out into the North Sea, while the 
Netherlands nevertheless managed to secure a substantial shelf that would prove to be of huge 
economic value. While offshore industry was a novel field to the Netherlands, in other areas the 
Dutch continued a proud maritime tradition. At the outbreak of WWII, practically the entire vast 
Dutch merchant fleet of 2.7 million tons had been at sea. By 1945 it had shrunk to a fleet of some 
1.5 millions. The reconstruction of the merchant fleet took place at amazing speed. By 1947, it 
passed 2.2 mill. Tons (yet, in a comparative perspective, the Dutch merchant fleet of the 20th century 
was not vast-see appendix II).1472  
                                                 
1471 Prescott, 1975: 166 
1472 Schokking, 1947 : 353 
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As a political matter, the Indonesian question was the most dramatic foreign policy issue in the post-
war era for The Netherlands, and a question that also had an impact on Dutch identity. In the latter 
respect, I will argue that the foreign policy of the Netherlands came to be more adjusted to what was 
appropriate for a bandwagoning state with a lost overseas empire. From postwar overseas 
intervention to uphold political relations with the empire, the Dutch polity silently drifted into what 
Arend Lijphard called "the trauma of decolonization", although this trauma should not be 
exaggerated in a comparative perspective. The Dutch had had political and economic functions in 
the Netherlands East Indies since 1595.1473  As we have seen, the colonial ties were cut during 
WWII due to the Japanese occupation of the former Dutch-controlled islands. As the Japanese 
empire disintegrated, nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia on 
August 17 1945, until British and eventually Dutch forces arrived to take control anew.1474 Since 
nationalist groups on the islands, a force much ignored by the Dutch government during the 1930s, 
in the meantime had managed to seize Japanese weapons and munitions, the European effort at 
establishing a monopoly of violence proved difficult. By summer 1947, Dutch forces only controlled 
a few enclaves on Java and Sumatra, plus the politically much less important Outer Islands. The 
chief motivation of the Netherlands was not to re-establish a form of colonial rule, or so it was 
claimed, but to secure investments and economic interests in Indonesia. But as we shall see, 
economic interests are at best a secondary factor here, since the loss of Indonesia would not account 
to a severe blow to the Dutch economy. Although this claim was made by contemporaries (that the 
loss of the empire signaled an economic catastrophe), the more overarching concern was that 
without Indonesia, the Netherlands would be just another European periphery, devastated by war, 
and without influence in Asia.1475 History indeed mattered, the Indonesian question soon developed 
into an issue of great symbolic value. Spurred on by the British government, Dutch authorities 
eventually settled for a negotiated deal with the provisionary regime of the Republic, 
institutionalised with the so-called Linggadjati Agreement of November 1946. This settlement was 
only temporary and highly fragile, evidenced by the clashes of interests between the Republic and 
the agents of the Dutch government on the islands. The Netherlands thus chose a military 
intervention in 1947 (the first so-called Police Action).  
The US position on this question was full of ambiguities. On the one hand, the Truman 
administration certainly had inherited the anti-imperialist belief of the FDR administrations. As an 
international liberalist, the US felt that it could not simply support openly the efforts of a European 
                                                 
1473 Steiner, 1947: 625 
1474 Homan, 1990: 123 
1475 Homan, 1990: 124 
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power in re-establishing what seemed to be imperialism. However, by this date- July 1947- another 
concern also had found its way into the corridors of power in Washington; the spread of 
communism. While the abandonment of European empires certainly were still welcomed, the 
Truman administrations - and indeed later administrations- feared power vacuums in former colonial 
territories that could be easily exploited by communist parties. If this were the case, then one evil 
would be replaced by an even worse threat to liberalism and free trade. Thus, the initial US reactions 
to the first police action were very mild. It was only when the case was taken to the UN Security 
Council that Washington began to raise concern. In August 1947, the Truman administration thus 
supported the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire at the islands, and actually offered 
to mediate through the so-called Good Offices Committee (GOC). This commission finally 
produced the Renville Agreement of January 1948, calling for the establishment of a United States 
of Indonesia.1476 This federation was to consist of the Republic of Indonesia plus the Netherlands. 
1477 Without going into specifics, the deal was riddled with ambiguities that were bound to erupt 
eventually. Hostilities between the Dutch and supporters of the Republic continued. In a 1948 visit 
to the Republic, the US mood changed. The US GOC delegation was convinced that the leadership 
of the Republic was not an amalgam of Soviet and Japanese interests, as previously claimed by 
Dutch diplomats.  From this visit on, the US perception was reversed: not granting substantial 
concessions to the Indonesian nationalists would produce the greatest danger of communist 
influence, not the opposite. The predominantly conservative Dutch coalition government strongly 
objected to this analysis, but lost much prestige as the the Republic of Indonesia crushed a 
communist coup at Java in September 1948. Thereafter, arguing that the government of the Republic 
was infiltrated by communists and that it was in no position to uphold a monopoly of violence, 
failed to make much of an impression in Washington or in the UN. The ultimate weapon of 
influence for the Truman administration was to issue an aide memoire dated December 8 1948 in 
which the US indirectly threatened to cease all appropriations to the Netherlands and Indonesia 
under the European Recovery Act if the parties went to war.1478 However, the handing over of such 
a note was an action that risked backfire. The potential blowback of Uncle Sam threatening a 
weakened western European democracy in 1948 seemed so serious that the State department 
withdrew the aide memoire. As a result, the Dutch government ordered military action in December 
1948, only to receive an international condemnation of which it was not prepared.1479 With this 
decision, the Dutch Empire was irretrievably lost. The Empire with a history of almost 400 years 
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could not be saved either way the Dutch government could have tried to achieve some political 
influence over Indonesia. Like the other European powers, it had to adjust to the fact that the age of 
imperialism was long gone. The US hegemony ensured that there was no international legitimacy 
for overseas colonies.  
Did this outcome change Dutch foreign policy, and even the predominant worldview and identity of 
Dutch politicians? This question is a substantial one, since the Netherlands clung to its empire 
longer than Denmark, the only Nordic country with at least formal sovereignty over inhabitated 
overseas territories into the 20th century. At the same time, the Netherlands did not preserve a 
special status as a former empire through a commonwealth as did Britain, or through prolonged and 
strong political ties as did France. The Netherlands became much more of an "Atlantic" state than 
France in the political sense, and a much more "European one" than did Britain. It is of course true 
that the Netherlands continued to have links with Surinam and what once was the Dutch Antilles, 
but her status was not comparable to other major former imperial powers.1480 Does this reveal a 
special trait of Dutch imperialism as well?  
Firstly, one must state at the outset that abandonment of the overseas possessions in the Dutch case 
were complete and permanent.1481 When the Dutch government completed the agreement where she 
renounced all claims to the sovereignty of West Guinea, it separated the Netherlands from its past 
for good. As we will see, history in one sense returned, but in the 1950s and 60s, the loss of the 
empire did not turn out to be the disaster some had predicted. Indeed, one is tempted to ask whether 
not the outcome was much more beneficial to the Dutch society than a continued empire would have 
been, although this remains a counterfactual hypothesis. One thing was the cost the empire would 
have constituted in the form of economic investments. Another matter was the cost in human tolls. 
The "Police actions" in Indonesia did not tempt the Dutch to pursue a policy of continued use of 
violence in order to keep the overseas possessions. Barely liberated from German occupation, the 
Netherlands plunged into one of the greatest battles in the history of the polity.1482 In 1947 alone, 
170000 Dutch conscripts and officers saw service in Indonesia.1483 Of the 2500 Dutch killed in 
Indonesia, only 250 died during the police operations themselves. 90% of the casualties stemmed 
from the results of the continued engagements by Indonesian guerilla forces. This was a testimony to 
the real costs of upholding extraterritorial sovereignty without local or international legitimacy. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
1479 Vandenbosch, 1950: 7 
1480 Baudet, 1969: 128 
1481 This is a truth with one modification concerning the Dutch Antilles. It is an autonomous country within the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. It was granted full autonomy in internal affairs in 1954, while the Dutch Government 
is responsible for defense and foreign affairs. 
1482 Vandenbosch, 1950: 1-3 
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the end, the support of continued use of extraterritorial violence on a large scale dwindled also in the 
Netherlands proper. Advocates of the Dutch Empire argued that the Netherlands without an empire 
would fall down the ladder of the international hierarchy, and ultimately would come to resemble 
the weakened Danish polity.1484 The hope of re-establishing the triangular commerce (the 
Netherlands-Indonesia-America) was perceived as vital to the Dutch economy, but not at any cost. 
The result was a dilemma that touched upon the very identity of what the Netherlands was. To many 
Dutch, the very idea of a Netherlands without special responsibilities and economic activities 
beyond the motherland seemed unconceivable.  
 
Nevertheless, by economic parameters, the Dutch economy thrived without an empire. Several 
factors help explain this. The Marshall aid did much to supply the Netherlands with the hard cash 
the government needed. Secondly, efforts at modernization and industrialization became entirely 
focused on improvements in the motherland. Later on, the booming offshore activity created an 
additional stimulus to the economy. But even prior to the latter, the Dutch prosperity rose incredibly 
in the years unto 1960. In 1938, 30 percent of the Dutch national income came from industry, by 
1957 the corresponding figure was 42 per cent (net factor cost).1485 This was no small achievement 
for a country that entered the postwar era with quite significant damages to its infrastructure 
(especially some of the major ports, docks and ship-building industry). Neither did the loss of the 
overseas employment possibilities constitute much of a loss. Banks and financing companies 
quickly adjusted to the post-imperial condition, and manual labourers found employment in the 
booming industrial sector. Thus, the increase in national income per capita averaged about 3.5 per 
cent per year from 1950 till 1970. In sum, this increase was seven times as much as the growth in the 
first 40 years of the 20th Century.1486 In sharp contrast to this development, the economic revival of 
the Dutch East Indies was painfully slow, to put it mildly. A challenged monopoly of violence, 
general political unrest and violent crime did not make the former Dutch colonies into attractive 
nodes of investment. To interpret the problems in the former colonies as a fault by the European 
powers is too much of a simplification. The main result of decolonization in economic terms in this 
case, was that the former colonist thrived, while the newly liberated overseas territories decayed or 
stagnated. In the political sphere, the Union was dissolved in 1954. The Republic of Indonesia made 
the situation even worse for its inhabitants by boycotting the Netherlands from 1957, thus striking a 
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blow against its own people, not the Netherlands to any particular degree. The sum of these 
developments in the economy also influenced the Dutch perspective of its role in the international 
system. It prospered by band-wagoning behind liberal international institutions and the US. In 
terms of security, the Netherlands remained a faithful ally of the US within NATO, in terms of 
economic integration and lowering of transaction costs, the Dutch were eager supporters of the 
European common market.  It is true that some last spasms from the imperial age were visible in 
1957-1962, largely over the status of New Guinea, and as a result of the 1957 Indonesian decision to 
nationalize Dutch firms on the islands. Although Dutch troops were dispatched, the Netherlands 
abided by the 1962 Accord of Washington that turned New Guinea into a part of Indonesia. But the 
Dutch urge to protect Paouans on New Guinea cannot be explained by economic reductionism; there 
was no profit for the Netherlands in such an action. Rather, it was a genuine perception that 
communism endangered the freedom of the Far East. The Netherlands was perhaps not so much of 
an international liberalist anymore, but a bandwagoning liberalist it certainly was. In this respect, the 
Dutch marched with the US. Thus, the desire to protect New Guinea took place in parallel with the 
Dutch enthusiasm for the UN, NATO and European integration. What happened in the Dutch case 
was not so much a change of ultimate aims, as it was a change of the means by which to achieve 
these goals. The UN became the vehicle for favouring an international scene in which international 
law had a decisive role. NATO became the chief instrument of peace. European integration was the 
preferred alternative in order to achieve trade across borders. For all the changes in the international 
hierarchy as well as the alterations in Dutch domestic politics, a core of the national habitus stayed 
in place.1487 In addition to these institutional solutions, Dutch liberalism was mirrored in very 
substantial programs of development aid. In fact, it is no exaggeration to claim that politicians and 
bureaucrats alike saw the development programs as a continuity of the Dutch liberalism that it 
perceived as an integral part of colonial policy during what Dutch historians have labeled the 
"ethical period". Overseas administrators in this period did not see themselves, or were perceived in 
the Dutch public, as colonisers, but rather as development experts. Thus, a huge support for 
development projects has remained above politics throughout the 20th century. It is true that aspects 
of the Dutch imperial conduct remained hidden to public attention for much of this century, and that 
criticism eventually arose on these matters. On the other hand, some Dutch ambiguity as to the 
multicultural legacies of the empire also has found political expressions that many observers find 
disturbing. Yet, the arguments on restricting immigration do not seem to make the Dutch polity 
adapt to a less liberal policy.  
                                                 
1487 See Wesseling, 1980: 130-132  
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5.5 Navies in a unipolar world Order; The US and North European              
Naval strength   
As we saw in the section on Britain in this chapter, the modalities of extraterritorial violence was 
somewhat changed after WWII. In terms of technicalities, the modern naval force of the stronger sea 
power was a much more complicated organization, easier to direct from onshore headquarters, much 
more autonomous, much more strategic through range and striking capability, and in many ways 
more stealth and distant from the territories to which it belonged. The cold war gave major 
incentives for a technological effort to out beat potential adversaries for more than four decades. Not 
so much changed during this period in terms of naval thought, however. It was certainly the case 
that Soviet build-up of a fleet of strategic submarines with a vast nuclear striking capability spurred 
NATO to change some priorities, but as social praxis, the planning for and application of 
extraterritorial violence did not change principally. However, the period from 1990 is much more 
challenging and conceptually intriguing to the student of this particular aspect of the monopoly of 
violence that every state seeks to gain. I have therefore chosen to summarize and compare the naval 
strength of the units of analysis in this section. As of the distribution of power in the international 
system, military power still is of vital importance. Extraterritorial power, in particular, is a strong 
indicator of the capability a state has to project power and the reach this projection has. For the US 
Navy, the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium represented more of a continuity than 
change. At the level of security political assessment, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(QDR-2001) of September 30th 2001 certainly did reflect an increased focus on what is labeled 
"new" threats, vulnerabilities and the tactics of terrorism and 4th generation warfare.1488 However, in 
terms of platforms, weapon systems, personnel and tactics, not much has changed since the end of 
the cold war. In spite of the rhetoric of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the administration 
of Bush the younger, the alleged need for reform produced few innovations. What was new after the 
horrible terrorist attacks of 911 was an increased US sense of vulnerability. The oceans that for 
centuries had protected the "First New Nation" from the evil forces of Eurasia did no longer seem 
like the buffers they once represented. To an administration that initially showed traits of contempt 
                                                 
1488 This presentation is heavily based on the following US primary sources: QDR-2001, Pentagon, Department of 
Defence, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17th September, 2002, 2000 Posture 
Statement, Department of the Navy, "Naval Forces in the 21st century", The United States Navy "Vision-Presence-
Power", 2000 edition, "…From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st century, A New Direction for the 
Naval Service, Combined vision of the US Navy and the US Marine Corps", Secretary of the Navy, 1994, "Status of 
the United States Navy as of March 11 2002", Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations statement - 
Senate Armed services Committee, March 7th 2002, Commandant of the USMC statement, Senate Armed services 
Committee, March 5th 2002 
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for "Wilsonianism", the terrorist attacks suddenly presented in the starkest manner the realities of a 
world of interdependence. It is interesting, however, to note that the QDR-2001 showed an immense 
interest in the coastal zones of Eurasia in general, and that of the Middle East in particular. It 
remains a fact that a minimum of stability in this area was and is a vital interest to the US, due to the 
substantial energy resources in the region. Apart from this, the Pentagon documents were reflections 
of traditional national interests and the upholding of US values that have been described from 
chapter 2 and onwards. hrough the policy for its Navy alone, the US signaled a global commitment 
to shape the international security environment. The ability to project power in order to stabilize 
conflicts, deter belligerents and reassure allies seemed a central tool for the policymakers who 
perceived the US as an "indispensable nation" in a Hobbesian world. Nevertheless, this did not 
transform the organization of the US Navy in terms of material, organization or personnel over 
night. As of 2001, the US Navy's and Marine Corps` operational capabilities rested with the 
following types and numbers of platforms and with the following suggestions for the future force 
structure: 
               Table 5.5.1: Force structure of the US Navy and US Marine Corps 20011489 
Type/Unit Status 2001 Proposed Force Structure 
2015 
NAVY   
Surface combat vessels (active/reserve) 108/8 99/8 
Operational amphibious groups 12 10 
SSN-attack submarines 55 49 
SSBN-strategic submarines 18 18 
Total number of vessels 318 Ca 300 
Aircraft Carriers (CVS) 12 9 
Flight Wings (active/reserve) 10/1 7/1 
Operational airplanes 4000+ Uncertain at time of  
writing 
Navy personnel on active duty 
(officers/sailors) 
53807/323288 Total estimated to ca. 
300000 
MARINE CORPS   
Mef-Marine expeditionary Forces 3 3 
Divisions (active/reserve) 3/1 3/1 
                                                 
1489 QDR-2001: 22 , CNO Statement -Senate Armed Services Committee, March 7th 2002, Commandant of US MC 
statement - Senate Armed Services Committee, March 5th 2002. For an updated version of current forces, see The 
Military balance, IISS, 2004-2005. Note that the numbers for the proposed force structure 2015 should be seen as 
tentative. 
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Flight Wings (active/reserve) 3/1 3/1 
The total impression of these figures should be divided into two groups of comments. Firstly, the 
extraterritorial forces of the US AD 2001 were larger than the corresponding organizations and 
platforms of any other state in the world. The US had inherited a colossus consisting of units from 
the Cold war through the US Marine Corps and the US Navy. In CVS alone, for example, no other 
state or even potential coalition of states has any chance of matching those of the USA. In addition, 
one should note that the very substantial US Coast Guard (under the responsibility of “Homeland 
Security”) is not included in the above numbers. 
Even more striking to the contemporary observer is the continuity represented by the force structure 
goals for the year 2015. The down-scaling of extraterritorial means of violence is on the whole 
microscopic in quantitative terms (the only exception is that of the use of battleships. The last 
battleship, USS Missouri, was decommissioned in 1992). By and large, moreover, it is the same type 
of platform, and the same organizations that form the basis for future estimates. Thus, the US did not 
significantly reduce its naval ambitions following the Cold War.1490 Moreover, 911 gave new 
incentives for substantial allocations for new ships, better weapons systems and overseas 
deployment. Inherent in this mode of thought was also a fundamental continuity of beliefs, of 
ideology- in a broad sense. It is not that the US necessarily asks other polities whether it has a right 
to defend the freedoms it holds for sacred, US policymakers just assume that the world must be 
made safe for democracy; however naïve Eurasian commentators may view such a policy. Neither 
can material factors be said to be the only plausible explanation for such a policy. While one can 
argue that a military-industrial complex does indeed exist in the US, this is not a sufficient 
explanation as to why the US takes upon itself such grandiose tasks in order to uphold an 
international framework based on values just as much as following a narrow national interest. In 
sum, the extraterritorial dimension of the US was unique in both quantitative and ideological terms 
at the turn of the century. Moreover, it was a result of the peculiar US foreign policy trajectory of 
the US. In the words of Andrew Bacevich; 
 
                                                 
1490 The US navy also could demonstrate that even its CVS were not obsolete platforms in the war on terrorism: " As 
example, on 11 September 2001, USS Enterprise (CVN 65) had just been relieved from being on station in support 
of Operation Southern Watch. She was heading south in the Indian Ocean, beginning her trip back to homeport in 
Norfolk, Va., when, on television, they saw the live coverage of attack on the World Trade Center, then on the 
Pentagon. Enterprise, without an order from the chain of command, put the rudder over, executed a 180-degree 
course change and headed back to the waters off Southwest Asia. Enterprise then remained on station in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, launching air attacks against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban military 
installations in Afghanistan. For approximately the next three weeks, aircraft from Enterprise flew nearly 700 
missions in Afghanistan, dropping hundreds of thousands of pounds of ordnance." 
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/carriers/cv-why.html 
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"The politicoeconomic concept to which the United States adheres today has not changed in a 
century: the familiar quest for an "open world", the overriding imperative of commercial 
integration, confidence that technology endows the United States with a privileged position in that 
order, and the expectation that American military might will preserve order and enforce the 
rules"1491 
                             For better or worse, this belief, one is tempted to say this particular and enduring 
ideological construction, made the US prone to force its will on international institutions in general, 
and questions of war and peace in particular, since ideologic as well as material interests influenced 
US judgements as to desired courses of action in international relations.. In the next section, we will 
look into the potential weakness of such a worldview, but no one can deny the fact that the US won 
the cold war. For decades, world systems theorists have declared the fall or decline of the US within 
this system, and Paul Kennedy in 1987 famously argued in much the same manner, but the bottom 
line is that the US prevailed. At the time of writing, the US is comparatively stronger in 
conventional, military terms than on any other point in history. The data in this section shows this in 
naval terms, and to a striking degree. If the question of power is not so much the geopolitical 
position of the US, then the domestic and international ideologic power of the US will be more 
vulnerable than its military power.1492 We will analyse one highly interesting approach to this 
question in the next section, but if we compare the extraterritorial military power of the US with the 
North European states, then the position of the US in strict military terms is obvious. 
 
The naval policies of Great Britain were based on similar threat assessments as in the US (although 
the security concept is somewhat broader than in the corresponding US documents). In all other 
respects, there are clear differences between the two.1493 A major similarity with the US exists in the 
sense that the Royal navy too has global assignments. These tasks are nevertheless described in 
much less ideological terms. The British Strategic Defense Review laid more emphasis on support 
                                                 
1491 Bacevich, 2002: 6 
1492 See Nau, 2002: 237-253 for an interesting discussion. Both Bacevich and Nau share the emphasis on history and 
ideology in US foreign policy as chosen in this thesis, although their approaches otherwise are somewhat different. 
In his study of US attitudes towards imperialism, historian David Ryan in 2000:227 concludes that ""by taking ideas 
seriously, by seeing them as inescapable and potent, and by following the ways in which they help leaders make 
sense of a diverse and fluid world, we get a better sens of the multiple currents of thought that combined in various 
ways to shape the evolvingUS approach to decolonization". In the next section, we turn the same approach on its 
head; what could predominant US reactions be to any attempt at making the US into an occupation force over great 
territories? 
1493 The analysis of British extraterritorial policies is based on the following primary sources: Strategic Defence 
Review 1998, Ministry of Defence, directorate of Defence Policy, presented in Parliament in July 1998 and revised 
on November 12th 2001, Royal Navy Strategy Plan 2001, The Next Fifteen Years, 2002, The Future Navy, 
Admiralty Board Paper 2/00 
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of overseas territories and management of humanitarian operations and peace support operations 
(PSO). Although 911 certainly influenced British thinking on security and naval priorities, there 
seems to have been even less of a juncture in British policies and doctrine than in the US with the 
beginning of the "war on terrorism". This is not surprising when one considers the ideological 
foundations of British foreign policy, so heavily influenced by the Imperial legacy. The troubles in 
Northern Ireland have been lasting, ensuring that both British politicians, military personnel and the 
general population have not been strangers to the effects of terrorism. The ability to carry out 
combined, joint operations is strongly emphasized, but as in the case of the US, there are few signs 
of radical rethinking of platforms and larger weapon systems, with the exception that strategic lifting 
capacity is increased through the lease of civilian merchantmen for use as roll-on, roll-off vessels (a 
capacity that the US has had for years). In quantitative terms, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines 
make up a much, much smaller organization and capability of extraterritorial violence than those of 
the US, as can be seen from table 5.5.2. 
                        Table 5.5.2; Force structure Royal Navy and the Royal Marines1494 
Type/Unit Status 2001 Proposed Force Structure 
20151495 
Amphibious vessels  2  6 
Frigates and Destroyers 33 32 
SSBN  4  4 
SSN 12 10 
Aircraft Carriers  3  2 
Helicopter carriers  1  1 
Mine warfare vessels 18 22 
Total nr. Fighting vessels 72 73 
Patrol vessels 32 30 (uncertain number) 
Support vessels in Royal Fleet Auxiliaries 
(RFA) 
Supply-vessels 
 
15 
 
10 
15 
 
12 
Planes and helicopters 182 Current estimates indicate 
approximately the same number a
in 2001 
Royal Marines 7000 7000  
Personnel, total 43562 Estimated at 43500 
                                                 
1494 Based on Royal Navy Strategy Plan 2001, The Next Fifteen Years, 2002 
1495 Again, the numbers for proposed force structures for 2015 are very tentative. 
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These figures give us a crude portrait of British naval developments in three dimensions. 
Firstly -and not surprisingly- Britain is a naval dwarf compared to the US. Moreover, the crucial 
extraterritorial power-potential through US Marines, aircraft and the flexibility inherent in US CVS, 
is lacking any correspondence, quantitatively speaking, in the British case. 
Secondly, as in the case of the US, there are no dramatic discontinuities in the British Naval 
organisation. The Royal Navy and Royal Marines certainly are to be modernised in arms, and 
command- and control-apparatus; but the ships, Marine units and airpower platforms remains as the 
same type of representatives for one kind of thinking in military means. In this respect, British 
policy on extraterritorial means of violence is similar to the dominant one in the US. A rethinking of 
security threats and -vulnerabilities has not led to a significant change at the conceptual or material 
solution to protection of national interests through naval means.  
Thirdly, I find reason to point out that there nevertheless is a considerable ambition behind the 
British plan for its maritime force structure for the coming years. Considering the almost astounding 
rise in cost in military technology, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines remain as one integrated 
cornerstone of the UK as a state. In an era where globalizations seemed to make some political 
scientists and historians predict the decline of the nation-state, the state apparatus in the monopoly of 
violence remained the most formidable to any other competing form of organisation. At the 
operational level, however, the British extraterritorial forces were used more extensively in distant 
waters than during the cold war. This is a main reason why the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines 
will remain more or less of the same size for some years to come. The intensive pattern of overseas 
deployment made British strategists and politicians alike prone to listen to Admiralty demands that 
there be no reduction in the number of personnel and capital ships. One step below in the 
international hierarchy, Germany, The Netherlands and all the Nordic states, even Iceland, kept 
naval forces intact throughout the 1990s (Germany is included here for the sake of comparison). As 
can be seen from table 6.5.3, these states were individually far less ambitious in their naval 
organisations than was Britain. However, several of the countries listed below cooperated in an 
institutionalised manner, and in naval terms even more intensely by 2001 than they did during much 
of the cold war. It is in fact striking to note that these states, including Norway that was not part of 
the EU, cooperated on development and purchase of technology, and exercised jointly and combined 
to an unprecedented degree, also with countries like France and Spain. Thus, the somewhat modest 
size of national navies should be seen in the light of increased genuine military cooperation within 
the EU framework (Iceland is not included her. Iceland does have a Coast Guard of 4 vessels and 
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128 personnel to man these vessels, largely occupied by the surveillance of fishing restrictions. 
Neither is Finland included, with its mainly littoral defense of Finnish territory). 
 
Table 5.5.3 Force structure of Navies in Germany, The Netherlands and the Nordic 
countries 20011496 
Type units Germany The Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden 
Conventional 
submarines 
14 4 6 6 8 
Frigates and 
destroyers 
17 12 7 (Thetis class n
included) 
3 10 
Corvettes 5 (classified as frigates by th
Dutch Navy, and therefore
included above) 
3 _ (Classified as 
frigates above)
Mine warfare vessel 28 12 6 9 19 
Fast patrol boats or 
patrol vessels, larger
types 
25 
(Pluss 30 Coast
guard vessels 
various types) 
Numerous coast guard 
vessels 
16 
+Numerous coa
guard vessels 
14 
(Plus 13 coast guard
vessels various types
35 
Numerous 
smaller vessels
in the coast 
guard and coas
artillery 
Supply vessels 8 6 6 1 (support vessel) Only smaller 
vessels for 
support of litto
warfare units 
Planes and helicopte 112  11  (2001: all aircraft 
under the Command
of the Royal 
Norwegian Air Forc
0 
Amphibious vessels 
 
10 3  2 (later 
decommissioned) 
Numerous sma
vessels for 
littoral warfare
the coastal 
artillery 
Personnel 27200 Marines: Approximately 
3000 in 3 Mariniersbataljo
4060 4950 9500 
 
Clearly, the Netherlands and Germany are far closer to being naval powers of significance than any 
of the Nordic states. Moreover, apart from the littoral warfare units of Sweden and Norway that 
                                                 
1496 Sources: Jane`s Fighting Ships 2001-2002, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite "Nordisk Sikkerhet-
Militærbalansen, 2002-2003", Oslo, DNAK, The Military Balance 2004-2005, IISS 
            
 5 An American Empire? The US and liberal International Institutions, 1945-2001
 
 
 
           
 
 
452 
clearly are mainly equipped for defense of motherland territory, the Netherlands is unique in this 
category of states in having a substantial Marine force consisting of three battalions.  
Germany is a considerable naval power, especially if we take into consideration  new naval vessels 
that are currently under construction. As in the case of the Netherlands, Germany does have a 
substantial number of aircraft designed to execute air to surface warfare at sea. Moreover, it has both 
the quantity and know-how of littoral warfare through its missile boats, mine warfare ships and 
amphibious vessels.  
The two longstanding NATO members Denmark and Norway have small navies, both in number 
and displacements of platforms as well as in manpower. This is all the more striking considering the 
scope of their extraterritorial sovereignty. Clearly, the solid foundation of thought established during 
the cold war that their navies were designed for regional operations and that allies would come to 
their assistance in a crisis, has not been replaced by a strengthening of extraterritorial platforms in 
quantitative measures. It is only by the year 2006 that any substantial modernization will materialize 
through modern ocean-going surface vessels.  
In quantitative terms, Sweden surprisingly is the strongest of the three Scandinavian states, although 
the gap is shrinking fast due to Swedish force reductions. The legacy of neutrality partly explains 
this, since Sweden focused on the defense of its littoral zones during the cold war to a degree that 
dwarfed similar efforts by Denmark and Norway. This largely resulted in very considerable Swedish 
coastal artillery, including mobile units, which partly has survived to this day. The sea-going navy 
was in a very different position during the cold war; "for the entire postwar era the Swedish navy 
has been a service in search of a mission".1497 From 1945 till 1958, the Swedish navy was assigned 
the dual purposes of defending against enemy invasion and securing sea-lines of communications to 
the western powers, but Swedish authorities increasingly came to perceive surface vessels in the 
Baltic as too vulnerable. In fact, by 1970, Sweden had decommissioned the last of its destroyers and 
almost all its submarines. This became a legacy that also made Sweden remain an "introvert" 
extraterritorial power during the 1990s. By 2001, however, international deployments became more 
of a priority, and the Visby-class corvettes were seen as expedient tools for such purposes. 
The incremental changes in doctrine, equipment and organisation of the extraterritorial means of 
violence was also distinct in the case of Norway, and to some degree also Denmark. One political 
scientist has identified the sources of this incremental change as a direct result of a peculiar 
Norwegian "defense tradition". In this tradition, history was interpreted in a manner that 
                                                 
1497 Kruzel, 1989: 81 
  
5 An American Empire? The US and liberal International Institutions, 1945-2001 
 
 
            
 
 
 
453
strengthened the army over the Navy.1498 To a lesser degree, the same applied to Denmark, and the 
historic wars with Germany reinforced this Danish foreign policy culture throughout the 20th 
Century.1499 In other words, Norway historically had had Sweden, while Denmark had both Sweden 
and Germany as neighboring states with which they had ambiguous historic relations. In popular 
expressions, the differences were emphasized rather than the similarities when the crucial period of 
nation-building occurred in the Nordic security complex. As we have seen earlier, nationalism 
suppressed Scandinavism. For both Denmark and Norway, one result of this was a navy of very 
modest ambitions and organisation, both compared to Sweden and when one considers the 
importance of extraterritorial sovereignty for these coastal states.  
This historic legacy came under considerable pressure when forces were to be modernised for 
meeting "new" security challenges. The latter development, restructuring the extraterritorial means 
of violence for the purposes of being able to deploy naval forces in combined, joint frameworks in 
operations beyond local and regional waters, became a point of convergence in political rhetoric in 
all the above countries, especially after 2001. How extensive impact this rhetoric and these goals 
will have on the use of navies and marines, and whether it will change naval doctrines principally, is 
too early to tell.  
 
5.6 The past as the future in the Atlantic empire? Overseas occupations, 
terrorism and piracy  
However, it is quite clear from the above that the organisation and platforms of extraterritorial 
military power are not being changed principally. Whether this will actually be a limiting factor on 
attempts at creating a new doctrine for the navies of the western world is a reasonable question. If 
we are to take the threat assessment so dominating among NATO members during the "war on 
terrorism" seriously, one might indeed wonder whether submarines, destroyers, frigates and Marines 
are the most suitable means to fight terrorism, or more broadly speaking what historian William 
Lind has dubbed "4th Generation warfare" (see below). It is true that frigates, corvettes and perhaps 
destroyers are still important to control sea-lines of communication. Frigates, corvettes and fast 
patrol boats might be very well suited to stop piracy, if these vessels are produced and deployed in 
the sufficient number. The same vessels, but particularly the smaller ones, are also suited to the 
enormous task of inspecting transports at sea, so vital for non-state belligerents when operating on a 
                                                 
1498 Ulriksen, 2002. Ulriksen demonstrates his thesis on the basis of the study of texts on Norwegian defence 
priorities. Although one might argue that the selection of these texts is somewhat biased, Ulriksen manages to 
demonstrate the striking fact that this particular maritime periphery gave the army a clear priority to the Navy.  
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larger scale. Neither should one lightly dismiss the argument of the US Navy that aircraft carriers 
are ideally suited in order to deliver air power and protection from the sea. It is nevertheless striking 
to note that the actual problem of fighting international "terrorism" by traditional military doctrines 
and -platforms remains unresolved, and perhaps especially so for sea- and air-power (although it 
might be argued that most regular western armies are hardly more conceptually developed in this 
respect). 
If we take a 4th generation warfare perspective on the use of force at sea and from the sea, it appears 
that the western states have a problem. One major challenge naturally is that the immense rise in the 
cost of building, equipping and operating modern warships has made navies rather small in terms of 
number of vessels. This makes both ships and planes too few to react against the stealth tactics of 
4th generation warfare. The other problem is much, much more complex. It must be seen in the 
perspective of ideology, the very peculiar character of asymmetric warfare and the limits of what 
can be achieved by modern navies.  
Let us then look at what these challenges actually are, and how they relate to the current world 
order. In doing so, I will borrow from two historians and military theorists that from the perspective 
of political science might seem obscure or rather marginal. Martin van Creveld and William Lind 
nevertheless have important insights that are far from obscure for the sociologist or political scientist 
studying the modern state, globalisation and warfare. Both scholars share the conviction that the 
modern state is in trouble. Not because of the globalisation of national economies or information, 
but because the modern state will no longer be equipped to deliver its main task of protecting society 
from the globalisation of violence by non-state actors.  
Let us begin with William Lind and his theory of 4th generation warfare (4GW).1500 In an article 
published in the Marine Corps gazette in 1989, with Lind as one of the co-authors, the essence of 4th 
generation warfare was described like this; 
                                                                                                                                                             
1499 See Unwin, 1996: 208-212. 
1500 More recently, Lind has summed up the concept of different generations of warfare in the following way; "The 
First Generation ran from 1648 to about the time of the American Civil War, and it was characterized, on the whole, 
by a battlefield of order. The battlefield of order created a military culture of order, which endures to this day.  
And there's the rub. For around the middle of the 19th century, the battlefield of order began to break down. Ever 
since, state militaries have had to grapple with a growing contradiction between their internal culture of order and 
the external reality of an increasingly disordered battlefield.  
 
The Second and Third Generations represent two different approaches to that problem. Second Generation war was 
developed by the French Army during and after World War I. Also known as firepower/attrition warfare, Second 
Generation war maintained the First Generation culture of order. Decision-making was centralized and hierarchical; 
orders were detailed and controlling, to permit synchronization of all arms.  
 
Third Generation war, also known as maneuver warfare, was developed by the German Army in World War I; by 
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"In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely 
undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be 
nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 
"civilian" and "military" may disappear. "1501 
 
The article produced debate within the then marginal camp of military theoreticians (the cold war 
did not produce major interest in military theory outside of military academies in the western world), 
but was otherwise ignored by academia, with one singular exception. Samuel P. Huntington based 
his 1993 article in Foreign Affairs "A Clash of Civilizations" on the conception of 4th generation 
warfare as elaborated by the authors of the 1989 Marine Corps Gazette. With the terrorist attacks in 
2001, the concept of a clash of civilizations awoke new interest. But the true insights and questions 
raised by the 4th generation warfare literature seemed to remain either completely unnoticed or 
badly misinterpreted in the US.1502 In other quarters, however, the normatively problematic (from a 
western point of view) notion of 4th generation warfare was being intensely studied. Exemplars of 
William Lind's "The Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook", written for the USMC, were found inside the 
command posts of Al Qaeda in the mountains of Afghanistan in 2002.  
Correspondingly, the Iraq war was a tragic testimony of a western reluctance to address the new 
security threats within novel intellectual frameworks. Thus, Lind concludes that the decision of the 
Bush and Blair administrations to invade and occupy Iraq was a strategic blunder based on 
international liberalism on part of the US. Israeli Professor Martin van Creveld has noted that in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
1918, Blitzkrieg was conceptually complete, lacking only the tanks necessary for operational mobility. The 
Prussian/German roots of Third Generation war go back earlier, to the Scharnhorst reforms that followed Prussia's 
defeat by Napoleon. This in turn created a military culture that was focused outward, on the enemy, the situation and 
the result the situation demanded instead of inward on rules, orders and processes. In effect, Prussia had broken with 
the First Generation culture of order. war". http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,Lind_061004,00.html. In 
principle, I argue that the development of 4th generation warfare is a major challenge for navies, although Lind has 
written most extensively on land warfare.  
1501 "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation"William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), 
 Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA),and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson 
(USMCR)Marine Corps Gazette October 1989, Pages 22-26 
 
1502 Why does the concept of 4th generation warfare, and an acceptance that 4th generation warfare seem so 
problematic for Western, but also for secular states in general? Conceptually, militarily and politically, it will 
probably be very hard for the modern state to adapt to the development if it entails a loss of the state monopoly of 
violence. The major problem is perhaps normative. To the extent that we accept 4th generation warfare as war, we 
also accept that the division between internal and external (domestic versus foreign policy) becomes much more 
blurred. Now, this will have a major impact on foreign policies for sure, but it will also threaten what constitutes the 
polity (see Buzan, 1991 for a conceptual discussion).  One might indeed look at the case of Israel, to study how one 
particular security environment has entailed a state trying to combat non-state groups. But the problem will get even 
more serious, perhaps, if international terrorism becomes a dominant tactic of 4th generation warfare. The civil 
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world of interdependence, the conventionally stronger party always loses in an international armed 
conflict. In his paper, "Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did",1503 for example, he mused as to what 
the Iraq occupation will produce; 
"In other words, he who fights against the weak - and the rag-tag Iraqi militias are very weak 
indeed - and loses, loses... As Vietnam and countless other cases prove, no armed force, however 
rich, however powerful, however advanced, however well motivated is immune to this dilemma.That 
is why the present adventure will almost certainly end as the previous one (Vietnam) did. Namely, 
with the last U.S. troops fleeing the country while hanging on to their helicopters' skids." 
 
How come these historians deliver such a gloomy forecast? In order to understand them, we must 
simplify and address the problem through three analytically different, but highly overlapping, 
questions; political ideology, the very peculiar character of asymmetric warfare and the limits of 
what can be achieved by military means by modern, secular western states. Since this thesis is about 
the policies and ideology of extraterritorial power, we will emphasis the first group of factors. 
However, we will seek to demonstrate that these variables are related to the two other classes of 
questions in a way that often escapes proper attention. 
 
Firstly, while the end of the cold war ended the appeal of Marxism, mankind had certainly not 
reached "The End of History". While political ideology did no longer seem important as a cleavage 
within the western world, the end of the struggle between liberalism and Marxism has in fact made 
international affairs more, not less, ideologically laden. This reaction started in earnest in 1981 with 
the Presidency of Ronald Reagan.1504 Gradually, and intensified from 1991, the western world 
seemed to converge around the notion of international liberalism. Powerful states and international 
institutions alike sought to export this ideology to Eastern Europe. But beyond this, radical Islamism 
was on the rise in North Africa, Indonesia, several Arab countries and in Afghanistan and the 
Caucasus. The terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 was conducted by the most violent off-spring of 
                                                                                                                                                             
liberties and the open society, so important for western ideology throughout the postwar era, might come under 
pressure. Indeed, one does not need to belong to the left to warn against such a trend at the time of writing.  
1503 Paper delivered by van creveld, Bergen May13 May 2004. 
1504 This is a simplification, indeed. Ideology, we have argued, have always played an important role in shaping 
foreign policy. But the rise of the "neoconservative" movement in the US can be dated back to the war in the Middle 
East in 1973, where conservatives, friends of Israel and US idealists merged in condemnation of the Republican 
administration for not doing enough to support Israel. For a biased but highly interesting discussion of this 
particular process from one who became victim of this movement, see Vol II of Henry Kissinger`s biography. For a 
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Islamism, and the first actions against the Taliban Regime of Afghanistan and Al-Qaida therefore 
achieved solid international support. The initial actions also had some traits of success, but all that 
followed showed how the ideological component is vital to a proper understanding of the huge gap 
between international liberalism and other cultures. While the international community, led by the 
US, sought to stabilize the country in the aftermath of the major military operations, it struggled in 
Afghanistan in terms of creating a monopoly of violence or anything resembling such a construct. In 
fact, the western world had major problems in small Kosovo, in spite of a continued UN, NATO and 
EU presence. It seemed as if international liberalism was not able to gain even the tiniest lasting 
foothold in these areas by means acceptable to the ideology of the western nations themselves.  
The weakening of NATO was accelerated within a few years after 911. The fact is that NATO no 
longer had the purpose that initially served as the building-blocks for the alliance (i.e. to keep the 
Germans down, the Russians out and the US in). Since established institutions die very slowly and 
reluctantly, the alliance throughout the 1990s sought to redefine its roles. However, the original 
interest in the alliance was gone, since the Soviet Union and communism was no longer deemed as a 
threat against Europe. This made the alliance vulnerable to disagreements on what constitutes the 
most important security concerns and in what way these should be addressed. To France and 
Germany in particular, there were also limits as to how long they would walk with the US. When the 
US combined international liberalism with what was perceived (however exaggerated or distorted 
such perceptions could be, this did not nullify the effect of perceptions as such) as something of a 
“unilateral gunfighter-nation attitude”, the cohesion among some of the western allies soon was 
weakened. This largely became manifest with the US initiative to invade Iraq (the cleavages that 
resulted in Europe to some degree consisted of Atlanticist versus non-Atlanticist states, "new" 
versus "old" European states, and between the elite and the majority of public opinion in the states 
that supported the US invasion). The invasion succeeded, but the occupation failed, at least in the 
short run. Once inside Iraq, a large number of different Islamic groups applied 4GW tactics in order 
to decrease the legitimacy of the occupation forces. Moreover, the actual conduct of the occupation 
forces combined with US tacit support of Israeli policies eventually managed to enrage the Arab 
world and raise already elevated European disbelief of US intentions in the Middle East. Indeed, the 
US citizens themselves came to doubt in the leadership of their country and the wisdom of US 
interventionism.1505In one single year, disapproval of how the President was handling the situation 
rose from 22 to 58 %.The international reaction was even less favourable. When asked whether they 
                                                                                                                                                             
discussion of the dangers of ideologic foreign policy, see the last chapter in Volume III of the biography by the same 
author.  
1505 http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm 
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believed the war in Iraq had helped the war on terrorism, respondents throughout the world 
responded largely in the negative.1506 Surprisingly, the legitimacy of the US hegemony had 
plummeted only 2 years after the attacks on US soil in 2001. 
The result of the Iraq-war fallout was an exposure of the political and ethical dilemmas that US 
policymakers and military units are bound to face in an age of 4th generation warfare. It seems 
almost incomprehensible how a democratic state can achieve victory without compromising the 
values for which it stands. In this respect, the dissimilarity to its opponents is astounding, since the 
non-state actors show no respect for the Geneva Convention or other international norms of 
behaviour in conflict. The resulting frustration and low morale in the armed forces of the state is 
inevitable. One consequence of this is a tactical conduct that undermines the legitimacy of the forces 
and the state leadership itself.  As William Lind and his co-authors in the 1989 article concluded, it 
is not the case that the small groups using 4th generation tactics will engage its enemies on the 
"battlefield", understood in traditional western terms.  
In sum, the US, or for that matter any other western state's, ambitions to transform distant regimes 
through intervention by force are limited by both international norms and their domestic institutions 
and level of public support. On both levels, legitimacy is a prerequisite for effective action and the 
endurance to carry out political reform and the desired social and legal improvements conceived in 
terms of human rights, market reform and the rule of law.  
The chief problem, if one is to be cynical, was that the age of imperialism had passed. The high 
ideals of a western power AD 2003 could not be imposed through intervention in the same manner 
that the older European empires once sought to transform their overseas territories. It was not only 
that the ultimate aims of promoting human rights, the rule of law and relatively free markets were 
more far-ranging than the goals of the 19th century European colonial states. The international 
climate was much less inclined to support large-scale interventions that did not comply with the 
international institutional logic, and lack of such support mattered in the 21st century. Secondly, and 
perhaps even more important, the US as a polity and society was not inclined to see itself as an 
empire either. Thus, as US policies (however undeservedly as seen from Washington DC) came to 
be compared to imperialism based on the actual conduct of US foreign policy, it lost support in a 
dramatic way by 2004. This is all the more striking when one considers the huge support the Bush 
administration had both in domestic and international realms in 2001/2002. While the US 
intervention in Iraq and its conduct in Afghanistan certainly was less of an imperialist policy than 
the praxis in overseas possessions of the British Empire, the US came to be criticized for what was 
                                                 
1506 The Washington Post, March 2004. Note that the survey was carried out prior to the publication of photos of US 
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labelled imperialism. In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair and US president George W. Bush set out to create a new order in international affairs in 
general, and in the Middle East and Western Central Asia in particular, partly through the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this respect, the invasion of Iraq was something much more 
ambitious than ending the efforts of the Saddam Hussein regime from building or using weapons of 
mass destruction. The pendulum between isolationism and international interventionism had swung 
in the direction of interventionism after the 911 attacks. This made stark measures against terrorists 
and potential enemies of the US politically possible to a surprising degree. In September 2002, for 
example, Head of the CIA Counterterrorist Centre, Cofer Black, said openly that the agency applied 
new forms of "operational flexibility" against suspected terrorists in US captivity. He stated that 
these novel US ways of dealing with prisoners were highly classified, but that "I have to say that all 
you need to know: There was a before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11".1507 But it did not take so 
long before pictures from the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq made the US public and the world “know”. 
Needless to say, the US public was as disgusted as many international commentators. The treatment 
of these and other prisoners was a breach with US values as well with international treaties that the 
US signed in 1949, and therefore backfired both domestically and internationally.  
The strategic problem in a world of international institutions based on, exactly, order as conceived 
as relations between states, combined with the operations by 4GW organisations such as Al Quaida, 
is that western extraterritorial military organisations are not ideally suited to the task they are 
assigned. The occupation of Iraq is a good example of this peculiar mechanism when a high-tech 
western power combats 4th generation opponents applying guerrilla warfare, or "terrorism" as a 
tactic; the US is condemned throughout much of the world, while the 4th generation warriors that 
live off the land and mingle with the civilian population can continue their appalling, indiscriminate 
killing. 
Therefore, it is possible to comprehend why it does not really solve the problem that the US Defence 
Budget for 2003 comprises over 40 per cent of the world's total spending on military material and 
operations.1508 While US defence spending with the current growth rate is starting to approach half 
of the globe's spending on the military, the US has only 5 percent of the world's soldiers.1509 This 
                                                                                                                                                             
soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners. 
1507 Cited in Mann, 2003: 142 
1508 "The Pentagon`s New Budget, New Strategy, and New War", Project on defense Alternatives, briefing Report 
no 12, June 2002 
1509 My argument here is very similar to that of Michael Mann in his book "Incoherent Empire". While there are 
some substantial dissimilarities in our perspectives, I will use several examples from his book to illustrate my own 
view. While Mann differs significantly from the theoreticians of 4th Generation warfare, his arguments on many 
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becomes an acute problem for the US (and we have demonstrated above that numerically, the US is 
much larger than the other western powers in military terms) after their sophisticated units and 
platforms have gained a tactical victory on overseas territory. After such a victory, of course, the 
territory in question must be pacified through a long-term occupation. While the 19th century 
European empires could do this in a brutal fashion, the US is restricted from doing so by her own, as 
well as international, norms of the postwar era. This is clear evidence of profound change in the 
international system, and illustrates the differences between the British and US “Empires”. 
While the 19th century British Empire could rule over vast territories with limited forces by 
recruiting local and regional manpower, the US forces are literally protected in fortresses when they 
are not on patrol in hostile territory.  
While the 19th century representatives of the British Empire went on duty to an overseas colony, 
they expected to stay for a very long period indeed. As a result, they merged with the local 
population where they served. This had several long-lasting implications. In British India, for 
example, while the officers remained Europeans, the non-commissioned officers soon had a majority 
of children of marriages between a British soldier and an Indian mother.1510 In contrast, by spring 
2004, morale among US servicemen crumbled as their contracts with the Army and the Marine 
Corps were extended for longer duties. While Civil-Military cooperation certainly had own units, 
US servicemen and -women had very little contact with the local population neither in Iraq nor in 
Afghanistan. While the British imperialists relied heavily on local rulers and built order with armies 
consisting of natives, the US solution early in the 2003 occupation of Iraq was to dissolve existing 
military units and police, practically making the servicemen of the earlier monopoly of violence into 
unemployed men with an uncertain future. While the old European states like France and Britain to 
this day have elite units of foreign mercenaries (The French Foreign Legion and the British 
"Ghurkhas"), the US has no such corresponding unit. While the European states learned about 4th 
generation warfare in places like North Africa and Northern Ireland over extended periods of time, 
the US was not prepared for the tactics they faced in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. The US, with 
the single exception of the early occupation years in the Philippines, was not an imperialist power. 
To the contrary, a dominant trait in US society was defined by being the opposite of the old 
European states. This international liberalism and US idealism has been instrumental in determining 
where US military power is applied, and how the US public opinion receives media coverage of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
points are very similar to those of William Lind and Martin van Creveld. I guess neither camps would necessarily  
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not so liberal treatment of prisoners or civilian population in areas they seek to pacify.1511 Moreover, 
it is perhaps not so surprising that a US administration, that believes in the power of civil society, 
individual liberty and which saw a corrupt state as the hindrance to Iraqi prosperity, did not plan for 
an intense restructuring of the Iraqi society through the means of rebuilding infrastructure. To a 
liberalist, society heals it own wounds. After all, all US citizens -and US soldiers are US citizens- 
have been taught from their first years in school that US values have been triumphant. And as Elihu 
Root wrote over one hundred years ago; 
"The American soldier is different from all other soldiers of all other countries since the world 
began…he is the advance guard of liberty and justice, of law and order, and of peace and 
happiness".1512  
All these, in many ways praiseworthy, beliefs proved to be overly optimistic in countries like 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The historical background for the US when it comes to occupation was Japan 
and Western Germany, but those territories were different than Afghanistan and Iraq in a number of 
aspects. The neo-conservatives were aware of this, but in fact some of them seemed to have been 
inspired by the cost-effectiveness of the historic British Empire. It was just that the British had done 
things so differently. Where the British imperialists ruled indirectly through native elites with one 
British commissioner and two or three political officers with an area of responsibility of one 
thousand square miles in West Africa, US military personnel at the time of writing rely on heavy 
armour and air support to ride through the streets of Baghdad on their swift patrols. And yet, the US 
does not apply the more Byzantine practises of dividing and ruling to control the areas of 
occupation.  
                     One might reasonably set forth the hypothesis that when faced with 4th generation 
opponents, second and third generation warfare fails. This has important bearings on the relevance 
of naval forces. While we should be very, very cautious to proclaim that war between modern states 
has vanished, it seems to me that the traditional thinking on naval strategy (largely a product of the 
cold war and Alfred Mahan) is almost irrelevant in fighting 4GW. Current doctrine relies heavily on 
high-tech weapons systems and platforms for extraterritorial use of violence. Naval platforms 
therefore have become incredibly expensive, and thus navies have shrunk in size. All the navies 
                                                                                                                                                             
1510 See Mann, 2003: 25-26: "By the early 1800s over 80 percent of the 291.000 imperial troops in India were 
Indian". He also notes that even after the rebellions (successfully pacificated by the British, in the late 1850s, two-
thirds of the Imperial army in India remained Indian. 
1511 The legitimacy of US administrations, both in domestic society as well as the international society, is of outmost 
importance to the US predominance in world politics in a particular manner (see Melby, 2004: 228-236 for a good 
discussion). If US extraterritorial praxis moves too far away from US ideals, then a crisis of legitimacy might occur.  
1512 Cited in Bacevich, 2002: 167 
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covered in this thesis have converged on this point; they contain very advanced but very few ships 
with a limited number of servicemen. In fact, this trend has been consistent for the last 60 years. In a 
war between states, this will make a western alliance, or even the US alone, impossible to defeat in a 
conventional war at sea, and in defeating military power projected from the sea.  
We should be careful, as social scientists, to make the claim that such a war will not occur in the 
distant future. But based on the evidence from the study of large-scale violence during the last fifty 
years, it is clear that such wars -where western states are part of the conflict in a direct manner- 
occurs more and more seldom.1513 This opens up the question as to whether the current doctrine and 
current organisations are as relevant as their price tags would indicate. According to the thinkers 
behind the theory of 4th generation warfare, new developments must result in a renewal. Fifteen 
years ago, Lind et al wrote that: 
                                                      "For about the last 500 years, the West has defined warfare. For a 
military to be effective it generally had to follow Western models. Because the West's strength is 
technology, it may tend to conceive of a fourth generation in technological terms.The fact that some 
non-Western areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology may lead them to 
develop a fourth generation through ideas rather than technology."1514 
                                                                                                                  
Since this was written in 1989, the ultimate conclusion must be that the hypothesis of 4th generation 
warfare as a way to combat western influence in general, and the US in particular, is strengthened 
rather than weakened. The big question on the side of naval praxis will then be whether our present 
platforms and weapon systems are optimally adjusted to the present and future threats. However, the 
required adjustment must start at the intellectual level, and must be conceptualized at the political 
level before a significant change in the praxis of extraterritorial praxis will occur in western states. 
Based on historical experience, such adjustments seldom come rapidly, and rarely unless the 
initiator of change has experienced defeat.  
It is quite conceivable, in fact has already happened against some units (USS Cole and French 
tankers), that the enemies of the US and its allies might strike against naval ships, civilian cruise 
ships, oil tankers, cargo ships, offshore oil- and gas-installations, pipelines and harbors. In a world-
system where some 80% of the long-range total transport is carried across seas, spectacular and 
large-scale disruption of this sector will have profound economic, political and military 
consequences. In the economic realm, transaction costs will with all probability increase sharply 
                                                 
1513 The best argument with empirical proof of this development is in my view van Creveld, 1991 
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after such attacks. It is not only the lost value of ships and commodities that will count, but also 
insurance rates and the entire logistical system of industries where producers are interdependent on 
each other and do not use resources to store raw materials and parts of their products locally. In such 
an economy, a steady inflow of the material needed for production and a steady outflow of the final 
product is a necessity for maintaining production. In the political and military realms, consequences 
are much more difficult to predict. The only certain effect will be a demand for de-centralised 
extraterritorial forces to protect the sinews of the modern world-system that stretch from continent to 
continent over the seas. The US or NATO will not have the capacity to protect all sea-lines of 
communication with existing plans for future force structures and with current doctrines. It will 
require far more ships and effective command and control of these ships, something that few 
African, Asian or Middle East countries are capable of supporting. The true maritime dilemma of 
the 21st century is therefore how to avoid such terrorism at sea.  
In this respect, another maritime development in the "new world order" with its "new" security 
challenges- piracy- might prove illustrative. While piracy is not necessarily an activity of 4th 
generation warfare -piracy is defined as a criminal act separate from terrorism- there nevertheless is 
a link between piracy and 4th generation warfare at sea. Firstly, acts of piracy are carried out by 
non-state actors that do not seek any kind of military-technological symmetry with the western 
powers. This leads to a second parallel; pirates seek weak and largely unprotected targets, a kind of 
indirect approach. Thirdly, pirates clearly thrive in areas of disorder, understood as weak states. 
While weak states may have problems in controlling their territory, they more often have even 
bigger problems in controlling the waters under their de jure national jurisdiction. All these 
parallels, I argue, make a look into the anti-piracy efforts of international institutions worthwhile.  
The 1982 UN Treaty on the Law of the Sea defined piracy in the following way in article 101  
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(I) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship 
or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of 
facts 
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making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).”1515 
 
In retrospect, it is easy to see that part a) ii would cause problems in addressing piracy from the 
standpoint of international law. The problem was that some states saw the 200nm. EEZ as "within 
national jurisdiction" for all practical purposes, whereas “failed states” did not even have the 
capacity to provide a minimum of law and order within their territorial waters. Therefore, the coastal 
state had the responsibility to exercise control within this zone, also with the purpose of stopping 
and prosecuting pirates. Needless to say, such tasks were beyond the capacity of many poor states. 
In many ways, it is not improper to say that the 1982 UNCLOS was unprepared for the fact that 
"failed states" might facilitate considerable problems for maritime safety. Like almost all other 
international treaties, the Law of the Sea institutions were based on the State as the "international 
person" responsible for its domain and its acts. Thus, the increase of the scope of coastal state 
jurisdiction also increased the scope of the problems of failed states. It is no exaggeration to claim 
that the problems in some states increasingly became internationalised in the process. From around 
1980, piracy emerged as a global security challenge; between 1984 and 1999, the IMO has compiled 
1587 attacks by pirates worldwide, presumably the actual number is much higher.1516 Through 
international pressure and support, some weak states nevertheless managed to control piracy within 
their national jurisdiction better. This was the case for some years in the waters off West Africa, 
where piracy constituted a big problem in the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1986, this region -and 
especially the Nigerian EEZ- had the highest reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
In average, 25 cases were reported each year.1517 The frequency of these assaults decreased 
significantly after efforts by Nigerian authorities to curb piracy within their national jurisdiction had 
been implemented. Needless to say, such a result was only possible though extensive operations by 
Nigerian navy and police forces, a level of state alertness that proved not to be sustainable. By 1998, 
the annual attacks off West Africa had risen to 22 again.  
Another problem area was the Malacca Strait, one of the busiest waterways in the world that during 
the last decade has also become one of the most dangerous. During the 1980s, piracy was not 
                                                 
1515 UNCLOS Official text. Resources on Piracy from 1990 are scarce. Some books on the theme have been 
published by journalists and popular writers. I have therefore restricted the use of sources to the Ofiicial statistics 
and papers presented by the IMO and MSC.  
One should also note that literally NO scholars have addressed the question of 4th generation warfare and naval 
forces. Indeed, scholars on military theory struggle with the same conceptual limitations as the author of this thesis 
does in this respect. As we will see, these problems at the intellectual level is perhaps even more striking in military 
circles.  
1516 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:1 
1517 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:2 
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common here, with an average of 7 assaults per year, again according to the IMO report. With the 
dismantling of the bipolar world order, piracy in the Malacca Strait exploded. There were 28 acts of 
piracy in 1989, and 50 in 1991 alone.1518 What made the Malacca Strait particularly important was 
the fact that it is one of the busiest waterways in the world, with more than 200 large ships passing 
each and every day. This makes the Malacca Strait interesting, beyond the question of piracy. Like 
Gibraltar, Bosporus, The Channel, and the Panama and Suez channels, the Malacca Strait belongs to 
a group of straits that can be characterised as the arteries of the integrated world economy. With 
energy and safe transportation being of outmost concern for the advanced economies, it is easy to 
see how failed states and 4th generation warfare makes for a rather dubious amalgam. NATO 
officials realized this in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, and used NATO naval forces to 
escort civilian shipping through the Eastern Mediterranean. But what body should take 
responsibility for the Malacca Strait (Indonesia certainly displayed little enthusiasm for the US 
proposals for increased US naval presence in these waters)? 
The question of suppressing piracy here in the 1990s offer some insights as to the potential and the 
limits to use an institution like the IMO and the states in the region to reduce irregular armed forces 
in such vital waterways.  
The Malacca Strait is shallow and narrow in some stretches, making boarding by pirates at night 
easier. Surveillance systems aboard commercial ships therefore would make the transit much safer. 
But merchantmen have sparse weapons to protect themselves from more heavily armed pirates or 
terrorists. Neither was arming of merchantmen seen as especially desirable by the international 
institutions (a revival of this old yet abandoned praxis is not entirely unfeasible, though).1519 On this 
background, the IMO therefore set out to work out regional arrangements for this particular strait, 
and simultaneously to give recommendations for ship-owners and -operators. This should be seen as 
the start of a development which outcome we do not know, but one which clearly are raising the 
protection costs of transport at sea. An IMO working group with experts from ten countries started 
to cooperate with the three littoral states of the Malacca Strait (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) 
in 1992 in order to produce a comprehensive report with recommendations for crews, ship-owners, 
flag states, all coastal states and port states. Clearly, these recommendations could apply to other 
regions as well, so that there could have been a substantial learning effect from the Malacca case.  
The findings of the expert group resulted in two circulars from the Maritime Safety Committee 
(MSC) in 1993. The first one was MSC/Circ. 622-"Recommenations to Governments for preventing 
                                                 
1518 Ibid: 3 
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and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships", while MSC/Circ 623 contained 
"Guidance to ship-owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing 
acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships". These suggestions (and suggestions they were), 
made the more political IMO Assembly adopt a new resolution- A.738 (18), recommending 
measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships. These suggestions are 
significant in a historic perspective, since they signalled the rise in protection of civilian shipping 
and transport at sea that has continued until the time of writing. On the other hand, the IMO 
resolution did not contain measures beyond the sharing of information through channels of 
communication already established. The real improvement was simply a system of reporting acts of 
piracy and attempts to armed robbery or similar incidents. This undoubtedly made reporting and 
localising this security challenge easier. To a large degree, the measures aimed at utilising existing 
international institutions in creating a system of early warning of piracy. As a result, IMO in 
collaboration with the International Mobile Satellite Organization (Immarsat) and the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) included "Piracy/armed robbery attack" "as a category of distress 
message which ships can now transmit through either the DSC (Digital Selective Calling) or 
Immarsat equipment by simply pressing a button"1520 on the bridge of the ship. Such a message will 
automatically be received by shore stations and ships in the vicinity of the attacked ship. Together 
with the regional cooperation on naval patrolling by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the 
frequency of pirate attacks shrunk to 6 in 1998. But it was the littoral states adjacent to the strait that 
had to carry out these regional measures, and in the long run such measures are taxing on the 
contributors.  
The recommendations from the IMO did little to curb piracy in the South China Sea even in the 
short run. In these vast and contested waters, piracy and armed robbery reached a level only 
surpassed by the golden days of piracy some centuries ago. In many ways, this example is a stark 
reminder of how complex a task it is to establish order in waters with unclear and disputed 
jurisdictional sectors. Just as the IMO facilitated better warning and information systems for civilian 
shipping, 42 incidents of piracy in the East and South China Sea were reported during a 7-month 
period in 1993.1521 The significant difference from the Malacca Strait was that the large majority of 
the China Sea attacks took place in international waters and were carried through with outright use 
                                                                                                                                                             
1519 Non-lethal weapons and passive protection is much more acceptable, and are being used at the time of writing 
(2005). 
1520 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:3 
 
1521 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:4 
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of weapons. Clearly, stopping such activities could not be achieved through appealing to nearby 
coastal states or simply by information sharing. In many ways, the South China Sea was the ideal 
area of operations for organized piracy enterprises and perhaps terrorists alike, being more than 200 
miles wide and literally dotted with uninhibitated islands that served as hiding places after an 
operation. At this stage, I believe it is fair to say that the problems in this area is only getting worse, 
judged by the number of cases of piracy, that to some degree seem to be embedded in organized 
crime. The annual number of attacks in these waters had risen to 98 in 1998, and does not seem to 
fall, although the statistical material obviously is inaccurate because many cases of piracy are not 
reported to the IMO. 
The US did not seem particularly interested in the problem during the 1990s. By and large, the 
political leadership during the Clinton administrations were far more occupied by the relationships 
to Russia and other East European Countries, China and addressing the mounting problems in the 
Balkans. At the military level, praxis was still focused on grand strategy and founded on the so-
called Powell Doctrine. The two were interrelated, since the Powell doctrine stated that if the US use 
military force, then this force should be applied with maximum force to ensure swift victories with 
as little risk to own soldiers as possible. Otherwise, the US Coast Guard had more than enough to do 
in waters nearer the homeland, especially regarding the smuggling of drugs and people to the US. 
Piracy in South American waters and in the Caribbean in fact was a problem, 38 attacks being 
reported by the IMO in 1998, but this was not a US priority. 
The ultimate result was that piracy remained, and to some degree increased, as a threat to shipping. 
From 1995 till 2000, for example, 244 incidents have been recorded in the South China Sea and the 
Malacca Strait.1522 Although the IMO certainly tried to install mechanisms for curbing piracy, the 
western states and organisations like NATO and the EU did not prioritise anti-piracy policies 
particularly high. Without support from these organisations and their strongest member states, all the 
IMO could achieve were incremental steps through appeals to states to comply with IMO 
recommendations (as in IMO recommendations from the MSC, such as MSC/Circ. 622/rev.1 from 
1999). However, the IMO through the MSC warned against measures to arm merchant ships, 
believing that aggressive responses to piracy from the crews of civilian ships would only lead to 
more casualties. Moreover, any ship has limited judicial freedom to counter-act by physical means 
in port or at anchor, or in transit for that matter. A civilian ship, or a naval vessel within the sphere 
of jurisdiction of another state in peacetime, does simply not have any police authority. In these 
                                                 
1522 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:4 
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circumstances, it must rely on the protection of the state that has, or is supposed to have, jurisdiction 
within the territorial sea or EEZ. Thus, port facilities and jurisdiction within national zones are the 
responsibility of the coastal state, while the merchant ship in practise is restricted to seek protection 
through passive means (navigation, use of lights etc). Furthermore, the international community at 
large did not  emphasise supporting IMO with the financial and material means to improve the anti-
piracy efforts. It is true that the International Maritime Bureau established a Piracy reporting centre 
in October 1992.1523 But it is illustrating of the lack of state support that this centre was located in 
Kuala Lumpur and financed wholly by voluntary contributions from shipping and insurance 
companies. More or less, the Centre simply assists the same companies. This body could 
nevertheless not stop an increase of piracy at the turn of the century, according to IMO; "The 
number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported to the IMO during 2000 was up 
by more than 50 per cent over the equivalent figure for 1999".1524 Although we only have reliable 
data from the late 1990s and onwards, the IMO reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships show that the problem of securing traffic at sea is substantial. For the last 6 years of available 
data, the IMO reports the following frequency of piracy and armed robbery. 
 
Table 5.6 IMO Reports on acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships 1997-
20031525 
Year Number of 
incidents 
1997 252 
1998 210 
1999 309 
2000 471 
2001 370 
2002 383 
2003 445 
 
                                                 
1523 "Focus on IMO-Piracy and armed robbery at sea", Paper, IMO, 2000:7, Quarterly statistics IMO 1997-2003 
1524 http://www.imo.org/Facilitation/mainframe.asp?topic_id=362 
1525 Numbers are taken from "Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships", annual reports IMO 1997, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002. 
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What really could reduce piracy would be one or all of the following precautions: 
1. The establishment of and active maintenance of an international regime that made states 
 responsible for increased protection for ships in port or at anchor. Needless to say, such a 
 regime would require the leadership of powerful states that could apply sanctions against 
 free-riders; 
2. The arming of merchant ships with lethal or non-lethal weapons in order to aggressively 
 deter and defeat acts of piracy; 
3. The establishment and operation of standing naval forces in waters where acts of piracy have 
 occurred with high frequency. 
 
Of those, point 2 is problematic both in judicial and operational terms, although non-lethal weapons 
currently used do have effect up to a certain point. However, the US-led war on terrorism ensured 
that 1 and 3 in fact materialised to a degree unprecedented after WWII. Thus, the protective 
measures in order to reduce the likelihood of terrorism at sea also helped to increase the protection 
of merchant ships against piracy in some waters. In fact, the measures decided upon in 2002/2003 
that sought to reduce the probability and consequences of terrorism at sea were of such magnitude 
that it deserves attention here. In sum, they constituted a change of the protection costs and thereby 
the transaction costs, in the world economy. To a large degree, states were again responsible for 
carrying out this protection from the acts of non-state actors.  
One of the initial concerns regarding terrorism at or from the sea was the possibility that the 
enormous traffic of containers on ships could facilitate an attack with weapons of mass destruction. 
A weapon of mass destruction, it was feared, could be secreted aboard a ship and carried into a port, 
and then be detonated by a terror group. The practical problems of physically searching the hundreds 
of thousands of containers that arrive in large ports would be formidable. Furthermore, maritime 
transports itself could be used by a 4th generation group of warriors in numerous ways. The 
terrorists could capture a large merchant ship, such as a laden tanker or gas carrier, and use the ship 
as a weapon itself, to cause a huge explosion or vast pollution in a port or populated area. This itself 
is a frightening prospect and has led, especially in the United States, to strict ship movement 
controls being implemented by the US Coast Guard. 
Secondly there is concern about the potential for an attack upon a ferry or large passenger ship, 
either caused by a bomb being secreted aboard, or an attack by an explosive-laden craft such as 
caused devastating damage to the USS Cole in Yemeni waters. 
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Thirdly, it is not totally unfeasible that 4th generation groups, or "terrorists", could attack offshore 
installations and pipelines. While this would require some equipment and trained personnel, the 
economic and environmental effects of such attacks could have significant political implications.  
All these scenarios and the countermeasures that were central, and partly implemented in the 
aftermath of the 911 attacks, nevertheless illustrate a dilemma in how to deal with 4th generation 
"warfare". Precautions against all eventualities of terrorist attacks must be proportional, and if world 
trade is brought to slow crawl because of the level of precautions, then the terrorists have probably 
achieved one of their objectives. In sum then, the terrorist threat is constituted by a "terrorist-in-
being", to apply a Corbettian phrase to the 21st century.1526 In the past, a major concern has been the 
wide variation in levels of port security. It is hoped that the security concerns will be sufficient to 
persuade all port managements that they need to greatly enhance security on the land and ship side 
of ports to prevent unauthorised entry. Luggage screening measures are being implemented in the 
passenger trades, while more sophisticated security checks are being employed. 
With the container trades, it is obviously impossible to check every container, but it is hoped that 
risk can be managed by dividing cargo into that which comes from high risk areas, or from sources 
where security is less strict from that cargo which is well checked, emanates from secure sources 
and has a clear documentary trail. Efforts are also being made to develop x-ray and other equipment 
that will enable whole containers to be scanned rapidly. While at the time of writing it is too early to 
tell whether these measures will be successful, the attempts to deal with the risk from terrorism 
towards or through maritime units constitute an enormous rise in transaction costs throughout the 
world. Moreover, it well illustrates the difficulty the modern state has in countering 4th generation 
warfare in an open world economy.  
In addition to the IMO regulations, heavily supported by the US, NATO responded to "credible 
evidence" that terrorist groups planned attacks on civilian shipping in the Western Mediterranean (it 
goes almost without saying that at present, it is very hard to evaluate the accuracy of the classified 
intelligence reports that justified these precautions). Thus, "Operation Active Endeavour" has lasted 
from 2002 till the time of writing, consisting to a high degree of regular patrolling and escort of 
civilian merchantmen in the Gibraltar Strait. In fact, the more or less permanent increase of the use 
of NATO naval forces was extended to cover the entire Mediterranean in March 2004.1527 In these 
waters then, the contours of a new "regime" were visible by 2004. According to NATO officials, 
                                                 
1526 The term "terrorist-in-being" was, to my knowledge, first used by two midshipmen at the Royal Norwegian 
Naval Academy in 2003. In a project thesis, midshipmen Rakvåg and Johnsen elegantly argued that the rise in 
protection costs was the major effect of the terrorist threat, and that the terrorists thereby achieved one of their chief 
purposes. 
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more and more coastal states showed interest in an increased presence from NATO naval forces to 
protect civilian shipping and ports (this is not solely bragging from NATO circles. Especially states 
without or with insignificant naval forces saw the benefits in an international presence around 
maritime choke points). Thus, it seemed that navies were more usable than a theoretical 4th 
generation warfare proposition might seem to indicate. It was not so much that the role of navies 
was new. Rather, it returned to something very old and once familiar to every state navy; protection 
of transport at sea from non-state actors, be it pirates or "terrorists". In the 21st century, moreover, 
offshore industry and coastal states to a large degree saw this increased naval presence as beneficial 
due to the increased surveillance it represented. Swift rescue operations and monitoring of pollution 
are but a few benefits to the civilian society of this "new" naval priority beyond the primary 
objective of curbing terrorism. The only problem, of course, is the immense cost of this activity. To 
the modern state, and especially the modern market-oriented western states, operating sophisticated 
naval platforms for these tasks comes at a high price. Although there does not exist any reliable 
estimation of the costs, there is no doubt that the annual price of naval patrolling alone amounts to 
many billion dollars. In sum, the war against, and the protection from, terrorism has a staggering 
price tag. In the words of the "9/11 Commission report" (authorized edition): 
 
"Between fiscal year 2001, the last budget adopted before 9/11, and the present fiscal year 2004, 
total federal spending on defense (including expenditures on both Iraq and Afghanistan), homeland 
security, and international affairs rose more than 50 percent, from $354 billion to about $547 
billion"1528 
 
The big question is how sustainable this level of effort is in the long run, and if it is not sustainable, 
how security can be achieved with fewer dollars spent. Presumably, then, it is only a matter of time 
before governments will start to question the wisdom of their current (2004) force structure goals. 
Could not the tasks of naval patrol and escort of merchant ships simply be done in a much cheaper 
way? One might reasonably argue that quantity would matter much, much more than the quality of 
ships required to curb terrorism at sea and piracy. Moreover, the costs of protecting civilian shipping 
cannot be carried by the states alone. Neither does a clear-cut military solution readily exist to the 
twin problems of terrorism and piracy (the two phenomena are linked in the security threats 
represented by 4th generation warfare). For example, The Economist in October 2003 argued that   
                                                                                                                                                             
1527 http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_sea-e.pdf 
1528 The 9/11 Commission report, 2004: 361 
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"According to a new study by Aegis Defence Services, a London defence and security consultancy, 
these attacks represent something altogether more sinister. The temporary hijacking of the Dewi 
Madrim was by terrorists learning to drive a ship, and the kidnapping (without any attempt to 
ransom the officers) was aimed at acquiring expertise to help the terrorists mount a maritime attack. 
In other words, attacks like that on the Dewi Madrim are the equivalent of the al-Qaeda hijackers 
who perpetrated the September 11th attacks going to flying school in Florida"1529 
 
An OECD report on maritime security, published in 2003,1530 pointed out that the shipping industry 
had to invest $1.3 billion that year on improved security and would face running costs of $730m a 
year to maintain better security systems. After all, there are some 46,000 merchant ships and 4,000 
ports around the world.  
With 232 million container movements through the world's ports each year, it is possible to look 
inside only about 2% of them at the time of writing. Adapting to the IMO requirements of increased 
port security, the owners of the world's biggest ports quickly co-operated, because they feared that, 
if they did not, they might have been cut off from trade with America. But the vast numbers of ports 
that are not able to achieve the ideal level of security will nevertheless represent a major problem.  
However, it is not infeasible that international terrorists will single out oil supplies as one of their 
major areas of priority, since the western world is vulnerable on this point. Indeed, such attacks 
occurred during the US occupation of Iraq, with spectacular long-term consequences for the entire 
situation in the area. A coordinated suicide attack on oil terminals off the coast of Basra took place 
in 2004. During the first year of the US occupation, about 100 attacks on the 4000-mile oil pipeline 
system took place.1531 From the point of view of the terrorists that want to attack US interests, such 
targets are ideal. Ideal because they sabotage the reconstruction of Iraq, because they help slowly 
raising the price of oil on the world market, and because protecting refineries and especially 
pipelines and offshore installations is such a demanding task that it renders the likelihood of 
successful attacks relatively high (as the Al-Quaida training manual states; "We don`t have to attack 
a tiger if we can attack a lamb"). Does this risk have wider implications? An answer in the 
                                                 
1529 http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2102424. See also the report "Energy Security" 
by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security for a similar conclusion; http//www.iags.org/n0524042.htm 
1530 “ Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact” , OECD, July 2003. 
1531 See "Terror`s Big Prize" by Gal Luft, http://www.iags.org/n050904a.htm 
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affirmative seems reasonable. Tamil Tigers separatists carried out a suicide attack with five boats on 
an oil tanker off the northern Sri Lanka in 2001. The French supertanker Limburg was attacked by 
Al Quaida off the coast of Yemen in 2002. The same year, a group of Saudi citizens was arrested for 
planning to sabotage Ras Tanura, the largest offshore oil loading facility in the world. It has been 
estimated that if successful, such an attack alone could cut the export of Saudi oil by 50%, and thus 
send oil prices "through the ceiling".1532 Likewise, the current level of piracy in the Malacca Strait 
make the following scenario likely; a terrorist group should easily be able to crash a smaller vessel 
into a supertanker in one of the busiest waterways in the world. When ignited, the supertanker would 
cause a vast area of burning oil that could shut down the choke point for several weeks, with grave 
implications for world markets, and possibly wounding the Achilles heel of the US.1533  
For the merchant navies of the world, there is also the delicate issue of screening crew members. 
Half of the world's merchant fleet, with 1.2 million seafarers on board, sails under a flag of 
convenience. Paperwork and background checks are often minimal. After the September 11th 
attacks, the International Labour Organisation introduced identity cards for seafarers—but this has 
not solved the problem. Repeatedly, false papers are found on crew members, also in European 
waters.1534 While reliable sources on this and related problems are classified and not open to regular 
scholarly analysis, it is not difficult to see the enormity of these challenges. The sheer complexity of 
global maritime traffic combined with the fact that extraterritorial surveillance is a lot more 
demanding than territorial intelligence, partly due to the different legal frameworks that apply to the 
two, makes looking for terrorists at sea analogous to finding the needle in the haystack. Obviously, 
the only feasible solution is to seek to avoid terrorists from being able to infiltrate civilian shipping. 
Since one never can be 100% sure to succeed in such an endeavour, naval escort and patrolling as 
witnessed in the Mediterranean during operation Active Endeavour indeed seem to be necessary 
precautions.  
In sum then, the US through NATO and the IMO has sought to handle the risk of terrorism at and 
from the sea by; 
• Increased control of cargo in merchantmen; 
• Tightened security measures in all international ports with a minimum of container 
 movements per year; 
                                                 
1532 Ibid:1 
1533 For an assessment of Al-Quaida and maritime terrorism, see the article by C. Dickey "High-Seas Terrorism", 
Newsweek, January 27, 2003: 4 
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• Naval patrolling and escort in some straits. 
 
Still, this security network is full of inadequacies. It seems to be an impossible task to protect a 
larger number of offshore installations, civilian passenger ships, and all major transportation in 
international waters. Not even all waters where the rate of piracy historically has been high, is 
surveyed by naval forces. Although protection costs have risen due to the measures taken by western 
powers after 911, most commentators seem to agree that an even higher level of security seeking 
will make transaction costs in the international economy too high. However, the idea that cheaper 
naval vessels could indeed perform protection of civilian shipping, ports and offshore installations in 
larger numbers does not seem totally unfeasible.1535 After all, pirates and terrorists at sea do not 
constitute a technologically very sophisticated adversary. It is therefore tempting to conclude that 
the current NATO doctrine of "transformation", meaning to a large degree achieving a superior 
military-technological level compared to any other state in world history, is the wrong solution. This 
is an especially critical question for the smaller coastal states. While the US - the state that sets the 
standard for current and future NATO navies- can afford to combine fantastic quality with a large 
quantity of naval forces, the trend at the time of writing makes the navies of the smaller states 
ludicrously small. Norway, the coastal state with national jurisdiction over 1/3 of the total 
continental shelves of Western Europe, for example, is thus reducing its already small navy 
significantly. As the Norwegian General Inspector of the Navy declared in June 2004; 
"The consequence is that the number of units is reduced. The Navy is becoming very small. The 
number of fighting vessels has been reduced to one quarter of what we had only a few years 
ago".1536 The motivation to do so rests in the assumption that the Navy has to be "compatible with 
its allies". Needless to say, armies and Air forces will argue the same, using the comparison with the 
capabilities of the US as a measurement of technological parity. This in itself is a logic axiom, but 
the outcome is a navy that quite simply will be overstretched sooner than new platforms are 
commissioned. The entire idea behind the reduction is entirely at odds with current security threats 
as perceived from a 4th generation warfare perspective. In the latter, quantity is much more 
important than a small number of high-quality platforms and systems. Indeed, the very criteria for 
                                                                                                                                                             
1534 Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington D.C., background brief for the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, 
June 5th 2003 
1535 The parallell between other aspects of what can be interpreted as the retreat of the state is evident. Already in 
1994, the private security industry in the US "had twice as many employees, and 1.5 times the budget, of all local, 
state, and federal police forces combined" (van Creveld, 2003: 15). In the US-led occupation of Iraq, mercenaries 
working for the US Army and civilian constructors became a regular feature of the entire security situation.  
1536 Marinen, no 6 2004: 2 
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what constitutes quality in extraterritorial units of violence seem dubious from a 4th generation 
perspective. 
Critics of the 4th generation warfare perspective will largely rely on the central assumptions of 
political realism in the study of international relations. To the classical political realist, international 
"terrorism" (many political scientists will discard the notion that terrorism and piracy and other 
crimes should be seen as a kind of warfare) remains a significant, but small problem compared to 
conflicts between states. In a Hobbesian world, scholars from the camp of structural realism will 
argue, wars between states remains a possibility. However, political realists increasingly face 
difficulty when they shall explain what states constitute a threat in military terms against the 
Atlantic empire. It is of course possible that China or Russia in the distant future may challenge the 
US, but otherwise the candidates for challenging the present hegemony by military means are few 
and relatively speaking weak.1537 It is not totally unwarranted, therefore, to question the current 
development of the naval forces of the states covered in this thesis. The conclusion is that the 
western powers should have the capacity to adjust to the current security threats from non-state 
actors. It is, of course, impossible to predict such an outcome. However, some trends after the 
terrorist attacks in 2001 seem to indicate that an adaptation is taking place, but that this slow 
transformation in no way is the end of the nation-state or the international state system. In fact, one 
might be tempted to say that exactly states and a community of states will prove robust in dealing 
with the "new" threats; after all, the modern state emerged as the most powerful organiser of 
violence during the 16th and 17th centuries. The trends already emerging that seemingly reflect the 
viability of the modern state can be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, as we have seen in the case of maritime security, strong states (The US) assumed leadership 
thorough international organisations (primarily the IMO) by trying to create a new international 
institution to safeguard international transportation at sea. We have described the immense 
challenges of port security that are currently being addressed, but in addition, a global satellite 
surveillance system that will cover over 80000 ships is scheduled to be operative by July 2006. 
Through this system, one should be able to detect the position, course, speed and identification of 
any vessel included in the system. Each coastal state will then, in principle, be able to follow all 
                                                 
1537 Indeed, war between modern states is an ever rarer occurence. In the words of one of the foremost among 
military historians, Martin van Creveld: "As the twentieth century approached its end, major interstate wars 
appeared to be on the retreat. In terms of numbers, they were becoming quite rare; in terms of size, neither the armed 
forces that they involved, the magnitude of the military operations they witnessed, nor (in almost all cases) the threat 
that they posed to the belligerents existencies even approached pre-1945 dimensions" (Creveld, 2003: 10). The war 
in Iraq seems an anomaly here, but it must be remembered that the invasion itself was swift, and it was the 
occupation itself that soon turned into a conflict between modern states and non-state groups.  
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ships in own waters, and indeed all ships owned by companies registered in the state on a global 
scope. Yet, considerable disagreements have risen over the sharing of information on maritime 
traffic, since states like the US hardly is interested to share too much such information with "Rogue 
states" as for example North Korea. Nevertheless, the US has had success at making nearly all states 
in the world agree to the safety measures now being implemented in the maritime sectors throughout 
the world. Interestingly, this is both beginning to look like an increased scope of US extraterritorial 
commitments and like a source of increased friction between the US and other states. These tasks 
and these tensions are not restricted to the questions of which territories the US should invade. On 
May 2nd, 2003, the EU Commission warned that the security measures should not lead to an 
inflation of unreasonably costly precautions, and the stationing of US customs officers in European 
ports raised considerable resentment in EU governments. In order to control the containers being 
loaded into ships headed for American territory, the Bush administration now insisted that US 
officials should lead and conduct the screening in European ports! Now, this kind of policy does 
share some uncanny resemblance to imperialism, as defined in this thesis. The main reason 
European, and indeed African and Asian, governments conformed to these measures simply was the 
threat of being excluded from the US markets. Since over 80% of world transportation is carried at 
sea, and since 20% of these goods end up in the US, the threat is grave enough to be taken seriously. 
On the whole, the US precautions are also understandable, despite their costs. Secondly, states 
played the wholly dominant role in the "war on terrorism". Indeed, this so-called war would not 
have been possible without significant state military organisations, and the international framework 
for countering terrorism wholly depends on the states and the state system. 
Thirdly, state defense establishments clearly are trying to come to grips with the realities of 4GW 
opponents. The fact that it was the US that was attacked in September 2001 made the US strive for a 
new approach for security (needless to say, grave doubts as to the efficiency of this approach soon 
surfaced). This naturally started a chain reaction in most NATO countries and beyond. As we have 
seen in this and the previous sections, one should not exaggerate the speed and scope of the 
institutional change that has occurred. Nevertheless, US naval priorities clearly indicate that an 
incremental process of change is under way. By the winter of 2004, the Bush administration, faced 
with scepticism from Indonesia and Malaysia, seemed to make progress towards some sort of a 
surveillance regime for the Malacca Straits. Proposals for a stationing of US troops in the area, while 
supported by Singapore, nevertheless faced severe resistance from Malaysia and Indonesia in the 
initial negotiations in this process. Government officials in the two states argued that US 
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deployments would make Islamist agitation and recruitment even harder to deal with.1538 The 
eventual outcome was that Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore agreed in August 2004 to patrol the 
Straits of Malacca in an effort to counter a rise in piracy and possible terrorist attacks. Refusing to 
allow US deployments, the states in the region assumed responsibilities themselves, an outcome that 
probably would not have materialised without pressure from the US. The United States nevertheless 
was welcomed to share relevant intelligence with the three states. One must hope that this regional 
cooperation will succeed, since there is no lack of non-state organisations capable of using violence 
on a large scale in this area, and since the Straits themselves are so important for the world-system. 
10 million barrels of crude oil from the Persian Gulf toward Asian countries pass through these 
straits each and every day. 80% of Japan`s oil is carried through the Malacca Straits. Accounting for 
a third of the world`s trade and 50% of the global oil supply, a closure of this waterway will add 994 
miles to travel for ships to and from China, South Korea or Japan, and the Middle East. The 
tremendous rise in freight rates would have global consequences.  
 
In this chapter, we have sought to give an overview of the attempts to form viable international 
institutions that were given the responsibility to regulate questions of extraterritorial sovereignty, 
and to analyse to what degree this affected the conduct of sovereignty at sea for the states covered in 
this thesis. In the two last sections, we described how current trends in naval force structures and -
doctrine are developing in the US and Northern Europe, and we discussed how these trends 
ultimately are at odds with a development where threats from non-state actors are increasingly 
highlighted in the foreign policy rhetoric of western leaders.  
It was clear from the outset that the US after WWII wanted to participate in the shaping of 
international affairs to a much larger degree than anytime previously. Our conclusion is that the US 
administrations from FDR`s wartime cabinet till Bill Clinton sought to do this primarily by setting 
up and supporting international institutions, the UN with all its sub-organisations, and later through 
regional security organisations. It gives a distorted representation of reality to call this en "empire". 
If any use of the word empire is justified, this US Empire was one based on invitation and 
integration. This was a result of the definitive US liberalism that provided the ideological building 
blocks of western cooperation in the postwar years. In this respect, our ideal-type of international 
liberalism is valid for US foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century.  
                                                 
1538 See for example, http://www.atimes.com June 19th 2004 and httpp://www.iags.org May 24, 2004 
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While it is true that the US at times intervened in other polities, in the maritime sector the dominant 
picture is that the US leadership and the international institutions that followed increased rather than 
decreased the formal as well as de facto sovereignty over waters and maritime resources. All coastal 
states gained the right to national control of their continental shelves, increased territorial limits and 
exclusive economic zones in this period. Indeed, the weaker coastal states utilised this international 
institutional matrix to press for ever increased national jurisdiction. The US accepted this 
development to a large extent, and even curbed the attempts of former paternalist powers like Britian 
to restrict the movement towards increased coastal state sovereignty over the oceans. Again, our 
ideal-types of the extraterritorial peripheries and the paternalist powers seem appropriate analytical 
categories. A central limiting ideological factor nevertheless was the tenet of international liberalism 
that international trade and the freedom of international waterways demanded free passage in 
international waters, and the right to "free and innocent passage" through straits and sea-lanes that 
were within EEZs and territorial waters. In this respect, the political geography of the oceans 
remains a large sphere where national sovereignty is limited.  
The imperfections in any attempt to create a viable international "regime" for regulating transport, 
fishing and offshore activities are thus inevitable. This might make coastal states vulnerable to risks 
that are not necessarily results of inter-state rivalry. Ecologic concerns were thus highlighted in the 
1980s and 1990s. From the 1990s and onwards, the direct threat against civilian shipping from non-
state actors in the forms of pirates and "terrorists" became more central. Initially, the renewed interst 
in piracy did not lead to huge increases in transaction costs. The terrorist attacks on US targets in 
September 2001 changed the priorities somewhat. The US initiated measures for increased port 
security through the IMO, and escort of civilian shipping through some straits through NATO. 
Otherwise, the US under the Bush administration led the so-called war on terrorism through bilateral 
agreements with single states in "the coalition of the willing". In the maritime realm, at least, this 
was a success in the sense that no major terrorist or 4GW operation has succeeded at the time of 
writing. The fundamental shortcomings in the efforts that have been undertaken post-911 are 
twofold.  
Firstly, any effort at regulating the threat from 4th generation warfare in the maritime sector by 
necessity must be based on international cooperation. If the international cooperation should 
collapse in this field, then the world economy as we know it cannot function simultaneous with 
overly strict security measures in the maritime sector. The US, for one, could be severely punished 
in the economic realm if this scenario became a reality. Thus, the scope of US unilateralism will be 
severely restricted: allies could not continually be alienated the way they were following the US 
decision to invade Iraq in 2003.  
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Secondly, it almost goes without saying that the current NATO "transformation" process has the 
result of making all navies of the countries covered here very sophisticated, very expensive and thus 
very small. The platforms thus being built at the time of writing will be highly able to wage war in a 
complex environment, but their small number will make the western states unable to adequately 
protect their offshore installations, ports, merchantmen and civilian cruisers. The fact is that quantity 
thus should be given much higher priority in the current planning of naval force structures. If we 
look at the combined figures for Britain, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, the total number of destroyers and frigates in these states are 82. This is with all probability 
way too small a number of platforms to deal with future risks. If the latter judgement is accepted, 
there are two soulutions; either to build a larger number of cheaper medium-seized ocean going 
naval vessels, or to provide the larger civilian ships with weapons on their own. Before any of those 
two solutions are even conceivable to western politicians, not to say naval officers, they must 
basically come to grips conceptually with what the weakening of the state monopoly of violence at 
sea will mean.  
 
 6 Conclusions 
We have reached the point of presenting an overview of the most important findings in this thesis. 
Needless to say, a comparative historical analysis in itself invites debate once it includes more than a 
few cases in a longer time-perspective than some decades. One might plausible argue that the 
"how"s of the empirical chapters in this treatise with some exceptions are not valuable at all in a 
current perspective. While such an objection holds some, albeit limited, truth in a prescriptive 
perspective, it is flawed in a theoretical one. Unfortunately, in order for us to present a stringent and 
brief presentation of our conclusions, they are presented as either empirical (6.1) or theoretical (6.2) 
in the following, solely for the sake of simplicity since the two are not so easily separable. 
 
6.1 Empirical conclusions 
In the present study of the interplay between domestic political development and international 
institutions, we have found considerable degrees of variation; variation over time as well as 
variation in space. More or less, we should conclude that domestic dynamics to a large degree 
influenced international changes, although international alterations in turn produced an environment 
for domestic institutional change as well. To simplify, the general pattern is that the causal direction 
varies with power. Strong states with the ability to project power to the international scene also were 
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able to shape international institutions to a far larger degree than did small states. Needless to say, 
the states with the ability to do so, tried to shape the international institutions, independently of the 
degree of formality of the institution, to suit their own interests and principles. Conversely, smaller 
states predominantly had to adapt as best they could to the international environment. While this 
tautology is a trivial insight, it is also only half the truth. A major alteration at the international level 
- with huge implications also for small states- took place in the 20th century. With the 
institutionalization of international law, the UN, The International Court and all the functional 
international institutions, the autonomy of small states not only de jure but also de facto increased 
significantly, although the asymmetry of state power was more dramatic than ever in the 
thermonuclear age. Thus, the balance of power was modified by a set of rules for the international 
game that benefitted all small states that escaped the perils of authoritarian or totalitarian rule.  
How could this be possible? The tautological answer to this question is that the international 
institutions endorsed sovereign equality and the "freedom of nations", and that the US was 
instrumental in setting up such an international institutional matrix. The more satisfactory reply is 
that state principles, results of the historical trajectory of the most powerful states, ultimately 
modified state interests in a manner that reduced the international anarchy. Since the US was a 
liberal internationalist and not a European paternalist, such was the outcome.  
Locally valid ideal-types 
The difference between the US and European states analysed here goes beyond recognizing different 
geographical, demographical and institutional mechanisms in explaining variation. The first and 
foremost analytical task in this thesis was to produce a typology of the foreign policy behaviour of 
the states according to the dominant interests and principles that determined maritime priorities. In 
order to evaluate these concepts we embarked on a lengthy empirical analysis in chapters 3 to 5.  
 
Northern Europe 
The formation of modern states and international treaties had its genesis in Europe, a multi-polar 
"system" of states and non-state actors characterized by fierce economic, military and political 
competition during the 16th and 17th centuries. Indeed, the level of conflict would occasionally rise 
to unprecedented levels in this strip of Eurasia until the 20th century. The formation and early 
consolidation of states in Northern Europe involved frequent wars at sea. Initially, these wars were 
fought with primitive means, and navies were very crude organizations until the middle of the 17th 
century. Predominantly, navies were semi-official, in the sense that private entrepeneurship was 
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even more important in war at sea than in land campaigns even well into the 18th century. States 
with strong commercial and maritime societies, like England and the Dutch republic, were most 
effective at creating a high degree of cooperation between private entrepreneurs and state authorities 
to build and maintain strong navies.  
Ideologically, the very intense struggles during the 15th and 16th centuries were important for the 
formation of maritime ideologies in the Scandinavian countries and Britain. I have argued on 
previous pages that this competition for markets and rights of taxation created an incentive towards 
mare clausum that reinforced the predisposition already created through intense rivalries between 
monarchs in the same field. More specifically, the city-league was an unwelcome intruder in the 
efforts of monarchs in Northern Europe to create centralized polities. The combination of 
international competition and competition with the Hansa made the Nordic states and England 
embrace mare clausum principles rather than mare liberum. This was again reinforced with the rise 
of Dutch maritime and commercial power, two aspects of Dutch development that were closely 
related. Indeed, the disputes between British and Dutch preferences on maritime rights constituted a 
conflict that refined the meaning of mare liberum and mare clausum, with scholars like Grotius and 
Selden articulating the philosophical underpinnings of two competing paradigms. To Dutch 
commercial interests, the Hansa was a competitor for sure, but the maritime industry in the Republic 
was a product of the coastal cities, and the Dutch therefore were much more familiar to some of the 
techniques of finance and sea-borne transportation that the German cities had pioneered. The Dutch 
maritime sector refined these techniques, and to a degree that made the Republic predominant in 
overseas trade and -transportation in Northern Europe for a short period. The federation was initially 
very cost-effective also at building and maintaining a strong navy, but ultimately proved to be the 
weaker part in the struggle against England. While the Republic maintained a predisposition tilting 
towards international liberalism, the Republic and later the Netherlands would never again seek 
predominance after the end of the 17th century. It is characteristic of this incremental Dutch turn 
towards bandwagoning that it did seek few privileges during the 19th century and did not take part 
in the partition of Africa to any noteworthy degree. In the crossfire between Germany and Britain in 
the 20th century, the Netherlands remained neutral until WWII, a war that changed both its foreign 
policy in general as well as Dutch overseas politics to a considerable degree. But the change was not 
bigger than the Netherlands remained internationalist through the process of European integration, 
the UN and NATO. Its transition from a polity with to a polity without overseas possessions was 
also failry liberal, compared to similar transitions of other European powers. 
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Britain actively used its financial and naval strength to pursue a blue-water Lockeanism, laying out 
the rules for the overseas territories and -waters as suited English interests. The mare clausum 
principle of England were not limited to home waters, but to all areas within the Empire. This was 
extraterritorial paternalism. It is true, of course, that the 19th century Pax Britannica had liberal 
traits. Indeed, one might point out that the anti-slavery campaigns and the rights of neutral states are 
clear elements of a gradually liberalizing empire. Much in the same vein, historians as N. Ferguson 
certainly are right in pointing out that the British Empire did not carry out the worst imperialism 
there ever was. At least, there is a substantial degree of truth in this for the 19th and 20th centuries. 
But imperialism it was. While the principle of the freedom of the high seas remained in theory, 
England carefully monitored and defended whatever privileges it had as a result of overseas 
possessions. The Royal Navy increasingly came to be identified as a chief institution of the Empire. 
It was an institution that only incrementally became organized and controlled by the state after the 
chaotic 16th and 17th centuries, where privateering had been a dominant naval activity carried out 
by semi-official entrepreneurs. Britons perceived the Navy to be vital for controlling overseas 
territories and protecting the sea-lanes that knitted the Empire together. The genesis of a peculiar 
british mare clausum empire has been demonstrated in this thesis.1539 The Navy ensured the 
shrinkage of distance that was a necessity of an overseas empire. After Trafalgar, the role of the 
Navy for British influence and security achieved mythical proportions. Indeed, one might plausibly 
argue that the myth that created a self-sustaining structure between civil society and the navy was 
created already in 1588.  In the trajectory that Britain followed after the historical junction of the 
Napoleonic wars, both the maritime preferences and institutionalization of naval power in Britain 
were "frozen", in the sense that it is a clear example of path dependency. Even well into the 20th 
century, therefore, English cabinets repeatedly applied force to quell unrest in the empire. The 
paternalist predisposition occasionally popped up even after WWII, witness Suez 1956 and the 
Falklands war, both overseas operations heavily dependent upon naval force. Old habits die hard, 
and William Wallace has claimed of British foreign policy that "the whole ethos of this country`s 
foreign policy continues to be biased by ideological assumptions which date from the Edwardian era 
and before".1540  
The relative decline of Britain in retrospect seems inevitable, given the economic and industrial rise 
of the US and Germany from 1880, and the rise of the USSR as a major military power during and 
                                                 
1539 See Stinchcombe, 1968: 103 on what he labels ”historicist explanations”. The thesis presented here is both a 
historicist explanation as well as a demonstration of institutional equilibriua and punctuated equilibria found in the 
path dependency of macro institutions.  
1540 Wallace, 1991: 70 
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after WWII. Correpsondingly, at an analytically separate ideational level, England found itself in an 
ideologically bewildering position after the war, eclipsed totally by the US, and required to abandon 
the empire as the price to pay for US support during and after WWII. Nevertheless, in style and 
ideology, British foreign policy, one might argue, remained quintessentially British. The 
Commonwealth and the "special relationship" with the US prevailed after WWII, and made the Isles 
distinct from the continental European powers in their quest for European integration. While Britain 
undoubtedly have close political, not to mention economic, ties to the Continent, the geopolitical 
mindset of Britain goes beyond "Europe". This to a large degree is the result of British history, so 
heavily influenced by the Imperial legacy rather than mere material interests. This demonstrates the 
potent role that national identity played in British foreign policy. Or as William Wallace observed;  
 
"When James the Sixth and First suggested that a written constitution might unite his two kingdoms, 
his English parliamentarians cited all these reasons for resisting. When Jacques Delores appears to 
threaten the imposition of a European written constitution, the reply, 395 years later, is in the same 
terms".1541 
 
Germany had no proud naval history on which to base an anbitious naval policy. Furthermore, 
Germany did not have a very considerable maritime institutional heritage either. The result was that 
Germany was a late-comer as a state, and in addition a society with a modest naval infrastructure 
indeed. As in the US, a theoretical approach to sea power therefore developed from the bottom to 
the top. The young Reichsmarine of Imperial Germany naturally and eagerly embraced the theories 
of A.T. Mahan, since these provided a rationale for Germany to become a naval power. The 
particular German political institutions and the personalities of Tirpitz and the Kaiser made this 
possible, but in retrospect the naval aspirations of Imperial Germany from 1894 till 1914 are striking 
in the sense that Britain served as a model, and that a war with Britain certainly were not the 
intended consequences of the political leadership in Germany. In fact, the sea power ideology of 
Mahan fitted the imperial enthusiasm in Europe as well as in Japan, witnessed by the highly 
ambitious naval construction programmes in a number of countries. The most peculiar feature of 
extraterritorial naval ambitions in Germany was quite simply that it was so utterly instrumental, and 
seemingly detached from diplomacy and a clear grand strategy to which the navy would fit (the fear 
of a “runaway” navy had made Britain and the US conclude that civilians as a rule should head the 
                                                 
1541 Wallace, 1991: 70 
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navy as well as the other services1542). The worst outcome of this was that leaders in Imperial 
Germany predominantly failed to fully comprehend that German sea power combined with the 
German army was quite simply perceived as a threat to British interests, whatever intentions the 
leadership in Berlin had with the navy. In the German perception, social Darwinist thought was 
present in the form that a strong navy was a requirement to ensure the nation "Der Platz in der 
Sonne" that it deserved. But in all fairness, such sentiments were in no way restricted to the 
Germans.  
For the Scandinavian countries and Iceland, there are clear similarities as well as divergent patterns 
that can be observed. In a historical perspective, the differences are more striking than contemporary 
analysis often convey. As we have seen in chapter 3, all the Nordic territories, and particularly 
Norway and Sweden, were strongly influenced by the competition with the Hanseatic League. All 
the Nordic countries developed initial dispositions for mare clausum due to this rivalry as well as the 
competition between monarchs in the early modern period. Indeed, as we demonstrated in chapter 2, 
a not insignificant notion of territorializing coastal waters existed in the old Norwegian kingdom that 
covered much of the Norwegian as well as the North Seas already prior to the 14th century. After 
the demise of the City-league, the Nordic states increasingly were influenced by the European 
balance of power, and up till the Great Nordic War, by the repeated clashes between Denmark-
Norway and Sweden. Both Iceland and Norway were too weak to survive as sovereign states, but the 
unions with Denmark and Sweden were peaceful. Moreover, Sweden ultimately was defeated by its 
nemesis-Russia, while Denmark eventually succumbed to the military power of Germany. In both 
instances, the result was that the defeated changed both important traits of its identity and its 
predisposition to act in a paternalist fashion on the international arena. It is often forgotten that both 
Denmark and Sweden had been truly imperial powers, and that the few adjacent states repeatedly 
waged war in the Baltic Sea. Denmark for centuries controlled the largest island on earth, several 
large Atlantic islands in addition, and had colonies in the West Indies. Sweden after the Thirty Years 
war possessed a large portion of the southern shores of the Baltic, and later laid Warsaw under siege 
and fought the Russian army in what today is Ukraine.  
Their losses in wars changed such adventurous expeditions forever. Again, the domestic side moved 
in tandem with the international; for the small states, the balance of power became a constraint on 
state policy. It was not only that this balance restricted state interests, but the clashes of arms 
changed the national identities as well. Indeed, contrary to Barrington Moores a priori assumption 
that the political problems of small states are not comparable to those of large countries, the 
                                                 
1542 See Albion, 1945:294-296 for a discussion. 
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trajectories of Sweden and Denmark are fascinating in the sense that it highlights the way national 
identity can be changed. Uffe Østergård, for example, has argued (convincingly, in my view) that 
the result of the Danish loss of Schleswig and Holstein to Germany under Bismarck was a "peasant" 
ideological hegemony in Denmark.1543 
By 1900, both Sweden and Denmark had become the neutral, peace-loving former imperialists par 
excellence (again; the exact date is not possible to pin down. Rather, the transition was a gradual and 
incremental process. Some outcomes at the international level had dramatic impacts though. In the 
case of Sweden, the defeat in the Great Nordic war seems of outmost importance. The colourful 
Norwegian historian Terje Ula in 1946 argued, not untruthfully, that the Danish-Prussian war of 
1864 was the true turning point in modern Nordic history). An inner equilibrium seemed to have 
crystallized, where the national habitus reflected the possible room for maneuver on the international 
stage. Indeed, the process that led to this outcome was well under way during the 18th century (The 
Great Nordic war particularly for Sweden, The Napoleonic wars for Denmark where she lost 
Norway and the bulk of her fleet). Characteristically, WWII tilted Denmark in a somewhat different 
direction again, since it joined NATO, and later the EEC/EU as the first Nordic state to do so. 
Sweden managed to stay neutral during WWII, and stayed outside of NATO and joined the EU only 
in 1994. Nevertheless, both Denmark and Sweden turned from paternalist powers to mare liberum, 
low-profile former small empires with only indirect overseas interests in the 20th century. 
Iceland remained under Copenhagen till 1944, while Norway broke loose from the union with 
Sweden in 1905. Both states played marginal roles on the European scene until 1940, with the 
important exception that both states were major exporters of fish, and while Norway had one of the 
largest merchant navies in the world. Both thus had important stakes in the international institutions 
regulating extraterritorial sovereignty. Indeed, conflicts with other states, notably Britain and 
Germany, arose again during the 20th century. These states nevertheless sought to carve out 
whatever national autonomy the international situation at any given time permitted. For Iceland, the 
political split with Denmark became a fact during the British-American occupation in WWII, a 
result facilitated by a rather smooth Danish attitude for sure, but above all a result of the fact that 
from a strategic perspective Iceland was too important to be lost to the Germans during the war, or 
to the Soviet Union after the war. Norway maneuvered skillfully through WWI, but was occupied in 
1940. The occupation years produced much the same result as in Denmark, Norway joining NATO 
in 1949.  
In the maritime realm, however, Iceland and Norway are prime examples of how the new 
                                                 
1543 See the entire article by Østergård, 1992 for a fascinating discussion. 
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international institutional matrix after WWII changed the opportunities of small states. The UN, and 
not to mention the International Court and the functional organizations under the UN umbrella, 
proved an opportunity to be utilized by the smaller coastal states in the north. The first, really 
significant landmark of this change in international relations was the verdict in the International 
court in 1951 (see chapter 5). The high mark of increased de jure sovereignty for the small coastal 
states was the 1973-1982 UNCLOS negotiations, during which the principle of the 200-mile EEZ 
achieved broad consensus. In this manner, the aspirations of the small mare clausum states came 
true. The fact that small states could gain, not only de jure sovereign rights, but in practice de facto 
sovereignty over so vast oceans, indicate that the international institutions themselves had changed. 
In an earlier epoch, the very notion that small states should exercise sovereignty over vast oceans 
with plentiful resources would have been dismissed as absurd. It is not inconceivable that one might 
raise objections to the choice of North European states for the present thesis. We have excluded 
France (through reasons expressed in chapter 2), for example. However, there are also similarities 
between the states covered here, both in a historic as well as contemporary perspective. As William 
Wallace once said of the sources of British foreign policy; "Until the end of the nineteenth century 
this essentially Protestant…sense of national identity divided Britain primarily from France and the 
Catholic and corporate states of southern Europe…Protestant northern Europe…was seen as sharing 
Britain`s values".1544 In this perspective, it is also clear why Britain throughout the 18th and 19th 
centuries saw itself as the natural leader of Northern Europe; it constituted a benign hegemony in the 
eyes of most Britons. Even more fascinating is the fact that a very peculiar and enduring divide in 
the approach to foreign policy between Northern Europe and the US arose early. 
 
The USA 
The US was, and still remains, a state based on ideas. These ideas to a large degree constitute what 
the US is, and thereby dominant traits of its foreign policy. The US was the new world, Europe the 
old. Perhaps luckily for Europeans in the 20th century, the US was always a political rejection of 
things European, whatever transatlantic tensions this has created. While the US in some respects can 
be described as a premodern society, the very essential characteristic of US foreign policy compared 
to the corresponding policies of major European states is that the US represented a breach with "The 
Old World". To portrait this view of the European states crudely, they were at times seen as the 
class-based, backward, conspiratorial, balance-of-power endorsing, colonial states. So strong was 
the rejection of this culture that US foreign policy only resembled European modalities of how 
                                                 
1544 Wallace, 1991: 70 
  
6 Conclusions 
 
 
            
 
 
 
487
statesmen should behave for a short period: “while other states had interests, the United States had 
responsibilities”.1545 Thus, détente never became embedded in the US society. Indeed, political 
realism, a result of the paternalist historic tradition in Europe, did not succeed in the US. Despite the 
efforts of Carr, Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger "this exotic, European plant could 
find no roots in the native soil of the American political tradition", as Hedley Bull wrote in the 
aftermath of the Kissinger era in US foreign policy.1546 The North Americans remained surprisingly 
faithful to the heritage of their political history. The US was forged as a reaction against European 
modes of rule, and indeed during an intense struggle over what the US should be. The outcome was 
a state that until the New Deal was minimalist; with a minimal federal bureaucracy, a minimalist 
conception of what the state should do to regulate society, a passive foreign policy outside the area 
that was seen as covered by the Monroe Doctrine, and during much of this time - a very small navy.  
Indeed, it is striking to note that the US did not seek to enforce her consistent preferences for liberal 
commercial relations and mare liberum through even the threat from a navy in-being (the opening of 
Japan from the 1850s and the occupation of the Philippines are exceptions to this rule). Contrary to 
Marxist theory and political realism, the US did not create a "strong core state" or "balance" against 
other powers in this respect. Neither did the US exclusively bandwagon by supporting whatever -
with some goodwill- can be called an international maritime regime during the 19th century, as 
liberal institutionalists could argue; the US rather chose the costly avenue of preaching mare liberum 
against Britain's paternalism. At the same time, the US on few occasions challenged the maritime 
hegemony of Britain until the 20th century. 
Ideologically then, the US was close to one single European historic federation, the Dutch republic. 
Any scholar with empirical sensitivity should be able to see this structure in American policy. As 
Mlada Bukovansky has forcefully argued; "From its inception, the United States took its cue from 
the Dutch (early supporters of liberal neutrality) and staked its identity upon the contested liberal 
interpretation of neutral rights".1547 With time, the liberal elements of US foreign policy 
nevertheless underwent some changes, and interestingly these changes to a large degree were results 
of domestic politics. The New Deal would for decades influence the liberal ideology of US policies 
because it raised the awareness of US politicians that state intervention in politics could yield 
results. The result was a new flavor in US liberalism, and a corresponding structure in US foreign 
policy; the belief that the US could and should seek to participate in the conscious creation of a 
world order based on international institutions.  
                                                 
1545 Lundestad, 1990: 11 
1546 Cited in Clark, 1989: 79 
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While the New Deal did not end isolationism, FDR combined the pragmatism of political realism 
with the visions of Woodrow Wilson to forge a different US foreign policy in one respect; the US 
became permanently involved in, indeed saw itself as the leader of, the free world after 1941. What 
was needed to provoke such an alteration was an armed attack on the US government itself. As the 
Spanish-American war of 1898 and WWI both produced short-lived fits of US interventionism, 
WWII was the real catalyst. By this time the US had become strong enough not to fear foreign 
contamination of its ideological values, instead, the world should be made safe for democracy. This 
liberal ideology did not only fit into a liberal world economy that US planners rightly perceived as 
beneficial to the US economy, it was part and parcel of what the US ideological projection into 
foreign policy was all about. Yet this projection of US ideals did not take place in an international 
environment free of competition. Thus, US foreign policy quite rapidly conformed to the 
requirements of perceived necessity, and thus included the use of military force. To back up and 
strengthen US leadership then, the creation and maintenance of international organizations went in 
tandem with huge overseas US military activity. What was spectacular about the latter was the scope 
and strength of US sea power and air power combined. With exceptions during the wars in Korea 
and Vietnam, the US Army was never especially large compared to the armies of the communist 
dictatorships. A major reason for this was that a strong US Navy and Air Force was not 
incompatible with the "empire by invitation", and neither was it incompatible with the unique, new-
deal inspired liberal international institutions that the US was so instrumental in creating after WWII 
(considering the fact that the US has stationed troops in 120 countries at the time of writing, the 
number of personnel on overseas duty, 400.000 (including Iraq), is not staggering). Seemingly, the 
end of the cold war gave US unprecedented opportunities to carry on the liberal civilizing mission, 
and in some respects it did. During the Clinton administrations, this goal was largely pursued 
through US leaderships in multilateral organizations. With the Bush presidency of 2000-2004, 
unilateralism seemed more dominant. This was just as much a result of the gunfighter wilsonianism 
that blossomed in this particular administration as it was a reflection of the fact that the cold war was 
over. And yet, it is too early to tell whether the US activist foreign policy after the terrorist attacks of 
2001 will be as short-lived as US interventionism was after the Spanish-American war. What can be 
assumed from our analytical model, however, is that the US will remain itself. National catastrophes 
in the form of lost wars or economic cracks might add new nuances to the US national habitus, but 
such crisis must be intense indeed for such alterations to occur. What cannot be predicted from the 
model is which of the ideological traits will come to dominate to produce either a very high level of 
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activism or a more isolationist foreign policy. The latter does however seem unlikely, the US being a 
status quo power at present. Moreover, little seems to alter the importance of American idealism on 
US foreign policy. "The War on Terrorism" and the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq bore an 
uncanny imprint of liberal rhetoric and the aspirations for "promoting democracy" and creating 
"freedom from fear". Thus, the US has predominantly been -and still is- an international liberalist 
when compared to other powers in world politics. 
If we are to sum up the comparisons in space and time in order to illustrate state trajectories, we can 
combine the ideational variable with a variable of state power in the international maritime balance 
of power as in figure 6.1 below. It shows that two trajectories were aborted (the Hanseatic League 
and Imperial Germany), while the trajectory of the US as a major power and later superpower 
influenced nearly all states in the direction of increased liberalism. 
 
Figure 6.1.1: State trajectories 
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Comments figure 6.1.1: 
The X-axis in the figure represents the continuum between marginal and great powers; here great powers 
refer to states with extraterritorial power. The Y-axis represents maritime ideology. For great powers, this 
continuum isthat between paternalism and international liberalism. The figure illustrates how the US and the 
Netherlands have had a rather constant maritime ideology. In contrast, the other European states covered 
here to various degrees have moved towards increased mare liberum principles as the power of the US on the 
international scene increased.  
 
International  institutions 
While theorizing about the international system can be hard, creating a synthesis of the history of the 
international institutions with special bearings on maritime matters during the last centuries is no 
small undertaking either. Indeed, however parsimonious our designs might proclaim to be, the 
complexities in describing, not to say explaining, its trajectory is painstaking.  
 
To generalise however, there certainly are changes as well as some enduring traits in this system, 
and I believe it is feasible to analyse them. An enduring and obvious feature of the international 
system is that power matters, and that hence, the most powerful actors have the capacity to try to 
shape international institutions to suit their own interests as far as it goes. Apart from this trivial 
observation, however, there is no mechanical law that says to what extent the stronger powers will 
do so, or to what degree they will prove successful in their attempts. Moreover, one should avoid the 
fallacy to conclude that the international system only is a restricting set of structures for the weaker 
powers, forcing small states either to isolate or bandwagon (although such efforts have been carried 
out by several states). The history of international maritime institutions is full of insights in this 
important respect.  
Prior to the middle of the 17th century states primarily tried to negotiate in bilateral forums, if they 
indeed did cooperate, but at this stage it was difficult to separate state extraterritorial policies from 
private enterprise. While ocean transportation and fisheries are sectors that always have been 
dominated by private entrepeneurs, the point here is that a state monopoly of violence at sea did not 
exist in the weberian sense. Firstly, the actors of extraterritorial violence were both state institutions 
and private, and at times the demarcation between them were blurred, as in the Companies that 
traded and waged war overseas with the blessings of their monarch, and the privateering vessels that 
preyed on civilian shipping. Moreover, the City league was also a major player of sea power. This 
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has been recognized in scholarship on the Mediterranean area, but fact is that the Hanseatic League 
played a major role in northern Europe as well during the 13th-16th centuries. Secondly, and related 
to the above, the "navies" of the monarchs were less institutionalised than the armies. The difference 
lies perhaps not so much in the lack of uniforms and the peculiar outlook of the arms at sea, as it lies 
in the very semi-official leadership and organisational endavours to build and man sailing naval 
vessels.  
Coupled with the distance between the political leadership and the scattered fleets and single vessels 
that made autonomy a trademark of the navy captain`s profession, this created a very peculiar mix of 
private initiative and state activity in the arm of the state on the seas.  
The result was a state of "super-anarchy" of international maritime affairs until the middle of the 
17th century. Not only were the kingdoms of the north in war with each other repeatedly during this 
era, but city-leagues were powerful actors as well. Then came the not always closely coordinated 
activities of trading companies, naval vessels and privateers that made treaties fragile. In other 
words, a centralized decision-making process in "foreign policy" was no ensurance that national 
actors behaved accordingly. Thus, the verdict of international relations as a self-help system is of 
considerable value in this period.  
But it is not a period where the international system can be exclusively seen as a system of balancing 
states. The very private and loose character of extraterritorial power made it a system where it was 
very hard to predict the intentions of foreign leaders, and where even acute analysis and 
"diplomatic" agreements did not ensure lack of armed clashes between representatives of states and 
companies. Monarchs clearly perceived that their domestic efforts at centralizing power was at odds 
with such a state of affairs, and the first step on the way to gain control of naval force was to get rid 
of the non-state actors capable of waging war at sea. Thus, the Hanseatic League was subdued 
gradually from the 16th century on. It quite simply was an inappropriate actor on the international 
scene, since it made incursions into the economic sovereignty of monarchs (taxation) and had the 
capacity to threaten the attempts at creating a monopoly of violence under the kingdom, and because 
it was increasingly difficult to strike deals with such a network of numerous small subunits as the 
League was.  
The 17th century saw an incremental change in the political control of navies, but only to a 
significant degree after the first Anglo-Duth naval wars in the middle of that century. And again, it 
is important to note that in Britain and particularly in the Dutch Republic, a close cooperation 
between private entrepreneurs and state institutions was the hallmark of raising and maintaining a 
navy. After the establishment of British sea power primacy during the 18th century, the struggle for 
international hegemony to a large degree stood between France and Britain until the end of the 
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Napoleonic wars. Numerous scholars have argued that the international maritime principles 
dominant during the British hegemony was one of the freedom of the seas. This is true only to a 
degree, since the English approach to sea power was to establish "command of the sea", thus 
denying opponents the ability to threaten or interfere with English interests. It is also simply false to 
claim that the largest overseas empire of the world was an empire of freedom, although the slave 
trade certainly became an issue in British politics during the 19th century, and even though Niall 
Ferguson to some degree is right in pointing out that the British Empire was not the worst of empires 
in a historical perspective. But the empire was not particularly liberal. Now, we might argue that 
with a minimalist concept of liberalism, Britain was liberal by contemporary standards. But the latter 
is whiggish history. If we apply the standards of Adam Smith, imperialism is not liberalism and 
never has been. The true hallmark of the international institutions regulating maritime policies 
during the Pax Britannica was marked by the origins of British hegemony, what Armitage (see 
chapters 1 and 2) has dubbed "blue-water Lockeanism". Clearly, such a conception of the relations 
between states and between peoples from the "civilized world" and "the barbarians" was part of 
what made 19th and early 20th century imperialism possible. The British handbook of military 
operations on land for Navy officers during the 19th century does much to indicate the different 
levels of norms that applied in the western world versus the colonies.  
Thus, international maritime affairs in the "short" 19th century from 1815 were very marked by one 
European paternalist power: Britain. On the other hand, the simple metropole-satellite model of 
western exploitation is a simplification at best. While British foreign policy never produced an 
international liberalism based on equality between nations, the Pax Britannica did show some 
genuine traits of securing minimal rights. We have mentioned the increasing British opposition to 
the slave trade, but in addition, the Royal navy became an instrument in suppressing piracy. In this 
field, the British polity that originally had collected huge resources from privateering took the lead 
among several western nations. Even privateering and letters of marque had been restricted to 
wartime by the early 1850s. Through the treaties of 1856, the use of privateering in praxis was 
abolished as a common tactic of major states, and the rights of neutral states in war was codified. 
This was as much a British concession as it was a small but not insignificant victory for the smaller 
sea powers and coastal states with major merchant navies. This change in maritime rules was a 
major international upheaval, in the sense that maritime principles became a resource for the weaker 
power, and further in the sense that the hegemon actually recognised these rights of lesser powers. 
By 1858, 42 of the 46 states that had been "invited to accede to the declaration of Paris had done 
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so".1548 While institutionalising rules in the maritime sector and even monoplizing the use of 
violence at sea in state formation had come late, it had now come for good. In the first major 
interstate war after Paris, the Spanish-American war of 1898, neither of the belligerents applied 
privateering. But alas, European paternalists in geographical proximity to each other produce a 
situation where tension is inevitable.  
The series of decisions and consequences that made 1914-1918 into a World war to a significant 
degree entailed maritime priorities and actions. With Britain entering a war against Germany, the 
entire Empire was affected, and the entire international system. The means of extraterritorial 
violence in an indutrialised age of sea power ultimately also made the US enter the titanic struggle 
over the European problem (i.e. the Lusitania affair as mentioned in the section above). To 
Woodrow Wilson, the chief reason was the threat to the freedom of the seas. Wilson’s protest after 
the sinking of Lusitania, and the Naval Act of 1916, with its explicit goal of a US Navy “second to 
none” was a product of US mare liberum principles! The later arrival of a president of a large-power 
liberal nation during the following "peace negotiations" in Paris, left European diplomats 
bewildered. The famous European portraits of Wilson in Paris make it all too clear that it was an 
exotic meeting, a clash between different principles and perceptions of international affairs in 
general, and maritime rules in particular. For the first time (since the Napoleonic wars, if one is to be 
generous), the US meddled in the internal affairs of "Old Europe", and now by trying to impose US 
principles in an international settlement. Again, true to its principles, the US prioritised mare 
liberum in litteral terms as a chief point of the settlement. Had Wilson succeeded, the international 
institution of maritime policies might have been changed. Instead, the balance of power and power 
politics at sea remained a dominant trend, although the US clearly tried to participate in forging 
international negotiations on arms control at sea. In other words, paternalism continued to prevail in 
European maritime politics, and the US to a large degree remained formally detached from the 
European political scene in the sense that it did not pursue an active foreign policy to stop or modify 
the gathering storm. From 1941 and until the time of writing, the US remained permanently 
involved in the European problem, and increasingly in other corners on the Eurasian continent. The 
US involvement in Europe during WWII (that ironically started in earnest with the US occupation of 
Iceland), the Pacific war (as David Kennedy has remarked, "the penultimate chapter in the history of 
Western colonialism in Asia that had lasted since the fifteenth century"1549) and the battle of the 
Atlantic were decisive factors in the outcome of WWII and the entire international system for the 
next 50 years. To a very considerable extent, this extraterritorial campaign also changed US foreign 
                                                 
1548 Thomson, 1994: 75. See Thomson, ibid: 75-78 for a further assessment 
1549 David Kenendy, 1999: 853 
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policy permanently, in the sense that the US would be involved in managing the balance of power. It 
did so, however, based on characteristically US liberal creeds coupled with the belief in 
management that was a trait in many US politicians who had engineered the New Deal. Many have 
dubbed the world order from 1945 onwards as one of US imperialism, and it is also true of course, 
that US foreign policy served US interests, that the building of overseas bases and naval stations, 
airfields and intelligence facilities would not have taken place without concrete national interests. 
But if it were an empire, it was first and foremost an empire of invitation and integration if we see it 
in a comparative perspective. We have evaluated the postwar order through a maritime perspective, 
and we should therefore be cautious in evaluating all aspects of the entire postwar institutional 
matrix. But some general characteristics of the international maritime institutions seem evident 
based on chapter 5. 
¾ A truly distinct feature of the postwar maritime order has been the simultaneous existences 
of a very inegalitarian distribution of power AND a very egalitarian distribution of de jure 
maritime rights among coastal states. As we saw in chapter 5, the US was by far the 
strongest naval power during the cold war, and is practically without competition in this 
respect today. This does have a parallel in the case of Britain in the middle of the 19th 
century, but never before has such primacy at the level of military power existed in tandem 
with a very broad international maritime law that granted all coastal states a large scope of 
jurisdiction over oceans as is the case since 1977. This development was a gradual process 
from the settlement in the dispute between UK and Norway in 1951 by the International 
Court, until the conclusion of the UNCLOS III negotiations in 1982. That small states 
successfully could use, and in fact develop by unilateral means, the existing body of 
international law, and that major powers accepted this, was a novel facet of the international 
maritime order. 
 
¾ While many scholars have asserted that economic interdependence, transnational companies 
and technological developments have given governments less scope of action during the last 
50 years, we have seen in chapter 6 that even politically weak states have gained increased 
leverage over maritime resources adjacent to its shores. Moreover, this increase in national 
sovereignty goes far beyond the territorial seas, and now covers a 200 nautical mile 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. Even more striking is the fact that such 
claims to national jurisdiction could be extended to cover ocean masses and seabeds around 
even the smallest islands. In sum, this has meant a territorialisation of the seas, and this has 
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occurred despite the fact that the US has been a mare liberum-inclined hegemon during the 
same era. When one considers the postwar era with the periods covered in chapters 3 and 4, 
this shows that the maritime dimensions of international politics have changed in a 
qualitative manner during the last 55 years.  
 
¾ While the territorialisation of the seas seems to vindicate a victory of the mare clausum 
doctrine as heralded by John Selden some 400 years ago, it does not change the fundamental 
dilemmas of managing the great commons the oceans are. In order for the world economy to 
function smoothly as viewed from the more prosperous states, mare liberum must still apply 
to the international waters, and the right to free and innocent passages through territorial 
waters remains a cornerstone in securing that ocean transportation (ca. 80% of world 
transportation of goods) is not hampered. Simultaneously, managing organic resources and 
controlling pollution is not secured through territorialisation alone. In this respect, maritime 
issues remain fundamentally international in nature.  
 
Beyond these general trends with significant implications for world politics, there also lies a whole 
set of normative and prescriptive questions that remain to be settled in the current maritime world 
order. Some of these indeed seem to be of grave importance for the modern state. International 
waters remain an open commons, and the most formidable one on the globe. Likewise, in weak or 
"failed" states that do not have the capacity to monitor their EEZs or even territorial waters, the de 
facto distinction between the open sea and the jurisdiction zone of the coastal state is not always 
obvious. Taken together, these two facets of ocean politics merge into a central question of authority 
in maritime politics that appears solvable on paper, but much more difficult in practise. The shipping 
of refugees, often under the most appalling of conditions, across oceans have become a challenge in 
the sense that many of the refugees either die, are immediately returned to where they came from or 
camps for refugees, or simply disappear to live without citizenship abroad. In international waters, 
disputes between states often appear as to who are responsible for returning the refugees or 
otherwise taking care of them: is it the nearest coastal state with sufficient port facilities, the flag 
state of the vessel that finds the refugee boats, or is it the state from where these refugees originally 
departed? Moreover, the rise in piracy and the possibility of terrorist attacks at sea directed against 
civilian shipping, cruisers and off-shore installations poses a "new" challenge in the era of the 
modern nation-state. Not new in a litteral sense, but novel in that state navies are not equipped to 
deal with such challenges, but are rather organized and equipped to fight other state navies. The 
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present threat, if we are to take politicians during G.W. Bush administrations I and II and NATO 
communiqués seriously, corresponds to what some military theoreticians have labelled 4th 
generation warfare. After the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, some international cooperation 
arose to face these risks, but with present plans for naval force structures, one is obliged to question 
whether the hardware fits the maritime challenges. Moreover, it is clear that the "terrorists-in-being" 
will impose huge costs to the prosperous societies if the maritime sectors are to be protected 
adequately. For the world economy and for the western nations in particular, increasing the 
transaction costs involving maritime transportation and energy supply might prove costly indeed. 
Is it possible to see a discernable pattern in the development of international maritime institutions? 
We have claimed so far that the ideologic principles upheld by the states that at one time or the other 
were hegemons, have been rather stable. Simultaneously, the degree to which these hegemons 
managed to mould the international institutions can be seen as levels of institutionalizing the 
hegemony itself. Clearly, the evidence presented in this thesis indicates that this ability has increased 
over time, although it never has been perfect, or even reached a desirable level in the eyes of the 
hegemon. If we combine these variables, a general model is created where a central variable of 
hegemony on the internatonal level is illuminated, as in figure 6.1.2. 
Figure 6.1.2: institutionalization and ideological content of international hegemons 
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How did this pattern matter?  
 
We will return to the theoretical conclusion in the next section, but it is evident that in addition to 
promoting the interests and preferences of the hegemon, also smaller coastal states managed to gain 
increased national jurisdiction at sea. The main change during the post war era was the combination 
of institutionalized international liberalism, and the simultaneous territorialization of the seas, that in 
sum was a benefit to the coastal states. We can get a crude portrait of this through figure 6.1.3, 
where the present outcome of the territorialization of the seas in the Northeast Atlantic is shown on 
the map.1550 (The “banana hole” and the “loop hole”, are the international waters that remain in this 
area. The zones surrounding Svalbard and Jan Mayen are regulated by Norway. The “grey zone” in 
the Barents Sea is a contested area subject of negotiations between USSR, later Russia, and Norway 
(see inserted map and text in the figure). The demarcation of this zone is being negotiated at the time 
of writing (December 2005)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1550 Illustration taken from http://www.sikkerhetspolitikk.no/kart/hav/3.htm 
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Figure 6.1.3: Oceans under national jurisdiction, The Northeast Atlantic 2003 
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6.2 Theoretical conclusions 
This thesis has been an empirical analysis facilitated by insights from historical institutionalism, in 
which the trajectory of the particular institution is seen as path-dependent. However, such an 
analysis must study the environment of the particular institution in order to grasp and explain 
changes in institutional behavior and -change. Since the state has been the main institution analyzed 
here, we have sought to embed the analysis of the state in its international environment. Clearly, the 
structures of the international system both constricted and enabled the actions and choices of state 
leadership. Conversely, state actions helped shape the content and form of the international system 
in the sense that it produced and altered the structural quality of subsystems on the international 
arena. Those actions were carried out based on material incentives, but incentives were often 
modified by the culture of security and foreign policy in each state. At times, all questions of state 
strategy were framed by this culture. The sum of material and ideational incentives created a foreign 
policy habitus. This habitus is not ofharacter, but neither is it a mystery or a foggy theoretical 
construct. The foreign policy culture of a state is a product of the historical experience of the state; 
more precisely, the very history of state and nation-building. While our narrative of such processes 
is perhaps straightforward in one sense, modeling such processes in social science is painstakingly 
difficult. Still, theory is - as Einstein once said- what enables us to see what we see. The central 
challenge therefore was to model the state as a unit in the international system, the system as a 
product of the states, and to construct a typology that allows us to analyse the degree to which 
particular idiosyncrasies of individual states helped shape the content of the international system. 
 
States 
In chapter 1, we asked three questions with bearing both to empirical and theoretical questions on 
the state level. We need to sum up the theoretical contribution based on both our theoretical as well 
as ideographic discussions through the thesis. Rather than recapturing the comments from 6.1, I will 
proceed by stressing the theoretical implications at the state level. The initial questions on states 
were as follows: 
• To what degree did was preparation for, and execution of, war at sea a peculiar praxis of 
foreign policy (1)? 
• In what ways were the states analysed here different actors in international maritime politics 
beyond varying material capabilities? Were these differences of such magnitude that they 
produced different foreign policy habitus or dispositions to act (2)? 
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• Thirdly, and most importantly, to what degree was the ideological and naval power of states 
connected? Did policychanges at the state level change relations among states in the 
maritime dimension of foreign policy, and if such alterations took place, did they constitute a 
change of the international state system? (3)  
 
 
(1) In a substantial way, the eminent theory of Tilly lacks a more dynamic concept of "war". If we 
are to be pedantic, war in traditional terms is large scale violence between states, so war as such did 
not exist until the states were created in a way that made them capable of waging war. However, 
across the time dimension, war remains a static concept in Tilly. This does not necessarily weaken 
his typology of states according to the capital-coercion categories of European states, but it rather 
leaves some very important facets of state formation and war unaddressed. It is in fact striking to 
note that the states that in different epochs in western European history most successfully combined 
capital with coercion were sea powers. The Dutch republic and England seem to be prime examples 
of this, while the Republic became too weak on the coercive dimension. But what "made" the 
English state was not warmaking as such. Rather, it was the very peculiar mixture of private and 
royal extraterritorial violence at sea and overseas territories. Praying on the ocean transports of 
Spain and France was not war in a strict sense, but this piracy sanctioned by the Crown formed the 
material basis of the English state and the later British Empire. Moreover, even after the middle of 
the 17th century, the use of sea power was much less "militarized" than the army organisations of 
Europe, much more dependent upon private entrepeneurship and much more profitable for the state 
that had the society strong enough to dispatch fleets and privateers. Indeed, the bias is not unique for 
Tilly; sociologists and macro historians alike have been prone to leave the question of extraterritorial 
power out of the equation. Commenting upon a major comparative history on Britain and Germany, 
historian N. Rodger recently noted that “None of the distinguished contributors to the book seem to 
be aware that Britain`s contribution to warfare, and warfare`s contribution to British history, were 
rather unlike those of Prussia”.1551 One could have wished that Tilly had devoted far more energy to 
the role of sea power, since it demanded fewer personnel to exercise a huge impact upon state 
revenues and the state system of Europe. Consider, for example, how the protection costs of a single 
state would rise due to the successful raids on one single valuable shipment carried out by one single 
enemy naval vessel. In addition, the lasting impact of sea power was that successful sea powers were 
much more prone to follow a geopolitical perspective on foreign policy based on high overseas 
                                                 
1551 Rodger, 2004: XIII 
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interests than smaller coastal states. While we should not critisize Tilly for the theory he did not set 
out to produce, it seems to me that his and Skocpol`s notion of the way international relations 
influences state formation is too reductionist. There was much more to the international system than 
"war", especially so in the 19th and 20th centuries, while I for one is not ready to dismiss the role of 
warfare. Furthermore, while the capital-coercion typology is an excellent basis for mapping a 
materialist history of Europe, it is far poorer in seeing the very substantial way ideology influenced 
state formation and -consolidation. Thus, very diverse societies are placed into the same analytical 
categories in Tilly`s scheme. Simultaneously, some national similarities are downplayed, since the 
typology is narrow. This is a classic problem of typologies in CP, but the major fault here is that the 
materialist factors dominate the entire model. The analysis in this thesis has demonstrated that naval 
policies were embedded in an ideologically coloured foreign policy. Mare clausum principles gave 
different incentives and justifications for extraterritorial policies than did mare liberum.  
 
(2) Concerning the second question, of spatial variations of foreign policy due to different                
national trajectories, the answer is affirmative. Britain, and for long periods the US, display                        
a very pronounced tendency of continuity in foreign policy, a continuity that is not entirely  
based on eternal interests, but also on an enduring national identity. Britain has remained true to the 
sea power axiom ever after Trafalgar. While the US has swung between isolationism and 
interventionism in the popular description, it has been an active player continually since 1941, and 
with an outlook that owes much to the myth of the fight against the evil European imperialists, the 
heritage of the Founding Fathers and the haven of freedom from sea to shining sea.  
That being said, we must not ignore the lessons to be found in the states that played lesser roles on 
the international scene in the post-war era. These show interesting cases of punctuated equilibria: of 
rather pronounced changes in foreign policy habitus due to international changes. But while the 
stronger sea powers demonstrated that domestic politics can determine foreign policy, and in the 
case of hegemons shape world politics, we must admit that the weaker states covered here are 
examples of the opposite, at least to a large degree. By and large, losses in war and international 
power politics where national boundaries were drawn anew were external factors that shaped the 
policies of the Scandinavian states and Germany. But there is more to the story than that, since the 
cases of Germany, Denmark and Sweden are all examples of states that turned from paternalism to 
either bandwagoning or neutralism in the form of assuming more peripheral roles in international 
politics. Thus, the first step in a conclusion is to state that domestic and international politics indeed 
were entwined in all the cases covered here. Next, it is not so difficult to see how the state formation 
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processes of England and the US influenced their foreign policy; to a very essential degree, the 
nationbuilding created a national identity that helped statesmen perceive national interests in a 
particular way. The problem with "national identity" is that it is such an elusive concept. This is the 
main reason why we on theoretical grounds have chosen to speak of foreign policy habitus in this 
thesis, and we have demonstrated that a typology of ideology coupled to national interests served to 
shape a predisposition in foreign policy decisionmaking on maritime issues.  The real challenge is to 
see how this fits into a truly nomothetic theory. In this respect, this thesis holds no definite answer in 
the form of a "new theory" of CP or IR. However, it is pretty clear that there are important findings 
here that support a particular branch of theories of state- and nationbuilding. The dialectic process 
between domestic and international politics and between ideology and interests lends clear support 
to a path-dependency model, and more precisesly to the concept of punctuated equilibria (see 
chapter 1). It is evident from the present exercise that the national ideology on maritime issues 
combined with national interests produced a high degree of continuity that has been broken only by 
major upheavals. Predominantly, losing a war means adaptation to new realities, and adjustment of 
national identity as well. But there was more to the international system that influenced foreign 
policy formation in maritime matters. It seems that the nature of hegemony, and particularly the 
dominant ideological trait of the hegemon, mattered to the system and its units at large. One should 
note that this is a huge step from both Marxist theories as well as realist theories of the international 
system. What mattered more than mere balance of power and economic strength were quite simply 
some deeply held values in the hegemonic power. It seems then, that the particular results of state- 
and nationbuilding shapes foreign policy, and that the outcome of this process in major powers will 
produce important results for the international system.1552 What then accounted for the variations in 
the domestic trajectories of the major powers covered here? 
One central difference between the Anglosaxon countries and Germany was that the former to a 
substantial degree had the opportunity to create a maritime community over a long span of time. By 
a maritime community I refer to shipbuilding industries, the merchant navy and the naval skills 
required to operate a merchant navy. National maritime policies also developed on an early stage, 
even in the US this came at an earlier stage than in Germany. Central in the formulation of these 
policies was the cooperation between the maritime community and interests in the civil society and 
the state agencies and political institutions that created laws and executed foreign policys. Thus, 
even though the US did not get embroiled in the viles of European power politics until much later, 
military interests were closely coordinated with maritime interest groups in maritime questions. 
                                                 
1552 Note the similarity to Stinchcombe`s (1968) discussion of the relationship between power and institutions. This 
thesis demonstrates the utility of his concepts on institutions, power and path-dependency. 
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History dictated that the policies in the US and Britain were different, to be sure, but the economic 
interests of the maritime companies and interest groups were practically always represented in the 
central discussions on national policies with bearings on the maritime sector. The contrast to 
Germany is clear. Although the old Hanseatic cities did have maritime communities uptill the 
German unification, the distance to the political institutions in Berlin were greater in both political 
and economic terms (and as we saw in chapter 4, even in cultural terms). The result was that the 
German Imperial Navy was built very fast, did not have a longstanding tradition, and came in a 
young state where the parliament seemingly had less control with naval policy than in the 
Anglosaxon societies. The argument I present here has no normative aim, and as we argued in 
chapter 4, the German political institutions simply wanted what Britain already had: a strong navy. 
The point, however, is that the building of this navy was less coordinated with the overall foreign 
policy of Imperial Germany than was the case with naval policies in Britain and the US. In the latter 
states, naval priorities and construction programmes were intensely debated in representative 
institutions, journals and newspapers, especially in Britain. The same can be said of the German 
case, but to a lesser degree, because the young naval service achieved much greater influence on 
naval policies than in the Anglosaxon countries. In other words, the Anglosaxon states seemed more 
firmly embedded in their civil society than was Imperial Germany. At the same time, international 
political and strategic developments also influenced the state. As we have seen, WWI "punctuated" 
German ambitions to become the dominant sea powers, just as defeats in war earlier had made 
Dansih and Swedish predispositions to a paternalist foreign policy unbearable and unrealistic.  
 
(3) To what degree was the ideological and naval power of states connected, or to be more precise; 
did ideology influence where, when and how naval force was used? 
The question raises the issue of primacy yet again, was there a causal relationship between national 
ideology and power, and what direction did such a relation have? 
The latter issue holds no answers in the form of a causal law, since the number of cases oh 
international hegemony is too low. I would rather conclude that naval power was a dual structure of 
ideology and material power, and that different mixtures of these sources of social power in 
combination have produced sea power and extraterritorial power. In this respect, the IEMP model 
developed by Michael Mann is instructive in the sense that it opens up for the complexities of 
empirical variations analysed in this thesis. Some states mixed ideological and military power in a 
way that produced extraterritorial power, but among these states, the outcome varied on the 
continuum between paternalism and international liberalism. Concerning the former question, we 
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have demonstrated that the economic power of the US until the 1890s to a very limited degree was 
applied to seek extraterritorial possessions and domination at sea. Therefore, it is too simplistic to 
argue that economic interests dictated ideology and gave incentives for colonialism and strong 
navies. Even between the two main liberalists, the Dutch republic and the US, there is a not 
inconsiderable difference, since the Duthc did indeed create an empire before the 20th century. 
The variation among the three historic "hegemons" in this thesis is therefore instructive. Criticism 
could be raised against this verdict in the vein that there are clear similarities between the Dutch 
republic, Britain and the US. All three states developed democracy at an early stage, one might 
argue (this is an interesting topic in itself, witness the earlier segregation policies in the US), all 
these states were empires of trade and developed considerable navies, and the conventional view is 
that all were fairly liberal by contemporary standards. And yet, the difference in maritime principles 
between the US and Britain that we have demonstrated in the empirical chapters are so pronounced 
that they produced two different hegemonies, two different world orders. It is true that a world order 
is not shaped by the hegemon alone, but we have also seen that the British Empire and the US after 
1945 indeed were instrumental in creating world orders that were both in their interest and 
compatible with their national ideology. 
Did policychanges at the state level change relations among states in the maritime dimension of 
foreign policy, and if such alterations took place, did they constitute a change of the international 
state system? 
I believe that chapters 3-5 leave us with firm empirical evidence that enable us to answer in the 
affirmative to these questions, although the question of systemic change will remain the most 
elusive and controversial. Again, the manifestations of US liberalism in various forms offer valuable 
insights. The pendulum between isolationism and interventionism produced different crystallizations 
in US foreign policy, and this changed transatlantic relations. Moreover, the different conception of 
liberalism, although not a dramatic change, in the US after the New Deal produced an altered 
approach to the management of US foreign policy and the world order. The case of Imperial 
Germany is instructive as well. Prior to the rise of German "navalism" in the late 1890s, there is 
some truth in the notion of British "splendid isolation" as regards continental affairs. As the result of 
Wilhelmine naval priorities became clear, this changed as well. In turn, the altered British naval 
priorities (Northern waters became much more important) and the world wars changed forever the 
relations between Paternalist European powers and their former colonies. The US did nothing to 
slow down the process of decolonization, although the cold war made the US thread warily in this 
regard in different regions. In Scandinavia, the balance of naval power in the North Sea and the 
Baltic Sea (primarily due to naval priorities in Germany, Russia and Britain) produced alterations in 
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foreign policy and extraterritorial policies in particular. And the changes were of such a scope as to 
influence national identity as well. The result was that the security complex of Scandinavia was 
changed, former paternalist powers like Sweden and Denmark becoming much more peripheral by 
adopting a preference of neutrality and legalism. In the postwar era, the principles and preferences 
of the US mattered for the entire complex of international organizations, including maritime matters, 
and maritime disputes were brought into the new institutions as issues to be solved in a multilateral 
context. No longer should principal cases in the maritime realm be solved by bilateral negotiations 
and determined by naval power alone. Extraterritorial conflicts are cases of international problems 
that were channelled through these mechanisms of discourse and settlement. It was not so much the 
matter if these mechanisms always were very efficient, but that they were there gave a de jure 
equality for all sovereigns. As we demonstrated in chapter 5, this was of outmost importance for the 
weaker coastal states. While the US had the seapower to establish "command of the sea" in many 
waters, it did not see this as the best way to secure interests and principles that served the US. 
Multilateralism was a viable solution to ensure the principles US leaders and opinion held so high, 
and in turn this also gave the US legitimacy. In the maritime sphere, the outcome was one of 
increased national jurisdiction over maritime resources, and in itself, this was a change of a structure 
of the international system. Prior to the UN, NATO, the International Court and the UNCLOS 
conferences, there was no other structure for a small power to turn to than the hegemon or an 
alliance of states if it were to secure some support for a particular national claim. Typically, a 
coastal state with very limited military power and an inclination to - or even a declared policy of - 
neutrality, seldom was in a position to gain such support unless two conditions existed. Firstly that 
the right the coastal state wanted was not disadvantageous for the hegemon. This was seldom the 
case during Pax Britannica. Secondly, the coastal state had to have some value in an important 
economic sector for the hegemon or alliance in which it sought support. This was the case with 
Denmark, Norway and Iceland from 1905 till 1940, when Britain simply no longer had the power to 
manage the northern waters by itself.  
By 1945, the institutional matrix were constructed that would evolve into a structure that also served 
as an enabling structure for weak and small states. As Kissinger (quoted in chapter 5) noted, the cod 
wars between Iceland and Great Britain saild volumes of the changes of international affairs during 
the postwar era.  
Against this, one can naturally point out that the international system is anarchic in the sense that no 
supranational monopoly of violence, taxation and legislation exists. But this anarchy certainly were 
modified until it became more hierarchical than anarchic, this influenced small states according to 
the specific ideological content of the international institutions. 
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Likewise, international relations theory to a large degree has treated the state as given, as a unit 
which preferences are also given, and thus explanation of the logic and structure of international 
systems follow directly. This is a reductionist theory both on the levels of states and systems, since 
the state is seen as analogous to the firm, and the international systemn as analogous to the perfect 
market. In order to achieve an approach with more empirical sensitivity, some scholars in IR 
therefore divided into a rationalist camp, chiefly occupied with game theoretic analysis of foreign 
policy and regional security complexes, and one constructivist occupied with the notion of the 
culture of foreign policy and the ideational facets of what constitutes the state and the international 
system of states. The latter group is closer to historical sociology and studies of political culture in 
the field of comparative politics. In the wake of such cataclysmic events as the end of the cold war, 
constructivist approaches in IR have gained ground. The central challenge, as Robert Keohane has 
argued, for constructivists is to build "testable" hypotheses and theories. While radical 
constructivists will dismiss such a demand, we have attempted to construct a typology of ideal types 
in this thesis. Where Alexander Wendt made the same effort in conceptualizing "cultures of 
anarchy" in the international system, we have argued that the ideology of foreign policy is a central 
theoretical challenge, and that the particular identity of stronger states in turn helped shape the 
international system. Furthermore, the responses of these states to contemporary threats are colured 
by their ideologies. In an age where scholars from Martin van Creveld to Herfried Müller see the 
monopolies of violence as fundamentally challenged, we should then expect the major powers to 
find countermeasures appropriate of their foreign policy habitus, but adjusted to the nature of 
challenges.  
 
The habitus of foreign policy and the International level 
We have constructed a typology of states based on one main ideological factor: mare liberum and 
mare clausum as a continuum of principles, and one material factor; degree of overseas interests. 
The combination of such variables made us a tool to compare national policies, to examine the 
interplay between domestic and international politics and the historical trajectories of polities in an 
international system.  
Now, a series of critique and objections could be raised against such a model. I believe it is 
necessary to address these questions, not in order to immunize the model, but in order to evaluate 
the insight with the highest potential of contributing to nomothetic theory. While the below does not 
amount to a summing up of this contribution, a meta-theoretical assessment is a requisite for 
summing up the theoretical contribution of the present exercise. 
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The main theoretical objections to the theoretical model here might be as follows. 
1. One is that it quite simply is impossible to construct a model of politics where the ideational 
and material interests behind politics are combined, and that we should rather  stick to one 
mode of explanation. In turn, this would produce more elegant models and make us avoid the 
multilevel analysis; 
2. Another objection, and related to the first, is that material interests are more important  than 
ideational ones, conceptualized as ideology in this thesis. Thus, material factors have 
primacy; 
3. The third is that ideational motives at times have been far more important than material ones. 
It follows that ideational factors have primacy; 
4. A fourth objection is that the multilevel model obscures the importance of the international 
level for the domestic one, and vice versa. 
 
These objections can all be addressed in either a purely theoretical set of answers or a purely 
empirical one. Both will require ample space. While I hope that the empirical case has been given 
through chapters 2-5, I will seek to sum up the theoretical case for such an approach beyond that 
given in chapters 1-2, hopefully without having to envoke the canons of philosophy of science as I 
do so. On the other hand, I find it practically impossible to separate the theoretical from the 
empirical one at this point, given the very nature of comparative politics and this thesis, empirical 
validity seems to me to be the crucial test for theory. Still, I believe there are sound theoretical 
refutations of the objections listed above. 
 
1. When one refuses models that are multidimensional in the sense of combining material and 
ideational interests, one is perhaps left with elegant models. Still, it seems to me that the last 50 
years of social scientific work on macro processes to some degree have suffered from elegant 
models that are just too uni-dimensional. More or less, the history of the social sciences in the 20th 
century reflects the schisma between the old German historical school and Marxism. The most 
fundamental cleavage involves the role of ideational reasons for action versus material interests and 
the primacy of materialism versus "culture". In other words, this cleavage is very fundamental for 
social theory at large. However, I cannot but agree with the argument of Giddens that too rigid 
interpretations of material structures as restricting human behaviour often leads to determinist 
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theories. If one excludes one of Weber`s sources of social action entirely, then the researcher`s 
conception of social reality that are being used for analytical purposes also becomes too narrow. As 
I argued in chapters 1 and 2, materialist theories of history can be fascinating and certainly 
enlightening, but I believe fewer and fewer scientists will argue that they are satisfactory. Likewise, 
some postmodern "cultural" theories at times seem too removed from the realities to provide 
adequate understanding of large-scale political phenomena (see below). On an even more 
metatheoretical level, I think few social scientists will refute that game theoretic models of political 
processes are elegant. On the other hand, any serious game-theorist (and here I refer to scholars that 
are true specialists) will argue that there are not some very definite limits as to what game theory can 
explain in political science. At the most general level, the failure of producing analytical models that 
can take into account diversity sooner or later is bound to make political science, and perhaps 
especially IR, the object of even more severe criticism from other disciplines and new analytical 
approaches that by themselves do not necessarily produce progress in empirical social research.  
In this sense, returning to historical institutionalism -a true Weberian programme- might yield new 
empirical insights through efforts at creating truly multidimensional models, because such models 
should have the potential of adding explanatory power to existing theory. Some of the theoreticians 
on whose shoulders I have been standing in this thesis clearly and explicitly recognized this long 
time ago, and subsequently produced outstanding scholarship. They include, but are not restricted to, 
otherwise diverse scholars like Michael Mann, Stein Rokkan, Douglas North, Peter Katzenstein and 
Hedley Bull.  
In this thesis, we have tried to demonstrate that an analytical model where states are seen as 
constituted by ideas as well as very concrete physical reality makes more sense than a uni-
dimensional theory. This has implications for state theory as well as theories of the international 
system and international relations proper. Naturally, this makes the present effort belong to the 
realm of constructivism in IR once one considers the thesis a work of IR. But in social theory at 
large, the theoretical assumptions in the model are not very different from established works in 
comparative politics. Involved in the study of political culture was a turn from the study of formal 
political institutions to more informal ones. It took some time for this approach to gain influence in 
other disciplines, but Douglas North eventually managed to demonstrate how culture in the form of 
informal constraints mattered also in the economic realm. One should not be surprised then, that IR 
scholarship recently has turned its attention to “social constructivism” of a more moderate character. 
The core problem in such attempts is to reconcile, so to speak, material and ideational factors. In this 
thesis, I have argued that there has been a certain dialectical process in states as to what was 
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appropriate action in extraterritorial issues in different epochs. I believe a theory of foreign policy 
and international relations should reflect such a process, since both purely material and purely 
"cultural" theories are bound to become too one-sided.  
 
2. Both "structural" realists and Marxists, I assume, will argue that involving the variables of 
ideology and culture is an unnecessary step. In the Marxist reply, it will be emphasized that culture 
is just "superstructure", or a "result of" material factors. In the study of foreign policy as in this 
thesis then, one could claim that all hegemons preached liberalism because liberalism always best 
served the interests of the hegemon. I believe this is a teleological argument, and an argument with 
limited explanatory power, as chapters 2-5 have demonstrated. 
The arguments from some political realists will be more diverse, and partly more related to objection 
nr 4. On the ontological level, however, scholars of the neo-realist school will claim that material 
interests are far more important than cultural factors in explaining foreign policy, and the interplay 
between domestic politics and international relations. It is not that they will deny the existence of 
ideology in any way, but that whatever variations there are in national ideologies will not produce 
very different foreign policies and international institutions. In this image, states are "like units", not 
functionally differentiated, and the division of labour between them not very well defined. This to a 
large degree is a result of the systemic logic of the international arena; it is anarchic, and remains so, 
states therefore have conformed to a single institutional logic in a self-help system. While structural 
realism certainly has its virtues, this program (as Marxist theories of international relations” is ill 
equipped to explain profound changes in the international system (indeed, some structural realists 
would argue that there are no significant changes in the international system after 1648. The 
problem then is a very restricted scope of the scholarship in question). How come? The fact remains 
that political realism relies too heavily on material variables, often quantitive studies of arms, 
sometimes of industry and economics, summing this up to constitute the balance of power, the only 
true international institution there is. Such modes of large scale analysis nevertheless had little to say 
as to how the cold war ended, and why its outcome turned out to be what it was. One might indeed 
point out that realist scholars in some instances proclaimed the demise of the US even until 1989. 
This failure is an outcome due to the fact that domestic politics, national ideology and international 
institutions matter, and that political realism after the 1960s failed to take these levels of analysis 
seriously. Huge changes take place in the international system due to domestic changes, the 
influence of ideologies that are less and less contained within state borders, and international 
institutions with rules and resources beyond mere power politics. Moreover, the application of 
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realist scholarship to foreign policy only explains parts of state policies. The national habitus, the 
role of tradition and identity, are all left out of the equation. While realist theory can help us lay out 
basic national interests, which is not a bad part of an explanation, realism fails to address the 
particular historic trajectories that have formed the formal as well as informal institutions that shape 
the predisposition to act in certain ways in different states, and realist theory in itself will in fact 
have absolutely nothing to say about non-material aspects of national decisionmaking at all, not to 
mention differences between states in this respect.1553  
 
3. The third objection to the thesis goes in the opposite direction of objection nr. 2, since it will 
claim that we have emphasized material factors too much in this thesis. This criticism will come 
from various positions that are not readily lumped together under one banner. Undoubtedly, various 
stands in the human and social science that lay particular emphasis on discourse theory and the 
formation of collective meaning in post-structural theory and radical constructivism will claim that 
"there is nothing outside the text". In this fashion, the various and voluminious references to 
strategic decisions in this thesis is unnecessary, we have therefore allegedly strayed away from the 
central task of social theory: to deconstruct the discourses that were most central to national identity 
as well as the "construction" of the world polity, largely a social product.  
While I am in no position to decipher what seems to me to be various and diverse stands in radical 
social constructivism, I nevertheless have a gnawing feeling that this line of scholarship also 
ultimately becomes one-sided, and fundamentally so. That social reality is social constructs is true to 
some extent, but this does mean that social constructs are realities, and poses the question whether 
such constructions are not to a considerable degree also results of utility-seeking behaviour and thus 
material factors. For comparative politics, the question remains whether large scale comparisons are 
possible through discourse theory alone, and whether the tools of radical constructivism produce 
more plausible explanations through stronger tools than historical institutionalism as traditionally 
used in comparative politics. 
 
4. The last theoretical objection to this thesis is the hardest one to address, and it certainly cuts 
deep into the very essence of the feasibility of multi-level, large scale comparisons. To put it 
crudely, some IR scholars will claim that introducing the state level makes the analysis of 
                                                 
1553 In the praxis of realist scholars, we often find empirical analyses that indeed include ideational factors, although 
they are not elaborated theoretically. Henry Kissinger (1957) for example, showed an almost heuristic interest in the 
praxis and worldviews of Great Statesmen. 
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international relations less elegant, while some comparative scholars would claim that far too much 
emphasis is put on the international level. Today, it is not exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that 
both these objections are dubious on empirical grounds , and that scholars with empirical sensitivity 
increasingly transcends the borders between IR and CP in macro studies (as we have seen both 
liberalists and moderate constructivists in IR use the domestic level to explain international 
relations, while macro theorists in CP from Stein Rokkan and Immanuel Wallerstein to Theda 
Skocpol and Charles Tilly certainly have operated with concepts of the international system or 
international variables to explain national differences and similarities).  
At a purely theoretical level, however, the objection has its merits. By presenting domestic political 
"development" as one process, by excluding variables exogenous to the state, the analysis becomes 
tidy, neat and causal mechanisms are restricted to the state level. This makes both qualitative and 
quantitative comparative research possible, and it most certainly has given important insights.  
On the other hand, we have seen that celebrated scholars in CP have found limitations in such 
approaches. Their answers have been to introduce the "international system" (Mann, Skocpol), the 
"world-system" (Wallerstein) or a "conceptual map of Europe" (Rokkan, Tilly) to account for 
regional and national differences. Through such efforts, they in my view produced better theories of 
macro phenomena. Moreover, Rokkan, Mann and North each have demonstrated that both material 
structures and cultural variables matter, and that it is not impossible to theorise on the interplay 
between international and domestic variables, whatever underlying structures they gave primacy. 
The two-level metaphor applying game theory to the study of foreign policy ultimately was an 
attempt at producing a formal theory of this interplay. Again, introducing the international systemic 
variables in some form clearly opened up for new explanations of national trajectories. Therefore, I 
will claim that it is a viable approach even in comparative politics. Furthermore, our model 
developed in chapter 2 explained extraterritorial state policy better than a model that would exclude 
the international level of explanation. The assertive but defensive policies of the smaller states in the 
latter half of the 20th century could not be properly understood without due refernce to international 
changes. Likewise, the specific US approach to the freedom of the seas could not possibly be fully 
grasped without taking into account its relationship to the British Empire.  
While the multilevel approach is utterly challenging, it remains an attractive route to a better 
understanding of large-scale social scientific inquiry. Numerous scholars have sought to tackle those 
problems before. In comparative politics, scholars that have applied a research design of what 
Charles Tilly labeled encompassing comparisons is a particularly influential group of scholars when 
one considers the history of macro sociology. Stein Rokkan and Immanuel Wallerstein both were 
pioneers in this kind of large-scale social science, and gave valuable contributions to macro theory. 
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However, relatively few scholars today apply such theories, and later attempts (i.e. Skocpol, 1979, 
Mann, 1993)) have largely relied on highly reductionist notions of the international system, chiefly 
corresponding to neorealism (Tilly) or economic reductionism in the form of neomarxism 
(Wallerstein). Rokkan is an exception; his conceptual map of Europe, while not a fully developed 
Theory, is both geopolitical and geo-cultural.1554 Likewise, International relations theory to a large 
degree has treated the state as given, as a unit which preferences are also given, and that thus does 
not need any further explanation or problematisation in order to explain the logic and structure of 
international systems. This is a reductionist theory both on the levels of states and systems, since the 
state is seen as analogous to the firm, and the system as analogous to the perfect market. In order to 
achieve an approach with more empirical sensitivity, scholars in IR therefore divided into a 
rationalist camp and one constructivist. The latter group is closer to historical sociology and studies 
of political culture in the field of comparative politics. This thesis is therefore an attempt to bring 
sociological macro theory in to study international systems, and simultaneously an attempt to bring 
theories from IR in to comparative, historical sociology. While a daunting task, it yields exciting 
results. Finally, there is the objection from some IR scholars (but certainly this group is shrinking in 
size judged from the last 15 years of IR scholarship) that domestic politics do not matter for 
international affairs to a degree that it makes any introduction of a two-level analysis worthwhile. 
The plausible assumption behind this argument is that if one is to analyse the international system or 
international relations, then one should have a theory of that system, and further that such a theory is 
possible without a theory of states. Indeed, the separation between internal and external (as in 
theories of CP that exclude the international variables) is then seen as a precondition for analyzing 
international affairs. The puzzle involved in this move is that in order to analyse an international 
community that are understood as consisting of states, these scholars ended up with a very crude a 
priori assumption not only of what states are, but how they behave according to the centuries-old 
international anarchy. The result, as scholars Buzan and Little have observed is that "IR theory is 
weaker than it should be because it is largely based on a narrow set of conditions".1555 While there is 
much truth in the belief of an international system with a high degree of continuity, such a theory is 
closed to the most dynamic source for change. In the words of IR scholar Ian Clark;  
"Continuity thus comes from the structure of the international system but change from the 
transformation of the individual units. Paradoxically, theories of international order have suffered 
both from too much concentration on the state and from too little elaboration of its evolving 
                                                 
1554 Interestingly, Immanuel Wallerstein in the recent years of his scholarship (1996-) has devoted considerable 
attention to what he labels the geoculture of the world-system. 
1555 Buzan & Little, 2000: 369 
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nature."1556 In this thesis, we have seen that international institutions were changed in tandem with 
state autonomy, largely depending upon what international institutions the major powers created. Is 
it possible to build a model useful for monothetic social science on the basis of our discussion 
above? I will claim that it is. What follows is not a universal model, since our empirical analysis in 
this thesis has been restricted to extraterritorial policies, and because the investigation has been 
territorially demarcated to the northern hemisphere. Nevertheless, we do have sufficient evidence to 
claim that the processes analysed here have had profound impact upon international institutions, and 
it is beyond dispute that these institutions have had a global influence. Our findings contradict the 
claim that the power of the state has been reduced during the 20th century. Indeed, we have 
demonstrated that the turning away from paternalist to liberalist principles has created a window of 
opportunity for smaller states. This opportunity was utilized by coastal states to increase the scope of 
national jurisdiction in a very concrete manner. We can illustrate this in a simple model as in figure 
6.2. 
Figure 6.2: Nature of hegemony and state autonomy in maritime politics for the majority of coastal 
states 
                                                              
                       Low                                                                                    High 
 
   Liberalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Paternalism 
 
 
                                                 
1556 Clark, 1989: 212 
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Figure 6.2 illustrates a central finding in this thesis. There was no automatic shift from Pax 
Britannica to a US hegemony. The logic of the international institutions was changed due to the 
different principles that constituted US foreign policy. In turn, this set in motion a development 
where the majority of states gained increased autonomy. Naturally there were exceptions to this, 
since the Cold War set limits to the implementation of US principles, and since breaches with US 
principles in territories like Vietnam ensured US interventions whenever opportunity permitted such 
interventions. But on the whole, and particularly in maritime affairs, the dominant trend is one of 
increased state autonomy also for weaker states. One hypothesis that can be drawn from this, is that 
the absence of a major challenger to the US after the Cold War will increase this tendency. The 
dominant macro trend in the history of the polities covered here is increased convergence towards 
liberalism and formal equality between states. In figure 6.1.1, this convergence is easily visible. 
 
Implications for the large-scale study of politics 
A major proposition that has been strengthened in this thesis is that IR theory must build analytical 
models of international affairs that take the nature and identity of state into account. This is an 
affirmation of views voiced by several scholars for a long time, notably Ian Clark (1989). This thesis 
demonstrates that the most influential states shape international interaction, and that this shaping in 
turn can alter the foreign policy of separate states significantly. Furthermore, this thesis has shown 
that international relations have changed in the sense that different international institutions mediate 
international interaction, and that these institutions in turn are the results of the principles and 
preferences of single states. Thus, the empirical material presented here strengthens the conclusion 
drawn by Buzan and Little that "The really big changes that define transformations of era are 
caused by changes in the nature of the dominant units whose actions largely define the international 
system".1557 Furthermore, I have argued that the changes in the international system due to the 
specific hierarchy of states are dependent upon the principles and preferences of the states highest in 
this hierarchy. That both ideology and material interests matter, is demonstrated in the field of 
extraterritorial policy. Beyond this, it is difficult to generalize. 
However, a major argument at a general level from this thesis is that comparative, historical analysis 
seems to be as important as ever for the social sciences.  
First, at the state level, the verdict that "historical depth is also necessary for the study of states 
because of another feature that they share with many of the societal structures with which they are 
                                                 
1557 Little and Buzan, 2000: 374-375 
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intertwined" is certainly confirmed here.1558 And yet, I believe that the thesis shows the degree to 
which states can change quite significantly as entities. While we find traits of continuity to be sure, 
it is striking to see how Germany, the Netherlands and all the Scandinavian states experienced 
defeats in war that seemed to produce an alteration of foreign policy habitus. We have demonstrated 
the content and consequences of these changes, but we have not addressed fully the mechanisms 
within these states that in more detail can analyze such changes. This requires further research, as 
the saying goes. What we have observed, is a close connection between international competition 
and the ideology of foreign policy. Imperial Germany perceived sea power as a requirement for 
survival in the international system, and pursued a navalist and imperialist overseas policy from the 
mid 1890s. The loss in WWI made Germany subdue the naval arm to the other services, while the 
Second World War made Germany a bandwagoning state. Likewise, the Dutch polity turned from an 
international liberalist to a liberal, bandwagoning state after the Napoleonic wars. Sweden and 
Denmark, once among the dominant sea powers in Europe with huge overseas possessions, both 
became peripheral after the 19th century, Sweden becoming a neutral, sovereignty-seeking 
periphery, Denmark more of a hybrid of sovereignty seeking periphery (prior to WWII) and 
bandwagoning state (after WWII). The US has been remarkably persistent in its liberalism, although 
the pendulum between isolationism and activism has swung in the latter direction. Typically, the 
periods 1895-1905, 1916-1919, 1941-1945 and 2001-2005 have been marked of an activist foreign 
policy with US forces waging war overseas, but each time justified on both universalistic and 
American values (indeed, it seems that Americans often see American values as universal).  
 
Secondly, for theories of the international system, the implication of this exercise may seem less 
optimistic. We have, I believe, seen the limitations of neorealism and liberal institutionalism in this 
thesis. At least, when one studies extraterritorial state policies, international interaction seems far 
less patterned than these theories suggest. When one adds that non-state actors were very important 
until the 19th century, and that 4th generation warfare theorists have a point when they see non-state 
actors as ever more important at the time of writing, theorizing about the world-system or 
international system seems even more dubious and daunting a task. And yet, there is no bigger 
fallacy than proclaiming IR theory as dead because of this. On the contrary, classical realism or 
classical liberalism combined with moderate constructivism should provide the scholar with 
concepts and causal as well as constitutive theories for the study of international affairs. Moreover, 
all three should be studied by comparative scholars in macro sociology, CP and history that seek to 
                                                 
1558 Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985: 348 
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explain large scale changes. The reason for this relevance is that in the real world, there is a very 
substantial interplay between domestic politics and international interaction. The dividing line 
between the state and its surroundings at times has been blurred, as a thesis on extraterritorial 
policies demonstrates. It seems to me that the dominating trend in Western Europe at the time of 
writing is that the interplay between "domestic" and "foreign" policy is becoming even more 
intimate. In the European states covered here, even in Iceland and Norway which are not EU 
members, EU jurisdiction to a very substantial degree is national jurisdiction. In the US, for all its 
intentions of curbing terrorism, a too isolationist and nationalist policy is difficult in the light of 
economic interdependence. In the latter state, society has a distinct set of values -a cultural code- 
that is uniquely American. We have seen that the national ideology of US politics has helped shape 
US foreign policy, and it is very likely to do so in the following years. In the case of Western 
Europe, the corresponding issue of identity is not settled in any way; "Europe has been created: now 
we must create the Europeans".1559 While EU states will perhaps have many common interests 
beyond economic policy in the years to come, the identity necessary for a more common foreign 
policy will not be easily forged. Once a political debate arises in western Europe over sovereignty of 
maritime resources, one can easily predict that the debates will be very intense, not only due to the 
fact that maritime resources are of highest concern for most of these countries, but because national 
ideology will be involved as well (in effect, the resistance against the EU reforms in 2005 are apt 
illustrations of the limitations that undoubtedly exist as to European integration)..  
In this thesis, we have argued that it was impossible to explain national preferences and principles in 
maritime policy without due reference to the international system, primarily but not exclusively 
consisting of states. At the same time, we have made clear that an account of international 
institutions without due reference to domestic policies will remain a sterile exercise. Therefore, we 
sought to construct a model of how domestic politics produced different extraterritorial policies. The 
model and the following empirical account have been structural to an extreme extent. And yet, the 
model also was an attempt to show that ideational motives for action modify material interests. In 
essence, as domestic politics is nearly inseparable from foreign policy, so is ideational incentives (or 
dispositions to act, habitus and mental "maps" of decision makers) inseparable from material 
interests. Both ideational and material factors constitute “the national interest”.  
 
 
                                                 
1559 See Shore, 2000 
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX I-quantitative estimate navies of the major powers  
 
(a) Major European powers 1650-1815 
 
 Ships of the line                                                            Cruisers 
 
Year England Netherlands Denmark England Netherlands Denmark 
1650 46 18 21 26 41 20 
1655 82 67 19 51 34 9 
1660 76 64 14 55 33 2 
1665 90 79 22 53 36 6 
1670 69 95 27 35 34 10 
1675 73 80 24 37 30 10 
1680 95 62 33 201560 23 11 
1685 98 72 33 20 23 11 
1690 83 52 27 26 21 11 
1695 112 72 27 46 42 10 
1700 127 83 32 49 29 10 
1705 122 79 36 66 28 11 
1710 123 86 39 57 33 13 
1715 119 71 36 63 24 15 
1720 102 56 24 52 18 16 
1725 106 44 25 46 20 13 
1730 105 38 25 45 18 9 
1735 107 42 28 43 25 9 
1740 101 35 26 43 24 7 
1745 104 33 28 67 27 8 
1750 115 34 30 79 20 12 
1755 117 29 28 74 25 9 
1760 135 28 30 115 29 12 
1765 139 30 31 91 29 12 
1770 126 31 31 76 44 14 
1775 117 26 33 82 38 15 
1780 117 26 34 111 40 16 
1785 137 47 32 133 38 18 
1790 145 48 32 131 36 16 
1795 123 28 30 160 30 13 
1800 127 16 28 158 6 9 
1805 136 15 20 160 1 11 
1810 152 13 2 183 7 0 
1815 126 19 2 151 14 3 
 
Data from Glete, 1993 volume II:522-675 
 
 
                                                 
1560 This fall is due to the fact that some ships of the Royal Navy over 100 tons were too small for the new Sxth Rte. 
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(b) Modelski and Thompsons “distribution of global power 
battleships1561-selected years 
 
 
year Great Britain France The USA Germany 
1816 130 79 2 0 
1826 96 41 4 0 
1836 79 23 5 0 
1846 72 23 6 0 
1856 77 38 6 0 
 
 
c) Modelski and Thompsons “distribution of global power pre-
Dreadnoughts-selected years1562 
 
year Gr.Brit. Germany USA 
1880   7   0   0 
1890 22   0   0 
1900 22   5   8 
1910 32 17 20 
 
 
d) Modelski and Thompsons “distribution of global power Dreadnoughts-
selected years1563 
 
year GrBr Germany The USA 
1920 39 0 18 
1930 20 0 15 
1940 15 5 15 
1945 14 0 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1561 Taken from Modelski & Thompson, 1988: table 3.4, 4.1, they here (ibid: 66) define a global power battleship 
after 1691 as a ship-of-the-line with more than 50 guns. Needless to say, this creates a somewhat crude estimate, and 
the definitions of the pre-dreadnoughts and dreadnoughts of the later age (see c) and d)) are also somewhat 
inaccurate in that other types of vessels are not included. However, as the authors also point out, such estimates are 
bound to be simplifications due to the existence of various designs of naval ships.  
1562 Excerpt from Modelski & Thompson, 1988: 76, table 4.2 
1563 Excerpt from Modelski & Thompson, 1988: 78, table 4.3 
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APPENDIX II: REGISTERED MERCHANT SHIPS IN 1000 TONS 
 
 
 
Year Norway Sweden UK Denmark Germany Netherlands USA 
1800     121      88   1699 No data No data No data     972 
1815     148    117   2477 No data No data no data   1365 
1850     284    204   3565      91    500    334   3536 
1880   1519    543   6575    250  1104    328   3578 
1914   1775    901 12466    562  3320    767   6861 
1925   1661    993 11984  1117  1975  2127 16111 
1950   5681  1493 10738  1386    770  2958 28409 
1969 18846  4750 13574  3486  7476  4089 19550 
 
 
 
Data gathered from Mitchell (1982)  and (1993) tables under chapter G “Transportation” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX III: Landings of fish in 1000 metric tons in European states 20th 
Century1564 
 
Year Denmark Germany1565 Netherlands Norway Sweden UK Iceland The USA
1913     61  217   99   597  105 1224   93 No data 
1924     69  274 108   617    74 1054 254 1116 
1937     88  672 263   904  121 1142 368 1974 
1950   251  553 258 1468  187   989 386 2223 
1960   581  674 315 1543  254   924 610 2242 
1970 1226  613 301 2980  295 1099 734 2230 
1975 1767  442 351 2550  215   980 995 2842 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1564 Data compiled from  Mitchell`s European Historical Statistics 1750-1975, 1980: table D9, p: 354-356, Mitchell 
(1993): table 14, pp 271-273 
1565 1946-1975: Western Germany 
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